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Professor David L. Blank, Co-Chair  
 
My dissertation examines a series of dialogues that the Roman politician and philosopher, 
Marcus Tullius Cicero, wrote in the single year between the death of his daughter in February 45 
BCE and the assassination of Julius Caesar in March 44 BCE. I argue that as a corpus these texts 
explore how human experience affects the perception and conceptualization of time. Each 
chapter addresses a category of experience—solitude, doubt, grief, and failure—with which 
Cicero grapples in his dialogues. Rather than simply reflecting back the troubled circumstances 
of its composition, however, Cicero’s philosophy interrogates these experiences to produce 
distinctive ways of understanding how time creates, shapes, and limits human being. Solitude 
articulates and punctuates the durative structures of human time. Doubt serves as the drive of 
inquiry, which must confront the uncertainty of linear progression in time. Grief reveals the 
 iii 
rupture between a subjective sense of time and the chronology of nature. Finally, failure 
demonstrates how the present is tied to heterogenous and indeterminate futures. Through these 
categories, I identify in Ciceronian philosophy an ethics of the “time of life” (aetas) that is a 
development of, yet distinct from the Hellenistic philosophical “art of the lifetime” (disciplina 
vitae). Building on recent work on Cicero’s place in the history of thought and his skeptical 
methodology, I seek to draw connections not only between Cicero and his Hellenistic 
predecessors, but also with later thinkers from Ralph Waldo Emerson to Gaston Bachelard and 
Emmanuel Levinas. Through this approach, I participate in an ongoing reappraisal of the 
Ciceronian texts of the year 45-44 and seek to locate them within the longue durée of critical 
thought on time and human nature.  
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Introduction 
 
I. A Philosophical Problem 
 
Cicero begins his letter to Publius Nigidius Figulus by expressing regret that he can no 
longer greet his friend in their old familiar manner. Like many things in the early days of Julius 
Caesar’s dictatorship, Cicero laments, “the times have snatched this custom away” 
(consuetudinem…tempus eripuerat).1 While Cicero voices similar regrets in missives to other 
exiled Pompeian partisans,2 what is interesting about this letter is both the particular explanation 
of the loss of consuetudo that it offers, and the particular addressee to whom it is proposed.3 
Certainly, the difference between Nigidius’ position as an exile in Athens and Cicero’s  
marginalized, yet secure status in Rome is due to Caesar’s clementia.4 Yet for all the “comfort” 
that Caesar’s benevolence may have bestowed upon Cicero in contrast to Nigidius, any 
individual action or aim seems at present to be dwarfed by the enormity of an impersonal and 
immensely powerful historical force:  
et in qua urbe modo gratia, auctoritate, gloria floruimus in ea nunc his quidem omnibus 
caremus. obtinemus ipsius Caesaris summam erga nos humanitatem, sed ea plus non 
potest quam vis et mutatio omnium rerum atque temporum. itaque orbus iis rebus 
 
1 Ad Fam. IV.13(225).1, unum enim partem et consuetudinem earum epistularum quibus secundis rebus 
uti solebamus tempus eripuerat. For Cicero’s close relationship with Nigidius, which stretches back at 
least to his consulship, when the latter served as expert witness against Catiline, see Cic. Pro Sulla 42. 
This letter is the only example of their correspondence preserved in the collection, but for an indication of 
their intimacy cf., ad Att. II.2(22), VII.24(148); ad Quint. Frat. I.2(2).  
2 This letter is dated to early fall (September) of 46 BCE; see Shackleton Bailey: ad loc; Marinone 1997: 
ad loc. For common trends in Cicero’s letters to the Pompeians from this period, see esp. Leach 1999. On 
Nigidius, see Rawson 1985: 93-95, 122-124, 162-184; Sedley 2012a; Garcea 2019; and below.  
3 For Cicero’s perspective on Caesar from this period, see esp., the attested series of mutual 
recommendation letters (cf. Pauli 1958): from Caesar just before the civil war, see ad Att. IX.6a(172a); 
IX.16(185).1-2; X.8b(199b); from Cicero during and after the war, Att. VIII.2(152).1; Fam. XIII.16(153). 
4 Cicero can even claim, albeit with a biting irony, that “even under present conditions it has not occurred 
to me to desire anything that Caesar had not thought already to provide for me” (nec mihi quicquam tali 
tempore in mentem venit optare quod non ultro mihi Caesar detulerit, 2). 
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omnibus quibus et natura me et voluntas et consuetudo adsuefecerat cum ceteris, ut 
quidem videor, tum mihi ipse displiceo. natus enim ad agendum semper aliquid dignum 
viro nunc non modo agendi rationem nullam habeo sed ne cogitandi quidem. 
 
And in this city in which I once enjoyed favor, authority, and glory, I am now entirely 
deprived of all these things. I retain Caesar’s greatest courtesy toward myself, but that 
means nothing in the face of the force and transformation of all affairs and times. Thus 
bereft of all the things to which nature, will, and habit had accustomed me, I seem to be 
displeasing not only to others but to myself as well. For, having been born to be always 
acting toward something worthy of a man, I now no longer possess the means to guide 
not only my action, but even my thought.5 
 
Desuetude extends much further than a lost form of epistolary address. The old currencies of 
Republican society and politics—gratia, auctoritas, gloria—fall before the scythe of “the force 
and transformation of all affairs and times” (vis et mutatio omnium rerum atque temporum).6 
Indeed, Caesar’s “greatest courtesy” (summam erga nos humanitatem) can only serve as a flimsy 
and impermanent barrier against the real, brute flux of res atque tempora. In recognition of this 
ineluctable transformation, Cicero confesses to his addressee that he has entirely lost the purpose 
that he had cobbled together for his life out of his natural ability, will to action, and habituation 
(natura…et voluntas et consuetudo). He has become despised to others and is revealed to himself 
to be entirely emasculated and deracinated; he is not only unable to perform the actions “worthy 
of a man” (dignum viro) for which he was born, but cannot any longer conceive of the means 
(rationem nullam) by which he might act—or even think (agendi…ne cogitandi).  
 
5 Ad Fam. IV.13.2-3. Translations throughout are my own, unless otherwise specified.  
6 Cf. the translation of Shackleton Bailey, “the total revolution of affairs and times”; of Williams, 
“violence and revolution in every relation of life and in the times themselves.” For this particularly 
Ciceronian collocation found elsewhere only in philosophical contexts, see, with the variant commutatio, 
de Orat. 3.225, de Rep 1.45; with vicissitudo in the place of vis, see Tusc. Disp. 1.68, 5.24; de Nat. Deor. 
1.52, 1.100 (both of these usages are specifically concerning astronomy). In the letters, Cicero elsewhere 
prefers the more generic and less philosophically loaded, perturbatio rerum, see, e.g., ad Fam. 
IV.4(203).4, V.16(187).3, VI.1(242).1. 
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 We might be inclined to interpret this confession in a cynical light.7 After all, Cicero is 
explaining to Nigidius—“by far and away the most learned and revered of men, once most 
highly favored and certainly my dearest friend” (uni omnium doctissimo et sanctissimo et 
maxima quondam gratia et mihi certe amicissimo, 3)—why he cannot secure for him a pardon 
from Caesar and an allowance to return to Rome. Furthermore, the consequences of Cicero’s 
failure or inability to act on Nigidius’ behalf are dire: he will die within a year, still in exile and 
without regaining the recognition that his more conciliatory counterpart in the Roman 
intelligentsia, Marcus Varro, came to enjoy.8 From this perspective, Cicero’s confession begins 
to appear at best a profession of ennui—or at worst of cowardice. What can be better defense for 
the failure of a specific action than a general plea that action is impossible?  
 This cynical interpretation, however persuasive, sacrifices a philosophical perspective for 
a political one. When Cicero writes to Nigidius about a vis et mutatio omnium rerum atque 
temporum that has profoundly upset his ability to act, let alone think, he is presenting this 
interpretation of the situation not simply to a political ally in need of assistance that he cannot 
provide, but also to a philosopher and religious searcher whose interests, the fragmentary 
 
7 This has often been the perspective of commentators, see e.g., Momigliano 1984: 201, “a rather inept 
and embarrassed letter.” For a more sophisticated reading that retains a political perspective, see Leach 
1999: 162, “In this letter Cicero seems careful not to define his position as one of strength but rather of 
uncertainty stemming from dispossession. On the one hand, while apologizing that one has not already 
died with the bravest, he wants to think that death from a misstep would still be possible. On the other 
hand, there is a kind of symbolic death that comes from marginalization, of putting one’s best skills in 
desuetude within a world where old customs and procedures that employed these skills are themselves 
defunct. Caesar’s associates have chosen to cultivate him and Caesar himself shows affability. As Cicero 
says to Nigidius, however, whatever influence he may in these circumstances wield, it is not that same 
influence he used to possess as merited by the actions of his past career.” 
8 On the relationship between Nigidius and Varro as the two leading intellectual luminaries of 1st century 
BCE Rome, see Aul. Gell. NA 4.9.1-2, 4.16.1, 17.7.5, 19.14.3; cf. Rawson 1985: 93-95. On the 
circumstances of Nigidius’ death we have only references from later sources; see, e.g., Jer. Chron. 156H.  
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remains of his oeuvre attest, tended precisely towards questions of change, destiny, and time.9 In 
the remnants of his grammatical writings, for instance, we find Nigidius proposing an 
etymological difference between perpetuus and sempiternus based on philosophical grounds: “it 
is proper for immortal things to be ‘sempiternal,’ while human things are ‘durable’; for durability 
belongs to our nature, which must endure the accidents of experience, while sempiternity is 
infinite, because it is ‘always’” (sempiternum inmortalium rerum, perpetuum mortalium est; 
perpetuitas enim in nostra natura est, quae perpeti accidentia potest, sempiternitas infinita est, 
eo quod semper, fr. 1 S = GRFF 1).10 In this etymological division, the difference between 
mortal and immortal notions of temporal continuity lies in the “accidents” (accidentia) which 
shape human perception and experience.11 Through human “endurance” (perpeti) of this 
accidental nature comes an understanding of temporal continuity as “durability” (perpetuitas), 
which is counterposed to the truly infinite temporality (sempiternitas from semper) of the 
immortality of the gods.12  
 Nigidius’ apparent philosophical interest in time seems relevant to the way in which 
Cicero writes about their shared political situation. Indeed, following Nigidius’ death in the 
 
9 The scant evidence from the fragmentary corpus is given a lively and colorful depiction in later 
testimonia, see Cicero’s own depiction at Tim. 1-2; cf. Lucan’s incorporation of the figure of Nigidius as 
an astrologer and prophet of destruction, e.g., Bel. Civ. 1.650-51, Extremi multorum tempus in unum / 
Convenere dies.  
10 For a discussion of this fragment in a grammatical context, see Garcea 2019: 94; for the philosophical 
background, see Legrand 1931: 36.  
11 On the “accidental” nature of human time, cf. Epicurus (Ep. ad Herod. 72-73a; Sext. M X.219). See 
below.  
12 This opposition between mortal and divine temporal continuity is framed often in similar terms in 
Cicero’s dialogues, notably in discussions of the possibility of permanent happiness for mortal existence. 
See, e.g., in the Epicurean polemics at de Fin. 2.86-87; Tusc. 5.96; for Cicero’s use of perpetuus in 
contexts pertaining to physical nature, see de Nat. De. 2.127-28 and esp. Tim. 40.  
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summer of 45, Cicero began to write a dialogue which featured his recently deceased friend and 
treated precisely this topic. The dialogue, which was perhaps titled de Universitate, centered 
around the old Academic debate concerning the origin of time—i.e., whether time was created 
along with the universe or whether it is truly infinite and increate.13 In this rarified philosophical 
discussion, Cicero included in the mouth of Nigidius as the “Pythagorean” speaker an extended 
translation from Plato’s Timaeus which deals with the moment of the creation of the universe 
and the problem of time.14 As David Sedley has reconstructed the argument of this dialogue, 
Nigidius put forward the doctrinal and literalist reading of the Timaeus, which contends that the 
universe had an origin in time and thus that time also has a beginning.15 The other speaker in the 
dialogue, identified in the extant prologue as the Greek philosopher Cratippus, would have 
presented the contrary Aristotelian view that time is infinite and without origin.16 Cicero, then, 
would have been left to intervene in the debate between these two positions “in a Carneadean 
fashion” (Carneadeo more et modo, Tim. 1), which would seem in this case to involve 
emphasizing the obscurity of Timaeus’ speech and its relation to the opacity of the natural world 
 
13 On the origins of this debate, see Pl. Tim. 37c-38c; cf. Sedley 2012a: 196-8.  
14 Notably, in this context Cicero uses perpetuitas to distinguish the continuity of the Pancreator’s 
temporal creation from his own true infinity—an emphasis that is lacking in Plato’s version (cf. Cic. Tim. 
40 and Tim. 41b4-6). On this apparent explicit reference to Nigidius’ work in Cicero’s translation, see 
Hoenig 2018: 98.  
15 2012: 196, “in Cicero’s day it was common to read the Timaeus as describing a world which, although 
thanks to divine protection it will never end, did have a literally temporal beginning. Such is the literalist 
interpretation of creation in the Timaeus regularly assumed in Cicero’s dialogues, where it is echoed by 
spokesmen for the Epicureans (ND 1.20), for Philo of Larissa (Luc. 118-19), and for Antiochus (Ac. 1.28) 
as well as by Cicero himself as a New Academic speaker in the Tusculans.” 
16 On Cratippus, see Philod. Ind. Ac. 35.13-18; on the oddity of a native Greek speaker appearing in a 
Ciceronian dialogue, see Sedley 2012a: 194-95; Hoenig 2018: 47-48. 
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from a human perspective.17 The dialogue likely concluded, in a manner familiar from the other 
philosophica of this period, with a call for continued inquiry into the inscrutable relationship 
between the flux of time and human experience. 
 Cicero seems to have left this dialogue unfinished and, instead, incorporated some of its 
components into the theological debate of de Natura Deorum.18 Its exceptional existence as an 
homage to Nigidius and their intellectual relationship, however, provides support for the 
philosophical significance of Cicero’s apologetic letter from the previous fall. At that moment, 
just before beginning work on his new series of philosophical dialogues, we find Cicero failing 
to find satisfactory explanations within the political and social realms for the new configurations 
of res and tempora through which he is living. Indeed, Cicero’s unwillingness to attribute to 
Caesar any real responsibility for the current period of transformation emphasizes this failure. If 
Caesar is not the true cause of the discursive and ideological problems that beleaguer Cicero and 
his political world, where else should he look but to philosophy? When he writes to Nigidius 
about the vis et mutatio omnium rerum atque temporum, he is thus not simply diagnosing a 
political situation, but is more fundamentally articulating a philosophical question of the type 
that, as he stresses in the letter,19 he hopes they will both consider in their mutual retirement from 
public life. 
 
17 On Cicero’s perspective on the obscurity of the Timaeus, see de Fin. 2.15.  
18 See de Nat. De. 2.47 with Sedley 2012a: 191-92.  
19 The letter concludes with an exhortation to Nigidius to consider his place in intellectual history and to 
engage in philosophical speculation as a form of consolation: “think not only of those ideas that you have 
received from other distinguished scholars, but also those which you yourself have brought to light by 
your ingenuity and enthusiasm. If you keep these things in mind, you will hope that everything will turn 
out well and you will bear more wisely whatever may occur, of whatever nature it will be,” (nec ea solum 
memineris quae ab aliis magnis viris accepisti sed illa etiam quae ipse ingenio studioque peperisti. Quae 
si colliges, et sperabis omnia optime et quae accident, qualiacumque erunt, sapienter feres, IV.13.7).  
 7 
 It is thus the central argument of this dissertation that the dialogues that Cicero writes in 
the wake of the letter to Nigidius are aimed at addressing this fundamental philosophical 
problem: the nature of the vis et mutatio omnium rerum atque temporum and, in particular, how 
res and tempora—time and our experience of that time as the stuff of reality—relate to one 
another in light of the force of flux and change. To put it simply, I contend that experience and 
time form two essential pillars of interpretation for Ciceronian philosophy in this period. More 
specifically, I am interested in tracing the influence of this problem on the ethically-focused 
dialogues with which Cicero begins his new cycle of philosophical writing: this project 
commenced with the lost Hortensius in November 46 BCE, was redirected and focalized by the 
death of his daughter, Tullia, in February of 45, and was brought to a sudden conclusion in the 
form with which I am concerned by Caesar’s assassination in March 44.20 Cicero’s choice to 
begin his new philosophical cycle with a strong emphasis on ethical concerns means that in order 
to understand how he investigates the relationship between “time” and “experience,” we should 
begin from the experiential side.  
 In the following chapters, therefore, I consider how Cicero’s experiences of this vis et 
mutatio are treated philosophically in order to open up distinct ways of understanding the human 
 
20 Of course, Cicero wrote “philosophy” both before and after this period; but since my argument is 
concerned with identifying a guiding focus and thematic interest in Cicero’s writings, I adopt this 
periodization as a way of situating his philosophical work in a specific personal, emotional, social, and 
political circumstance. For Cicero’s own view on the periodization of his work, see the retrospective 
catalogue provided at de Div. 2.1-4. Here, he presents the central texts of the period of my interest as the 
Hortensius, the “four books concerning the Academics” (quattor Academicis libris), and the Tusculans. 
This list presents many difficulties, however; for instance, it entirely dismisses the de Finibus, and is 
clearly already looking ahead to the emphases of his coming works (e.g., de Gloria, de Officiis) through 
its reincorporation of the de Republica and the oratorical works of the previous decade into the ethical 
project of 45. Rather than using this catalogue as a definitive demarcation, therefore, I adopt the more 
inclusive chronological approach; for a full chronology of Cicero’s writing from this period, see 
Marinone 1997: 211-52. For a thorough consideration of the catalogue in de Div. 2, see Altman 2016: xi-
xxxi. 
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perception and conceptualization of time. By observing textual resonances and preoccupations in 
the letters that Cicero writes during this period, I identify four categories of experience through 
which to interrogate the philosophical writings: solitude, doubt, grief, and failure. The first 
chapter relates the experience of solitude that Cicero describes following the death of Tullia to 
the different depictions of a bounded and finite lifetime explored in de Finibus bonorum et 
malorum (de Fin.). In the second chapter, I read the Lucullus (Luc.) with an interest in how 
Cicero’s commitment to doubt as the drive of philosophy confronts the unknowability of limits 
in the progression of time. The third chapter considers Cicero’s philosophical use of grief in the 
Tusculan Disputations (Tusc.) as a way of discerning the divergent temporal strata of human life 
revealed by proximity to death. Finally, in the fourth chapter, I work especially from the final 
book of the Tusculans and de Senectute (de Sen.) to examine how the personal and societal 
failures through which Cicero lives affect his theorization of the future. The course of chapters 
thus follows a chronological, but not fully inclusive, path through the ethical dialogues of the 
year 45-4 BCE.21 Guiding this chronological reading is an interest in the experiences with which 
Cicero grapples in these dialogues22 and the insight into human time that philosophical treatment 
of these experiences can divulge. I conclude this introduction by providing précis for the 
arguments of each chapter, but first it is necessary to give a general background of the 
 
21 Most notably, my project in its present form does not address Cicero’s interest in time through the 
theological debates of de Nat. De. This addition will be forthcoming in a future iteration. See Ch. 4, 
section IV for an indication of how I see this text fitting in to my argument.  
22 It should be made clear that, while I engage with Ciceronian biography to make my argument, this 
dissertation is not intended to be a biographical, or even primarily historical, inquiry. When I refer to an 
“experience,” I am inevitably referring to the complex interaction between Cicero’s lived life and its 
textual reflections and refractions.  
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philosophy of time as it influences Cicero’s work and to examine in particular vita and aetas as 
the two key formulations of his understanding of human time.  
II. Time and Eternity in Cicero’s Philosophy 
tempus autem est—id quo nunc utimur, nam ipsum quidem generaliter definire difficile 
est—pars quaedam aeternitatis cum alicuius annui, menstrui, diurni nocturnive spati 
certa significatione.  
 
But time—I speak now only of present usage, for it is very difficult to define in 
general—is a certain part of eternity, with a particular outward appearance in the span of 
years, months, days, or nights. 
 
de Inventione, 1.39 
 
In this section, I consider the influence on Cicero’s dialogues of the central temporal duality in 
Greek metaphysics—time and eternity. Drawing from Sabine Luciani’s monograph Temps et 
Éternité dans l’Oeuvre Philosophique de Cicéron, I survey the Platonic and Stoic notions of 
eternity and discuss Luciani’s application of these categories to Cicero’s writing. I offer 
Luciani’s work, which embraces the general view that Cicero’s dialogues are exercises in 
philosophical “synthesis,” only as a starting point for my own project. As I discuss below, I 
reject the notion that Cicero’s philosophy is aimed at synthesis, and so I do not support Luciani’s 
specific conclusions. Yet her work argues strongly for the importance of time in the Ciceronian 
philosophical corpus. I thus conclude this section by offering a different interpretation of 
Luciani’s central claim—that Cicero transfers the philosophical treatment of time from physics 
to ethics—that will serve as the entry point for my own argument: we must look to the depiction 
and analysis of experience in Cicero’s dialogues in order to understand his ethics of time.  
 We have no indication as to why Cicero failed to finish his de Universitate. If he had 
completed it, however, this fictional debate with Nigidius would have been his only explicit 
treatment of time in the logos to which it generally belonged among the Greek philosophical 
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schools: physics.23 Cicero’s philosophy participates in a general trend toward “ethicization.”24 In 
Cicero’s writings firm distinctions between the three traditional philosophical logoi—physics, 
ethics, and dialectic—are elided by his insistence on the ethical purpose of all philosophy and the 
essential role that personal experience and behavior plays in his interests and arguments.25 
Physics, understood in the Greek mode as inquiry into the natural world, is a particular casualty 
of Cicero’s ethically-focused approach, with his theological texts that follow the dialogues with 
which I am concerned (e.g., de Nat. De. and de Div.) serving to fill this perceived void.26 
Because Greek philosophy had tended to treat time principally as an element of the natural world 
and especially as a facet of metaphysical cosmology or material causation, the function of time in 
Cicero’s ethical philosophy has often gone unnoticed.  
 Yet the importance of Cicero’s writings for the development of an ancient philosophy of 
time is simply and abundantly evident in the definition of time that he provides in his first work 
of rhetorical theory—de Inventione, written when the author was only 22 years old in 84/3 BCE. 
Whether or not Cicero originated the neologism aeternitas,27 his choice of this word not only 
marks the beginning of a lifelong engagement with the Greek philosophical tradition on time and 
 
23 Cf. Sedley 2012a: 195. On Cicero’s treatment of the logoi, which he refers to as the triplex ratio (Ac. 
Lib. 1.19; de Fin. 5.9; Tusc. 5.68), see also Gawlick and Görler 1994; Schofield 2002. On the application 
of tripartite distinctions in Hellenistic philosophy generally, see e.g., Algra et al., eds 1999: xiii-xvi. For 
time treated specifically as a phenomenon of causation in physics, see Hankinson 1999: 497-98.  
24 On this historical trend more generally, see e.g., Foucault 1986; Schmid 1991; Sellars 2003. 
25 See, e.g., de Fin. 1.11, where Cicero’s narrator defends his decision to write, to the exclusion of all 
other topics, about the central ethical question of Hellenistic philosophy—what is the “end” toward which 
all action is aimed. See also below, Ch. 4, section III.  
26 On “philosophical theology” as a form of inquiry in the metaphysical tradition of the Hellenistic 
schools, which aims to “rationalize the irrational,” see Mansfeld 1999: 452-78.  
27 On this question, see esp. Luciani 2006: 9-14.  
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eternity, but also its entrance into common Latin usage.28 By paraphrasing Plato’s Timaeus in his 
definition of tempus as “a certain part of aeternitas,”29 Cicero is flagging the depth of his 
engagement with the post-Platonic metaphysical distinction between αἰών and χρόνος. 
Furthermore, with a telling nod toward the future of his interest in the question of time, he urges 
his audience to understand that this definition is only situationally applicable—“I speak now 
only of present usage, for it is very difficult to define [time] in general” (id quo nunc utimur, nam 
ipsum quidem generaliter definire difficile est).30 By thus translating the philosophical duality of 
time and eternity into Latin, Cicero’s youthful foray into the debate establishes a starting point to 
which he will return again and again throughout his life and to which the entire Latinate 
philosophical tradition owes its articulation of these concepts.  
 The origins and influences of Cicero’s formulation of tempus and aeternitas have 
received significant scholarly treatment in Sabine Luciani’s monograph Temps et Éternité dans 
l’Oeuvre Philosophique de Cicéron. In this study, she argues that Cicero’s dialogues, 
culminating in the Tusculan Disputations, are deeply engaged in the arguments concerning time 
and eternity familiar from Greek philosophy and, especially, seek to formulate an ethics in the 
Platonic-Aristotelian tradition that sees the potential for human life and action to “imitate 
 
28 Note that Nigidius’ sempiternus articulates a similar concept to Cicero’s aeternitas but emphasizes an 
alternate (non-Greek) etymological resonance. Cicero also rejects the more readily available archaic Latin 
cognate aevum and its related abstract noun aevitas, which had been preferred by previous philosophical 
authors (e.g., Lucretius, see below), using these forms only in quotation (Brut. 58; Tusc. 1.28) or in an 
imitation of archaic speech (de Leg. 3.7-9; Hort. fr. 110 G). The success of Cicero’s choice of neologism 
transforms the way that these questions are treated in Latin. For the post-Ciceronian trajectory of 
aeternitas, esp. its incorporation as an aspect of Imperial ideology, see Charlesworth 1936; Étienne 1986; 
Balbuza 2014.  
29 See Pl. Tim. 37d-e, discussed just below.  
30 The context to which he is referring is an exhaustive definition of the aspects that make up the 
“performance of an action” (in gestione negoti, 38) in a forensic investigation, which includes also “place, 
manner, opportunity, and ability” (locus, tempus, modus, occasio, facultas).  
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eternity” (cf. Tusc. 5.70, studium illius aeternitatem imitandi). She contends, furthermore, that 
Cicero’s philosophical innovation lies in treating this relationship between time and eternity 
within a broader discussion of human life—beginning from human perception and experience 
rather than from metaphysical speculation.31 She also proposes that the understanding of eternity 
at work in Cicero’s philosophica is not divorced from its Greek predecessors, but instead can be 
understood as a meeting between Platonic and Stoic theories. She claims that, by synthesizing 
the Platonic theory of metaphysical eternity and the Stoic notion of the eternally material present, 
Cicero’s ethical treatment argues in favor of the immanence of aeternitas in tempus through the 
mediation of the divinely immortal soul.32  
 According to a doctrinal interpretation of Platonic thought, only the forms are eternal. In 
the ontological creation story of the Timaeus,33 the eponymous speaker recounts, “seeing that the 
Model (τὸ παράδειγμα) is an eternal Living Creature (ζῶον ἀΐδιον), the Father (ὁ πατήρ) set 
about making this Universe (τόδε τὸ πᾶν), so far as he could, of like kind. But inasmuch as the 
nature of the Living Creature was eternal (αἰώνιος), it was impossible to attach this quality in its 
 
31  She sees Cicero’s philosophy as a “transference” of the “problem of time” from the cosmological to 
the ethical discourses of philosophy, see, e.g., 2010: 18, “Dès lors, la problématique du temps se trouve 
transférée du plan cosmologique au plan éthique. Il ne s’agit pas tant de s’interroger sur la nature, 
l’origine ou le statut du temps que de mesurer les enjeux humains de la temporalité.” This interpretation is 
based in a tradition that contends that Cicero’s philosophica amount to a “humanization” of philosophy—
that is, Cicero’s project, much like Plato’s Socratic dialogues before him, aims at every point to ground 
philosophical debate in the shared experiences of human life. This tradition begins in modernity with 
Montaigne (see esp. ch. xxxviii of his First Essay, “Of Solitude”) and Montesquieu (see his “Discourse 
on Cicero”) whose interest in Cicero as a model of humanistic philosophical inquiry has been furthered in 
20th century scholarship by, e.g., Kretschmar 1938; Boyancé 1941, 1944, 1967; Görler 1990; Altman 
2016.  
32 I draw from Luciani 2010 throughout the remainder of this section. 
33 As discussed above, Cicero was working on a translation of the Timaeus for his unfinished de 
Universitate between the completion of the Ac. Lib. and before de Nat. De. Fragments survive, on which, 
in addition to Sedley 2012a and Hoenig 2018: 38-101, see Lévy 2003 and Luciani 2010: esp. 214-222. 
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entirety to what is generated (τῷ γεννητῷ); therefore he planned to make a moveable image of 
eternity (εἰκὼ…κινητόν τινα αἰῶνος)…moving according to number (κατ’ ἀριθμὸν), which we 
have named Time (χρόνον).”34 In this allegory of the creation of the world, which serves as a 
touchstone for both ancient and modern debates about the nature of time, Eternity (αἰών) 
preexists and generates Time (χρόνος). The Platonic relationship between Eternity and Time, 
therefore, is one of model to material, idea to realization, being to becoming, motionlessness to 
movement. This theoretical construction is, of course, not without problems—most notably for 
the post-Platonic tradition concerning the nature of the soul.35 In Timaeus’ account, the soul is 
simultaneously model and material; the form of existence and existence itself; possessed of 
eternity, but bound by time in its incarnation. This dual role given to ψυχή by Timaeus is 
symptomatic of the instances of doubling that characterize the opening of his speech in which 
everything—reason, god, heaven—must be created twice, first as model and then as generated 
matter.36  
 Timaeus’ account demonstrates a particular manifestation of this doubling as it relates to 
time. In his narrative, eternity (αἰών) exists in the atemporal being of the forms.37 Yet, after the 
creation of time in the movement “according to number” of “days and nights and months and 
 
34 Tim. 37d-e. Trans. here and throughout for the Timaeus adapted from Bury.  
35 See further below, Ch. 3, section III. For Cicero’s catalogue of ancient philosophical theories 
concerning the nature of the soul see Tusc. 1.18-25.  
36 Of course, it is even more complicated since, according to the Principle of the Triad that Timaeus lays 
out at 31a, “it is not possible that two things alone should be conjoined without a third; for there must be 
some intermediary bond to connect the two.” This principle helps Timaeus to explain the refractive way 
in which the originary “Living Creature” exists as model, generated realization, and all-encompassing 
unity. See also on the “receptacle” as the “third kind,” below, Ch. 2, section V.  
37 This is not an uncontroversial reading of this deeply complex and contested passage. I follow Luciani’s 
account of the Timaeus here (starting esp. at 2010: 199), which is largely based on Degani 1961, Ramelli 
and Konstan 2007, and O’Brien 1995.  
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years, which existed not before the cosmos came into being,”38 eternity persists in a logical 
dilemma: “For we say that ‘is’ or ‘was’ or ‘will be,’ whereas, in truth of speech, ‘is’ alone is the 
appropriate term [for Eternal Being]; ‘was’ and ‘will be,’ on the other hand, are terms properly 
applicable to the becoming which proceeds in time, since both of these are motions; but it 
belongs not to that which is ever changeless in its uniformity to become either older or younger 
through time.”39 As such, “was” and “shall be” properly describe the conditions of becoming, 
whereas “is”—not the present tense, but rather an existential, tenseless presentness—truthfully 
relates the changelessness and uniformity of Eternal Being.40 Platonic eternity, therefore, exists 
as being outside of time, yet simultaneously as a logico-grammatical puncture in the heart of 
becoming; a property of the atemporal model as well as an aspect of tenseless presentness.  
 The Stoics respond to the dilemma that this doubling of eternity poses in their 
theorization of eternity. In Stoic physics, the Platonic relationship between eternal model and the 
material of becoming is replaced by a thoroughly material explanation of the creation and 
destruction of the cosmos by ekpurōsis. The Stoics produce a unitary construction of time, 
which, nevertheless, is composed of antitheses that accommodate aspects of the metaphysical 
duality of Platonic time: as Luciani puts it, for the Stoics, “le temps est à la fois un et multiple, 
 
38 ἡμέρας γὰρ καὶ νύκτας καὶ μῆνας καὶ ἐνιαυτοὺς οὐκ ὄντας πρὶν οὐρανὸν γενέσθαι, 37e.  
39 λέγομεν γὰρ δὴ ὡς ἦν ἔστι τε καὶ ἔσται, τῇ δὲ τὸ ἔστι μόνον κατὰ τὸν ἀληθῆ λόγον προσήκει, τὸ δὲ ἦν 
τό τ᾿ ἔσται περὶ τὴν ἐν χρόνῳ γένεσιν ἰοῦσαν πρέπει λέγεσθαι· κινήσεις γάρ ἐστον, τὸ δὲ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ 
ἔχον ἀκινήτως οὔτε πρεσβύτερον οὔτε νεώτερον προσήκει γίγνεσθαι διὰ χρόνου…, 37e-38a. 
40 On the nature of the “is” in this passage, see esp. Tarán 1979: 45, “In the Timaeus atemporal eternity is 
expressed by the timeless and tenseless ‘is’. It is a mode of being radically different from perpetual 
duration. The model of the universe, the general idea of animal and its four sub classes, is eternal because 
it is atemporal and immutable. By implication all ideas are eternal. Plato’s tenseless ‘is’ (Tim. 37 E 6), 
however, is existential, not copulative.” 
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limité et infini, périodique et cyclique.”41 In the clearest ancient testimony on the subject, 
Stobaeus, quoting Arius Didymus, records that Chrysippus defines time (χρόνος) as an “interval 
of the movement of the cosmos” (τῆς [τοῦ κόσμου] κινήσεως διάστημα). The report continues 
with a passage that seems to refer directly to Timaeus 37d-e: 
Μόνον δ᾽ὑπάρχειν φησὶ τὸν ἐνεστῶτα, τὸν δὲ παρῳχημένον καὶ τὸν μέλλοντα ὑφεστάναι 
μέν, ὑπάρχειν δὲ οὐδαμῶς φησιν,42 ὡς καὶ κατηγορήματα ὑπάρχειν λέγεται μόνα τὰ 
συμβεβηκότα, οἷον τὸ περιπατεῖν ὑπάρχει μοι ὅτε περιπατῶ, ὅτε δὲ κατακέκλιμαι ἢ 
κάθημαι οὐχ ὑπάρχει. 
 
[Chrysippus] argues further that only the present exists; the past and future subsist, but, 
according to him, do not exist at all. Similarly only those predicates which have come to 
be actual are said to be real. For example, walking around exists for me (or: is real in my 
case) while I am walking around, but when I am lying down or sitting, it does not exist.43 
 
Chrysippus realizes in materia the grammatico-logical argument of the Timaeus. While “only the 
present exists (ὑπάρχειν),” this existence is achieved through the subsistence of past and future 
(ὑφεστάναι).44 The present is only arrived at through a limiting process of convergence, whereby 
the overlapping sequence of temporal intervals “having been” and “about to be” shrinks 
infinitely toward the mathematical “Now.”45 Yet, in the same way that predication in language 
describes the truth of an action like “walking” only when the subject is, in fact, walking, the only 
time that has a similar predicative truth-value is this vanishingly infinite duration that we call, 
however imprecisely, the “present.” Thus, the Stoics posit, the only true, i.e., predicative, 
 
41 2010: 236.  
42 Φησιν conj. v. Armin; ms.: εἰσὶν.  
43 See Stob. I.106,5-23 = Long and Sedley 1987: i.304 (51B). 
44 Cf. somewhat more explicitly, the polemical account at Plut. de Comm. Not., 1081F = Long and Sedley 
1987: i.304-5 (51C), citing Chrysippus, “one part of the present time is future and the other past.”  
45 Cf. Sambursky 1956: 151, “The present is thus given by an infinite sequence of nested time intervals 
shrinking towards the mathematical ‘now,’ and it is therefore to be regarded as a duration of only 
indistinctly defined boundaries whose fringes cover the immediate past and future.” 
 16 
temporality is this eternal present.46 Stoic eternity is thus not the divine atemporality of the 
Platonic Demiurge, but rather the omni-temporal infinity of the present.47 
 Luciani understands Cicero’s aeternitas as a synthesis between these two ancient theories 
of eternity—Platonic and Stoic. In her reading, “Cicéron élabore une délicate synthèse entre 
l’éternité cosmique…des stoïciens, d’une part, et l’éternité transcendante et métaphysique posée 
par Platon, d’autre part. Faisant de l’âme un medium entre deux éternités, il explicite 
indirectement la distinction platonicienne entre temps et l’éternité.”48 For Luciani, Cicero’s 
isolation of aeternitas as a distinct articulation allows for him to conceive of a direct connection 
between the atemporal eternity of the Platonic αἰών and the omnitemporal infinity of the Stoics’ 
cosmic present. The Stoic’s infinite present realizes the implications of Plato’s eternity within 
cosmic time—a realization that Cicero can simply refer to as aeternitas. The soul, then, is eternal 
in both senses: immortal because of its connection to the divine atemporality of αἰών, but 
existing in the omnitemporal present of Stoic time. Luciani thus argues that, by embracing the 
 
46 See esp. Goldschmidt 1979: 43, who comments on this passage from Stobaeus, “L’originalité de la 
théorie stoïcienne est d’interpréter ce ‘est’ éternel et immuable dans un sens temporel, et de le concevoir 
comme ‘présent’ pendant toute la durée, si l’on peut dire, de l’acte qui le définit…[D]ans le stoïcisme, la 
temporalisation de ‘éternité’ ou, si l’on préfère, le privilège accordé au présent d’être un temps et de 
concentrer cependant en lui l’achèvement et la perfection que le platonisme avait réservés à l’éternité, 
vont pouvoir s’étendre au passé et à l’avenir. Au lieu de n’être ‘que des changements,’ passé et futur sont 
résorbés dans le présent total de la période cosmique et, en ce sens, on peut dire avec Apollodore, que ‘le 
temps dans son ensemble est présent.’” 
47 In keeping with their materialist metaphysics, the Stoics deny the Platonic immortality of the soul; yet, 
at the same time, they argue—uniquely among ancient philosophical systems—that some souls may 
survive for a limited period after the death of the body. Due to their materiality, as “breath characterized 
by tensile motion,” the souls of the wise attain a strength and consistency through which they persist, not 
retaining their individuality, but elementally “in the region below the moon…like the other stars” (Sext 
Emp. M. 9.73 = SVF II.812, ἔκσκηνοι γοῦν ἡλίου γενόμεναι τὸν ὑπὸ σελήνην οἰκοῦσι τόπον, ἐνθάδε τε 
διὰ τὴν εἰλικρίνειαν τοῦ ἀέρος πλείονα πρὸς διαμονὴν λαμβάνουσι χρόνον, τροφῇ τε χρῶνται οἰκείᾳ τῇ 
ἀπὸ γῆς ἀναθυμιάσει ὡς καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ἄστρα). On the material nature of the Stoic soul, see Long and 
Sedley 1987: i.320-321 on 53G 1-5 cf. 47Q-R. 
48 Luciani 2010: 382.  
 17 
soul’s immortality, Cicero’s thought inscribes an aspect of eternity onto the immediate 
experiences that define a human life: death, grief, emotion, ethical action, duty, virtue, and 
happiness.49 The inscription of the eternity of the soul onto these shared human experiences 
offers a way of thinking—in fact, a “moral pratique”—about how life should be lived as an 
“imitation of eternity” (studium illius aeternitatem imitandi).50 Luciani thus argues that Cicero’s 
philosophy is fundamentally concerned with tracing the consequences of aeternitas for human 
life.  
 Yet I see that Luciani’s analysis opens the way for a further, decidedly less lofty, inquiry 
into Cicero’s dialogues particularly concerning the nature of human temporality. Rather than 
approaching Cicero’s treatment of time from the perspective of aeternitas, I think that his 
philosophical language and interest establishes the grounds for a more thoroughly human 
understanding of time. In Greek philosophical language, a relationship between eternity and 
human time is evident at a semantic level: αἰών, the word with which Timaeus refers to the 
eternity of the forms, means more readily, “a lifetime,” “a generation,” or an “epoch.”51 The 
sense that the word comes to possess in the Timaeus is produced by active philosophical 
 
49 See esp., ibid.: 223, “Il est apparu que Cicéron, tout en adoptant sur l’âme l’hypothèse platonicienne, 
tendait à l’inscrire dans une conception immanente du monde. Cette position l’a conduit à considérer 
l’éternité, en tant que capacité à résister éternellement à la mort, comme un attribut de l’âme.” For my 
perspective on Cicero’s defense of the immortality of the soul, which differs significantly from Luciani’s, 
see also below Ch. 3.  
50 See Tusc. 5.70; cf. Tim. 6 and 34 with Luciani 2010: 387-88. And see below, Ch. 4, section IV for the 
Aristotelian and Platonic influences of this formulation. 
51 This association is not uncontested. See, e.g., Benvéniste 1937 who proposes that the underlying sense 
of αἰών is not durative but pertains to “l’idée de force vitale.” Opposing this hypothesis in favor of the 
durative sense offered here, see Degani 1961 and Festugière 1971. I generally accept the durative sense, 
which I explore in more detail below.  
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argumentation and through its opposition to χρόνος.52 Thus, as I discuss further below, when 
Cicero formulates his translation of the Timaean definition of time using the neologism 
aeternitas, he leaves behind in Latin a lexical remnant: aetas.53 Cicero’s neologism, in fact, 
carefully disentangles the conflation of senses within the Greek αἰών in order to establish a 
clearer opposition between tempus and aeternitas.54 For Luciani, it is precisely this clear 
demarcation that allows Cicero to formulate the synthesis of Stoic and Platonic theories of 
eternity with the divinely human soul at its center: “aeternitas désigne tour à tour un attribut du 
cosmos, un attribut de l’âme humaine et un attribut de l’être.”55  
 Luciani’s project, in part because of its focus on the Tusculans, considers primarily those 
places where Cicero more or less explicitly discusses the relationship between eternity and time. 
If, however, we pursue the premise that Cicero’s philosophy is an “ethicization” or, even more 
strongly, a “humanization” of philosophy, it follows that his philosophical interest in human time 
should enable other readings that are not based exclusively on the development of the duality of 
Greek physics: tempus and aeternitas. Even in Cicero’s youthful configuration of the problem in 
 
52 Elsewhere in classical Greek, it is more common to speak of an αἰών as a period of χρόνος (see, e.g., 
Aeschy. Ag. 554) or even as the child of χρόνος (Eurip. Heracl. 900).  
53 Cf. Varro’s discussion of the etymological roots of aevum where he uses aetas to denote the “duration 
of all the years” as the conceptual link between temporality and eternity properly: LL 6.11, “Aevum 
‘eternity,’ from an aetas ‘period’ of all the years (from this comes aeviternum, which has become 
aeternum ‘eternal’): which the Greeks call an αἰών—Chrysippus says that this is <ἀ>ε<ὶ> ὄν ‘always 
existing’” (Aevum ab aetate omnium annorum [hinc aeviternum, quod factum est aeternum]: quod Graeci 
αἰῶνα, id ait Chrysippus esse [ἀ]ε[ὶ] ὄν). This passage is discussed by Luciani 2006: 11-13.  
54 See Luciani 2006: 13-14, “Il semble donc que l’utilisation d’aeternitas par Cicéron implique une 
aspiration vers l’abstraction et la volonté de distinguer nettement la notion générale de temps de 
l’expérience humaine. Désireux de donner une définition concise du temps humain qui corresponde à 
l’usage courant et soit utilisable par l’orateur, Cicéron le distingue du tempus generale, qu’il désigne par 
le néologisme aeternitas. Mais ce faisant, il établit une identification pour le moins problématique, qui 
renvoie à la question des rapports entre αἰών et χρόνος dans la tradition philosophique.” 
55 2010: 242. See also Luciani 2006.  
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de Inventione, he indicates clearly that if we hope to understand time better, we must look not 
just to its metaphysical relation with aeternitas but also to its “outward appearance in the span of 
years, months, days, or nights” (cum alicuius annui, menstrui, diurni nocturnive spatii certa 
significatione). Rather than embracing the perspective of aeternitas, as Luciani does, I thus 
propose to examine the ways in which Cicero’s philosophica engage more directly with the 
complexities of human temporality, especially as our understanding of time is influenced and 
given character by the experiences of life. 
 In this dissertation, therefore, I offer readings of Cicero’s dialogues that take as their 
starting point Luciani’s proposition that his philosophy is concerned fundamentally with “les 
enjeux humains de la temporalité”56; but, I demonstrate that this philosophical concern can and 
should be used to elucidate other objects of Ciceronian inquiry. The guiding questions of my 
project are thus: what are the common human experiences that possess a privileged relationship 
to the perception and conceptualization of time? Can a certain experience alter the way 
individuals conceive of their temporal existence? How does philosophy, understood broadly as 
series of investigations into being and becoming, intervene in order to clarify or transform 
humanity’s relation to the temporal strata in which it exists? These are the questions that I have 
formulated for myself in reading the dialogues and traditions of their interpretation. But I also 
pose these questions in an attempt to understand how Cicero’s own experiences of the vis et 
mutatio omnium rerum atque temporum came to be reflected and addressed in his philosophy. 
Before surveying the four experiential categories—solitude, doubt, grief, and failure—that will 
structure my engagement with Cicero’s texts, first it is instructive to examine more closely the 
 
56 2010: 18.  
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two primary concepts with which Cicero articulates humanity’s temporal existence: vita and 
aetas.  
III. The Lifetime or the Time of Life? 
 Turning now to consider the conceptual grounds of my own project, in this section, I 
argue that the inquiry into the temporal strata of human being evident in Cicero’s texts takes 
shape not only in relation to the theorization of eternity, but also with regard to the Greek 
tradition of the “life” or “lifetime” (βίος) as a central ethical category. By definitively 
distinguishing aetas from aeternitas, Cicero’s philosophical language opens up a new avenue for 
thought on the unique formation of human time. As I examine throughout the chapters that 
follow, this new line of inquiry frequently considers and problematizes the relationship between 
the qualitative and ethical structure of the vita and the temporal accumulation of the aetas as two 
distinct modes of articulating humanity’s temporal existence.  
 As we have seen, the operative conceptual duality for the Greek metaphysics of time was 
formed by αἰών as an extracosmic, limitless notion of time in opposition to the finite cosmic 
sequence of χρόνος.57 This duality, however, was never static.58 A particular source of 
continuing argument was the apparent inconsistency between the primary sense of αἰών as a 
durative “period of existence,” which possesses a beginning and end, and the philosophical 
attribution to the concept of an ideal and unending “eternity.” Aristotle influentially reconciles 
these different meanings of αἰών by ascribing to the First Mover the qualities of an unending life, 
“since both life and a continuously unending span of existence belong to god: for god is thus” 
 
57 In addition to the clearest statement from classical philosophy at Tim. 37d (discussed above), cf. Parm. 
fr. 8.5; Arist. de Cael. I, 279a; Plot. Enn. III.7.4.  
58 On the long and fractious history of the meanings of αἰών, see also Keizer 2010.  
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(φαμὲν δὴ τὸν θεὸν εἶναι ζῷον ἀΐδιον ἄριστον, ὥστε ζωὴ καὶ αἰὼν συνεχὴς καὶ ἀΐδιος ὑπάρχει τῷ 
θεῷ· τοῦτο γὰρ ὁ θεός, Metaphys. XII.7[1072b]). Aristotle clarifies Platonic metaphysical time 
by affirming αἰών as an eternal “period of existence,” concomitant with the life of the θεός, 
which can more readily be compared with humanity’s impermanent duration in χρόνος.59 
Understood in this way, an αἰών is always conceived of as a durative “timespan,” which can 
either be quantified and subjected to generation and demise, as in the case of human experience, 
or which remains innumerable and without origin or end, as for First Mover. The human “time of 
life” thus attains its characteristic quality through analogy to the divine ideal: the only difference 
is constituted by quantification.  
 This metaphysical tradition was counterpoised by an alternate line of thought, such as 
made evident in Epicureanism, that rejected any ontological or metaphysical status for human 
time as established via the Aristotelian-Platonic concept of αἰών or even through the material 
infinity of the Stoics’ eternal present. In Epicurean physics, the constant movement of atoms 
produces an infinite number of possible worlds—all of them free from any teleological terminus 
or intervention from god.60 As a consequence, time is simply a symptom of the movement or 
actions of bodies, which is made evident through perception and measurement. Epicurus 
 
59 Cf. earlier in the same passage, where Aristotle likens the divine way of life—the activity of immobility 
(ἐνέργεια ἀκινησίας, Eth. Nic. 1154b) in contemplation that affords an eternal pleasure—with “the best 
which we may enjoy only in a short time” (διαγωγὴ δ᾽ἐστὶν οἵα ἡ ἀρίστη μικρὸν χρόνον ἡμῖν. οὕτω γὰρ 
ἀεὶ ἐκεῖνο [ἡμῖν μὲν γὰρ ἀδύνατον], Metaph. 1072b). This metaphysical reconciliation between αἰών and 
χρόνος in the figure of the First Mover is of obvious importance to the history of Platonic and theological 
temporalities: see, e.g., Brown 1959: 96, “Aristotle succeeds in formulating philosophically the notion 
which also underlies the Christian theology of time—that time is relative to Becoming rather than Being, 
and Becoming is relative to imperfection…[H]is notion of activity that is motionless and in eternity 
may…formulate the abstract formal characteristics of perfection.” On the Aristotelian relationship 
between contemplation, pleasure, and the consummation of life, see Ch. 4, section III.i.  
60 For the constant movement of atoms in Epicurean physics, see, e.g., Ep. ad Herod. 43-4, Lucr. 2.80-124; 
Long and Sedley 1987: i.46-52 (11); and for its connection to infinite worlds and a view of world-formation 
that lacks direction or telos, see Ep. ad Herod. 45, Lucr. 2.1052-1104; Long and Sedley 1987:  i.57-65 (13).  
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explicitly denies the need to “search for better descriptions of time” (καὶ οὔτε διαλέκτους ὡς 
βελτίους μεταληπτέον, Ep. ad Herod, 72 = Long and Sedley 1987: i.33-34 [7B]; trans. Geer). 
Instead, he proposes that the nature of time is to be sought exclusively in the conventional means 
by which humans perceive and measure time in “days and nights and their parts, and in the same 
way with changes in our own feelings and with motion and rest, recognizing that the very thing 
that we call time is in its turn a special sort of accident of these accidents” (ὅτι ταῖς ἡμέραις καὶ 
ταῖς νυξὶ συμπλέκομεν, καὶ τοῖς τούτων μέρεσιν, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς ἀπαθείαις, 
καὶ κινήσεσι καὶ στάσεσιν, ἴδιόν τι σύμπτωμα, περὶ ταῦτα πάλιν αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐννοοῦντες, καθ’ ὃ 
χρόνον ὀνομάζομεν, ibid. 73a). According to this Epicurean position, then, time exists solely in 
the human perception of movement and the measurement of changes in the phenomena of real 
bodies that make up worlds.61 For the Epicurean, therefore, it would be illegitimate to assign any 
ontological status to time, certainly from the human perspective, beyond the “accidence” of 
accidents.62  
 When Cicero intervenes in this debate, beginning first with the definition from de 
Inventione and playing out over the course of his lifelong oeuvre, he seems at first, as Luciani 
amply demonstrates, to simplify its core duality. By establishing aeternitas as an independent 
concept, Cicero’s use of this neologism erases the need for Aristotle’s metaphysical 
reconciliation of the senses of αἰών: his semantic incision effectively removes the meaning of “a 
 
61 As we saw above, the idea of χρόνος as the measurement of movement is familiar from both the 
Platonic-Aristotelian and Stoic traditions. But, unlike these traditions, Epicurus does not seek to reconcile 
this cosmic ἀριθμός with a metaphysical substance of eternity (αἰών).  
62 See Long and Sedley 1987: i.37 (on 5b), “Time is a special case..., being discernible not in bodies 
themselves but in certain of bodies’ accidents, typically motion and rest. Paradoxically, it is something self-
evident, yet can only be understood by ‘analogical reasoning’—first drawing directly on experience to collect 
an appropriate set of accidents, then abstracting time as the common measure of them all…Since it depends for 
its existence on the bodies whose motion etc. it measures, it certainly cannot exist per se.”  
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lifespan” from the ideal of eternity. For Cicero, aeternitas describes exclusively the metaphysical 
substance of divine, infinite time without reference to a durative structure or “age.” Likewise, 
tempus refers simply to the sequences of cosmic time, as measured in the “outward appearance 
(significatione) in the span of years, months, days, or nights.” Yet, as a by-product of this 
distinction, which clarifies the relation between aeternitas and tempus, the question arises: what 
to do with the aetas? Through this lexical division, Cicero’s philosophy can approach the time of 
life as a form of temporal existence that is distinct for humanity—a unique accumulation or 
sedimentation of time, yet one that cannot be reduced to simple accidence or enumeration 
because of its particular durative quality, its material effects on our biological nature, and the 
influence of its unknowable quantity on our perception of ourselves and the world.63 Human time 
conceived thus cannot be defined, like the Epicurean notion of time, exclusively through the 
measurement of the behavior of bodies; likewise, as a distinctly durative temporal form, it also 
cannot be transmuted by analogy into the time of divine eternity: instead, the aetas both 
possesses its own ontological status, which, however, can only be described and accessed 
through human experience.64  
 Cicero’s isolation of aetas as an articulation of human time thus enables the creation of a 
new and more explicit duality in relation to the qualitative structure of human life, which in the 
 
63 I discuss the importance of aetas esp. in Ch. 1, section V with respect to de Finibus; Ch. 3, section III 
for the Tusculans; and Ch. 4, sections I, IV-V for Cicero’s thought in general and esp. in de Sen.  
64 It should be stressed that this dissertation is not exclusively about Cicero’s use of the word aetas, nor 
am I always concerned primarily with the relationship between vita and aetas that I outline here. My 
purpose in introducing these concepts is to establish the grounds on which my examination of 
“experience” can be built. The independence of aetas as an available concept for human time in Cicero’s 
philosophical language and thought helps to support my interest in the temporal aspects of the particular 
experiences—solitude, doubt, grief, and failure—on which my chapters are focused.  
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Greek tradition is primarily referred to as βίος, and in Latin as vita.65 Of the many argumentative 
threads that weave through Plato’s Republic, for instance, the primary ethical trajectory begins 
from a question about how to select the best “course for a whole life” (ὅλου βίου διαγωγήν, 
344d), which leads to a complex description of the βίοι that would populate the ideal polis as a 
social unit.66 As a philosophical category, a βίος is founded on “a particular desiderative 
orientation,” which allows those who study and practice ethics to live—to perceive, desire, act, 
and think—in a purposeful and intentional way.67 As Sara Brill puts it, “If part of the work of 
philosophy is to make life appear as an object of thought and choice…the question then is how to 
inspire contemplation of bios, how to overcome the impediments to doing so found in the 
unexpressed, tacit assumptions even the most philosophically inclined people have about the 
character and worth of their own lives.”68 Within the post-Platonic ethical tradition, therefore, the 
study of βίοι is essential to the primary questions of philosophy: how to know oneself, how best 
to live with respect to one’s own capacities, and how to apply those capacities in the context of 
human society.  
 Aristotle preserves the central role that βίος plays as an ethical category, but also 
strengthens its relationship to creaturely life (ζωή).69 As a “way of life,” Aristotle’s βίος 
 
65 For the collocation of aetas and vita in the ethical dialogues, see de Fin. 2.87, 3.76; Tusc. 1.94 
(discussed below), 3.69, cf. 5.70; de Sen. 9, 76-7, 82; de Am. 87, 101. Cf. from the letters, e.g., ad Fam. 
VI.4, X.1; and from the theological works, see de Nat. De. 1.50-1, 1.66; de Div. 1.17. 
66 Cf. the four “lives” discussed at Laws 733d-734e. On this aspect of the Republic, see, e.g., Rutherford 
1995: 218-27 and Weiss 2012. 
67 Brill 2016: 12.  
68 Ibid. 
69 The relationship between these concepts in Aristotle’s corpus is an complex and well-studied topic both 
in classical scholarship and in contemporary thought: for the former, see, e.g., Cooper 1975: esp. 159-160 
for the argument that βίος always refers to a “way of life,” with Keyt 1978: 8 for a refinement of the 
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describes how the manner in which an animal interacts with its environment demands a specific 
internal “coordination among its parts and activities.”70 In this biological sense, a “way of life” is 
one of several differentiating factors that determine the essential identity of a species.71 Beyond 
this descriptive role, as James Lennox argues, βίος plays an even more important part in the 
conceptual construction of Aristotelian biology because it is through this category that his 
thought grasps “the underlying unity in organic complexity.”72 In the Aristotelian corpus, 
therefore, the biological sense of βίος can easily be conjoined with the ethical, as Aristotle 
confirms ethics as the study of the human “way of life”—i.e., the “underlying unity in organic 
complexity” that is particular to humanity. As a differentiating factor and an explanatory 
category, βίος thus comes to be associated both with an essentialist view of organismic life and, 
especially within the context of ethical philosophy, the range of activities that can be developed 
and sustained upon this underlying stratum of biological complexity for the human animal.73  
 In post-Aristotelian Hellenistic philosophy, this biological-cum-ethical βίος attains the 
status of an “art” or a “discipline.” Cicero, in fact, provides one of the earliest attested 
formulations of this purpose for philosophy in the peroration to Torquatus’ speech in de Finibus. 
Responding to the Ciceronian speaker’s disdain for Epicurus’ rejection of conventional 
education, Torquatus urges his audience to understand that the great teacher of the Garden “did 
 
point. For a critical perspective on the latter, especially with regard to Giorgio Agamben’s controversial 
application of the Aristotelian categories, see Finlayson 2010. On the bios praktikos and theoretikos 
specifically, see, e.g., DeHart 1995 and Bénatouïl and Bonazzi 2012; see also below, Ch. 4. 
70 Lennox 2010: 352.  
71 On this specifically biological understanding, see Lennox 2009 and 2010.  
72 Lennox 2010: 351-52. 
73 On the nature of Aristotle’s biological “essentialism” evident in this definition, see Charles 2000 with 
Lennox 2010: 329-33.   
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not value any erudition except that which aided the art of a happy life” (qui quod tibi parum 
videtur eruditus, ea causa est quod nullam eruditionem esse duxit nisi quae beatae vitae 
disciplinam iuvaret, de Fin. 1.71).74 This disciplina vitae or τέχνη περὶ τὸν βίον comes to 
describe the goal of Hellenistic ethics—to bring philosophical inquiry to bear on the living of a 
life (βίος / vita) and to shape philosophy as an art, discipline, and practice that would enable 
those who pursue a bios philosophikos to live the happiest and most authentically human form of 
life possible.75  
 Although certainly not absent from these biological and ethical treatments of the βίος, the 
temporality of life is approached usually as an organizing feature or delimiting factor in the 
Greek tradition.76 It is true that the human “way of life” must be discerned through the activities 
and pursuits in which an individual “spends his time” in the same manner that Aristotle describes 
how a “flat-beaked bird” is well-suited to pass its days eating plants in a swampy environment.77 
Time affords structure and sequence to the capacities and activities that shape an individual’s 
βίος. Similarly, time may be understood to be a delimiting or determining factor, produced, for 
 
74 On the attestation of this turn of phrase, see Schmid 1991: 25-32, 58-68; Sellars 2003.  
75 See, e.g., Diog. Laert. 7.87-9 = Long and Sedley 1987: i.395 (63C; a report on the contents of 
Chrysippus’ On Ends), “Therefore, living in agreement with nature comes to be the end [of happiness], 
which is in accordance with the nature of oneself and that of the whole…The nature consequential upon 
which one ought to live is taken by Chrysippus to be both the common and, particularly, the human.” 
This, of course, was not an uncontentious position even among Stoics (e.g., Diogenes continues, 
“Cleanthes admits only the common nature…”); but, in support of Chrysippus’ definition, cf. Sen. Ep. 
76.9-10 and Epict. Disc. 1.6.  
76 On the difficulty of understanding the post-Aristotelian βίος as a temporal category, see, e.g., on 
Aristotle’s claim that happiness requires a bios teleios (Eth. Nic. 1098a), Irwin 1985: 104-6 with Farwell 
1995. See also below, Ch. 4, section III.i.  
77 Arist. PA 693a, “Those [birds] whose life is spent in swamps and are herbivorous have broad beaks, 
which are useful for digging and pulling up their food and for cropping plants” (ὅσων δ᾿ ἕλειος ὁ βίος καὶ 
ποοφάγος, πλατὺ τὸ ῥύγχος ἔχουσιν· πρός τε γὰρ τὴν ὄρυξιν χρήσιμον τὸ τοιοῦτον καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῆς 
τροφῆς σπάσιν καὶ κουράν, trans. Forster).  
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instance, by the features of our biology. A summation of this approach to the lifetime is found, 
for instance, in Aristotle’s study, “On the Length and Shortness of Life,”78 which searches for the 
zoological and environmental αἰτία that dictate the relative longevity of different forms of animal 
life.79 Thus, while a “way of life” is a configuration of features and activities that importantly 
take place in time, the βίος itself is not a temporal category properly, but a circumscription of 
biological possibility and ethical purpose.  
 As Hellenistic philosophy—and Epicureanism in particular—was incorporated into Latin 
language and culture, however, the role that time plays in ethics becomes more pronounced.80 In 
Lucretius, we can see how translation into Latin reiterates and transforms the central debates of 
the Greek philosophy of time, especially as it relates to human life. Drawing both on the 
semantic resources of Latin and the conceptual basis offered by Epicurean physics, Lucretius 
formulates a philosophical vocabulary that sets the stage for Cicero’s own intervention. To take a 
representative passage, Lucretius concludes his third book on the nature and mortality of the soul 
with a summation of arguments on why we should not fear death and, in particular, why craving 
long life is a mistake.81 A man who desires only to keep living—to persist in the repetitious and 
anxiety-driven pursuits that keep him “fleeing from himself” (se quisque…fugit, 1068)—is 
 
78 Περὶ μακροβιότητος καὶ βραχυβιότητος, part of the “Parva Naturalia.” 
79 See, e.g., on why larger animals live longer because they contain more moisture: “there are two causes, 
quantity and quality, so that the moisture must not only be present in quantity, but this must also be hot, in 
order that it may not easily be either frozen or dried” (δύο γὰρ τὰ αἴτια, τό τε ποσὸν καὶ τὸ ποιόν, ὥστε 
δεῖ μὴ μόνον πλῆθος εἶναι ὑγροῦ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο καὶ θερμόν, ἵνα μήτε εὔπηκτον μήτε εὐξήραντον ᾖ, 466a; 
trans. Hett).  
80 On the role played by time in Epicurean ethics more generally, see esp. Warren 2009: 242-48.  
81 On the Epicurean basis of this Lucretian argument, see KD 19-21. Cf. Warren 2004: esp. 57-108, who 
discusses the possibility of a “Timeless” subjectivity in Epicureanism, i.e., one that is not invested in its 
own futurity.  
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“sick” (aeger, 1070) and does not understand the “cause for his disease” (morbi…causam). The 
only solution, Lucretius contends, is philosophy: 
quam bene si videat, iam rebus quisque relictis  1071 
naturam primum studeat cognoscere rerum,  
temporis aeterni quoniam, non unius horae, 
ambigitur status, in quo sit mortalibus omnis  
aetas, post mortem quae restat cumque, manenda.   1075 
Denique tanto opere in dubiis trepidare periclis  
quae mala nos subigit vitai tanta cupido?  
certa quidem finis vitae mortalibus adstat,  
nec devitari letum pote quin obeamus.…    1079 
et sitis aequa tenet vitai semper hiantis.    1084 
posteraque in dubiost fortunam quam vehat aetas,     
quidve ferat nobis casus quive exitus instet.  
nec prorsum vitam ducendo demimus hilum  
tempore de mortis nec delibare valemus,  
quo minus esse diu possimus forte perempti.    
proinde licet quot vis vivendo condere saecla:   1090 
mors aeterna tamen nilo minus illa manebit,  
nec minus ille diu iam non erit, ex hodierno  
lumine qui finem vitai fecit, et ille 
mensibus atque annis qui multis occidit ante. 
 
For could he see well enough, at once he would throw his business aside and first study 
to learn the nature of things, since the matter in doubt is not his state for one hour, but 
for eternity, in which state mortals must expect all time to be passed which remains after 
death. Besides, what is this great and evil lust of life that drives us to be so greatly 
agitated amidst doubt and peril? There is a fixed end for the life of mortals, and death 
cannot be avoided, but die we must…One unchanging thirst of life fills us and our 
mouths are always agape. Furthermore, it is uncertain what fortune the next years may 
bring, what chance has in store, what outcome awaits us. And by extending life we do 
not deduct one iota from the time of death, nor are we able to diminish that, so as to 
leave perhaps a shorter time after our departure. Therefore you may live to complete as 
many generations as you want; that eternal death will still be waiting, and no less long a 
time will he not-be, who has made an end of life from the light of today, than he who fell 
many a month and year before.82 
 
In translating Epicurean materialism, Lucretius conceives of a “lifetime” (vita) as a fixed 
duration that is bounded by death (certa quidem finis vitae mortalibus adstat, 1078). This period 
 
82 De Re. Nat. 3.1071-94; trans. adapted from Rouse.  
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is a site of struggle against “the great and evil lust of life that drives us” (quae mala nos subigit 
vitai tanta cupido, 1077), which always leaves us with an “unchanging thirst of life and with our 
mouths always agape” (et sitis aequa tenet vitai semper hiantis, 1084). As the only true remedy 
for this excruciatingly repetitious and insatiable lust for more life, Lucretius recommends 
dedicating ourselves to study of the “nature of things” (naturam primum studeat cognoscere 
rerum, 1072). Such a dedication to (Epicurean) philosophy will allow us to understand that we 
should be concerned not with “our state for just one hour but for eternal time, in which condition 
all time that remains after death must be passed for mortals” (temporis aeterni quoniam, non 
unius horae, / ambigitur status, in quo sit mortalibus omnis / aetas, post mortem quae restat 
cumque, manenda, 1073-75). The nature of human life (vita) is thus to be understood in relation 
to death (mors)—a death that is emphatically conceived of as eternal (temporis aeterni).  
 Playing on the shared etymology available in Latin between aetas and the adjective 
aeternum, Lucretius gestures to the Greek metaphysical unity between these two concepts in 
αἰών and juxtaposes them to the finite existence accessible to humanity. As the “all time that 
remains after death” (omnis aetas, post mortem quae restat), Lucretius’ understanding of aetas is 
thoroughly opposed to the limited span of human life.83 Although a human life must take place in 
time (aetas), this temporal embodiment can bring only uncertainty, the whims of chance, and an 
unknown outcome (posteraque in dubiost fortunam quam vehat aetas, / quidve ferat nobis casus 
quive exitus instet, 1085-86). The infinite time of death (mors aeterna, 1091), in fact, 
demonstrates the baselessness of thinking about the vita as a principally temporal concept: “by 
extending life we do not deduct one iota from the time of death” (nec prorsum vitam ducendo 
 
83 Elsewhere, Lucretius simply uses the Latin cognate, aevum / aevom, to communicate the ontological 
primacy of this eternal time, see e.g., 1.45, 460; 2.647, etc. Note again that Cicero rejects this archaic 
Latin word in favor of the neologism aeternitas; see above, n.28 and n.53. 
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demimus hilum / tempore de mortis, 1087-88). In the face of the temporal primacy of the aetas 
that belongs ultimately to mors aeterna,84 the vita lacks any temporal existence that is proper to 
itself—it is completely without extent or duration in comparison to the reality of omnis aetas: 
“Therefore you may live to complete as many generations (saecula) as you want: nevertheless 
that eternal death (mors aeterna) will still be waiting, and no less long a time will he not-be, who 
has made an end of life from the light of today, than he who fell many a month and year before” 
(nec minus ille diu iam non erit, ex hodierno / lumine qui finem vitai fecit, et ille / mensibus 
atque annis qui multis occidit ante, 1090-94). “Generations” (saecula) fall away and human time 
collapses so that there is no difference between dying at this moment or countless months and 
years before. By translating these Epicurean precepts, therefore, Lucretius conceives of the vita 
as a site of ethical possibility—i.e., for liberation from fear of death and the attainment of 
pleasure—conditioned by and subjected to an eternal time (aetas), rather than constituted as 
itself a form of temporality. Furthermore, by firmly locating the association between aetas and 
eternity in death beyond the realm of human experience, Lucretius translate into Latin the core 
duality of the Greek philosophical tradition in deeply antagonistic terms. Time, which is 
conceived as the aetas that belongs only to mors aeterna, opposes vividly the ethical structure of 
the human vita.  
 As is made clear in the chapters that follow, Cicero’s philosophy transforms the ways in 
which vita and aetas interact as two distinct conceptions of human time. This interaction is 
enabled and clarified by the separation in his thought of aeternitas from aetas.85 By this 
separation, aetas is transferred from its antagonistic position in Lucretius’ formulation as the 
 
84 Cf. 1.233, infinita aetas with Berns 1976: 478-80.  
85 Unlike Lucretius, for instance, Cicero never modifies aetas with infinita or aeterna.  
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infinite time of death to offer a more productive and positive framing for humanity’s relationship 
to time. For Cicero, human time possesses a definitive shape and finite structure, but also 
progresses elementally in a series that lacks predictability and a graspable endpoint from the 
perspective of the present.86 While these two modes can be roughly ascribed to Cicero’s use of 
vita and aetas, it is more precisely through the dynamic interaction of this duality that his 
philosophy communicates human temporality.87 Furthermore, and more importantly for the 
specific arguments of this dissertation, the value of his philosophy for the question of temporality 
lies less in his explicit discussion of these concepts than in the ways that his dialogues use 
common experiences and skeptical argumentation in order to arrive at a complex and dialectical 
understanding of human time.  
 Before turning to describe this role that experience plays in Cicero’s philosophy, I offer a 
brief demonstration of the complexity of the duality vita / aetas in a passage taken from the first 
book of the Tusculan Disputations.88 In this passage, we can clearly see that Cicero uses vita to 
articulate a qualitative and teleological understanding of life, while simultaneously employing 
 
86 For the structure and internal organization of a life, see, e.g., the definition of human ratio at de Fin. 
2.45 as embracing the “whole structure of life even as it unfolds” (omnis status vitae consequentis), which 
is modified over the course of the debates in de Fin. to include Piso’s Antiochean definition of a vita as 
nothing other than its constitutive progredientes aetates (5.41); this organization is discussed below, Ch. 
1, sections IV-V. On the unknowability or unpredictability of the human experience of time, esp. in 
relation to the chronology of nature, see Tusc. 1.93-4 (discussed just below and in Ch. 3, section III). 
Chapter 2 also deals with the uncertainty in the progression of time due to the fact that “nature did not 
give us a knowledge of limits” (rerum natura nullam nobis dedit cognitionem finium, Luc. 92). 
87 This dynamic between vita and aetas addressed especially in Chapter 4.  
88 This book features two mutually exclusive arguments concerning the fate of the soul following death: 
on the one hand, according to the ideal argument drawn from primarily Platonic sources, the main speaker 
M. contends that the soul will survive the death of the body; on the other hand, building on material (esp. 
Epicurean) positions, M. also argues that the soul—or however we should identify the vital force—
perishes along with the body. I discuss in more detail the argumentation of this book within the Tusculans 
and this passage in particular below; see Ch. 3, section III.  
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aetas in conjunction with tempus to articulate aspects of human temporality that are quantitative 
and ontologically prior to intent and action. Because this passage also treats arguments similar to 
those from the Lucretian passage discussed above, we can appreciate that, unlike Lucretius, who 
preserves the connection between aetas and aeternum in the infinite time of death, Cicero is 
interested in approaching aetas as a specifically temporal understanding of human life.  
 Within M.’s material argument that the soul is mortal, he considers the consequences of 
this mortality for the relationship between death and the time of life. If an individual lives with 
the knowledge that death (mors) marks an absolute end, life (vita) becomes a firmly demarcated 
period of time that is both characterized by the uncertainty of happenstance in the ephemerality 
of daily experience (incertos casus cotidie) and by a durative brevity (brevitatem vitae).89 Yet 
what determines both the quality and extent of this vita is neither simply the biological 
potentiality nor the ethical choices and actions of the individual; rather, these elements that give 
character and structure to an individual life are conditioned by an “agreement” with Nature, 
which allows for time to be of use to humanity in the first place:  
Pellantur ergo istae ineptiae paene aniles, ante tempus mori miserum esse. Quod tandem 
tempus? Naturaene? At ea quidem dedit usuram vitae tamquam pecuniae nulla 
praestituta die. Quid est igitur quod querare, si repetit, cum vult? Ea enim condicione 
acceperas. Idem, si puer parvus occidit, aequo animo ferendum putant: si vero in cunis 
ne querendum quidem. Atqui ab hoc acerbius exegit natura quod dederat. “Nondum 
gustaverat,” inquiunt, “vitae suavitatem: hic autem iam sperabat magna, quibus frui 
coeperat.” At id quidem in ceteris rebus melius putatur, aliquam partem quam nullam 
attingere: cur in vita secus?…Eorum autem, qui exacta aetate moriuntur, fortuna 
laudatur. Cur? nam, reor, nullis, si vita longior daretur, posset esse iucundior. Nihil enim 
 
89 “Death, which because of uncertain changes and chances hangs daily over our heads and on account of 
the shortness of life can never be far off, still does not deter the sage from considering the interests of his 
state or his family for all time.” (itaque non deterret sapientem mors quae propter incertos casus cotidie 
imminet, propter brevitatem vitae numquam potest longe abesse, quo minus in omne tempus rei publicae 
suisque consulat, 91). M. presents this argument as supporting the sage’s consideration of posterity even 
though he will have no perception of the future consequences of his actions after he has died. For the full 
argument in context, see below, Ch. 3, section III. Here I am primarily concerned with elucidating 
Cicero’s philosophical vocabulary.  
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est profecto homini prudentia dulcius, quam, ut cetera auferat, adfert certe senectus. 
Quae vero aetas longa est aut quod omnino homini longum?  
 
Let us cast aside, therefore, all these foolish old wives’ tales about how wretched it is to 
die “before one’s time.” What time do we mean? Nature’s? But she was the one who 
gave you use of a lifetime just like a loan without establishing a day for repayment. 
What is there to complain about, then, if she asks for it back whenever she wants? You 
accepted it on this condition. Likewise, if a small child dies, these same people think that 
this must be borne with equanimity and if it is an infant still in its cradle, they think there 
should be no cause for lament at all. And yet nature has taken away what it had given 
even more cruelly. “The infant had not yet tasted the sweetness of life,” they opine; “but 
this one was already hoping for great things which he had begun to enjoy.” But in other 
cases it is thought better to grasp some part rather than nothing—why would it be 
otherwise in life?…On the other hand, the fortune of those who die when their time is up 
is praised. Why? For, I think that to no one else would it be sweeter if a longer lifetime 
were granted to them. For certainly there is nothing sweeter to humanity than wisdom 
and, just as old age carries off other things, indeed it bestows that. What span of time is 
long or what that belongs to humanity is lengthy at all?90 
 
Arguing against the conventional wisdom of “old wives’ tales” (istae ineptiae paene aniles) that 
attribute significance to a death that comes “too early” (ante tempus mori), M. firmly locates 
temporal priority in the ontological catch-all, “Nature” (Natura). It is only by means of a 
“contract” (condicio), which Cicero likens to a loan agreement, that the time (tempus) that is 
Nature’s becomes fit for human “use” as a “lifetime” (usuram vitae).91 This notion of a contract 
between Natural chronology and the human lifetime supplants the Lucretian antagonism between 
the infinite aetas of the mors aeterna and the finite vita. Cicero’s condicio allows human life, 
even while being subject to the capriciousness of Nature, to attain a meaningful relationship to 
time.92 Yet, even with this more productive relationship, the conditions of the contract do not 
 
90 Tusc. 1.93-94.  
91 On this condicio, see further below, Ch. 3, section V.  
92 On this metaphor for the relationship between human and natural time, which appears after Cicero in 
the consolatory tradition, see Sen. Cons. Polyb. 29, “If anyone should be angry that he has had to pay 
back borrowed money—especially that of which he had the use without paying interest—would he not be 
considered an unfair man? Nature gave your brother his life, she has likewise given you yours. If she has 
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stipulate the “day of repayment” (nulla praestituta die), a persistent uncertainty that produces 
fundamental asymmetry between natural and human time.93  
 Recognition of this asymmetry reveals the baselessness of the popular sentiments that M. 
goes on to list.94 First, M. criticizes the notion that the death of small children or infants should 
not be a “cause of lament” (ne querendum) because they have “not yet tasted the sweetness of 
life” (gustaverat…vitae suavitatem), whereas we should find more cruel the death of someone 
older because “he hoped for great things, which he had already begun to enjoy” (hic autem iam 
sperabat magna, quibus frui coeperat). In opposition to this sentiment, M. targets the very 
logical conception of life as a durative whole: if in all other matters it is better “to grasp some 
part rather than nothing—why would it be otherwise in life?” (in ceteris rebus melius putatur, 
aliquam partem quam nullam attingere: cur in vita secus?). At the base of this misconception 
about an appropriate “time” to die, therefore, M. pinpoints a deeper problem about how the parts 
 
required from him from whom she wanted it an earlier payment of her loan, she has but used her own 
right; the fault is not with her, for her terms were known, but with the greedy hopes of mortal minds that 
often forget what Nature is, and never remember their own lot except when they are reminded (si quis 
pecuniam creditam soluisse se moleste ferat, eam praesertim, cuius usum gratuitum acceperit, nonne 
iniustus habebitur? dedit natura fratri tuo uitam, dedit et tibi. Quae suo iure usa si a quo voluit debitum 
suum citius exegit; non illa in culpa est, cuius nota erat condicio, sed mortalis animi spes avida, quae 
subinde, quid rerum natura sit, obliviscitur nec umquam sortis suae meminit, nisi cum admonetur; trans. 
Basore). Cf. Cons. Marc. 10; [Plut] Consol. ad Apoll. 106.  
 
93 Note that M. does not refer to suicide as a way of “evening” the scales, cf. Sen. Ep. 70.19 with Kennedy 
2010: ad loc. For the engagement of this passage with Epicurean “symmetry” arguments, see Warren 
2004: 57-108; see also below, Ch. 3, section III.  
94 On the Epicurean counterarguments that M. adapts here, which, like the Lucretian passage above, seem 
interested in the possibility of a “timeless” way of experiencing the world, i.e., one that is uninvested in 
its own futurity, cf. esp. Parfit 1984: 177 with Warren 2004: op cit., who proposes, “Timeless,” as a 
hypothetical subject, “We would be much happier if we lacked the bias towards the future. We would be 
much less depressed by ageing and the approach of death. If we were like Timeless, being at the end of 
our lives would be more like being at the beginning. At any point in our lives we could enjoy looking 
back or forward to our whole lives.” As I discuss below, Cicero seems interested in adapting these 
Epicurean arguments to support, not a timeless existence, but one that transforms its relation to the future.  
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of a life are related to its consummation. How much of a “life” is it necessary to live to achieve 
satiety or happiness? At what point in the consecutive stages of a life can we truly say that we 
have lived “enough”?95  
 In pursuit of this deeper problem, M. challenges the second popular notion that those who 
die “when their time is up” (exacta aetate) are the most fortunate.96 He ridicules this 
misperception by asking why such lucky people should not want to live to be old men: if they 
have already reached the age that marks the peak of humanity’s physical potential surely nothing 
could be sweeter than to attain an even longer lifetime (vita longior). Living beyond the aetas 
exacta, in fact, would allow them to attain wisdom (prudentia)—the sweetest reward that human 
life has to offer, which is bestowed finally by old age (Nihil enim est profecto homini prudentia 
dulcius, quam, ut cetera auferat, adfert certe senectus). Looking at life in this way from within 
successive ages that make up a vita, M. proposes, it is always mistaken to say that there is a 
better or worse time to die. There exists no such thing as a death that is “timely” for the living: 
each age (aetas) of life gives way to the next, culminating, one hopes, in the wisdom of senectus. 
In the end, these erroneous sentiments only reveal the asymmetry between natural and human 
time, and the absolute primacy of the “contract” by which brute, chronological time is converted 
into the durative structure that we recognize as the “lifetime.” Yet, as the ironic and polemical 
cast of M.’s argument emphasizes, these popular views also reduce a purely teleological and 
qualitative understanding of human time to an absurdity: M. asks in summation, “What span of 
 
95 On these questions in the Tusculans, see below Ch. 3 and in the de Sen., Ch. 4.  
96 Cf. Lucr. 1.232-34, where this same idiom is used to refer to the creative destruction of the passage of 
infinite time. This is a peculiar turn of phrase in Cicero, but one that he uses also at Sen. 60 to refer to the 
“prime part” of Marcus Valerius Corvinus’ life spent in energetic activity in the fields; see below, Ch. 4, 
section IV. Thus, this is another locus where we can see clearly the difference between the Lucretian and 
the Ciceronian uses of aetas. Cf. Plaut. Capt. 720 for the idiom as it is used here.  
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time is long or what that belongs to humanity is lengthy at all?” (Quae vero aetas longa est aut 
quod omnino homini longum?). 
 In Cicero’s philosophical language, aetas thus stands both as a part of and outside the 
vita. As a point of focalization for the asymmetry between natural and human time from within 
human experience, aetas represents a temporality that is purely quantitative, realized in human 
experience of the “stages of life”—infancy, adulthood, old age. Yet a life (vita) coincides with no 
“span of time” (aetas) long enough to realize the human potential—or satisfy the human desire—
for living. M.’s contiguous uses of aetas to refer both to the age that marks the “acme” of human 
development and to the insufficiently long “span of time” within which human life must take 
place draws attention to this semantic and logical instability. The vita stands in relation to the 
aetas as whole to part; yet, viewed from the perspective of the part to the whole, the aetas 
surpasses this relation. A vita is lived through aetates, but no formation of aetas can ever 
coincide with the teleological structure of the vita. I propose, therefore, that in Cicero’s 
philosophical vocabulary, the aetas articulates a particular accumulation or sedimentation of time 
that is unique to the development of life, whereas a vita typically possesses a certain quality or 
overall structure.  
 In this brief passage, we perceive the dynamic interrelation of vita and aetas as two 
related but often warring ways of formulating human time. It would seem from Cicero’s interest 
in ethics that he, like Lucretius, would favor the structure of the vita, which provides a course 
within which the capacities and activities of human life might be developed and perfected or, in 
Lucretius’ case, through which the dictates of culture and the fear of death might be unlearned in 
order to achieve a tranquil and “timeless” existence. Yet this passage demonstrates equally that, 
for Cicero, philosophical inquiry cannot turn away from the aetas—cannot relegate time to the 
 37 
eternity of death in favor of an ideal of timelessness—but must address it as a constitutive part of 
human being in life. One primary goal of Ciceronian philosophy, as I see it and seek to outline in 
the chapters that follow, is therefore to define an ethics of time that is complementary to yet 
distinct from an ethics of life as it had been developed in Hellenistic philosophy. In other words, 
in these texts Cicero brings philosophical inquiry to bear on the temporality of human existence 
in a manner analogous to the ways in which post-Aristotelian thought had structured the 
biological and social possibilities of the human animal. Cicero’s dialogues offer not just a view 
of an ethics of individual capacity and action, but an ethics of the time of life: a philosophy that 
represents the complexity of time through meditation on and the mediation of human experience.  
IV. Experience 
Nature does not like to be observed…Direct strokes she never gave us power to make; 
all our blows glance, all our hits are accidental. Our relations to each other are oblique 
and casual. 
 
Ralph Waldo Emerson, “Experience” (169-170).  
 
In this final section of the introduction, I consider the role that experience plays in Cicero’s 
dialogues, particularly from a methodological perspective. Drawing a comparison to Ralph 
Waldo Emerson’s philosophical reaction to the death of his son in his essay, “Experience,” I 
contend that Cicero’s use of skeptical methods and arguments offers him a way to articulate the 
conceptual dissociation that accompanies profound human experiences. I then comment on how I 
have attempted to render some of this methodological richness in the presentation of my own 
readings by drawing on contrastive strains of thought from post-Ciceronian philosophy. Finally, I 
offer brief summaries of each chapter focused on the experiences that structure my argument—
solitude, doubt, grief, and failure.  
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 In Sharon Cameron’s reading of Emerson’s “Experience,” she contends that the fractious 
and dissociated statements that comprise the content of the essay should not be understood 
according to a logic of synthesis or even contradiction. The various perspectives offered 
throughout are not meant to “fit” together in some final summation of human experience, even as 
a denial of completion or expressibility. Rather, Cameron argues, Emerson constructs his essay 
in an “elegiac” mode—that is, according to “a systematic representation of grief.”97 In response 
to the death of his son Waldo, Emerson writes a text that is as mimetic as it is analytical, 
imitating in its repetitious statements and its fluctuation of impressions and sentiments the 
aspects of his experience that escape prosaic description or direct observation.98 In other words, 
the essay adopts mimesis as a technique to move beyond the inexpressibility of the experience 
that lies at its heart without, however, removing it. In Cameron’s reading, therefore, Emerson’s 
skeptical statements—his assertions that “we do not see directly, but mediately…we have no 
means of correcting these colored and distorting lenses which we are”99—are tied to his 
experience of grief in the form and method of his philosophy: because of the impediments to 
human knowledge and understanding we can only hope to grasp some aspect of the truth of our 
experience of the world through a philosophical art that mirrors our own oblique and partial 
perspective.  
 
97 Cameron 2007: 56.  
98 Ibid.: 71, “Repetition in ‘Experience’ dramatizes the partiality of experience…Also its fleetingness. 
The man can mourn the same indirect relation to experience and to grief ten times because each time—
every single time—what he says is both fleeting and partial…They are continuous, but as a series of 
continuous displacements.” 
99 Emerson 2003: 181.  
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 I discuss further in Chapter 3 the relationship between Emerson’s “Experience” and 
Cicero’s own expressions of grief at the death of his daughter in the Tusculan Disputations.100 
From a methodological perspective, however, I think that Cameron’s reading of Emerson offers 
important insight for the form of Cicero’s dialogues, and it has also helped me to conceptualize 
the argumentative structure of this dissertation. As we have already seen, Cicero does not 
approach time as either a purely metaphysical or exclusively accidental category. Rather, he 
approaches its primacy and reality through the vacillating and unstable lens of human 
experience. As I argue in each of the following chapters, Cicero’s texts illuminate a temporal 
ontology that is distinct from and constitutive of experience; yet, it is through the very 
experiences that form the basis of his philosophical inquiry that such an understanding of time 
arises. Much like Emerson’s “Experience,” I propose, Cicero’s dialogues blend an elegiac mode 
of representation and a form of skeptical philosophical investigation in order to communicate 
obliquely the flux of time and experience that is their object.  
 Building on significant recent scholarly work on Cicero’s skepticism, I aim to view his 
method as more than a sign of his affinity for the dialectics of the New Academy or a residue of 
his youthful philosophical training under Philo, the “last” of the Academic skeptics.101 In 
addition to these important historical considerations and with the benefit of the comparison with 
Emerson, I contend that Cicero’s skeptical approach to philosophy reflects the fleetingness and 
incompletion of the human experiences toward which he directs his inquiry. Like Emerson, 
Cicero develops a mode of presentation that allows him to incorporate the obscurity and 
 
100 See below, Ch. 3, section I. 
101 For work on Cicero’s skepticism in its philosophical and historical context, see, e.g., Burkert 1965; 
Lévy 1992; Görler 1995; Algra 1997; Thorsrud 2012; Woolf 2015; Brittain 2016; Cappello 2019. This 
scholarly tradition is discussed more fully below, Ch. 2, section II.  
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partiality of human perception as an integral part of philosophy’s drive to theorize and 
understand. In his most expansive methodological notice from the preface of the Lucullus,102 for 
instance, Cicero makes clear that the inescapable obscuritas of reality and the infirmitas of 
human faculties are inevitably reflected in his own “discussions” (nostrae disputationes); yet 
these methodological hindrances do not overcome the “drive to inquire” (studium exquirendi), 
which enables the dialogues to “draw out” (eliciant) or “mold” (exprimant) their imperfect raw 
material into something that has a truth to it, or at least strives to render truth (aliquid quod aut 
verum sit aut ad id quam proxime accedat). The generative and mimetic metaphors through 
which Cicero expresses the hoped-for outcome of his inquiry (elicio, exprimo)103 should guide us 
to look neither solely at the systematic, explicative content of his debates nor at their dialectical 
and inconclusive form. Rather, we should examine the interplay between content and form, 
analysis and mimesis, conclusion and inconclusiveness, which allows the imperfections of his 
work to reflect something of the truth of imperfect human experience. 
 Even the apparent clarity with which Cicero expresses his methodology in this passage 
from the Lucullus must be put into motion. Although there undoubtedly remains a strand of 
 
102 Luc. 7, “For although all understanding is obstructed by many hindrances, and there is both an innate 
obscurity in reality itself and a weakness in our faculties so that it was not without reason that the most 
ancient and wise thinkers distrusted their ability to discover what they desired, nevertheless they did not 
slack in their pursuit nor will we in our exhaustion abandon our drive of inquiry; nor do our discussions 
aim at anything besides, by debating either side of a matter, drawing out or somehow giving shape to 
something that is true or approaches it most closely” (Etsi enim omnis cognitio multis est obstructa 
difficultatibus, eaque est et in ipsis rebus obscuritas et in iudiciis nostris infirmitas ut non sine causa 
antiquissimi et doctissimi invenire se posse quod cuperent diffisi sint, tamen nec illi defecerunt neque nos 
studium exquirendi defatigati relinquemus; neque nostrae disputationes quidquam aliud agunt nisi ut in 
utramque partem dicendo eliciant et tamquam exprimant aliquid quod aut verum sit aut ad id quam 
proxime accedat).  
103 See Cicero’s use of elicio at de Sen. 15 to refer to the earth’s capacity for creation; cf. also de Fin. 2.2 
where the verb is used to describe the Socratic practice “eliciting” an opinion against which to argue. For 
exprimo as a verb of imitation, see e.g., Pro Rab. Post. 2; of translation, Rep. 1.43; and of physical 
sculpting (although not frequently in this literal sense in Cic.), see Plaut. Ps. I.i.56.  
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continuity that reflects Cicero’s attention to disciplinary sympathies, he constantly revises the 
way in which he formulates his philosophical strategies throughout the works of 45: “arguing 
against the views of everyone else” (contra omnes dicere quae videntur, Luc. 7), “pursuing not 
only those views that we approve but also the doctrine of all the philosophical schools” (non 
modo quid nobis probaretur sed etiam quid a singulis philosophiae disciplinis diceretur 
persecuti sumus, de Fin. 1.12), “debating one side and then the other” (in utramque partem multa 
disseruntur, Ac. Lib. 1.46), “arguing whatever strikes us as being approvable” (quodcumque 
nostros animos probabilitate percussit, id dicimus, Tusc. 5.33), “following a Carneadean 
fashion” (Carneadeo more et modo, Tim. 1), etc. The development and transformation of these 
formulations—which are neither fully consistent between themselves nor in their application 
within the dialogues—gestures to partiality, repetition, and deferral as the only constant and 
central features of Ciceronian inquiry. The richness of Cicero’s argumentative strategies thus 
comes not simply from their ability to weigh different doctrinal positions on important 
philosophical questions:104 more fully, they allow Cicero to communicate, like Emerson, the 
dissociation of experience and the experience of dissociation. Through this dedication to elegiac 
obliquity, the very impossibility of comprising the most profound human experiences, such as 
solitude or grief, in a single perspective or even with a single method of inquiry can be 
transformed into a meaningful form of philosophical writing.  
 
104 Although this is undeniably an intended aspect of his philosophical practice; cf. de Div. 2.4, which 
enticingly asserts that “if some grievous occurrence [i.e., Caesar’s death] had not interrupted [our 
writing], we would now have succeeded in laying open every topic of philosophy” (nisi quae causa 
gravior obstitisset, nullum philosophiae locum esse pateremur). This encyclopedic impulse gains 
significance beyond the old scholarly chestnut, “eclecticism,” if we attribute it to a desire to represent not 
simply a “totality” of philosophy, but a “totality through partiality” in the ever-changing transformation of 
experience. On Cicero’s so-called eclecticism, see, e.g., Glucker 1988; on the relationship between 
skepticism and eclecticism, see Brunschwig 1988.  
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 I have attempted to preserve something of this methodological richness in my own 
approach to these texts by identifying strands of thought in the long history of post-Ciceronian 
“experiential” philosophy to frame my readings.105 I introduce each chapter with a pair of 
epigraphs from later writers that are selected because they articulate contrasting, often mutually 
exclusive perspectives on the central questions of my reading. I intend these perspectives from 
later writers to help to articulate the dissociative aspects within the experience of the text. For 
instance, in the first chapter, I begin from two views drawn from 20th century French philosophy 
on the relation between solitary experience and temporal duration.106 For Gaston Bachelard, 
solitude is a state of creative destruction by which one duration of time is punctuated in order to 
allow a new period to begin. On the contrary, Jacques Derrida contends that solitude—in 
particular, the solitude that follows the death of a loved one—is a moment of consummation in 
which the relation between present and past, self and other is realized. By taking this 
juxtaposition as my starting point, my reading aims to demonstrate both how these divergent 
perspectives are present in Cicero’s depiction of his own experience of solitude and, more 
importantly, how he incorporates this experiential dissociation into the form and content of his 
philosophical argumentation in de Finibus on the duration of a lifetime. I do not intend this 
approach to be either a systematic exercise in intellectual history or an “application” of modern 
thinkers onto Cicero’s philosophy. Rather, I hope that this framing device may illuminate 
 
105 This tradition of a “post-Ciceronian” philosophy of experience remains to be defined in full, but its 
general outline can be seen in studies in the philosophical reception compiled in Altman 2015. For the late 
antique and medieval form of post-Ciceronian philosophy, which is seen primarily in the consolatory and 
therapeutic traditions, see Brachtendorf 1997; Kendeffy 2015. For the Italian renaissance as a formative 
period, see McLaughlin 2015; DellaNeva 2015. On the importance of the early modern French tradition, 
see, e.g., Green 1975; Eden 2015; Sharpe 2015. On 20th century French philosophy and Derrida in 
particular, see Leach 1993; Miller 2015.  
106 For references, see below, Ch. 1, section I. 
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readings of the text that are aware of the resonances, developments and tensions in thought that 
connect Cicero’s writings and our own world.  
 Chapter 1, “Specters of Solitude,” is thus concerned with human time as duration. I argue 
that Cicero writes the solitude that he experiences following the death of his daughter into his 
philosophical inquiry on the origins and ends of life in de Finibus bonorum et malorum. In the 
first and second parts of the chapter, I examine Cicero’s descriptions of solitude in the letters that 
he writes to Atticus from Astura especially in the weeks after Tullia’s death. I argue that these 
descriptions encompass aspects recognizable from both the Bachelardian and Derridean 
perspectives on solitary experience: Cicero’s solitudo is a moment of punctuating cessation in 
the ephemeral sequence of his life, which both erases and clarifies the relationship between his 
present and past. I then turn to consider in the third section how Cicero writes this experience of 
solitudo into the form of de Finibus. By transferring his experience of solitude following Tullia’s 
death into his youthful reminiscence of the Academy in the final book of this dialogue (de Fin. 
5.1), Cicero organizes these debates on the structure of a lifetime as a rendering of the 
relationship between the origin and ends of his own life. In the final two sections of the chapter, I 
demonstrate how this form is related to the content of the philosophical discussion that makes up 
the work: in the fourth section, I argue that Cicero’s skeptical divisio draws out how the 
Epicureans and Stoics conceptualize, unsatisfactorily, the structure of human life (status vitae, 
2.45). Finally, in the fifth section, I focus on the Antiochean argument in the final book, which 
introduces aetas into the debate about human duration. Rather than offering closure on the 
question of the structure of the vita, however, the skeptical form of the work also reveals the 
failure of the Antiochean configuration by accentuating the absence of any notion of cessation or 
withdrawal in Antiochus’ vitalistic understanding of the vita as a series of unbroken aetates 
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progredientes (cf. 5.41, 59). On the whole, I argue, Cicero demonstrates that without solitude 
philosophy fails to understand the dialectical alternation between duration and cessation through 
which humanity can access the organizing structures of its lifetime.  
 In the second chapter, “Doubt’s Drives,” I consider the relationship that Cicero’s 
philosophy discloses between the progression of time and doubt. I argue in particular that 
Ciceronian doubt creates a procedure for confronting and traversing limits in experience. 
Drawing from the contrasting perspectives offered by Dante and Descartes on the relation 
between doubt and truth, I also contend that this procedure, by constantly deferring the ends of 
inquiry, serves as an approach to an ungraspable, unlimited truth. In the first section I examine 
how in the Lucullus Cicero intervenes in the epistemological arguments of the Hellenistic 
schools in order to arrive at an understanding of “doubt” as an intentional state of mind that can 
be adopted as a response to the pervasiveness of epistemic “uncertainty.” From this perspective 
on Cicero’s doubt, in the second section, I contextualize Cicero’s philosophical project within 
the history of the skeptical Academy and argue that his importance within the development of 
and possible divergence from this tradition pertains to the connection that he draws between 
doubt, truth, and time. In the third section I elucidate this connection by reading the Lucullus 
with attention to the verb sequi, the semantic nexus of which allows Cicero to articulate the 
limited and often circular trajectory of skeptical inquiry within the ineluctable progression of 
time. In the fourth section, I examine how this relationship between skeptical inquiry and time is 
evident not only in the argumentation and mise en scène of the Lucullus but also in Cicero’s own 
compositional practice, as we can see in his revision of the contents of the dialogue into the 
Academici libri. This connection between theory and practice demonstrates the force of the 
thought that “nature didn’t give us any knowledge of limits” (rerum natura nullam nobis dedit 
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cognitionem finium, 92) for Cicero’s philosophy. In the final section, I return to the connection 
between doubt and truth. I contend that Cicero locates an approach to truth in the interplay of 
inquiry and time, limitation and limitlessness that doubt facilitates. Doubt does not invariably 
lead to truth; but by adopting doubt as a way of experiencing the world, its constant deferral of 
the end of inquiry transforms each new moment into a potential receptacle for truth.  
 The third chapter, “The Discernment of Grief,” examines the temporal consequences of 
the death of a loved one in the Tusculan Disputations. I contend that Cicero’s philosophical 
exercise of grief—not its resolution, but its incorporation into philosophy—creates a form of 
temporal “discernment” that embraces the different strata of time revealed by proximity to death. 
Beginning from the contrasting perspectives of Emerson and Freud on what grief can teach us, I 
raise the question of the relationship between Tullia’s death and Cicero’s philosophy and argue 
that the Tusculans should be read as a product of the irresolution of his grief. In support of this 
contention, in section II, I examine the representation of Cicero’s grief for Tullia in the letters 
and biographical tradition. From this biographical evidence, I identify his experience as 
“melancholic,” or at least as a failure to treat her loss as a particular loss. In section III, I trace 
the influence of this melancholic grief on the divergent arguments of the first book of the 
Tusculans. I argue especially that Tullia’s death and the Consolatio, which serves as her textual 
cipher, functions as the force of dissociation between the ideal and material understandings of 
humanity’s relation to death and time. As a structuring absence in the text, the loss of Tullia thus 
preserves the obliquity that is reflective of Cicero’s experience of grief. In section IV, I examine 
how Cicero’s presentation of philosophical therapies in Tusc. 3 foregrounds the loss of a 
subjective sense of time that accompanies grief. This temporal disturbance opens up in 
experience an approach to the unthinkability of death and the human relation to time that the first 
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book treats philosophically. In the final section, I contend that Cicero locates this approach to 
unthinkability in the “will” (voluntas), or as I propose an alternate translation suited to the 
argument, “discernment.” This exercise of voluntas is not a subjective will to recover from or 
forget grief, but an adoption of a general “human” will that allows the mourner to live in grief as 
a manifestation of the divergent temporalities that define his existence. 
 The final chapter, “The Future of Failure,” revisits the lifetime as a basic formation of 
human temporality in order to consider questions of judgement—how a life should be considered 
a success or a failure—and the future. In particular, I argue that by extending a skeptical 
approach to the structures of the vita, Cicero’s dialogues seek to formulate an ethics of the aetas. 
This mode of ethics takes as its foundation not the possibilities—and failures—of the lifetime, 
but the unbound temporal horizon of the time of life. Framing my argument with Heidegger and 
Levinas’ contrasting perspectives on the future orientation of human time, in the first section, I 
read from one of Cicero’s philosophical letters to Aulus Manlius Torquatus (ad Fam. VI.4[244]) 
to reaffirm the distinction between vita and aetas by means of their differing relation to the 
future. In the second section, I examine the ways in which Cicero’s life might be considered a 
“failure” and how biographical and scholarly interpretations tend to view Cicero’s philosophical 
writing as an amelioration for the failures of his own vita activa. The third section surveys 
Cicero’s own skeptical treatment of the philosopher’s life and its characteristic activity theoria or 
contemplatio. In the first part of the section, I focus on the inconclusiveness of his inquiry into 
the post-Aristotelian association between contemplatio, happiness, and the consummation of life. 
And, in the second part, I reconsider the relation between philosophy and truth that Cicero 
inherits from the Platonic tradition. By also demonstrating the inconclusiveness of this relation, 
Cicero’s skeptical treatment of the vita envisions a form of the philosopher’s life that is atelic 
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and anachronous, thus incorporating a form of “failure” within its defining activity. In section 
IV, I turn to the diachrony of the aetas as an alternative way of conceiving the future. In 
particular, I juxtapose the logical sequences of the “divine mind” (divina mens) from M.’s 
argument in Tusc. 5 with the future of the aetas as articulated in the later dialogue, de Senectute. 
By considering the future from within the breakdown of intergenerational time during the late 
Republic, Cicero aims in this dialogue to liberate the future of the aetas from the vita. In the final 
section, I expound upon this future aspect of the aetas by identifying two modes of futurity 
evident in de Sen.: paternity and fecundity. As a whole, I contend in this final chapter that 
Cicero’s philosophical work under Caesar’s dictatorship persists in and holds open the 
heterogeneity of failure, thereby emphasizing the ways in which his present is tied to and 
produced by an unknowable future.  
 This dissertation, therefore, aims to understand the influence of experience on time in 
Cicero’s ethical dialogues of 45-44 BCE. It draws from scholarship in ancient philosophy, 
Ciceronian biography and epistolography, Roman history, and modern theories of time and 
experience in order to elucidate how Cicero’s writing from this period can be read as a corpus 
dedicated to a specific philosophical problem and serving a unique place in the history of 
thought. Yet, by his very commitment to investigating the turbulence and transformations of 
time, Cicero’s philosophy is not systematic. Cicero did not relish in constructing an unassailable 
edifice through and out of which his readers will find no passage except those that he, the 
master-builder, has left open. Cicero was, after all, many things, but never a master-builder. It is 
my hope that these readings open up at least a few disused corridors in the maze that Cicero left 
behind, and to leave at least as many closed. Perhaps by design, and certainly by a long lineage 
of historical choices, these texts and their perspectives on some of the most pressing questions 
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for human existence have been preserved, not as an unchanging instantiation of one man’s time 
and experience, but as a benefit for a posterity that will still be searching for their answers.  
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Chapter 1. Specters of Solitude. 
L’instant c’est déjà la solitude…C’est la solitude dans sa valeur métaphysique la plus 
dépouillée. Mais une solitude d’un ordre plus sentimental confirme le tragique isolement 
de l’instant: par une sorte de violence créatrice, le temps limité à l’instant nous isole non 
seulement des autres mais de nous-mêmes, puisqu’il rompt avec notre passé le plus cher. 
Dès le seuil de sa méditation—et la méditation du temps est la tâche préliminaire à toute 
métaphysique—voilà donc le philosophe devant l’affirmation que le temps se présente 
comme l’instant solitaire, comme la conscience d’une solitude.  
Gaston Bachelard, L’intuition de l’instant (15) 
This terrible solitude which is mine or ours at the death of the other is what constitutes 
that relationship to self which we call “me,” “us,” “between us,” “subjectivity,” 
“intersubjectivity,” “memory.” The possibility of death “happens,” so to speak, “before” 
these different instances, and makes them possible. Or, more precisely, the possibility of 
the death of the other as mine or ours in-forms any relation to the other and the finitude 
of memory.” 
Jacques Derrida, Memoires for Paul de Man (33) 
I. The Solitude of Astura 
In late November 46 BCE,1 at the same time Cicero was beginning to outline what would 
become his new course of philosophical dialogues,2 Cicero writes to Atticus from his recently 
 
1 The dating of this letter (Att. XII.9) is contested. Schmidt 1893 assigns this and the following letter a 
date in July 45 due to the seductive idea that Cicero intentionally acquired his villa at Astura as a place of 
mourning in the wake of Tullia’s death; for the most extensive argument in this direction see Petersson 
1963: 525 and also below n.3. Shackleton Bailey: ad loc., whose dating I adopt, cites Taylor 1937, “there 
seems to be no adequate reason for taking [these letters] from their context among the letters of 46” that 
cluster at the beginning of Att. XII. Aside from the benefit of being the less interventionist choice, a date 
circa 20 Nov. 46 allows us to draw out better the connections between Cicero’s grief, Astura, and his 
philosophical project that this editorial choice discloses.  
2 Another contentious point of dating, but a communis opinio has emerged based on Cicero’s comments in 
Att. XII.12(259) that the Hortensius was completed prior to Tullia’s death in February 45. This protreptic 
call to the individual and communal study of philosophy stood as the first programmatic statement in 
Cicero’s new project. For the extant frr. see Grilli 1962; cf. Diels 1888; Dyck 2008; Mihai 2014. Cicero’s 
visit to Astura in late 46 and the completion of the Hortensius soon afterwards allows us to see the 
connection between this place and philosophy for Cicero. Grief over Tullia is an important, but 
subsequent admixture.  
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acquired villa at Astura.3 The surrounding sea and landscape are common points of reflection in 
the many letters that Cicero dispatches from this secluded, cliff-side locale. And, this innocently 
brief, yet prophetically melancholy missive is no exception:  
Ne ego essem hic libenter atque id cottidie magis, ni esset ea causa quam tibi 
superioribus litteris scripsi. nihil hac solitudine iucundius, nisi paulum interpellasset 
Amyntae filius. ὢ ἀπεραντολογίας ἀηδοῦς! cetera noli putare amabiliora fieri posse villa, 
litore, prospectu maris, tum his rebus omnibus. sed neque haec digna longioribus litteris 
nec erat quid scriberem, et somnus urgebat.  
 
I would remain here quite willingly, and would feel so more and more daily, if it were 
not for that reason I wrote you about in my last letter. Nothing could be more pleasing 
than this solitude—if it were not for the intermittent interruption of Amyntas’s son. What 
annoying, unending chatter! But, as for the rest, you could not imagine it to be more 
lovely—the house, the shore, the view of the sea, and indeed everything. But these 
things aren’t worth a long letter, and there was nothing else I wanted to write, and sleep 
presses on me.4  
The letter seems to show Cicero at relative ease. He expresses his satisfaction, if not genuine 
pleasure, in “the house, the shore, the view of the sea, and indeed everything” before drowsily 
laying down his pen. He even engages Atticus in a joke about his tiresome neighbor.5 
Considering the violent upheaval that continued to wrack the Roman world at this moment, 
Cicero finds a measure of solace and respite in “this solitude” (hac solitudine) at Astura.  
 
3 Schmidt 1899, based on his previous reordering of the letters in Att. XII, describes this purchase as a 
spur of the moment decision, which was transacted during a short stay at the more popular seaside 
destination, Lanuvium, while trying to recuperate from Tullia’s death. In addition to the problems with 
dating the letters, we know that in Feb. 45 Cicero was facing significant financial difficulties, and 
particularly a liquidity crisis caused by over-leveraging his existing properties; see XII.13 discussed 
below and XII.25(264). This situation makes the sudden purchase of a new villa in the early months of 45 
unlikely. Given a more conservative dating of the letters from this period, Cicero probably acquired 
Astura in late fall 46, which may, in fact, have contributed to his later financial problems.  
4 Att. XII.9[246].  
5 “The son of Amyntas,” i.e., L. Marcius Philippus punningly referred to as Philip of Macedonia, cf. Att. 
IX.15(183), XIV.11(365). 
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 As often with Cicero’s shortest letters, however, Att. XII.9 is deeply complex.6 Obliquely 
referring to “that reason (ea causa) I wrote you about in my last letter,” Cicero conjures up 
anxieties that he need not spell out again for his friend.7 Yet why would Cicero write this letter if 
not in an attempt to excise this causa from his mind as he tries to fall asleep? After all, “there 
was nothing else [he] wanted to write about.”8 Cicero also seems preoccupied by the fragility of 
the solitude that he finds at Astura. The phrasing of the first sentence, “I would remain here quite 
willingly, and would feel so more and more daily, if it were not for that reason” (Ne ego essem 
hic libenter atque id cottidie magis, ni esset ea causa), emphasizes the brittleness and 
vulnerability of his experience. The potential for daily growth (cottidie magis) in his enjoyment 
of solitude is punctured by the resurfacing of ea causa in much the same way that his physical 
isolation is interrupted (nisi paulum interpellasset) by the arrival of “Amyntas’ son.” Cicero’s 
desire for solitude is frustrated by personal anxiety and inter-personal obligation. Even his joke 
about the busybody neighbor reveals deeper concerns of the moment: L. Marcius Philippus, was, 
much like Cicero himself, without firm footing in the current political maelstrom. He was 
married to Caesar’s niece, but was also the father-in-law of Cato; he had openly opposed Caesar 
at the beginning of the civil war, and now after Caesar’s consolidation of power remained safe 
only through the clemency of the dictator.9 Philippus’ disturbance annoys Cicero perhaps most of 
all because it forces him to confront his own political and social predicament. In his desire to 
 
6 See, e.g., Fam. XIV.20(173) sent to Terentia just before their divorce.  
7 Cf. Shackleton Bailey ad loc: “ea causa. Unknown.”  
8 On the importance of this trope in Cicero’s letters to Atticus during this period, see Martelli 2016.  
9 On Caesar and Philippus’ relationship, see Caesar B. Civ. 1.6.5 and Cic. Att. IX.15.5(183). On his 
arrangement with Caesar after the civil war, see Att. X.4.10(195) with Shackleton Bailey ad loc.  
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avoid even the empathetic presence of Philippus, the solitude of Astura starts to feel less like a 
respite and more like a bitter retreat.  
 How, then, should we understand the solitude that Cicero both seeks and despairs to find 
at Astura in the winter of 46? The difficulty of encompassing the full nuance of his experience is 
reflected in the contrasting perspectives of Gaston Bachelard and Jacques Derrida.10 As 
Bachelard contends, “par une sorte de violence créatrice, le temps limité à l’instant nous isole 
non seulement des autres mais de nous-mêmes, puisqu’il rompt avec notre passé le plus cher.” 
Put simply, a solitary instant separates us from others and from ourselves. At the same time, this 
withdrawal is not purely destructive, but seethes with the possibilities of creation. For Bachelard, 
solitude is a “positive experience of nothingness,” which has been subtracted from the 
continuities of life and confirms to philosophy “que le temps se présente comme l’instant 
solitaire.”11 As a consequence of its subtraction from succession, solitude enables philosophy to 
embrace all emergent possibilities, having been freed from any necessary ties to the past.12 
Although also emphasizing a productive or creative aspect, Derrida writes, by contrast, “This 
terrible solitude which is mine or ours at the death of the other is what constitutes that 
relationship to self which we call ‘me,’ ‘us,’ ‘between us,’ ‘subjectivity,’ ‘intersubjectivity,’ 
‘memory.’” Solitude, and specifically the solitude that follows the death of a loved one, does not 
erase the past, rather, it gives the past meaning; it does not isolate the self, but connects the self 
 
10 Cited above as epigraphs. 
11 2000: 47, “The positive experience of nothingness in ourselves can only help to clarify our experience 
of succession. Indeed, it shows us a succession that is plainly heterogenous, clearly marked by 
occurrences of newness and surprise and by breaks, cut too by voids.” 
12 On Bachelard’s philosophical approach more generally, see the introduction to his work The Dialectic 
of Duration by Cristina Chimisso (Bachelard 2000: 1-16). See also below, n.110.  
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to itself and to others. Far from being, as it is for Bachelard, the reification of a singular instant 
and a liberation from past ties, for Derrida, solitude is the very condition of possibility for 
personal connection, inter- and intra-subjectively.  
 Cicero’s own experience and philosophical use of solitude embraces the tension between 
these two positions. As I examine further in the next section, Cicero’s descriptions of and 
associations with solitudo develop over the course of the early months of 45. Writing to Atticus 
following the death of Tullia, the solitude of Astura comes to represent for Cicero a moment of 
withdrawal, an instant that has been liberated from his subjective sense of continuity. It severs 
him from his public persona, his private anxieties, and even his own past. Yet, through the 
introspection and philosophical inquiry that solitude enables, this singular instant resonates with 
other moments throughout time, giving the past meaning and opening up a new way of 
approaching the duration of a lifetime. It is significant, therefore, that one of the first 
philosophical dialogues that Cicero begins to write in the early spring is concerned precisely with 
the relation between the origins and “ends” of life. The debates contained in de Finibus bonorum 
et malorum consider the different ways in which Epicurean, Stoic, and Antiochean theories on 
the ethical finis—i.e., “the end, the final, the ultimate aim, to which all precepts for living well 
and acting ethically refer”13—conceive of the finite structure of the vita. In order to arrive at 
these “ends,” each speech in the dialogue begins from a “cradle argument,” which makes a claim 
about how the first impulses of life are connected to its ultimate purpose and overall structure. 
The biographical framing of this dialogue also gestures to an interest in tracing the shape of a 
life. Each set of debates moves the reader further into Cicero’s past until, in de Fin. 5.1, we find 
 
13 1.11, id quod his libris quaeritur, qui sit finis, quid extremum, quid ultimum quo sint omnia bene 
vivendi recteque faciendi consilia referenda.  
 54 
him in the solitudo of the Academy during a youthful sojourn to Athens. By writing his 
experience following Tullia’s death into this reminiscence, Cicero creates in the form and 
content of this dialogue a sustained inquiry into the relationship between solitude and the 
duration of a life.  
 In this chapter, therefore, I argue above all that Cicero’s solitudo can be understood best 
in relation to his interest in human time and, in particular, the finite structure of the vita. In order 
to elucidate this relationship between solitude and duration, in section II, I complete my reading 
of Cicero’s letters from Astura and, in section III, relate these epistolary accounts to the 
programmatic opening of de Fin 5. In section IV, I consider the “cradle arguments” of Epicurean 
and Stoic ethics in de Fin. 1-4, which propose different theories of non-temporal continuity for 
the vita. In the final section, I focus on Piso’s introduction of aetas in de Fin. 5 in order to offer 
an understanding of the continuity of the vita as a duration of time. I contend, however, that the 
skeptical impasse that awaits at the end of the work opens onto a moment of discontinuity, which 
represents through the form of the dialogue Cicero’s experience of solitudo. 
 II. A Philosophical Solitude 
  Solitudo functions as a dominant signifier in Cicero’s letter writing in the early months 
of 45 BCE.14 The importance of the word for understanding the themes and sequence of book 
XII of the letters to Atticus is belied by the editorial placement of XII.9 prior to a series of letters 
(XII.13-26) that Cicero wrote four months later, all from Astura. Through the editorial emphasis 
on geographical location over strict chronology, we can see more clearly how XII.9 foreshadows 
Cicero’s return to Astura in March of 45 following the unexpected death of his daughter Tullia at 
 
14 See Att. XII.9(246), 13(250), 15(252), 16(253), 18(254), 23(262), 26(265), and XIII.16(323). Cf. 
Walters 2013: 427, who, however, ignores XII.9 and the chronological problems that it creates for his 
argument.  
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Tusculum in the middle of February.15 If, even prior to Tullia’s death, Cicero is drawn to the 
solitudo of Astura, then, following her death, at which point it has become unbearable for Cicero 
to remain either at his Tusculan villa or at Atticus’ house in Rome, this quality becomes 
indispensable. Cicero departs from Rome for Astura specifically in search of the solitude that he 
associates with the place (XII.13[250]):  
me haec solitudo minus stimulat quam ista celebritas. te unum desidero; sed litteris non 
difficilius utor quam si domi essem. ardor tamen ille idem urget et manet, non mehercule 
indulgente me sed tamen repugnante…cum enim mihi carendum sit conviviis, malo id 
lege videri facere quam dolore. Cocceium velim appelles. quod enim dixerat non facit. 
ego autem volo aliquod emere latibulum et perfugium doloris mei.  
This solitude upsets me less than the busyness back in town. I wish I could just have 
you. But I’m writing with no more difficulty than if I were at home. Still, that white hot 
pain persists and overwhelms me—even though I’m fighting against it, not indulging 
it…So, since I must get rid of social obligations, I prefer for it to seem like I do this for 
some legal reason rather than pain. Please ask Cocceius to pay his debt, because he is not 
doing what he said he would. I wish to buy some little hiding-place and refuge from my 
pain.  
In this first letter that survives after a nearly three-month break in the correspondence,16 the 
solitudo of Astura does not simply offer a respite from Cicero’s political troubles or personal 
anxieties but has become a positive mode of experience that produces a specific state of mind. 
Cicero articulates an opposition between solitudo and celebritas to measure the difference 
between the agitation that the activity of Rome caused him and the “less upsetting” isolation of 
the villa.17 But this is not a necessarily obvious duality: through it, solitudo opposes a state of 
 
15 Cicero spends nearly the whole of March 45 in Astura. During the following months he divides his time 
between this seaside villa (May 1-15, June 22- July 6, and August 25-30), his estate at Tusculum where 
Tullia had died (May 17-June 21, July 8-August 24), and a brief trip to his hometown Arpinium (June 22- 
July 6). For the full chronology see Marinone 2004: 211-13.  
16 It should be noted that this gap may be, in part, a natural result of the fact that both correspondents were 
in or near Rome for these months. 
17 This opposition is found elsewhere in Cicero’s writings, even as far back as Inv. 1.38; cf. Att. III.7(52), 
Off. 3.1. He also uses celebritas in the sense of “fame” at Tusc. 1.12; cf. also its use to describe the 
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“swiftness” as well as “busyness” or “frequency,” thereby taking on a meaning that encompasses 
both a lack of motion and a singularity of occurrence. Solitudo is a motionless instant and an 
isolated moment outside of sequence.  
 The definition of solitudo in opposition to celebritas reflects other fundamental features 
of the way that Cicero thinks about the isolation of Astura. In the motionless and singular state 
that his seaside villa affords, two constants remain: Cicero’s literary activity and “that white hot 
pain” which “still persists and overwhelms [him]” (sed litteris non difficilius utor quam si domi 
essem. ardor tamen ille idem urget et manet). In Cicero’s world following Tullia’s death, his 
Asturan solitude is less a refuge or a retreat from political upheaval, defined simply by a lack of 
disturbance, and more of a necessary psychological support—a substantive experience that he 
seeks out in its own right. In fact, Cicero already begins to look elsewhere for the refuge that he 
had previously identified with Astura. This letter concludes with a plea to Atticus to straighten 
out affairs with Cicero’s debtor, Cocceius, so that he can free up enough cash to complete the 
purchase of another parcel of land, which he refers to as “some little hiding-place and refuge 
from my pain” (latibulum et perfugium doloris mei). As book XII progresses, it becomes clear 
that this latibulum is Cicero’s proposed shrine to Tullia.18 This proposed shrine offers the 
prospect of a new refuge where he will be able to lay his grief to rest. The solitude of Astura, 
instead, serves as the place in which Cicero lives with his pain—and fights vainly against it.  
 This function of Asturan solitudo becomes more evident in the letters that follow. Cicero 
writes on March 8th, “solitude helps somewhat” in his battle against his grief, “but it would be 
 
“throng” of society among which philosophers are observers in the Pythagorean fable at Tusc. 5.9; on this 
fable, see below Ch. 4, sections II and III.  
18 On Cicero’s shrine for Tullia, which will never actually be built, see esp. Boyancé 1944; Martelli 2016; 
and Englert 2017. See also below, Ch. 3, sections III and IV.  
 57 
much more beneficial if you were present” (solitudo aliquid adiuvat, sed multo plus proficeret si 
tu tamen interesses, XII.14.3[251]). Again, on March 10th, “So far, nothing has suited me more 
than this solitude” (mihi nihil adhuc aptius fuit hac solitudine, XII.16[253]). Such comments, 
which resurface regularly throughout the correspondence of March 45, express both a desire for 
solitude, understood as the absence of others, and a paradoxical claim that, in fact, the only thing 
that could make Cicero’s solitude more complete or beneficial would be the presence of Atticus. 
This tension between solitude as absence and as desire for presence manifests itself most 
evocatively in XII.15(252): 
in hac solitudine careo omnium colloquio, cumque mane me in silvam abstrusi densam 
et asperam, non exeo inde ante vesperum. secundum te nihil est mihi amicius solitudine. 
in ea mihi omnis sermo est cum litteris. eum tamen interpellat fletus; cui repugno quoad 
possum, sed adhuc pares non sumus.  
In this solitude I lack communication with everyone. In the morning I hide myself away 
in a dense and thorny wood and I do not leave it before evening. Nothing is more a 
friend to me than solitude—apart from you. In my solitude all my speech is with books, 
although weeping interrupts it. I fight against the tears as much as I can, but as yet I am 
no match for them.  
Whether or not we understand Cicero’s “dense and thorny wood” (silvam…densam et asperam) 
as a part of the real Asturan landscape or as a metapoetical reference to the writer’s immersion in 
his craft,19 solitude, understood as a paradoxical mix of absence and presence, isolation and 
fullness, defines Cicero’s state of mind in his grief. Although he does not “talk to anyone,” 
nevertheless “all [his] speech is with books.” Likewise, “nothing is more a friend” (amicius) than 
solitude, except, that is, a real friend—Atticus. Of the several comparisons of this type,20 this 
 
19 See Walters 2013 for an argument in favor of the metapoetic reading of silva akin to Gk., ὕλη. But cf. 
XII.9 above for Cicero’s infatuation with the “real” Asturan landscape which, of course, is just as 
literarily constructed as it is “real.”  
20 E.g., nihil hac solitudine iucundius, XII.9; mihi nihil adhuc aptius fuit hac solitudine, XII.16; nec 
quicquam habeo tolerabilius quam solitudinem, XII.18. 
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particular formulation stands out because it does not compare solitude to an abstract attribute, 
such as iucundus, aptus, or tolerabilis, but rather to Atticus himself in his capacity as amicus. 
This letter demonstrates fully the paradoxical nature of Cicero’s solitudo: it is an absence defined 
by presence, an isolation filled with sermo, and loneliness reconfigured as friendship.  
 This letter also marks the conclusion of a transformation, begun in XII.9, of the 
relationship between solitudo and an ephemeral, sequential sense of time. Unlike in XII.9, where 
the arrival of a nosy neighbor disturbs Cicero’s respite and heralds the return of daily routine, in 
XII.15 Cicero’s solitude is now so complete that it defines the rhythm of life. Cicero describes 
himself as departing “early in the morning” (mane) to hide in the dense thicket from which he 
does not depart until evening (ante vesperum).21 In their cooptation of the natural rhythm of 
sunrise and sunset, Cicero’s solitary habits reflect and shape his literary work.22 The dialogues 
that Cicero writes at this period are “daily” affairs. Rather than being organized exclusively 
around the availability of leisure time for their aristocratic interlocutors,23 they present 
 
21 For an interesting historical resonance on the rhythm of Cicero’s solitary routine, cf. its inversion in 
Machiavelli’s 10 Dec. 1513 letter from exile to Francesco Vettori: “When evening comes, I return home 
and enter my study; on the threshold I take off my workday clothes, covered with mud and dirt, and put 
on the garments of court and palace. Fitted out appropriately, I step inside the venerable courts of the 
ancients, where, solicitously received by them, I nourish myself on that food that alone is mine and for 
which I was born; where I am unashamed to converse with them and to question them about the motives 
for their actions, and they, out of their human kindness, answer me. And for four hours at a time I feel no 
boredom, I forget all my troubles, I do not dread poverty, and I am not terrified by death. I absorb myself 
into them completely” (1996: 262-65). My thanks to Peter Bing for this reference.  
22 On the organization of Cicero’s philosophica cottidiana, see esp. Luciani 2010: 49-66.  
23 A common theme in the prologues of the literary works of the 50s is the defense of the use of otium—
that is time free from public affairs—for the study of philosophy. See esp., Rep. 1.14, de Or. 2.24; cf. the 
shift in discourse evident in e.g., Luc. 5-6, de Fin. 3.7. As Gildenhard 2007 passim argues, in the 
philosophica of 45, Cicero ceases to refer to the traditional alternation of negotium/otium and instead uses 
the formulaic defense of otium as a polemic against Caesar’s dictatorship. As Luciani 2010: 67 also points 
out, in the works of 45, Cicero’s discussion of otium becomes a site for the debates surrounding the 
genera vitae. Cf. Kretschmar 1938; Boyancé 1941 and 1967. I return to these questions in Ch. 4.  
 59 
philosophical inquiry as “quotidian”—that is, both so common as to be “everyday” occurrences 
and literarily structured around a division of days into morning and afternoon discussions.24 
Solitudo and sermo become nearly interchangeable through parallel pronominal use: “In it 
[solitudo] all my speech is with books, although weeping interrupts it [sermo]” (in ea mihi omnis 
sermo est cum litteris. eum tamen interpellat fletus). Any “interruption” (interpellat) of this 
solitary life, which used to be threatened from without (nisi paulum interpellasset Amyntae filius, 
XII.9), can now only come from within. Sermo can be replaced by “weeping” (fletus), but this 
does not disturb the essential solitude. Solitudo has come to define Cicero’s experience and 
mindset, his compositional process and philosophical goal; it is both a necessary condition for 
his literary production as well as the very object of his work.  
 Cicero reemphasizes his pursuit of solitude in two letters from the end of the sequence 
written from Astura. In response to a request from Atticus that he return to Rome, the still-
grieving orator responds, “But, as you say, my house is the forum. What good is that house to me 
if I lack the forum? I am dead, dead I say, Atticus, and have been so for a long time, but I am 
only now admitting it after losing the one thing I was clinging to. And so, I seek solitudes…” 
(sed domus est, ut ais, forum. quid ipsa domo mihi opus est carenti foro? occidimus, occidimus, 
Attice, iam pridem nos quidem, sed nunc fatemur, postea quam unum quo tenebamur amisimus. 
 
24 See esp., the organization of Tusc., e.g., 1.8, Dierum quinque scholas, ut Graeci appellant, identidem 
libros contuli. Cf., e.g., 3.7, Ut enim in Acedemiam nostram descendimus inclinato iam in 
postmeridianum tempus die. See Luciani 2010: 64, “Cette ‘temporalisation’ de la philosophie permet de 
garantir son intégration dans la cité: insérés dans le cours naturel du temps par le biais de la scénographie, 
les entretiens de Tusculum se veulent une actualisation de la méthode socratique.” Luciani refers to “la 
cité,” despite the fact that Cicero’s dialogues are invariably set in country or suburban estates, because 
this claim is part of her argument that the dialogues of 45 should be understood as a protreptic call to his 
fellow Romans to engage in philosophical activity as an antidote to authoritarianism. This argument has 
become widespread in recent work on the philosophica; see, e.g., Gildenhard 2007 passim; Fox 2007: 67; 
Baraz 2012 passim. Thus, “la cité” is less a geographic location and more of a reference to the political 
collective. 
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itaque solitudines sequor…,XII.23[263]). “I seek solitudes” (solitudines sequor) defines the task 
that Cicero sets for himself in his grief at the loss of both his political position (forum) and his 
daughter (domus)25—and as a philosopher.26 A few days after this pronouncement, Cicero 
responds testily to Atticus’ reports of public maligning of his grief by saying that at this time he 
is unable to enjoy the company of even so noble a friend as Nicias of Cos.27 He writes that a 
complete break separates him from his former life as a public figure: “solitude and retirement are 
now my province” (sed mihi solitudo et recessus provincia est, XII.26[265]).  
 Although Cicero occasionally uses the word provincia in a general sense to mean 
“occupation” or “duty,”28 it typically has a quasi-technical sense, referring to the purview of a 
foreign governorship. In the late Republican period, provinciae were sources of contention and 
tools of the ruling factions in their political maneuvering. The Senate sometimes granted 
provinces to former consuls as an excuse to remove them from Rome when they had gained too 
 
25 On the consistent association in the letters of this period between Tullia and Cicero’s domus in contrast 
to the forum as a metonym for public life, see esp. ad Fam. IV.6(249), “I am not able now, as in the past 
when my home received me in sadness from service to the Republic and lightened my sorrow, to flee in 
my gloom from my home to the Republic so that I might find a haven in its benefits. And so I am absent 
at home and in the forum because home cannot console the pain inflicted on me from the Republic and 
the Republic cannot console the pain inflicted on me at home” (non enim, ut tum me a re publica maestum 
domus excipiebat, quae levaret, sic nunc domo maerens ad rem publicam confugere possum, ut in eius 
bonis adquiescam. itaque et domo absum et foro, quod nec eum dolorem quem de re publica capio, 
domus iam consolari potest nec domesticum res publica). This letter and the trope is discussed in detail 
below, Ch. 3, section II. It is interesting to note, however, that Cicero reserves his elaborations on solitudo 
for Atticus. The word does not appear in the epistles of ad Fam. from this period.  
26 I return in Ch. 2 to the resonances between this formulation and the ways in which Cicero frames the 
Academic skeptical approach to philosophical inquiry as a “pursuit” (sequi). And, in Ch. 3, I consider 
fully the role that grief plays in this philosophical project. 
27 Likely a grammarian and textual critic to whom Cicero refers at two other times in the letters (Fam. 
IX.10[217]; Att. VII.3[126]). The self-defensive tone of the latter of these two lends more than a 
possibility of sarcasm to XII.26.  
28 E.g., Pro Sul. 52, tum tuus pater, Corneli, id quod tandem aliquando confitetur, illam sibi officiosam 
provinciam depoposcit… 
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much influence; yet the embattled systems of assigning provinciae invited significant abuse and, 
in the case of Caesar, played a vital part in his ultimate monopolization of power.29 The pairing 
of provincia with recessus produces a further complexity. In almost every other instance where 
Cicero uses recessus, it appears with its antonym, accessus.30 If we understand this technical 
sense of provincia, therefore, the phrase solitudo et recessus provincia est combines, under the 
rubric of solitudo, an ironically antithetical combination of senses: a withdrawal that is also a 
formally assigned duty; a fraught retirement from which Cicero must still carry out important 
and necessary tasks; a place of forced exile out of which a “rise” (accessus) may still be 
possible—but at what cost to himself and to his country? 
 It has become widely accepted in the scholarship on Cicero’s philosophica of 45-44 BCE 
that the former consul writes a “republic of letters” as a textualization of the Res Publica that 
was lost in the upheaval of the first half of the 1st century BCE.31 This reading emphasizes above 
all the political function of the texts as statements of opposition to Caesar’s dictatorship.32 This 
 
29 See Cicero’s own speech on the topic, de Prov. Consul., which is concerned specifically with the issue 
of the renewal of Caesar’s governorship of Gaul in 56 BCE and is filled with anecdotes about the abuse of 
power that proconsular governors visited on their provinces; on this complex speech, see esp. Grillo 2015. 
On Caesar’s Gallic command in particular, see Balsdon 1939 and 1939a; Ridley 1981; Drogula 2015: 
232-344.  
30 E.g., Div. 2.34 where the “rise and fall of the seas are governed by the movement of the moon” 
(quorum accessus et recessus lunae motu gubernantur). Cf. Nat. De. 2.49, 3.24, Fam. IX.14(326). In the 
only exception, aside from the present instance, it serves as a synonym for latebrae, meaning “hiding 
places” (Sed tamen cum in animis hominum tantae latebrae sint et tanti recessus, augeamus sane 
suspicionem tuam, Pro Marc. 22).  
31 This currently popular opinion is based upon the work of a series of German scholars, who have 
focused especially on the Tusculans. See Bringmann 1971; Strasburger 1990; Wassmann 1996; and 
Lefèvre 2008. For a critical consideration of the historicist roots of this position, see Altman 2015.  
32 Gildenhard 2007: 276 articulates this widely held scholarly position that, the philosophica, and in 
particular the Tusculan Disputations, “are a most determined effort by Cicero to scribere πολιτείας. On 
the (related) critical principles of economy and benevolence, an interpretation of the dialogue that 
foregrounds political and pedagogic aspects yields the most satisfying results…Read as an effort to 
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literary edifice, which is the product of the otium that was compelled upon Cicero by Caesar’s 
ascendency, is considered a relatively straightforward stand-in for the political negotium that the 
former consul had previously privileged morally and performed enthusiastically.33 Cicero’s 
repeated insistence in the prefaces to the philosophica that through his project he aims to remain 
beneficial to his countrymen even in the midst of his forced retirement supports this argument 
that we should understand his literary endeavors under Caesar as “politics by other means.”34  
 Yet Cicero also claims in these letters of February and March 45, which were written at 
the very moments when, still emotionally raw from the death of Tullia, he is articulating the 
purpose of his intellectual labor,35 that his pursuit is isolation (sequor solitudines) and his 
provincia is solitudo. The finality of these claims should lead us to consider the possibility that, 
rather than proposing literary otium as a simple stand-in for political negotium, Cicero’s ethical 
dialogues record and advocate for a redefinition of the terms by which the philosopher measures 
his current endeavors and the previous political activity of his life. The social and political 
conditions of Caesar’s dictatorship had invalidated the traditional distinction between and moral 
 
reckon intelligently with the realities of tyranny, the dialogue will sparkle and testify to the genius of 
Cicero’s political and literary imagination.” Baraz 2012 pushes this argument to the extreme; see e.g., 9, 
“[Under Caesar], Cicero was forced into inactivity, and the virtual disappearance of the political system 
that had been a central concern of his life left him distraught. Writing, and the writing of philosophy in 
particular, became not a facet of his political life, but rather an alternate way of being in politics, a 
substitution that he struggled to construct as viable.” On this position further, see below Ch. 4, part II.  
33 Görler 1990 provides a helpful label for scholarly approaches that characterize Cicero’s philosophy as 
“politics by other means”: the Ersatzbeschäftigung thesis (158). 
34 Cicero repeatedly refers in the prefaces to the pedagogic intent of his philosophica: see, e.g., de Fin. 
1.2, 1.10, 3.6; and esp., Tusc. 1.7, 2.4-5. On the organization of the entire Tusculans as a catechistic 
narrative, see Gildenhard 2007: 207-75.  
35 See e.g., Marinone’s dating of the so-called volumen proemiorum to February 45 (2004: 213). There are 
significant scholarly difficulties in handling this supposed “book of books,” attested only in the late Att. 
XVI.6(414), but the debate around its dating offers a useful barometer for the point at which Cicero began 
to think of his new philosophical writings as a unified whole.  
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evaluation of negotium and otium; if we, therefore, posit a new term, solitudo, as animating 
Cicero’s philosophy at its very origins, we find him engaged in a process of critique and revision 
both of the dominant ideology of the Roman elite and his own participation in a status quo that 
had brought about its own demise.36 Solitudo is at once a personal refuge, a point from which to 
reckon with his former life, a place of mourning for the death of his daughter and collapse of his 
country, and a site from which to carry out the duties to come—which will not be the same as 
those of the past. Solitudo embraces both the failures of the present as well as the potentialities 
that arise from that failure. To inhabit and expand this solitudo becomes Cicero’s goal, and this 
shift marks a profound awareness of the shortcomings of the categories of traditional Roman 
thought and a need to reinvigorate them through philosophical endeavor.  
III. The Solitude of the Academy 
 In the sections that follow, I examine how Cicero writes his experience of solitude at 
Astura into the form and content of de Finibus bonorum et malorum, one of the first ethical 
works that he began writing there following Tullia’s death.37 As I consider in detail in the next 
section, this multi-volume work consists of arguments and counter-arguments concerning the 
 
36 See esp. Habinek 1994 for the argument that Cicero’s dialogues are not simply “reflective” of their 
historical juncture but are “constitutive of [their] political and social context” (66 n.5). Cf. Lotito 1981. 
Whereas Habinek’s short essay on this topic focuses on how Cicero’s dialogues—especially looking 
forward to de Officiis—might be understood as “the cornerstone of the imperial pax Romana” (55), I 
would like to hold this conclusion in abeyance. Throughout this project, my aim has been to restore a 
measure of unevenness to our understanding of Cicero’s life and work. Thus, if we restrict our own 
interpretation diachronically, we can find a proliferation of constitutive possibilities in the temporal and 
historical failure through which Cicero writes, rather than a foreclosed conclusion. On this failure, see 
below, Ch. 4.  
37 More accurately, this work is the first fully extant dialogue completed in 45. It was written at roughly 
the same time as the Lucullus, but that dialogue was almost immediately submitted to total revision; see 
below, Ch. 2, section IV. See Marinone 2004 for dating, cf. Bringmann 1971: 93-138. 
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relationship between the origins and “ends” of life.38 The skeptical divisio that organizes this 
debate proposes and ultimately rejects three different theories concerning the nature of the 
continuity that unites a human life (vita). The exposition of these arguments takes place in a 
series of retrospective and autobiographical settings that juxtapose a philosophical perspective 
with different moments from Cicero’s life. In this section I contend specifically that, by 
dramatizing the debate of the fifth book in the solitudo of the Academy, Cicero renders his own 
experience in the world of the dialogue. Through this interaction between form and content, 
experience and philosophy, the text as a whole approaches the duration of a life not as a seamless 
succession but through the spectral resonance between discontinuous moments of cessation and 
withdrawal across time. 
 The anomalousness of the final book of de Fin. marks it as of programmatic importance 
for this work and for Cicero’s philosophy more generally. The book begins, atypically for the 
introduction of a new dialogue, without a preface.39 The choice of personae and setting also 
differs from the debates that make up books 1/2 and 3/4. Books 1 and 2 are staged at Cicero’s 
Cumaean villa in 50 BCE, just before the beginning of the Caesarian civil war. The main 
interlocutor, Lucius Manlius Torquatus, who had been a Pompeian partisan, was killed in 48. 
Books 3 and 4 creep slightly further into the past: 52 at Lucullus’ Tusculan estate. The 
 
38 The work is divided into five books comprised of three dialogues: books 1 and 2 on Epicureanism 
between L. Torquatus and Cicero; books 2 and 3 on Stoicism between Cato Minor and Cicero; and book 5 
on Antiochus’ philosophical synthesis. The content of these dialogues is concerned with the structure of a 
lifetime (status vitae, 2.45) and the forms of continuity that unite the origins and ends of life. I consider 
this point in detail below, sections IV and V. 
39 Both book 1 and book 3, each of which begins a new diptych, commence with an extensive prologue 
(1.1-13; 3.1-7)—a pattern that would lead us to expect a similar introduction to book 5. Many readers 
have also remarked on the absence of a book 6 which would contain Cicero’s refutation of the Antiochean 
version of Academic philosophy presented by Piso à la books 2 and 4. On these and other oddities of the 
literary structure of de Fin. see esp., Giancotti 1959 and Dörrie 1978.  
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interlocutor of these books, Cato the Younger, died only a year prior to the time of writing, in 
April 46.40 In the final dialogue of book 5, however, none of the participants is particularly 
partisan and the setting—79 BCE in Athens—seems distant from the political fracas of the 
Caesarian era.41 Cicero closes his first ethical dialogue, therefore, not amid the still pressing 
turmoil of the recent past, but in a time and place that could appear to be far removed from the 
present, even in an idealized rendering of his own youth.  
 Far from simple nostalgia, however, Cicero revisits this particular past self at this 
moment in time as part of his quest for solitude: when the group of young Romans arrive at the 
Academy, they find “the solitude [they] had wanted” (solitudo erat ea quam volueramus, 5.1). 
Cicero retrojects this series of dialogues onto his past selves in order to reckon with the duration 
of his own vita. Yet the disjointed nature of the work articulates a lifetime not as a seamless 
experience of continuity, but as punctuated throughout by moments of withdrawal, 
contemplation, and conversation.42 As the letters express personally, de Finibus represents 
philosophically an understanding of solitude as a momentary cessation in the unfolding of life, 
which both severs the present from the past and gives the past its duration and meaning. 
 Cicero’s reminiscence of his youthful journey to Athens begins with a litany of proper 
names. This framing device establishes relationships not only between the speakers and places 
 
40 On the significance of the setting of books 3/4, see Frampton 2016, who focuses more on the mise-en-
scène—a library—than the time. On the choice of Pompeian partisans as dramatis personae see 
Strasburger 1990: 41-43. 
41 Yet a reader alert to the recent political history of Rome knows that there is, in fact, a direct connection 
between the dictatorship of Caesar in 45 and the situation in 79 during Sulla’s brutal rule. Plutarch even 
tells us that Cicero traveled to Athens less out of a desire for a Bildungsreise and more out of fear of 
Sulla. He did not return to Rome until after Sulla had died (Cic. 3-4). 
42 This retrospective disjointedness differs significantly from Cicero’s other multivolume works of the 
period (Ac. Lib., Tusc., Nat. De., Div. etc.), all of which move forward in time and take place on 
contiguous days.  
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within the world of the dialogue, but also their connection to the time and situation of the text’s 
composition:  
Cum audissem Antiochum, Brute, ut solebam, cum M. Pisone in eo gymnasio quod 
Ptolemaeum vocatur, unaque nobiscum Q. frater et T. Pomponius Luciusque Cicero, 
frater noster cognatione patruelis, amore germanus, constituimus inter nos ut 
ambulationem postmeridianam conficeremus in Academia, maxime quod is locus ab 
omni turba id temporis vacuus esset. Itaque ad tempus ad Pisonem omnes. Inde vario 
sermone sex illa a Dipylo stadia confecimus. Cum autem venissemus in Academiae non 
sine causa nobilitata spatia, solitudo erat ea quam volueramus. 
 
After I had listened to Antiochus, dear Brutus, as I was accustomed to, along with Marcus 
Piso in the gymnasium that is called the Ptolemaeum, together with my brother Quintus 
and Titus Pomponius and Lucius Cicero, who was by relation my first cousin, but by 
affection my brother, we all decided among ourselves that we should take an afternoon 
stroll to the Academy, especially because at this time the place is free from any crowd. 
We all gathered at Piso’s at the appointed time and passed the six stadia from the Dipylon 
gate in varied conversation. And, when we arrived in the justifiably renowned space of 
the Academy, we found the solitude that we had wanted.43  
 
Following a spare setting and a single vocative, Brute, as dedication, Cicero succinctly 
introduces a cast of characters among whom, from the perspective of the time of composition, 
the living mingle with the dead. Marcus Pupius Piso Frugi, who died just a few years prior to the 
writing, had been perhaps a decade older than Cicero. Consequently, during their time in Athens, 
Piso had played the host. In the intervening years, however, the two had become political rivals 
and, it seems, never reconciled before Piso’s death.44 Lucius Cicero, although the youngest of the 
group, had died first, less than 10 years after the fictional date under apparently tragic 
circumstances.45 Cicero’s perennially rocky relationship with his brother, Quintus, had barely 
recovered at the time of composition from its low point during the Caesarian civil war and 
 
43 De Fin. 5.1. 
44 On their turbulent relationship see, e.g., ad Att. I.13(13), 14(14), 16(16), etc.; cf. Brut. 240, 310. 
45 See Att. I.5(1).  
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continued to be a source of tension due to financial issues and political disagreement.46 Most 
marked of all these names is Titus Pomponius, an individual better known as “Atticus.” Cicero’s 
decision to name his best friend not with his cognomen, but with his family name is owed to an 
attention to historical consistency—after all, in 79, Atticus was not yet Atticus. But the choice 
also emphasizes the retrospection of the dialogue and Cicero’s awareness of his own belated 
removal from the period into which he writes his fictionalized persona. He is looking back on a 
lifetime that has already come to a close.47  
 The collection and naming of these friends and family members enacts a specific kind of 
commemoration that differs from the political martyrization of the preceding books. Whereas the 
presence of Cato and Torquatus owes its impact to the concerns, shared by many of Cicero’s 
readers, of the current political situation, these names—Piso, Lucius, Quintus, and Pomponius—
take on their meaning through their relationship to Cicero’s personal, even interiorized life. By 
naming the living among the dead and the dead among the living, Cicero creates a fictional space 
through which, to use a Derridean turn of phrase, the proper name “remains”—that is, it stands in 
for and survives the deceased, but at the same time exists only as a remainder, and a reminder 
 
46 On the aftermath of the civil war and its effect on their relationship, see esp. Att. XI.5(216) and despite 
a thaw in 47-6, the dissolution of both brothers’ marriages and financial trouble once again chilled their 
relationship: see, e.g., XIII.39(342); XIV.13(367).  
47 Cicero explicitly makes this connection in the opening of de Senectute, a dialogue deeply invested in 
their friendship and its connection to the duration of their lifetime together; see §1, “I know that you 
brought back from Athens not only a cognomen, but humanity and wisdom as well” (teque non cognomen 
solum Athenis deportasse, sed humanitatem et prudentiam intellego); see below, Ch. 4, section IV. On the 
related use of the name in the correspondence, see Cappello 2016: 466-67, “The cognomen ‘Atticus’ 
denotes more than the informal register Cicero used to address his friend. The nickname functions as a 
reminder of Atticus’s intellectual and social pedigree, as well as highlighting the role he plays in the 
correspondence.” Cappello traces the use of Atticus as an appellation in the letters, which does not 
become common until the late 50s, but is prefigured by various forms of word play that link Titus 
Pomponius with Greece and the Greek ideal.  
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that the individual will never again answer to that name “except through what we mysteriously 
call our memory.”48  
 After a stroll spent in “varied conversation” (vario sermone) from Piso’s lodging and 
through the Dipylon gate, the group arrives at “the justifiably renowned space of the Academy” 
(in Academiae non sine causa nobilitata spatia) to find it exactly as they had hoped: deserted of 
local activity and, possibly, still dilapidated from Sulla’s sack of the city in 86. The interpretative 
crux of the phrase solitudo erat ea quam volueramus is, strikingly, the word solitudo. In this 
context, the word has been understood to mean either temporary “emptiness” or more permanent 
“desolation.”49 With an eye to the archaeological implications of Cicero’s description, John 
Glucker emphasizes the continuity of urban use that Cicero’s interest in the monuments of the 
Academy demonstrates: “Despite the destruction of the groves by Sulla only a few years earlier 
(Plut. Sulla XII; Appian Mithr. 30), the gymnasium itself does not appear to have been entirely 
demolished. The solitudo which Cicero speaks of need not mean more than what we are told by 
Cicero himself: quod is locus ab omni turba id temporis vacuus esset. In the early afternoon, the 
Athenians had their customary siesta, and only ‘mad dogs and Romans’ would stroll in the 
midday sun.”50 Glucker assimilates the Romans to a group of British colonists braving the 
afternoon heat while the “natives” take their “customary siesta.”51 Discomfiting and potentially 
 
48 Derrida 1988: 48, “At the moment of death the proper name remains; through it we can name, call, 
invoke, designate, but we know, we can think (and this thought cannot be reduced to mere memory, 
though it comes from memory) that…the bearer of the name and the unique pole of all these acts, these 
references, will never again answer to it, never himself answer, never again except through what we 
mysteriously call our memory.”  
49 The debate is summed up between Glucker 1978 and Dörrie 1978.  
50 Glucker 1978: 242 with n.66. 
51 Glucker here refers to Noël Coward’s originally satirical quip (after Kipling), “Only mad-dogs and 
Englishmen go out in the midday sun.” 
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apt comparisons aside, Glucker’s argument ignores the more surreal aspects of Cicero’s interest 
in the Academy—the living presence of dead philosophers52 who appear among the monuments. 
Cicero is perhaps more interested in l’esprit de lieu than in the physical remains of the place 
themselves. Furthermore, Glucker’s insistence on the modern colonial resonance53 of the scene 
only reaffirms the importance of Sulla’s recent devastation of Athens in the war against 
Mithridates.54 What does it mean for a group of young Romans to explore an area of the city that 
their fellow countryman had “ravaged” (ἔκειρε) only a few years prior? How does this 
geopolitical state of affairs in 79 BCE relate to Cicero’s stated purpose in de Fin. of rendering 
the Greek tradition of philosophy “in Latin letters” in the mid-40s?55 Although Glucker may be 
correct to imagine the Academy’s monuments that Cicero visited as a young man in 79 BCE as 
largely intact, the political significance of the Sullan devastation and the manifold connotations 
of solitudo argue against a primarily archaeological significance for the opening of de Fin. 5.  
 
52 See below.  
53 The colonialist valence of Glucker’s reading is strengthened by the fact that the only piece of positive 
evidence in support of his siesta hypothesis is a quote (242 n.66) from the French/Greek philologist 
Jean/Ioannis Psichari/Psychari’s Το ταξίδι μου (My Journey, originally published in 1888). Although 
Glucker presents this story as a simple comparandum, Pischari’s complex relationship to modern Greek 
national identity should not be overlooked in such an offhand reference. For a brief biographical sketch, 
see Orgeolet 1978.  
54 Or at least the “lower” sections of the city. According to Plutarch, Sulla’s destruction amounted 
primarily to a pillaging of cultural goods and treasures, with the stated exception of the suburban areas of 
the Academy and the Lyceum: “And when timber began to fail, owing to the destruction of many of the 
works, which broke down of their own weight, and to the burning of those which were continually 
smitten by the enemy’s fire-bolts, he laid hands upon the sacred groves, and ravaged the Academy, which 
was the most wooded of the city’s suburbs, as well as the Lyceum” (ἐπιλειπούσης δὲ τῆς ὕλης διὰ τὸ 
κόπτεσθαι πολλὰ τῶν ἔργων περικλώμενα τοῖς αὑτῶν βρίθεσι καὶ πυρπολεῖσθαι βαλλόμενα συνεχῶς ὑπὸ 
τῶν πολεμίων, ἐπεχείρησε τοῖς ἱεροῖς ἄλσεσι, καὶ τήν τε Ἀκαδήμειαν ἔκειρε δενδροφορωτάτην 
προαστείων οὖσαν καὶ τὸ Λύκειον, Sulla 12.3; trans. Perrin).  
55 De Fin. 1.1: cum quae summis ingeniis exquisitaque doctrina philosophi Graeco sermone tractavissent 
ea Latinis litteris mandaremus… 
 70 
 Following a more literary approach to this passage, Heinrich Dörrie argues that the 
Academy of Cicero’s recollection is deeply fragmented. This fragmentation is both physical—
Dörrie puts more stock than Glucker in the ancient descriptions of Sulla’s destruction of Athens 
and its relevance for the disused state in which the Roman groups finds the Academy56—as well 
as philosophical. In 89, three years prior to Sulla’s sack of the city, Athens had sided openly with 
Mithridates in rebellion against Rome. At that point, the leading philosophers of the Academy—
Antiochus and Philo—had departed from the city to different places of exile.57 The leaders of the 
Academy were thus not only away from Athens during the crucial early months of 86 during the 
Sullan bombardment, but, also, as Dörrie says, “Diese Jahre räumlicher Trennung führten zu 
tiefer Entfremdung zwischen den beiden Akademikern.”58 And, although Antiochus returns to 
Athens following the end of open conflict, this intellectual “Entfremdung” produces a schism in 
the history of Academic thought: “Das war kein ‘bloß akademischer’ Streit; sondern nach der 
 
56 See esp. 1978: 212, “Am alten Ort war es nicht mehr möglich zu unterrichten. Die Gebäude waren 
zerstört—und mit diesen war die Bibliothek, welche die schriftliche Hinterlassenschaft namentlich der 
Schüler Platons enthalten hatte, vernichtet.” Dörrie overstates his argument concerning the uniqueness of 
the library since, at least as far as the edition of Plato was concerned, copies were readily available to 
those wishing to pay for them since at least the scholarchy of Arcesilaus. See D.L. III.66 and IV.32 along 
with Wilamowitz 1920: 224; Solmsen 1981.  
57 Philo to Rome, where Cicero studied with him and where he died in 84/3, and Antiochus to Alexandria. 
For Cicero’s own account of this exile and the “end of the Academy,” see Brut. 306. On the biography 
and thought of these two important and controversial scholarchs, see Brittain 2001 for Philo and Sedley 
ed. 2012 for Antiochus. Glucker 1978 also discusses this philosophical/political situation, but with rather 
different conclusions; see, 15-45, where he argues that Antiochus had already separated from the 
Philonian Academy by the time of their respective exiles (c. 87); as a corrective to this position, see Polito 
2012, who argues that Antiochus’ “secession” is better understood as “an internal—albeit perverse—
development of scepticism. He put forward the argument that to claim everything is inapprehensible 
presupposes apprehension at least of this very claim” (32). In the context of my work, I am less interested 
in the historicity of these philosophical developments than in Cicero’s representation of them. 
58 1978: 212.  
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Katastrophe 89-86 war ein völliger Neubeginn erforderlich geworden.”59 In fact, the very first 
words (Cum audissem Antiochum…ut solebam in eo gymnasio quod Ptolemaeum vocatur) of de 
Finibus recall this Academic schism—or, better, the end of the Academy as a continuous 
institution. Antiochus, the leader of the resurrected “Old” Academy, delivers his lectures not in 
the school’s ancestral home, but in a building, the Ptolemaic gymnasium, which lay at the busy 
heart of Athens’ agora.60  
 With a full appreciation of this political and historical context, we can understand better 
the programmatic quality of the opening of de Fin. 5. In the wake of the fragmentation of the late 
Academy, this group of young Romans conducts a pilgrimage to the site of its past unity.61 
Rather than discovering a univocal Academic tradition, however, they find evidence of both 
continuity and discontinuity, tradition and innovation. In this fractured and temporally layered 
setting, Cicero dramatizes the transformation of Greek philosophy “in Latin letters” as a potential 
avenue for the continued development of Academic thought, which embraces both the 
importance of its past and its potential for adaption and change.  
 
59 Ibid.: 213; cf. Luc. 11-14 for Cicero’s own discussion of this “Neubeginn.” See Polito 2012: 34 for a 
more cautious, but generally complementary appraisal of the same evidence: “Antiochus’ school neither 
had an institutionalized form comparable to the Academy nor, relatedly, was meant to compete with it but 
rather sought to take over its legacy at a time when the Academy itself was no longer active.” 
60 On the archaeological location and use of the Ptolemaeum, see Thompson 1966: 40-48. 
61 Antiochus’ resurrection of the “Old” Academy as a synthesis of several related philosophical traditions 
is contingent, at least in his argumentation, on the historical existence of a unified Academy. Yet, from 
the time of Plato, there was both a spatial fragmentation—with Aristotle’s choice to “walk” in a different 
place than Plato—and periods of temporal return—for instance, Arcesilaus’ decision to turn back the 
clock from Polemo to Plato. There was in antiquity a strong awareness, which Cicero clearly shares, of 
the fragmented and contentious nature of Academic philosophy and various attempts at reconstruction: 
see, e.g., the fragment of Hermippos on the conflict between Xenocrates and Aristotle, F 33 = D.L. V.2-3 
with the commentary in Bollanseé 1999: 52-69.  
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 Yet, beyond these considerations of Cicero’s self-positioning within Academic history, 
how should the group’s desire for the place to be deserted be understood (solitudo erat ea quam 
volueramus)? They had decided to visit the Academy in the early afternoon precisely when “it 
would be free of any crowd” (maxime quod is locus ab omni turba id temporis vacuus esset).62 
The narrator gives no indication of the composition or purpose of this turba—it is simply their 
absence that is sought by the Romans.63 If we, then, also draw in the complex associations that 
solitudo possessed for Cicero at the time of composition and the opposition between solitudo and 
celebritas, familiar from the letters, that seems to be at work in the dialogue also, the solitudo of 
the Academy begins to look like the windswept solitudo of Astura. Just as Cicero seeks solitude 
at Astura away from the celebritas of Rome, the group of Romans desires to find a desolate 
Academy free from the bustle of the city (turba). Unlike Antiochus, who forsakes the solitude of 
the Academy to look for activity and purpose in the current heart of the city, Cicero and his 
friends embrace the space of contemplation and conversation afforded by the perfect solitudo 
that they desire and enjoy in the Academy. In addition to a subtle critique of Antiochus’ 
philosophical activities, therefore, the group’s desire for solitude renders Cicero’s personal 
pursuit of solitude within the world of the dialogue. In the letters from Astura, his solitude 
enables him to converse with long-dead authors by means of their books (in ea [solitudine] mihi 
 
62 For Dörrie, this desire reflects the Romans’ curiositas—a vis admonitionis (Fin. 5.2) that drives Cicero 
and the others to visit the site of the Academy in the same way that Greek worshippers traveled to shrines 
of heroes or modern tourists embark on their own “pilgrimages” (see esp. 1978: 219). Dörrie thus arrives 
at a conclusion not dissimilar to Glucker’s, although he expands Glucker’s figure of the British colonist to 
a “curiosity seeker,” who is driven to visit sites of cultural or religious significance in search of the 
enlightenment that such travel promises.  
63 Cf. Polito 2012: 36, “Either Piso [sic] is implying that the current lecturer is unworthy of his popularity, 
or, more likely, there are no ongoing lectures to attend there, and the crowd that gathers in the area does 
so for other and non-philosophical purposes.” 
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omnis sermo est cum litteris, Att. XII.15). In the fictional manifestation of this solitudinous state 
of mind, the solitudo of the Academy enacts the conditions for a spectral interaction between 
present and past. It sets the stage for the arrival of the revenant.  
 Piso’s first remarks make clear that, in fact, the group’s purpose in visiting the Academy 
is not so much sight-seeing as specter-seeking:  
Tum Piso: “Naturane nobis hoc,” inquit, “datum dicam an errore quodam, ut, cum ea 
loca videamus, in quibus memoria dignos viros acceperimus multum esse versatos, 
magis moveamur, quam si quando eorum ipsorum aut facta audiamus aut scriptum 
aliquod legamus? Velut ego nunc moveor. Venit enim mihi Platonis in mentem, quem 
accepimus primum hic disputare solitum; cuius etiam illi hortuli propinqui non 
memoriam solum mihi afferunt, sed ipsum videntur in conspectu meo ponere. Hic 
Speusippus, hic Xenocrates, hic eius auditor Polemo, cuius illa ipsa sessio fuit, quam 
videmus. Equidem etiam curiam nostram—Hostiliam dico, non hanc novam, quae minor 
mihi esse videtur, posteaquam est maior—solebam intuens Scipionem, Catonem, 
Laelium, nostrum vero in primis avum cogitare; tanta vis admonitionis inest in locis; ut 
non sine causa ex iis memoriae ducta sit disciplina.”  
 
Then Piso said, “Is it due to our nature or a certain error, I wonder, that, when we see the 
places in which, by our recollection, we have been told famous men used to spend their 
time, we are moved more than when we hear about their deeds or read their writing? I 
am now moved in just this way. For something of Plato comes to my mind, who, we are 
told, first used to hold discussion here; indeed, those nearby gardens not only bring his 
memory to me, but seem to place the man himself before my eyes. Here Speusippus, 
here Xenocrates, here his student Polemo, whose very sitting-place it is that we see. 
Likewise, our curia—I mean the curia Hostilia, not the new one, which seems smaller to 
me after its expansion—there I used to reflect gazing on Scipio, Cato, Laelius, and most 
of all my grandfather. Such a power of reminding is in places that it is not without reason 
that the methodical training of memory is based on them.”64  
 
Piso punningly relates the evocative power of physical places (loci) to the topoi of Greek 
mnemonics. In this bilingual wordplay, Piso affirms a connection between place and memory, 
but decidedly not a mnemonic one.65 In particular, he recalls the familiar experience of 
 
64 De Fin. 5.2.  
65 For the influences of memory in this passage, see Marconi 1994; on Cicero and memory more 
generally, see, e.g., Jaeger 2002; Pieper 2014.  
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remembering something from one’s past—in this case, the curia Hostilia—as having been 
“larger” than it is presently. This distorting effect of memory on place is only enhanced by the 
subsequent destruction and re-construction of the curia so that its old form can only exist in 
memory. Furthermore, Piso’s naming of this building is already submerged in a temporal 
conflation: for many readers of Cicero’s text, the destruction of the curia Hostilia calls to mind 
the dramatic events of 53 BCE when a building by this name was used as a funeral pyre for 
Cicero’s political archenemy, Clodius. Due to Cicero’s attention to historical consistency 
elsewhere in the passage, however, it is unlikely that this is a simple instance of anachronism. 
Rather, as Madvig proposes, the building that Piso refers to as the curia Hostilia existed prior to 
Sulla’s dictatorship, when it was renovated.66 At the same time, however, it is equally hard not to 
imagine that Cicero invites a conflation of these events. Like the use of names in the opening of 
the dialogue, Piso’s commemoration is a recollection of a remnant: naming and memory restores 
to life, often in a greater form than it ever materially possessed, a fragment of a deceased time, 
creating in experience a temporal palimpsest.67  
 
66 Madvig 1877: ad loc., “Notat Gzius Ciceronis errorem, qui Pisonem inducat curiae Hostiliae 
deflagrationem significantem, quam multis annis post in P. Clodii funere accidisse notissimum sit; et tum 
demum Faustum Sullam ex SCto novam splendidorem extruxisse. In eadem sententia cetereos fuisse 
puto; certe recentiores sunt omnes. Verum in ipso exordio, ubi Cicero sermonis olim habiti formam et 
occasionem fingit veterumque temporum memoriam et amorem fratris patruelis amissi renovat, non potuit 
ita oblivione implicari; facillimeque res expeditur. Hostiliam enim proprie appellat eam curiam, quae fuit 
ante L. Sullam dictatorem, in qua Scipio, Cato, Laelius sententias dixerant, novam autem, quam Sulla, 
vetere mutata et amplificata, fecerat uno aut altero anno ante, quam hic sermo haberi fingitur (a. 81 aut 
80).”  
67 Through Piso’s comparison between the curia Hostilia—a place that no longer exists—and the 
Academy—a place whose existence is in dispute—Cicero may also be drawing attention to the potentially 
distorting effects of his own recollection. Can he trust his memory of his friendships with the other 
participants? The apparently profound significance of this particular afternoon? The out-of-time 
experiences that he records? 
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 In addition to these distorting and palimpsestic effects of memory, Piso specifies further 
that in some places—especially the nearby “Gardens” of Plato and the old curia Hostilia at 
Rome—memory is overcome by involuntary sight: the hortuli “not only only bring [Plato’s] 
memory to me, but seem to place the man himself before my eyes,” while the old curia building, 
prior to its renovation, allowed Piso to “gaze upon (intuens) Scipio, Cato, Laelius, and [his] 
grandfather.” These places owe something of their power to traditional knowledge. The 
repetition of the verb accipere marks a heritage associated with these sites that has been handed 
down over generations.68 Yet the ultimate effect of the Academy and the curia Hostilia on Piso 
is not comfortably encompassed by the concept of “tradition” any more than it can be simply a 
function of memory.69 The phrase hortuli…ipsum videntur in conspectu meo ponere adapts a 
common Latin idiom for seeing or considering unreal phenomena (e.g., a dream) to stress, 
instead, the very presence of the long-dead Plato.70 By placing the hortuli as the subject, Piso’s 
utterance blurs the boundary between reality and spectrality. The apparently “real” gardens make 
manifest ipsum—emphatically, demonstratively Plato himself—in the path of Piso’s visual 
 
68 Cf. the common idiom a maioribus sic accepimus vel sim., e.g., at Cic. In Q. Caec. 61.6, In Verr. 
2.5.145, Pro Clu. 159.15, Tusc. 1.3.  
69 Note the relationship between these cultural and individual forms of recollection that is disclosed by 
Piso’s framing of his experience: “when we see the places in which, by our recollection (memoria), we 
have been told (acceperimus) famous men used to spend their time…” 
70 For Cicero’s use of the idiom videor mihi + inf. in relation to fantasy, see, e.g., his claim at Luc. 74, “I 
seem to have lived with [Socrates and Plato]” (vixisse cum eis equidem videor). The phrase is often used 
in his letters to express the uncertainty of a sense-perception or the impossibility of verifying a thought; 
consider e.g., the ambivalence of the phrase in the letter to Nigidius Figulus (ad Fam. IV.13.5), “I’m 
under the impression, first of all, that I see the mind of him (Caesar) who has the most power and it is 
favorable to your safety” (Videor mihi perspicere primum ipsius animum qui plurimum potest propensum 
ad salutem tuam). On this letter, see above, Intro., section I.  
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faculty (conspectus).71 In Piso’s phrasing the place in which he presently stands subordinates its 
reality to a remnant of the deceased past. Without ever leaving the present moment, he is 
transported through time. 
 The other characters in the dialogue corroborate Piso’s spectral experience, each 
according to his particular interest. Quintus, a budding playwright, recalls catching a glimpse at 
Colonus not only of Sophocles, but even of Oedipus.72 Pomponius at first mocks the others for 
their over-active imaginations claiming, as a good Epicurean, to “think only of the living” 
(vivorum memini, 5.3), but then refers to the Epicurean practice of surrounding oneself with 
images of the beatified teacher, “even in cups and rings” (nec tamen Epicuri licet oblivisci, si 
cupiam, cuius imaginem non modo in tabulis nostri familiares, sed etiam in poculis et in anulis 
habent). Finally, Cicero recalls an experience he had visiting the death-place of Pythagoras at 
Metapontum before turning his attention to a nearby exhedra where, he says, “I’m under the 
impression that I see [Carneades], for his image is well-known (est…nota imago), and I think 
(puto) that his seat itself, bereft of such a great spirit, longs for his very voice (desiderari illam 
 
71 A turn of phrase used often in speeches with demonstrative immediacy, see, e.g., In Verr. 2.1.122, 
Quam rem etiam tribunus plebis in contione egit, cum eum quem iste virgis ceciderat in conspectum 
populi Romani produxit… 
72 The connection between Quintus and Oedipus is otherwise unattested in Cicero’s writings. Is it a 
convenient fiction? Or a memory of a youthful interest? Considering the significance of the others’ 
visions, it seems hard not to ascribe more than random attribution to Cicero’s association of Oedipus at 
Colonus and his often-estranged brother. In the corpus, Sophocles’ final tragedy appears elsewhere only 
at de Sen. 22 in an anecdote about the old playwright’s familial conflict: at the end of his life, his sons 
bring him to court for neglecting his business affairs on grounds of senile incompetence. Sophocles reads 
to the jury from this play and asks, “whether the poem seems to have been written by an imbecile” 
(quaesisseque num illud carmen desipientis videretur). Perhaps in Cicero’s insertion of this play into his 
recollection of his brother, therefore, we find another durative figure, uniting youthful aspiration with the 
experiences of old age—with an emphasis on cantankerousness. 
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vocem).”73 This vision presses upon Cicero to the exclusion of the other “marks of famous men” 
that fill a place like Athens (etsi multa in omni parte Athenarum sunt in ipsis locis indicia 
summorum virorum). “At this moment,” he says, “I am moved by that sitting place” (hoc autem 
tempore…ego illa moveor exhedra, 5.4). Cicero’s present moment (hoc…tempore) interacts and 
resonates with another instant through the mediation of physical place. This temporal resonance 
is made evident not only through the internal sense by which Cicero is “moved” (moveor), but 
also verges on the aural, as he perceives in the place a longing for Carneades’ “very voice” (illam 
vocem). Cicero’s depiction of the group’s experience of solitude in the Academy thus teems with 
the presence of other moments throughout time.  
 The simultaneous presence of all these temporally heterogenous instants circumscribes an 
experience that is inescapably uneven and subtracted from sequential chronology. Yet, in its 
placement at the end of the retrospective sequence of autobiographical settings in de Fin., this 
experience also creates a durative figure of Cicero’s own life, drawing together disparate 
moments in a temporal assemblage that conjoins the experiences of his youth and old age. I 
propose that this is more than a purely fictional device, but rather reflects Cicero’s own 
experience at the moment of the text’s writing. Cicero reuses the word solitudo to describe both 
his circumstance at the time of composition and the Academy of his reminiscence. This 
repetition marks a seam between real and written worlds, between present and past, and between 
human experience and the goals of philosophy. Cicero’s compositional technique and the 
autobiographical settings of the work allows us to see an author tracing the ambit of his life—
registering in the fictional spaces of his text the contours of his lifetime. Yet, as a singular 
 
73 quem videre videor (est enim nota imago), a sedeque ipsa tanta ingeni magnitudine orbata, desiderari 
illam vocem puto, 5.4. 
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moment subtracted from the sequential unfolding of this lifetime, Cicero’s solitude expands 
beyond his own sensuous experience to include the overtones of others’ lives and other moments 
in time. As Cicero reckons with the ghosts of his own past—a litany of unresolved grief, failed 
relationships, and lost opportunities—the solitude of the Academy opens up another way of 
understanding the temporality of his existence. The solitudo that Cicero desires to find should 
therefore be understood not as desolation, emptiness, or even loneliness, but as a profound sol-
itude in the sense of “oneness”—a solitary instant unbound from the unfolding of a lifetime in 
which the multiple harmonizes inseparably with the one.74  
IV. Looking for a Lifetime in Solitude 
 Turning now from the connection between Cicero’s experience of solitudo and the 
representational form of de Fin., I examine more closely the philosophical content of the 
dialogue. De Fin. is organized as a series of three debates on “moral ends”—that is, concerning 
“the end, the final, the ultimate aim, to which all precepts for living well and acting ethically 
refer.”75 As indicated above, the settings of the three dialogues move backward in time, tracing 
the outline of Cicero’s own life. Simultaneously, however, each dialogue is propelled forward by 
the divisio Carneadea, a form of skeptical meta-argumentation that pits different doctrinal 
 
74 On the etymology and derivations of solus, see Walde-Hofmann 1938: ii.557. Cf. Gk. μονότης, which 
has a similar derivation to solitudo (and is an exact match for Lt. solitas) and has the primary sense of 
“unity” (LSJ A.I). The sense of “oneness” for solitudo was clearly alive for Cicero; cf. Off. 1.139, where 
solitudo is used in opposition to multitudo; Brut. 227 where the orator Publius Antistius was the sole 
voice in the forum—i.e., the forum was his solitudo. This complexity of sense seems to be less prevalent 
in contemporary authors, for whom the word has a more straightforward meaning of “emptiness,” which 
is connected to the related verb desolo; see Walde-Hofmann 1938 ad loc. Cf. e.g., Sal. Jug. 74.1, 75.1; 
Caes. De Bel. Gal. 4.18, 6.23; Liv. 1.4, etc.  
75 1.11, id quod his libris quaeritur, qui sit finis, quid extremum, quid ultimum quo sint omnia bene 
vivendi recteque faciendi consilia referenda. It is evident from the semantic range attributed to finis 
throughout the work that Cicero is interested in the relationship between an “end” as a goal and an “end” 
as a final limit or conclusion, i.e., the end of life. See e.g., 3.26, on which cf. Derrida 1993: 5-6. 
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positions on the chief good (summum bonum) against one another to reveal the inconclusiveness 
of each.76 Furthermore, the speeches of the individual books are structured around reiterations of 
the “cradle argument” of Hellenistic philosophy,77 which theorizes the relationship between first 
principles of life and the ultimate ethical good. Thus, the main ethical object of the work—the 
summum bonum—is connected by form and content to a larger question of the structure, 
constitution, or duration of a vita. As the divisio cycles through the different philosophical 
positions on the chief good, it proposes and ultimately rejects three models of the form of human 
life.  
 This section focuses in particular on the Epicurean and Stoic-influenced arguments from 
the first four books and traces the dialogue’s movement from the ethical narratives that these 
philosophies use to structure a life toward a more temporal understanding of duration. The 
Epicureans propose a static, homotelic vita, which is delimited not by progression or time, but by 
pleasure and pain. This position is supplanted by the Stoic theory, which proposes that the 
continuity of a life is determined by logical sequence, the material transformation of an 
individual’s constitutions, and the deterministically qualitative progress toward virtue. Finally, as 
I address in the final section, Piso’s Antiochean position challenges the qualitatively logical 
progression of Stoic theory by arguing for the continuity of a vitalistic duration that equates the 
vita with a succession of time (progredientibus aetatibus, 5.41). Due to the skeptical nature of 
the divisio, however, the work fails by design to arrive at a conclusive understanding of the vita 
 
76 For Cicero’s own account of the divisio within the text, see esp. 5.16-22; cf. 2.33-43 and 4.49-50. For a 
discussion of the form of the divisio as it operates in the text, see Annas 2001: xxiii-xxvii; Brittain 2016. 
On the divisio as a form of meta-argumentation see, e.g., Koch 2006: 188; Schofield 2012; Maso 2015: 
199. 
77 On the term, see Brunschwig 1986 and below.  
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according to these available positions. In the impasse at which the text arrives in the solitudo of 
book 5, we find an alternative expression of philosophy as a search for solitude—a mode of 
inquiry that finds the duration of a life not in continuity, but in moments of resonant withdrawal 
and spectral disjuncture.  
 Each dialogue addresses the vita as an important object of inquiry. Yet the nature of the 
continuity that allows an individual “life” to be treated as a life shifts throughout the debate. In a 
definition that frames the argument as it progresses, the Ciceronian speaker in book 2, 
responding to the Epicurean Torquatus, asserts that the ability to reckon with the complete 
structure of one’s own life separates humans from animals: 
homines enim, etsi aliis multis, tamen hoc uno plurimum a bestiis differunt quod 
rationem habent a natura datam mentemque acrem et vigentem celerrimeque multa simul 
agitantem et, ut ita dicam, sagacem, quae et causas rerum et consecutiones videat et 
similitudines transferat et disiuncta coniungat et cum praesentibus futura copulet 
omnemque complectatur vitae consequentis statum. 
 
For humans differ from beasts in many ways, but especially in this: that they possess 
reason, given by nature, and a mind that is sharp, active, and able to perform many tasks 
at once quickly—in a word, sagacious—such that it sees the causes and effects of events, 
draws analogies, makes comparisons between what is dissimilar, relates the present to the 
future and embraces the whole structure of life as it unfolds.78  
 
In this reiteration of a fundamental philosophical problem—the difference between human and 
animal life79—the expected response—reason—is defined by two distinct methods of reckoning 
the continuity of a life: logical sequence and a sense of time.80 The capacity of reason to 
“embrace the whole structure of life as it unfolds” sums up a list of abilities, such as deduction 
 
78 De Fin. 2.45. 
79 Commonly referred to as the scala naturae. For the classic Aristotelian version, which divides humans 
from animals and plants on account of “mind and the contemplative faculty” (περὶ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τῆς 
θεωρητικῆς δυνάμεως), see de Anima 413a-414a; cf. Pl. Laches 196e-197c.  
80 On the significance of this definition of reason for the history of this question, see Luciani 2010: 252.  
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and cognition by analogy, that are not in and of themselves dependent on temporality. Indeed, 
Cicero’s definition begins from the notion of cause and effect (causas rerum et consecutiones) 
which, with reference to the Stoic “chain of causes” (catena causarum), foregrounds instead the 
deterministic nature of the cosmos.81 These abilities, in fact, point to a Stoic definition of reason 
as the ability to recognize a timeless—or, better, not temporally contingent—and deterministic 
consequentiality, which is further emphasized by the repetition of the same root in the noun 
consecutiones and the participial adjective consequentis.82  
 Yet Cicero’s definition does not end with this Stoic notion of ratio, but, looking forward 
to the argument of the next three books, raises a question about the relationship between the 
logical structure of Stoic consequentiality and the human sense of time. If reason “relates the 
present to the future and embraces the whole structure of a life as it unfolds” (cum praesentibus 
futura copulet omnemque complectatur vitae consequentis statum), where does Stoic rationality 
arise from or cross over into a temporal sense from within life? When does the ability to “relate 
present to future” become an exercise of reason? At what point in the sequential “unfolding” of a 
life will reason overcome ephemerality to render an understanding of its overall “structure” 
(status)? Rather than offering a purely logical notion of “consequentiality,” Cicero thus 
emphasizes that humans inevitably experience the unfolding chain of cause and effect in the time 
of their own life. Reason’s crowning accomplishment, therefore, lies in its ability to convert a 
 
81 See e.g., Alex. On fate 191.30 = Long and Sedley 1987: i.337 (55 N), “[The Stoics] say that since the 
world is a unity which includes all existing things in itself and is governed by a living, rational, intelligent 
nature, the government of existing things which it possesses is an everlasting one proceeding in a 
sequence and ordering. The things which happen first become causes to those which happen after them” 
(my emphasis). Note that in this definition, the Stoic notion of cause and effect is emphatically not 
dependent on time.  
82 Cf. Gk. ἀκολουθία, “consequentiality,” which for the Stoics played an important ethical role in the 
definition of “proper function” (τὸ καθῆκον). See Long and Sedley 1987: i.359 (59 B).  
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temporal sense into a logical one or, conversely, logical sequence into a temporality—to 
apprehend the “whole structure” (omnis status)83 of life even in the midst of its ephemerality 
(vitae consequentis).  
 To approach this human capacity for overcoming the ephemerality of experience in order 
to apprehend life’s total structure is one of the primary goals of de Finibus. Each dialogue is 
organized around a reiteration of a central “cradle argument,” a term proposed by Jacques 
Brunschwig to refer to a common form of argumentation in Hellenistic philosophy. The 
argument begins from “the behavior and psychology of the child in the cradle usually in 
conjunction with young animals and then draw[s] more or less directly certain conclusions which 
lead to the formulation and justification of a moral doctrine.”84 As the first example—that of the 
Epicurean Torquatus—demonstrates, these arguments are ultimately concerned with the 
relationship between the origins and ends of human life. Torquatus commences his extended 
speech in favor of pleasure as the ultimate good with a formulation that will become a rhetorical 
reference point for the cradle argument throughout the dialogue:  
Omne animal simul atque natum sit voluptatem appetere eaque gaudere ut summo bono, 
dolorem aspernari ut summum malum et quantum possit a se repellere; idque facere 
nondum depravatum, ipsa natura incorrupte atque integre iudicante. Itaque negat opus 
esse ratione neque disputatione quamobrem voluptas expetenda, fugiendus dolor sit.  
 
Every animal, as soon as it is born strives after pleasure and rejoices in it as the greatest 
good, while it spurns pain as the greatest evil and repels it from itself as much as 
possible. And it continues to do this in obedience to the uncorrupted and intact judgment 
 
83 Cf. Off. 1.11, which echoes this passage, but uses the phrase totius vitae cursum. Intriguingly, the nouns 
status and cursus are conceptual opposites. Cf. Varro Ling. Lat. 5.11, who lists status and motus as 
antithetical, and cursus as a type of motion; see e.g., ibid. 8.59-60. It is clear, therefore, that in the 
definition in de Fin. Cicero stresses the composite nature of the human sense of time both as finitely 
bounded (status), yet progressively dynamic (consequens). 
84 Brunschwig 1986: 113; cf. Inwood 2016. See also Altman 2016: 103, “Birth plays an unusually large 
role in Cicero’s On Moral Ends: each of the dialogue’s major interlocutors anchors their conception of the 
ultimate end in tendencies that emerge at birth, i.e., at the beginning.” 
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of nature itself so long as it is not perverted. For these reasons, [Epicurus] denies need for 
reasoning or discussion as to why pleasure should be sought and pain avoided.85 
 
In the Epicurean cradle argument, therefore, the appetite of the infans—a category that 
encompasses both newborn humans and “every animal”—for pleasure and its avoidance of pain 
justifies the central tenet of the school’s ethics. The basic ethical principles established by “the 
uncorrupted and intact judgment of nature itself” (ipsa natura incorrupte atque integre 
iudicante) will remain unchanged throughout an individual's life—so long as that subject 
remains “un-perverted.”86 The “structure” of a human life, therefore, appears remarkably 
featureless. Any possibility for personal morality or collective engagement must be tempered by 
the limits of pleasure and pain. In the best case for human life, these limits will remain 
unchanged from infancy until death, but they are threatened constantly by worldly “perversions.” 
The first impulses of the infant provide to the Epicurean all the necessary orientation for an 
entire life lived from beginning to end in accordance with the chief good—voluptas.87  
 
85 De Fin. 1.30. Torquatus’ main speech begins at 1.29 following an extended elenchos (1.14-28). On the 
transition from rapid debate to rhetorical speech in the de Fin. (rhetorica disputatio), see Inwood 1990. 
Gorman 2005 offers a comprehensive study of the Socratic method in Ciceronian dialogue as a whole. 
86 On this point, see Warren 2016: 44-5.  
87 As Brunschwig 1986: 122 notes, “In one sense…there is no ‘cradle argument’ in Epicureanism; the 
identification of pleasure with the sovereign good is founded not on any observation of the new-born 
child, but on adult feelings. Yet, in another sense, cradles do provide an ‘argument’; thanks to them, the 
adult is justified in accepting the force of his feelings. This position sets up a delicate balance between a 
summons to intuition and a return to reasoning.” This peculiar logical status of the Epicurean cradle 
“argument” is indicated by Torquatus’ final comment that, although having just discussed a form of 
reasoning, Epicurus “denies need for reasoning or discussion as to why pleasure should be sought and 
pain avoided” (negat opus esse ratione neque disputatione quamobrem voluptas expetenda, fugiendus 
dolor sit).  
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 In book 2, the Ciceronian speaker’s response to Epicurean ethics aims primarily to 
complicate the function and characterization that Torquatus ascribes to pleasure.88 Yet he also 
includes his own polemical version of the cradle argument, which is instructive not only in its 
critique of the Epicurean summum bonum, but also for its radically different depiction of the 
structure of a life: 
Omne enim animal, simul et ortum est, et se ipsum et omnes partes suas diligit, duasque 
quae maximae sunt in primis amplectitur, animum et corpus, deinde utriusque partes. 
Nam sunt et in animo praecipua quaedam et in corpore, quae cum leviter agnovit, tum 
discernere incipit, ut ea quae prima data sint natura appetat asperneturque contraria. 
 
Every animal, as soon as it has been born, loves itself and all its parts, but especially it 
embraces those two most important parts—mind and body—and then the parts of each of 
these. For body and mind both possess certain special features which it recognizes at first 
only faintly, and later begins to discern, with the result that it begins to desire the first 
things given by nature and reject their opposites.89  
 
As a corrective to the Epicurean cradle argument, Cicero introduces a process of ethical 
development or “appropriation,” which draws from Antiochean and Stoic theories of oikeiosis.90 
Instead of “pleasure” as the primary impulse of the infant, this theory claims that a human is born 
endowed with a self-love that any individual instinctively feels for itself and all its parts. Over 
the course of a life, this self-love expands to encompass those things that further one’s own 
 
88 On this response to Epicureanism and some points of potentially willful misconstrual, see Morel 2016; 
and, on Cicero’s presentation of Epicureanism more generally, see Armstrong 2011; Fish 2011; and Maso 
2015. See also below, Ch. 4, section III.i.  
89 De Fin. 2.33; note Cicero’s translation of the Stoic tag ta prota kata physin with ea quae prima data 
sint natura, cf. 3.17. 
90 On the inconclusive Quellenforschung for book 2, see Bénatouïl 2016: 200-1. One problem is presented 
by the fact that Cicero refers to the human being as divided between body and soul, whereas the Stoics 
generally propose a unicameral theory. On Cicero’s conflation of this aspect of Stoic theory in Tusc., see 
Graver 2002: xix. For the Stoic definition of oikeiosis, see Stobaeus 4.671 = Long and Sedley 1987: 
i.349-340 (57 G); for the function of the theory in Stoic thought more generally, see esp. Inwood 1985 
and Engberg-Pedersen 1990. On the Antiochean development, see Gill 2016.  
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nature in expanding circles of sympathy and identification.91 Yet the basic aspect of oikeiosis 
that Cicero emphasizes is simply its progression. The primary impulse of the infant—self-love—
leads to development over time: guided by “the first things given by nature” (ea quae prima data 
sint natura), the individual recognizes, if only “faintly” (leviter), the capacities of itself and its 
parts. This faint recognition, in turn, promises a development of these capacities, even in the first 
moments of life, and a movement toward the realization of their potential for “appropriating” 
those external things that are in accordance with nature. Oikeiosis thus introduces a narrative of 
progress and dynamic change into the relation between origins and ends of life that is absent 
from the Epicurean conception of the vita.  
 If we reduce the arguments of the Epicurean Torquatus and the Ciceronian speaker of 
book 2 to consider only the features of the cradle argument, therefore, we note above all how the 
Epicurean theory offers a static model of human life. The limits of pleasure and pain remain an 
unchanged constant from origin to end with no need for development or sequence—the only 
alteration to these limits, in fact, is due to worldly perversion, and must be undone by philosophy 
so that they can be returned to their original state. On the other hand, Cicero’s response 
emphasizes progression as a defining element of life and the development of a sense of causation 
or temporality as the essential component of human reason. Cato’s speech in favor of the Stoic 
chief good, virtus, in book 3 picks up where Cicero’s polemic against the Epicureans leaves off. 
Cato, as we expect by this point, begins his speech with a reference to the cradle argument:  
Placet his, inquit, quorum ratio mihi probatur, simul atque natum sit animal (hinc enim 
ordiendum), ipsum sibi conciliari et commendari ad se conservandum et ad suum statum 
eaque quae conservantia sunt eius status diligenda, alienari autem ab interitu iisque rebus 
quae interitum videantur afferre. Id ita esse sic probant, quod ante, quam voluptas aut 
dolor attigerit, salutaria appetant parvi aspernenturque contraria, quod non fieret nisi 
 
91 On the function of nature in the theories of oikeiosis in the text, see Inwood 2016. 
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statum suum diligerent, interitum timerent…Ex quo intellegi debet principium ductum 
esse a se diligendo.  
 
He said, It seems correct to those whose system I approve, that as soon as an animal is 
born (for we must begin at the beginning), it feels attached to itself and is compelled to 
preserve itself and its constitution, and to care for those things that help to preserve its 
constitution; likewise it is repelled from destruction and from those things which seem to 
threaten destruction. They judge this to be correct because infants seek salutary things 
and shun the opposite even before they have chanced to experience pleasure or pain; and 
this would not happen unless they cherished their constitution and feared its 
destruction…From this we ought to understand that the primary impulse to action is 
drawn from self-love.92  
 
Cato coopts the form of the Epicurean cradle argument—note the verbatim repetition of the tag 
simul atque natum sit animal (cf. 1.30). Yet, in this Stoic version, Cato refers to the origins of 
life not in order to justify the ethical good itself, but to clarify the natural starting point from 
which both progress toward virtue and philosophical inquiry into the ethical life must begin (hinc 
enim ordiendum).93 In more explicit terms than Cicero’s response to Torquatus, Cato posits the 
origins of life only as the site of a natural self-love, a state of being “compelled to preserve itself 
and its constitution, and to care for those things that help to preserve its constitution” 
(commendari ad se conservandum et ad suum statum eaque quae conservantia sunt eius status 
diligenda). Cato uses the word status to refer to the “constitution” of the infant—that is, the 
material elements that make up its being.94 As noted above, Cicero’s speech from book 2 
 
92 De Fin. 3.16.  
93 On this point, see Brunschwig 1986: 129. 
94 Cf. Sen. Ep. 121. This entire letter deals with how the “constitution” (constitutio) of an individual 
changes over the course of life, causing what is suited to its constitution to also change: “But each age has 
its own constitution, different in the case of the child, the boy, and the old man; they are all adapted to the 
constitution wherein they find themselves. The child is toothless, and he is fitted to this condition. Then 
his teeth grow, and he is fitted to that condition also” (Unicuique aetati sua constitutio est, alia infanti, 
alia puero, alia seni; omnes ei constitutioni conciliantur in qua sunt. Infans sine dentibus est: huic 
constitutioni suae conciliatur. Enati sunt dentes: huic constitutioni conciliatur, 15, trans. R.M. 
Gummere). Unlike Seneca’s discussion, however, Cato avoids talking explicitly about the “age” of life 
(aetas), preferring instead the more logically inflected status. See below n.121.  
 87 
introduces this same word to refer to the bounded and complete “structure” within which a life 
unfolds (omnis status vitae consequentis 2.45). The juxtaposition of status as both general 
structure and particular constitution argues against any theory of human life as uniform and 
homotelic. A life takes place through its status; the vita will be defined by different 
constitutions.95 The status of the infant may be a necessary foundation for oikeiosis, but this 
initial constitution, along with what its nature requires, will give way to other constitutions in the 
progression toward the final good and the consummation of the status vitae.  
 The limitations of the cradle argument for understanding the relationship between origins 
and ends of life are clarified further in Cato’s discussion of ἀξία or aestimatio—the value 
assigned to the good. He describes a series of cognitive processes by which “notions” (rerum 
notiones) arise in the mind (in animis fiant) in the course of ethical progress. These are: 
experience (usus), combination (coniunctio), analogy (similitudo), and “rational inference” 
(collatio rationis).96 It is through this last process that “the mind ascends from those things which 
are in accordance with nature and arrives at an understanding of the good.”97 This “ascension” of 
the mind is not a quantifiable, step-by-step summation. Instead, the shift between apprehending 
“the first things in accordance with nature”—that is, in accordance with the primary impulse of 
self-love—and apprehending things in accordance with virtue—that is, in accordance with the 
 
95 Cf. Seneca’s use of constitutio for this second sense, quoted above n.94. But he also uses status in a 
similar sense in the same letter (121.8). See also, de Off. 3.117, where Cicero uses constitutio to translate 
Greek εὐστάθεια.  
96 This is the translation of Annas and Woolf 2001.  
97 Cum enim ab iis rebus quae sunt secundum naturam ascendit animus collatione rationis, tum ad 
notionem boni pervenit, 3.33.  
 88 
good—is one of a qualitative shift in aestimatio.98 To illustrate this complete change of state, 
Cato draws an analogy between estimation of the good and the taste of sweetness: “Just as 
honey, although it is supremely sweet, is nevertheless perceived to be sweet by its own unique 
kind of flavor, not by comparison with other flavors, thus this good that we are dealing with is to 
be valued among the most valuable things, yet its value depends on its innate quality not on 
quantity.”99 In contrast to the homotelic depiction of a human life offered by the Epicurean 
cradle argument, the Stoics thus sketch the contours of a vita in which profound differences in 
kind separate origins and ends. Yet the Stoic theory of oikeiosis also eschews an accretive 
progression from primary impulse toward true ethical action in accordance with virtue. Rather, 
“the value of virtue is peculiar and distinct: it depends on a change in kind, not a summation in 
degree” (alia est igitur propria aestimatio virtutis, quae genere, non crescendo valet, 3.34).  
 This Stoic emphasis on the qualitative changes that define the structure of a life and 
progress toward virtue has a significant effect on the way that Cato understands human time. In 
his discussion of “opportuneness” (εὐκαιρία), he applies a similar qualitative logic to 
temporality:  
Et quemadmodum opportunitas (sic enim appellemus εὐκαιρίαν) non fit maior 
productione temporis (habent enim suum modum quae opportuna dicuntur), sic recta 
 
98 The shift enabled by the exercise of these rational faculties is contingent, in part, on the material 
constitution of the individual. According to Stoic developmental psychology, children do not possess 
logos, but come into partial possession at the age of 7 and may have it fully only at 14. Thus, any exercise 
of reason can only possibly be carried out by an individual of the appropriate constitution, of which “age” 
is a necessary but not sufficient element. On this aspect of Stoic theory, see Long and Sedley 1987: i.259 
(on 42), “By allowing all normal people to have some cognitions, albeit weakly held in most cases, the 
Stoics provided a basis for ‘progress’ exactly analogous to their doctrine of ‘proper functions.’ What 
perfects these latter is not a change in their objective content, but the expert understanding, consistency 
and moral integrity of their agent.” For the age of reason, see Aetius 4.11.1-4 = Long and Sedley 1987: 
i.238 (39 D). On the Stoic notion of “progress” or προκοπή toward virtue, see below.  
99 Ut enim mel, etsi dulcissimum est, suo tamen proprio genere saporis, non comparatione cum aliis dulce 
esse sentitur, sic bonum hoc de quo agimus est illud quidem plurimi aestimandum, sed ea aestimatio 
genere valet, non magnitudine, 3.34.  
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effectio (κατόρθωσιν enim ita appello, quoniam rectum factum κατόρθωμα), recta igitur 
effectio, item convenientia, denique ipsum bonum, quod in eo positum est ut naturae 
consentiat, crescendi accessionem nullam habet. 
 
And just as opportuneness (for this is what I’ll call eukairia) is not increased by a 
prolongation of time (for things that are called opportune possess their complete 
measure), thus right conduct (for I’ll translate katorthо̄sis this way, since a katorthо̄ma is 
a single right action)—indeed, right conduct as well as proper things and the good itself, 
which consists in agreeing with nature, permits no increase or addition.100  
 
Cato’s analogy connects the absolute quality of a truly ethical action and the “opportuneness” of 
a moment in time. Just as what is truly in accordance with nature permits of no quantification or 
enhancement (quod in eo positum est ut naturae consentiat, crescendi accessionem nullam 
habet), a time that is opportune exists always in its “complete measure” (habent enim suum 
modum). This modus is not arrived at by a “prolongation of time” (productione temporis), but 
comes into being in the fullness of the moment.101 The quality of opportune time has important 
implications for the Stoic’s further thinking about the time of life and, in particular, the temporal 
conditions of a happy life. As Cato goes on to say, “The Stoics don’t think that a happy life is 
more preferable or desirable if it is long than if it is short” (Stoicis non videtur optabilior nec 
magis expetenda beata vita si sit longa quam si brevis).102  
 
100 De Fin. 3.45. 
101 It is interesting to consider opportunitas as in some ways the antithesis of Cicero’s experience of 
solitudo. Both are exceptional in progression time, but whereas solitudo is a solitary instant subtracted 
from continuous succession, opportunitas is an over-determined fulfillment of duration—solitudo is 
characterized by withdrawal and cessation, which allows a sense of durative structure to form, while 
opportunitas is experienced as a “fullness” and a “completeness” in and of itself.  
102 On this point, Cato offers the analogy of the happy life as a shoe that fits just right—“so it is for the 
things of which the good is determined entirely by propriety and opportuneness; a greater number of these 
things will not be preferred to fewer, nor more long-lasting to shorter” (Ut, si cothurni laus illa esset, ad 
pedem apte convenire, neque multi cothurni paucis anteponerentur nec maiores minoribus, sic, quorum 
omne bonum convenientia atque opportunitate finitur, nec plura paucioribus nec longiquiora brevioribus 
anteponentur, 3.46).  
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  Stoic theory clearly privileges quality over quantity and logical determinism over 
temporal succession in its conception of the unity of the vita. The qualitative shift that 
characterizes a life in accordance with virtue marks, for the Stoics, the attainment of 
“wisdom.”103 At the same time, however, just like the infant, the sage must still be said to live 
“in accordance with nature.” Since the status of the sage has passed through a categorical 
change, his nature—and therefore the things needed to live in accordance with that nature—has 
been transformed according to the determination of cosmic reason. Thus, for all its emphasis on 
qualitative transformation, the determinism of Stoic logos unifies a human lifetime under the 
rubric of “nature.” Regardless of status, to live ethically is always to live in accordance with 
one’s nature.  
 The Ciceronian speaker of the fourth book, arguing from a generally Peripatetic or “Old” 
Academic position against Cato’s Stoicism,104 takes aim at precisely this peculiarity in his 
characterization of ethical progress. This version of the cradle argument differs significantly 
from the previous instantiations as Cicero draws attention to the multi-form paths toward ethical 
perfection that the equally diverse first impulses of life open up:   
Omnis natura vult esse conservatrix sui, ut et salva sit et in genere conservetur suo. Ad 
hanc rem aiunt artes quoque requisitas quae naturam adiuvarent, in quibus ea numeretur 
in primis quae est vivendi ars, ut tueatur quod a natura datum sit, quod desit acquirat; 
iidemque diviserunt naturam hominis in animum et corpus; cumque eorum utrumque per 
se expetendum esse dixissent, virtutes quoque utriusque eorum per se expetendas esse 
dicebant; et cum animum infinita quadam laude anteponerent corpori, virtutes quoque 
animi bonis corporis anteponebant. Sed cum sapientiam totius hominis custodem et 
 
103 This qualitative difference is a defining aspect of the Stoics’ conception of progress toward virtue; see, 
e.g., Cato’s analogy at 3.48 that compares the attainment of wisdom and happiness to the qualitative 
difference between drowning and breathing air or blindness and sight. Cf. also Long and Sedley 1987: 
i.382 (61S-T).  
104 He names his sources as Xenocrates and Aristotle at 4.15, although the influence of Antiochus’ return 
to the “Old” Academy as a polemical maneuver against the Stoics can be perceived throughout. On the 
“Old Academy,” see 5.7; cf. Annas 2001: xi; Polito 2012.  
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procuratricem esse vellent, quae esset naturae comes et adiutrix, hoc sapientiae munus 
esse dicebant ut cum eum tueretur qui constaret ex animo et corpore, in utroque iuvaret 
eum ac contineret.  
 
All of nature desires to be the preserver of itself, in order that it might be safe and 
preserved in its own kind. To this end, [the Peripatetics/Old Academics] say that arts are 
also required to aid nature, among which is numbered most importantly the art of living 
so that it might guard what was given by nature and acquire what is lacking. These same 
men also divided the nature of a human into mind and body, since they argued that each 
of these parts ought to be developed for its own sake, and they also said that the virtues of 
each of these parts ought to be developed for their own sakes. And, since they praised the 
mind as infinitely more valued than the body, they also valued the virtues of the mind 
above the goods of the body. But since they desired wisdom, which is the comrade and 
accomplice of nature, to be the guardian and caretaker of the whole human being, they 
argued that it was the duty of wisdom, since it guards a being which consists of mind and 
body, to aid and maintain it on both accounts.105  
 
This account of the origins of life varies from the more straight-forward cradle arguments of the 
Epicureans and Stoics in that it deemphasizes a singular, unified primary impulse—or even an 
individual life—while instead emphasizing the multiple and dynamic paths toward self-
preservation and self-realization that are open to “all of nature” (Omnis natura) from its very 
inception. Cicero further includes not only “natural” paths, but also the addition of “arts” (artes) 
that “aid nature” (adiuvarent) and “acquire what is lacking” (quod desit acquirat) in nature. The 
argument continues along this line of thought: true progress toward ethical perfection, wisdom, 
and happiness involves constant development of the virtues of the mind, the goods of the body, 
and the various arts that humanity has developed to aid in this pursuit. This dynamic and 
accretive process, in fact, subtends and maintains the continuity of an entire vita.106 Thus, while 
 
105 De Fin. 4.16-17.  
106 See e.g., 4.25, “Therefore we are humans; we consist of soul and body, which are of a certain kind. 
And it is fitting for us, as the first natural impulse demands, to care for these parts and to constitute from 
them that end of the supreme and final good. And if the first things are correct, this end must consist in 
arriving at the largest number and the most important of the things that are in accordance with nature” 
(Sumus igitur homines; ex animo constamus et corpore, quae sunt cuiusdam modi, nosque oportet, ut 
prima appetitio naturalis postulat, haec diligere constituereque ex his finem illum summi boni atque 
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the Ciceronian speaker agrees with the Stoic position that human life is a site of development and 
change, he challenges the doctrine that the attainment of wisdom requires a qualitative 
transformation of state between primary impulses and ultimate ends: he asks, “what nature ever 
forgot its own original constitution? (Quae autem natura suae primae institutionis oblita est?, 
4.32)” 
 In a formal analogy to the movement from book 2 to 3, the “Old” Academic polemic 
against Stoicism in book 4 receives positive exposition in book 5, which I discuss below. The 
dialectical divisio Carneadea thus propels the text toward a conceptual impasse that defers any 
true argumentative or narrative closure beyond the “ends” of the present dialogue.107 The 
inconclusiveness of this divisio does not simply pertain to the dogmatic fines bonorum, but 
incorporates along with them the unified structure of a life and the ability of philosophy to 
describe or explain it. We began from a definition of the human being that is based in reason’s 
capacity to apprehend the “whole structure of life as it unfolds” (omnem…vitae consequentis 
statum, 2.45). The various cradle arguments can be understood as competing claims concerning 
the relationship between philosophy and this essential human capacity. For the Epicureans, since 
 
ultimi; quem si prima vera sunt ita constitui necesse est, earum rerum quae sint secundum naturam quam 
plurima et quam maxima adipisci). Cf. also 4.31-2. 
107  Many readers have argued, instead, that the Antiochean doctrine expounded by Piso in book 5 
represents both a strong synthesis of the preceding doxae and the doctrine held by Cicero himself to be 
the most proximate to the truth; see Brittain 2016: 13 for the history of this reading. More recently, 
however, Charles Brittain has argued convincingly that this reading of Cicero as a “mitigated sceptic” 
misses the text’s “Carneadean scepticism” that expresses “radical doubt about such philosophical views 
[i.e., doctrines]—and in particular, systematic philosophical views about goods—through the dialogue as 
a whole” (Brittain 2016: 13-14). On this view, see also Annas and Woolf 2001: xxvii, “In book v, 
however, C. shows that in ethics at least he is unconvinced by Antiochus’ own theory. By producing a 
powerful argument against it he shows that for him no theory is left standing as the clearly preferable one.  
Attractive as is a synthesis like that of Antiochus, we are, in Cicero’s view, back where we always were: 
trying to think through for ourselves the arguments on each side and come to our own understanding of 
which is the best way to live.” For further consideration of Cicero’s skepticism, see below Ch. 2. 
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the primary impulse is identical to the final good, it is the task of the philosopher to unlearn—
and to teach others to unlearn—the dictates of culture that prevent humanity from realizing the 
homotelic status of its vita. The Stoics contend that human life cannot be defined by a single 
status but passes through multiple constitutions defined by qualitatively different needs. Due to 
the deterministic worldview that animates the Stoic developmental narrative, however, these 
constitutions are unified under the common rubric of “nature” and directed by cosmic reason. 
The temporal existence of humanity is thus subordinated to the logically-dictated progress 
toward virtue: the only time that matters is the “fullness” of a moment (opportunitas) in which 
the ultimate good is present—the fulfillment of the vita for the sage has no distinctly temporal 
existence or quantifiable heterogeneity. The role that philosophy plays within the ephemeral 
experience of a lifetime, therefore, is ambiguous for the Stoics. Is philosophy simply a 
refinement of the basic human ability to apprehend cause and effect through reason? Can a 
human be wise without being a philosopher?108  
V. Finding Solitude 
 The point of undecidability toward which the argument of book 4 is already driving can 
be understood, in large part, as a problem in the relationship between continuity and time in the 
vita. Cicero’s objection to the Stoics’ logical explanation of the unity of a life—“what nature 
ever forgot its own original constitution?”—discloses a dilemma about continuity and human 
time: is the duration of a lifetime continuous? Or, is discontinuity inherent in the human 
experience of duration? This impasse drives the argument throughout the final book. In order to 
 
108 On this ambiguity in Stoicism more generally, see e.g., Sen. Ep. 89.4-5, who distinguishes between 
wisdom as “the good of the human mind perfected” and philosophy as “the love of wisdom, and the 
endeavor to attain it.” Thus, “philosophy strives toward the goal which wisdom has already reached” 
(Sapientia perfectum bonum est mentis humanae. Philosophia sapientiae amor est et adfectatio. haec eo 
tendit quo illa pervenit).  
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better clarify the terms of debate, I consider briefly as a comparandum the different conceptions 
of temporal duration offered by Henri Bergson and Gaston Bachelard. On the one hand, Bergson 
proposes that the human lifetime is nothing other than the continuity of duration. For Bergson, 
duration is the succession of conscious states through which we live and perceive the world. Yet 
these states are vitally unified and interconnected so as to be inextricable, except by abstraction 
and analysis.109 Bachelard, on the other hand, argued that the structures of human life are formed 
from a series of apprehensions of temporal discontinuity. We begin not from unified duration but 
from a duality of time: “continuous as possibility, as nothingness…discontinuous as being.”110 In 
order to explain duration, therefore, we must always bring continuity into being through “an 
artificial system—a rational or social system.”111 All forms of continuous duration are thus 
inherently plural, constructed, and dialectical. The experience of solitude, on the other hand, as a 
“positive experience of nothingness”112 provides a moment of cessation in which we are 
confronted with the discontinuous being of time. From this moment of “creative destruction” 
philosophy can apprehend the dialectic of durative structures that we understand as human life.  
 
109 See, e.g., 1910: 100-101, “Pure duration is the form which the succession of our conscious states 
assumes when our ego lets itself live, when it refrains from separating its present state from its former 
states…We can thus conceive of succession without distinction, and think of it as a mutual penetration, an 
interconnexion and organization of elements, each one of which represents the whole, and cannot be 
distinguished or isolated from it except by abstract thought” (emphasis orig.). On Bergson and duration, 
see e.g., Deleuze 2002; Lin 2013: 18-32.  
110 Bachelard 2000: 44, “We need to give ourselves the temporal alternative that can be analysed by these 
two observations: either in this instant, nothing is happening or else in this instant, something is 
happening. Time is thus continuous as possibility, as nothingness. It is discontinuous as being. In other 
words, we start from temporal duality, not from unity” (emphasis orig.). On Bachelard’s response to 
Bergson, see Bachelard 1969; Kennedy 2011: 19-22.  
111 Ibid.: 64.  
112 See above, n.11. 
 95 
 This early 20th century debate is relevant for considering the argument in the final book 
of de Fin. because it draws out the temporal aspect of Cicero’s skeptical challenge to Piso’s 
Antiochean synthesis. As I argue in this section, in Piso’s elaboration of oikeiosis, we find the 
vita defined, finally, as a duration of time, which looks forward to Bergson’s understanding of 
life as “pure duration.” By emphasizing the temporality of succession as an response to the 
Stoics’ strict qualitative determinism, Piso’s Antiochism presents philosophy as a fulfillment of 
humanity’s ability to apprehend the “whole structure of life,” not simply as a chain of necessary 
cause and effect, but in such a way as to animate the time of life with constant subjective activity 
aimed at achieving happiness from within the unfolding of the vita. For the Antiochean speaker, 
as for Bergson, life is time and time is alive—that is, life exists only in the interconnection and 
continuity of time, which stretches in the unbroken succession of duration from original 
constitution to the ultimate end (progredientibus aetatibus, 5.41). Given that the durative 
continuity between origins and ends is temporal, the practice of philosophy transforms each new 
moment in the course of a life into an opportunity to add to ethical perfection and happiness.  
 Yet, in the consummate inconclusiveness of the work, we also find Cicero’s skeptical 
response to Piso, which mounts a Bachelardian objection to Antiochus’ vitalistic panchronism. 
Cicero asks, what if philosophy fails to accomplish the goal that Antiochus sets for it—of 
bringing ethics to bear on the continuity of time? If the structure of human life cannot be 
considered as simply static, deterministically qualitative, or continuously temporal, where can 
philosophy find its purchase on the vita? It is important to recall that book 5 takes place in the 
solitudo of the Academy, a moment of withdrawal and cessation. Through this rendering of 
Cicero’s experience of solitude in the world of the dialogue, the text draws us toward the 
impasse that awaits at the end of the divisio Carneadea while it simultaneously opens up an 
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alternative way of understanding the importance of philosophy for human time. Rather than 
seeking to explain human life through the continuities of present and past, ends and origins, 
Cicero’s skepticism operates in the discontinuities of a lifetime. Philosophy functions in the 
disjunction of the present from the past as a liberation from succession. Philosophy exists for and 
through the time of solitudo. 
 Piso’s speech in book 5 offers the most elaborate variation on the cradle argument in the 
work. In fact, as Christopher Gill notes, Piso does not just use the cradle argument in order to 
support his ethical principles, but constructs his speech out of a single, unified developmental 
narrative.113 In contrast to Cato’s exposition of Stoic oikeiosis, which must account for doctrinal 
specificities, such as the value of the good, Piso avoids lengthy excursuses on individual points 
of dogma in order to leave his audience with a rhetorically integrated and seamless narrative that 
passes through birth, growth, and the perfection of life in its various forms. This narrative starts 
with the familiar cadence:  
Omne animal se ipsum diligit, ac simul [et] ortum est id agit ut se conservet, quod hic ei 
primus ad omnem vitam tuendam appetitus a natura datur, se ut conservet atque ita sit 
affectum ut optime secundum naturam affectum esse possit. Hanc initio institutionem 
confusam habet et incertam, ut tantummodo se tueatur qualecumque sit; sed nec quid sit 
nec quid possit nec quid ipsius natura sit intellegit. Cum autem processit paulum et 
quatenus quidque se attingat ad seque pertineat perspicere coepit, tum sensim incipit 
progredi seseque agnoscere et intellegere quam ob causam habeat eum quem diximus 
animi appetitum, coeptatque et ea quae naturae sentit apta appetere et propulsare 
contraria. Ergo omni animali illud quod appetit positum est in eo quod naturae est 
accommodatum. Ita finis bonorum exsistit, secundum naturam vivere sic affectum ut 
optime affici possit ad naturamque accommodatissime. 
 
Every animal loves itself, and as soon as it is born it acts in order to preserve itself, 
because this is the first impulse given to it by nature with a view to its life-long 
protection, and to preserve itself in the way that it can exist best according to nature. At 
 
113 On the rhetorical and philosophical differences between the Stoic and Antiochean iterations of 
oikeiosis, see esp. Gill 2016: 221-26 and 246. Gill draws particular attention to the many asides and 
convolutions that characterize Cato’s speech in contrast to the strong sense of narrative that defines 
Piso’s. 
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the beginning of life this arrangement is opaque and vague such that it only seeks to 
protect itself, whatever it may be—it does not understand what it is or what its potential 
is or even what its own nature is. But when it has grown a bit and has begun to 
understand to what extent certain things affect it and pertain to it, then, gradually, it 
commences to make progress and to recognize itself and to perceive why it possesses that 
which we call a desire of the soul. It begins to seek out those things which it feels are 
suited to its nature and to repel the contrary. Therefore, for every animal, what it desires 
is located in what is suited to its nature. Consequently, the End of Goods comes into 
being, that is to live according to nature so disposed as to be best and most aptly disposed 
toward nature.114 
 
Piso proposes to synthesize and reduce the doctrinal variations that, he claims, obscure the 
fundamental agreement between the Stoic and “Old” Academic narratives of growth and moral 
progress. For instance, he emphasizes the shared supposition that the primary impulse is toward 
self-preservation, using language (diligo, conservo, etc.) that recalls for Cicero’s reader intra-
textually the terms previously used by Cato and Cicero in books 3 and 4. There is further 
agreement that the first impulse possesses no inherent ethical value or even clarity: rather, this 
initial inclination must be developed into self-awareness and recognition of the nature of the 
individual animal.  
 The difference, as Piso presents it, arises in the nature of the continuity that connects the 
origins and ends of life. The Stoic characterization of happiness and ethical living requires a 
change of kind, dictated by the logic of aestimatio and the attainment of virtus. According to the 
magisterial Antiochean narrative, however, which also seeks to systematize the whole history of 
ethical philosophy,115 there are as many different Ends, as many different paths to the final good, 
as many different ways to realize happiness as there are ways of living.116 Oxen, horses, humans, 
 
114 De Fin. 5.24.  
115 See Sedley 2012 on Antiochus’ practice of using the history of philosophy in argumentation. 
116 See esp. 5.26, “Therefore, when we say that the ultimate end for all living creatures is to live following 
nature, we should not be understood to be saying that all have the same end.” (Quare cum dicimus 
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vines, and crops may all possess different natures and therefore different summa bona.117 But for 
the structure of each vita, the finis consists always in the ongoing activity and continuous 
development of the partes-cum-toto.118  
 In order to account for these continuous paths of development, Piso introduces a 
specifically temporal conception of the structure of a lifetime that supports and delimits his 
ethical narrative. As we have seen, in the previous speeches, the basic formation of human life, 
vita, has been understood as either a homotelic natural state defined by the limits of pleasure or a 
series of cause and effect, which passes through a logically determined succession of 
qualitatively distinct constitutions. These ways of conceptualizing the relationship between part 
and whole, beginning and end, subordinate temporality to ethical or logical sequences. By 
contrast, Piso’s speech emphasizes that the parts of the whole of life are themselves a form of 
durative time:  
Cum igitur ea sit quam exposui forma naturae, si ut initio dixi simul atque ortus esset se 
quisque cognosceret iudicareque posset quae vis et totius esset naturae et partium 
singularum, continuo videret quid esset hoc, quod quaerimus, omnium rerum quas 
expetimus summum et ultimum, nec ulla in re peccare posset. Nunc vero a primo quidem 
mirabiliter occulta natura est nec perspici nec cognosci potest; progredientibus autem 
aetatibus sensim tardeve potius quasi nosmet ipsos cognoscimus. 
 
 
omnibus animalibus extremum esse secundum naturam vivere, non ita accipiendum est quasi dicamus 
unum esse omnium extremum).  
117 See 5.39-40, however, for a reiteration of the scala naturae that accentuates the continuity not just 
within a single life but between different forms of life; e.g., “But if sensation were given to the vine, so 
that it possessed a quality of appetition and a power of movement, what do you think it would do? Would 
it not try to accomplish for itself those things that the viticulturist had provided for it previously?” (At 
vero si ad vitem sensus accesserit, ut appetitum quendam habeat et per se ipsa moveatur, quid facturam 
putas? An ea quae per vinitorem antea consequebatur per se ipsa curabit?, 40).  
118 See esp. 5.55-60, e.g., “Furthermore, there are very clear, readily recognizable, and not at all doubtful 
indications from nature, especially evident for humanity but also with regard to every living creature, that 
the life force desires to always be engaged in some activity (Sunt autem etiam clariora vel plane 
perspicua minimeque dubitanda indicia naturae, maxime scilicet in homine sed in omni animali, ut 
appetat animus agere semper aliquid, 55).  
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Since the appearance of our nature is as I have laid out, if everyone were to recognize 
themselves as soon as they were born (as I said at the beginning) and they were able to 
judge what the power of their nature is as a whole and with regard to its individual parts, 
they would immediately perceive the very thing that we are inquiring into—that is, what 
is highest and last of all the things that we seek—and they would be incapable of being 
wrong in any matter. But as things are now, our nature is curiously hidden from us from 
the beginning and it can be neither perceived nor understood. But with the advancing 
ages we come to understand ourselves bit by bit, or rather, belatedly.119 
 
In this restatement of the cradle argument, Piso subordinates the narrative of ethical development 
to the temporal succession of a life. Since humans do not possess clear knowledge of their nature 
“as soon as they are born” (simul atque ortus esset), that nature, which will determine “the 
highest and last of all things we seek,” must be constituted out of the very progression of the 
time of life (progredientibus autem aetatibus).120 The vita, which is the site of ethical progress 
and the quest for self-knowledge, is nothing other than the interdependent and continuously 
unified moments of the time of life (aetates).121 Only as we are formed in the fullness of our 
nature by the succession of these ages can “we come to understand ourselves bit by bit, or rather, 
belatedly” (sensim tardeve potius quasi nosmet ipsos cognoscimus). Indeed, it is perhaps only 
“belatedly” (tarde)—that is, after a succession of aetates—that the nature of life is evident to the 
human. Piso’s speech thus introduces the aetas as a way of articulating the temporal continuity 
 
119 De Fin. 5.41.  
120 Cf. 5.59, “Therefore nature created and shaped the human body in such a way that some parts of it are 
complete from the first, while others are fashioned by the advancing age (Natura igitur corpus quidem 
hominis sic et genuit et formavit ut alia in primo ortu perficeret, alia progrediente aetate fingeret…). This 
notion is certainly not un-Stoic (on the material constitution of Stoic progress, see above, n.98. Yet Piso’s 
shift into the diction of aetas is notable (see below, n.121), and his stress on the unbroken continuity and 
constant action through these “ages” performs an important distinction.    
121 Aetas is used sparingly in the earlier books (9x total): e.g., in the repeated phrase, ultimum tempus 
aetatis (2.87, 3.76), cf. 1.63, 2.88, 2.118, 3.9, 3.76, 4.6, 4.13. By contrast it appears 11x in Piso’s speech 
alone, with a wide array of meanings; see also, 5.27 (x2), 5.43, 5.50, 5.55 (x2), 5.57, 5.59, 5.62 (x2).  
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of human life. As the partes-cum-toto that comprise the duration of human life, the succession of 
aetates subtends ethical progress and life itself.  
 Within this vitalistic and panchronic conception of the human lifetime, Piso claims that 
happiness consists in the enjoyment of as many bodily goods and the accomplishment of as 
many virtues of the mind as possible and in the manner best-suited to the nature of the 
individual. This totality of happiness can only be the result of a life-long process of philosophical 
study and determined action: because the vita is the time of life and the time of life is the 
condition of ethical progress for the vita, “it rests with us (and by that I mean our art) to seek out 
the consequences of those principal endowments that we received until we have achieved what 
we desire” (itaque nostrum est [quod nostrum dico, artis est] ad ea principia quae accepimus 
consequentia exquirere, quoad sit id quod volumus effectum, 60). Adopting the Stoic idiom of 
“consequentiality” (consequentia exquirere) for his own purpose, Piso emphasizes the interactive 
and accumulative aspect of humanity’s interaction with its own development and change over 
time. Unlike the Stoic definition of a happy life, therefore, which is based only on the presence 
of virtue, permits of no degree, and does not depend on the amount of time that it is lived, 
Antiochean happiness exists in time and can be prolonged because it is, in a fundamental sense, 
constituted by the time of life. In the translation of this temporal vitalism into ethical doctrine, 
Antiochus’ theory thus allows for a distinction between “happier” and “happiest” lives. For 
Antiochus, “the things which are counted as bodily goods are those that complete the happiest 
life, yet it is just as true that happiness can exist without them” (illa enim quae sunt a nobis bona 
corporis numerata complent ea quidem beatissimam vitam, sed ita ut sine illis possit beata vita 
exsistere, 5.71). The “happiest” life will be “filled with” and “completed by” (complent) the 
 101 
accumulation of external goods and goods of fortune that takes place over time, but founded 
upon a “happy” life, which is determined by the potency of moral goodness and virtue.  
 According to Piso, therefore, the Stoics and “Old Academics” agree that an ethical life 
must unfold and develop from first natural impulse toward an end. They disagree, however, in 
the thread of continuity that conjoins the end and its origin—that is, whether it consists of the 
consequentiality of deterministic reason or the unbroken succession of durative time out of 
which any chain of consequence must be formed and experienced. Much of the remainder of the 
debate in book 5 between Piso and Cicero is focused on pushing this disagreement to a point of 
impasse.122 In a peculiar dialectical twist, Cicero, who in the previous book, which is set later in 
time, argued against Stoicism in favor of Antiochism, returns, from the dramatic future, to argue 
from a Stoic position and to critique the Antiochean doctrine on happiness. In particular, Cicero 
compels Piso to address the apparent inconsistency between the Antiochean dogmata that 
happiness exists by degree and that the sage is “always and invariably happy” (sapientes omnes 
esse semper beatos, 5.77). For the Stoics, Cicero argues, only the sage can be considered happy 
and the happiness of the sage is unassailable, since his status—the logically constituted state of 
his being—is not dependent on extension in time and is defined by the presence of absolute good 
and the exclusion of the absolute bad.123 For Piso, however, since happiness is formed out of the 
progredientes aetates and so exists by degree, the consistency of the Stoic notion is lacking.124 
 
122 See Cicero’s speech: 75-86; and, Piso’s rebuttal: 86-95. 
123 Cf., e.g., Cato’s comment that, “A man who has made some progress toward the state of virtue is 
nonetheless as much in misery as a man who has made no progress at all” (qui processit aliquantum ad 
virtutis habitum nihilo minus in miseria est quam ille qui nihil processit, 3.48).  
124 See 5.81. Cicero presses Piso to defend the proposition, a consequence of the Antiochean’s acceptance 
that external goods bear on ultimate happiness, that happiness can coexist with the presence of evils: e.g., 
“It is violently inconsistent to consider the same man happy who is oppressed by many evils” (nam illud 
vehementer repugnat, eundem beatum esse et multis malis oppressum, 5.77).  
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Cicero thus challenges Piso to defend the function that Antiochus assigns to philosophy for 
understanding and acting upon the human lifetime: since his philosophy is pointedly 
eudaimonistic, if Piso cannot defend happiness, the entire Antiochean project is in jeopardy.125 
 Piso meets Cicero’s critique on this point by arguing that, in fact, the Stoic dedication to 
the logical consistency of happiness puts true, lived happiness out of reach. If philosophy is an 
expression of the “burning desire to live happily” (beate enim vivendi cupiditate incensi, 5.86), 
Piso argues, then its consummation does not lie in definitions and syllogisms, but in the practices 
and the ways of living that have been developed and exercised by philosophers throughout 
history, from Plato, to Pythagoras, to the wisemen of Egypt and Persia.126 Piso accuses the Stoics 
of perverting the true nature of philosophy by inventing new names to disguise the fundamental 
agreement between Stoicism and the “Old” Academy.127 Thus, it is the Stoics who rob 
philosophy of the ability to defend happiness by rendering the terms by which the defense must 
be carried out meaningless for the conduct of life—for who would claim that “a crop of grain is 
not fertile and dense, if you can see a single weed anywhere in it or that a business is not 
profitable if among the greatest profits it incurs the smallest loss” (ne seges quidem igitur spicis 
uberibus et crebris si avenam uspiam videris, nec mercatura quaestuosa si in maximis lucris 
paulum aliquid damni contraxerit, 5.91). Piso maintains, therefore, that it is more important for 
 
125 See Piso’s rebuttal to Cicero at 5.86, “The whole importance of philosophy, as Theophrastus contends, 
lies in obtaining a happy life” (omnis auctoritas philosophiae, ut ait Theophrastus, consistit in beata vita 
comparanda). On Cicero’s skeptical treatment of eudaimonism more generally, see Ch. 4, section III.i.  
126 See 5.87.  
127 For instance, the Stoics call things that are truly “goods” only “preferables” (et sumenda et eligenda et 
praeposita [quae ita definiunt ut satis magno aestimanda sint], 5.90).  
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philosophy to defend a definition of happiness that supports and conforms to human experience 
than to reduce that experience to a purely logical consistency.  
 In this final skeptical gambit of the dialogue, Cicero is not simply reversing the divisio by 
arguing in favor of Stoic doctrine—nor is he allowing Antiochism to have the last word. Instead, 
he is using skeptical argumentation in order to pit the Stoic and Antiochean positions against one 
another to draw out a latent undecidability.128 On the one hand, Cicero’s challenge to Piso 
demonstrates how the Stoics privilege systematization and logic in order to produce a 
philosophical edifice that is as beautifully interconnected as a work of art: “By god, it is 
marvelous how their system is interwoven with itself (I must admit what I really think). The 
conclusions agree with the premises (Respondent extrema primis), the intermediate steps agree 
with both, every part fits with every other part; they understand what follows logically and what 
is contradictory.”129 While this remark may seem to be highly laudatory, with Piso’s critique in 
mind, its emphasis on artifice discloses the failure of Stoic doctrine to account adequately for 
human experience: the logical continuity between “conclusions” and “premises” (extrema 
primis) supplants the true aim of philosophy—to apprehend the structure and potential of a 
human lifetime. On the other hand, Cicero criticizes Piso’s Antiochean theory for getting “ahead 
of itself” (proclivi currit oratio, 5.84)130 and “getting stuck in a rut at the end” (venit ad 
 
128 Indeed, Cicero repeatedly states that he is not interested in whether the Stoic or the Antiochean 
position is “true” but what is consistent: 5.77, 79, 83, 84. In doing so, he is emphasizing that his use of 
Stoic argumentation is not to support its conclusions, but to render unsatisfactory the Antiochean’s. Cf. 
esp. 5.81, “What could be less approvable than to say that someone is happy, but not happy enough?” 
(quid minus probandum quam esse aliquem beatum nec satis beatum?). 
129 Et hercule (fatendum est enim quod sentio) mirabilis est apud illos contextus rerum. Respondent 
extrema primis, media utrisque, omnia omnibus; quid sequatur, quid repugnet, vident, 5.83.  
130 Cicero’s language here recalls Chrysippus’ comparison of an individual’s the loss of control over his 
emotions to a runner losing control over his legs on account of his own momentum (see Galen PHP 
4.2.14-18 = SVF 3.462 and 4.6.35 = SVF 3.478); this language is reprised in the context of Cicero’s own 
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extremum; haeret in salebra). Furthermore, as Piso’s response to this critique makes clear, this 
inconsistency in argumentation is required in order for philosophy to be a bastion of the very 
aspects of human experience that Stoicism sacrifices for logical consistency. Stoicism fails to 
produce a philosophy suited to human experience and Antiochus fails to render human 
adequately experience in philosophy.  
 What remains absent from these attempts to develop a philosophy of the human lifetime 
is allowance for an experience that confronts the discontinuity of time. Antiochus describes 
human time according to a durational continuity: a lifetime is an unbroken succession from 
origins to ends. The Stoics ascribe heterogeneity to human experience in the shift from status to 
status, but this is heterogeneity without discontinuity: given the power of cosmic reason, these 
changes, in fact, disclose the underlying continuity of “nature.” As the divisio approaches the 
ends of knowledge available to these positions, however the skeptical epochē that awaits in its 
inconclusive conclusion creates its own kind of solitude.131 Perhaps, as readers, we can 
experience the suspension of closure that Cicero’s skeptical argument produces as itself a 
subtraction of time from continuity—a moment of Bachelardian withdrawal and disjuncture in 
which we are severed from the past, but in the same instant are able to look, even mournfully, on 
that past as completed and to consider the bare potentialities of the present. In other words, what 
is absent from these philosophical accounts of the relation between the origins and ends, but 
present through the representational form of the work as a whole, is Cicero’s own experience of 
solitudo. Through the claims in his letters that solitude both enables and serves as the object of 
 
discussion of the emotions at Tusc. 4.14 and 4.42, where the same form proclivi is found; see Madvig 
1877: ad loc.  
131 On this “subjective” element in the outcome of the dialogue, see Brittain 2016: 29-30.  
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his philosophy, we can see in the impasse at the end of de Finibus an opening onto such a 
moment of unboundedness—and an invitation to the reader to experience this solitary instant as a 
liberation from temporal succession. In his text’s ultimate rejection of the continuities of the vita, 
Cicero brings philosophy to bear on the interstices of a lifetime. It is there, in the positive 
experience of nothingness, that philosophy finds its purchase on human time and experience.
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Chapter 2. Doubt’s Drives. 
 
Although the usefulness of such extensive doubt [about all things, especially material 
things] is not apparent at first sight, its greatest benefit lies in freeing us from all our 
preconceived opinions…The eventual result of this doubt is to make it impossible for us 
to have any further doubts about what we subsequently discover to be true. 
 
René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, §12 
 
Nasce per quello, a guisa di rampollo,  
a piè del vero il dubbio, ed è natura  
ch’al sommo pinge noi di collo in collo.  
 
Thus doubt is born like a new growth  
from the root of truth, and its nature drives us 
toward the summit from peak to peak.  
 
Dante, Paradiso 4.130-2 
I. From Uncertainty to Doubt 
 For Cicero, philosophy is a discourse and practice that owes its function and purpose to 
human fallibility. In the Lucullus,1 the dialogue that will form the basis of this chapter, Cicero 
presents doubt as an experience through which philosophy can turn that very fallibility into the 
pursuit of truth in time.2 In the sections that follow I argue that Cicero conceives of doubt as a 
response to reaching the limit of knowledge in the present moment. This limit marks a point of 
 
1 The composition of the Lucullus and its subsequent revision, all of which took place between March and 
July 45, is coextensive with de Fin. It is the third and only extant book from Cicero’s original 
philosophical trilogy (or second book of the original diptych on Academic philosophy) Hortensius, 
Catulus, Lucullus. The material of the Catulus and Lucullus was quickly refashioned by Cicero into a 
significantly different four-volume work (the so-called Academici Libri). Griffin 1997 persuasively 
argues also for an intermediary version between the original diptych and revised four dialogues, although 
no material from this initial revision, the existence of which is based on evidence in the letters, remains 
extant. Thus, the Academica are really the remains of three different revisions. Following Hunt 1998: 13-
16 and Cicero himself, I refer to the Lucullus (Luc.) and the fragments of the Academici libri (Ac. lib.) as 
distinct (see Att. XIII.32[305].3 for the Lucullus and Catulus; Att. XIII.13[321].1, 16[323].1, 19[326].3; 
and Tusc. 2.2 for the nomenclature of the later revisions), although I use the catch-all Academica (Ac.) to 
refer to the whole assemblage (cf. Cicero’s Ἀκαδημικὴ σύνταξις, Att. XIII.13.1). See Griffin 1997 and 
Cappello 2019: 16-35 for the circumstances of composition and revision. On the significance of this 
compositional process for my argument, see below section IV. 
2 On the understanding of doubt as an experience for Cicero, see esp. Cappello 2019: 312-23.  
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“uncertainty,” a quality that inheres in sense-impressions of the natural world and is a 
characteristic of potentially truth-valued propositions. Doubt, in turn, is a symptomatic response 
to the pervasiveness of uncertainty in experience, a response which, furthermore, can be 
harnessed rationally and adopted intentionally as the drive of inquiry. By deferring and 
prolonging the confrontation with the uncertainty, I contend ultimately, Ciceronian doubt 
transforms each new moment in the progression of time into a potential receptacle for truth.  
 In this first section, I outline the debates about the limits of human knowledge that inform 
the Lucullus and establish the relationship between uncertainty and doubt that Cicero develops 
through his engagement with the categories of Hellenistic epistemology. In the dialogue, the 
venerable Republican aristocrat Lucullus3 voices a position in favor of Antiochus’ syncretic and 
dogmatic epistemology.4 In particular, Lucullus defends the basic Stoic proposition that some 
impressions are inherently and discernibly kataleptic—i.e., “graspable.”5 Speaking from the 
perspective of an Academic skeptic,6 Cicero argues, on the contrary, for a fundamental 
 
3 On the choice of personae and setting, see below, section IV.  
4 This is a conventional and admittedly simplistic understanding of Antiochus’ philosophical position, 
who, as Polito 2012 and others have recently argued, is more rightly conceived as a bonafide participant 
in and successor to the skeptical Academic tradition. I continue to use the conventional labels “syncretic” 
and “dogmatic” because they seem to me true to Cicero’s own view of Antiochus’ project, but this view 
should certainly be understood as polemical.  
5 On the kataleptic impression in Stoicism, see, e.g., D.L. VII.54 = Long and Sedley 1987: i.236-7 (39A).  
6 My use of the conventional label “Academic skepticism” is meant to be descriptive, referring to the 
Ciceronian speaker’s own characterization of his approach. On the one hand, he is “skeptical” in the sense 
that he resists accepting philosophical arguments on the basis of “authority” (see, e.g., 64), puts forward 
the view that there can be no certain knowledge, and employs dialectical argumentation that opposes the 
positions of dogmatic schools (see, e.g., his application of a divisio at Luc. 138-41; for the use of 
divisiones in Luc. and their difference from those found in de Fin., see Lévy 1992: 335-444 and Algra 
1997). On the other hand, he is “Academic” because he claims to belong to the philosophical tradition of 
Plato and insists that the purpose of his skeptical approach is the pursuit of truth, or at least the semblance 
of truth (e.g., 66, Qui enim possum non cupere verum invenire, cum gaudeam si simile veri quid 
invenerim?). On the view that Cicero must be understood as both a skeptic and a Platonist, see esp. 
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indiscernibility of impressions and, by extension, argumentative positions:7 “I don’t think that 
there are any <impressions / positions> such that if I assented to them I wouldn’t often be 
assenting to something false, because there isn’t a differentiating feature dividing true from 
false” (ego nihil eius modi esse arbitror, cui si adsensus sim, non adsentiar saepe falso, quoniam 
vera a falsis nullo discrimine separantur, 141).8 This position does not affirm or deny the 
existence of a truth, but simply opposes the Stoic idea that there is a criterion—“a differentiating 
feature”—inherent in kataleptic impressions that allows for the true to be discerned infallibly 
from the false. This epistemological uncertainty or “universal akatalēpsia”9 leads the skeptic to 
argue contra Stoicos that it is necessary for the sage to withhold his rational assent from all 
 
Burkert 1965; I discuss the nature of Cicero’s philosophical activity and its connection to truth further 
below, Chapter 4, section III.ii. The use of “skepticism” in this label is anachronistic, but not modern; see, 
e.g., Gell. IX.5.6 with Striker 1980: 54n.1. Cicero’s approach, which maintains the importance of “truth” 
for inquiry, should be considered as in some ways distinct from forms of ancient skepticism that, using a 
formulation from Brittain and Palmer 2001, are only “concerned with reporting how things appear…” 
(70). This latter approach, while its influence is clearly evident at times in Cicero’s philosophy, is more 
fully identifiable with the Pyrrhonian tradition; see, e.g., Sextus’ avowal that he merely reports what 
happens to him (Ph. 1.4, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ νῦν φαινόμενον ἡμῖν ἱστορικῶς ἀπαγγέλλομεν περὶ ἑκάστου; and, 
1.15, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, ἐν τῇ προφορᾷ τῶν φωνῶν τούτων τὸ ἑαυτῷ φαινόμενον λέγει καὶ τὸ πάθος 
ἀπαγγέλλει τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἀδοξάστως, μηδὲν περὶ τῶν ἔξωθεν ὑποκειμένων διαβεβαιούμενος). See further 
below, section II.  
7 There is frequent debate in the scholarship about Cicero’s apparent conflation of “impression” and 
“position” in the epistemological debates between the Stoics and Academics that he records; i.e., whether 
it is appropriate to say, as Cicero often seems to, that a sage assents to a philosophical position in the 
same way that he assents to a kataleptic impression. As I argue throughout this dissertation, I think 
Cicero’s philosophy is best understood as a creative translation of his Greek counterparts, thus, we should 
understand in his apparent conflation of these two categories a choice to broaden the purview of skeptical 
uncertainty from the restricted place (the impression) it holds in the dialectical confrontations of 
Hellenistic philosophy. On the origins of this debate, see Striker 1980, Frede 1984, Burnyeat 
(Unpublished), etc.  
8 Luc. 141; translations from this dialogue here and throughout draw extensively on Brittain 2006. On the 
contentious applicability of the katalēpsis to objects outside of the realm of sense perception, see Striker 
1980: 70. Despite the difficulties that she identifies, I think that, within the world of Cicero’s dialogues, 
we are at least encouraged to make an association between the forms of uncertainty confronted in 
representation and conceptualization, sense-perception and belief. 
9 On this term, see D.L. IX.61.  
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impressions and positions, since, if his assent were given to a false impression, even if 
indiscernibly so, he would cease to be wise—according to the Stoics’ own definition of 
wisdom.10 The acknowledgement of universal akatalēpsia is an admission that, because 
uncertainty is a characteristic of the interaction between the natural world and human cognition, 
there can be no adjustment to our senses or to our faculty of reason that would enable us to 
overcome definitively the limits of knowledge. Cicero thus argues throughout the dialogue that 
the skeptic’s “suspension of assent” (retentio / sustinendae adsensiones; ἐποχή) can transform 
this confrontation with uncertainty from a manifestation of biological and rational deficiency into 
a philosophical commitment.11  
 As a development of this standard Academic argument, to which I return below, in 
Cicero’s use of these skeptical categories, recognition of universal akatalēpsia is, furthermore, 
accompanied by a confrontation with the limitlessness of truth from within the limitation of 
human experience.12 Human senses and beliefs will always be insufficient for a comprehension 
 
10 On the chain of reasoning behind this basic skeptical argument see Brittain 2001: 12-13. As with most, 
if not all, forms of Greek skeptical argumentation, this argument only has validity when directed against 
the assertion of an opponent—in this case, the Stoics, who held that the sage will never assent to a false 
impression or hold an opinion. Out of this context, the argument cannot necessarily provide any positive 
account of a skeptical position regarding the sage. On the ad hominem nature of skeptical argument, see 
esp. Striker 1980. On the historical basis for these arguments in their dialectical relation to Stoicism, see 
esp. Annas 1980; Couissin 1983. 
11 On the nature of this skeptical “view” or, as I prefer, “commitment,” which is fundamentally different 
from Stoic “assent,” see Frede 1984: 256: “having a view involves one kind of assent, whereas taking a 
position, or making a claim, involves a different kind of assent, namely the kind of assent a skeptic will 
withhold.” My preference for “commitment” comes from the active role of doubt that Cicero emphasizes 
in his presentation of the skeptic’s “view,” on which see further below. 
12 See, e.g., Cicero’s use of the metaphor of a “mole desiring the light” (talpam num desiderare lumen 
putas?, 81) to describe the relationship between the limitations of human experience and the limitlessness 
of truth; this passage is discussed below, section II.   
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of truth, which, therefore, stands in an unlimited relation to the finitude of human experience.13 
Uncertainty and doubt demonstrate that, subtending the finite coherence of a sight, belief, or life, 
there is a potentially boundless truth of which any particularity can only ever realize a limited 
part. This is not to say that confrontation with uncertainty reveals anything substantive about that 
truth. Rather, it only confirms the partiality of experience, thereby reminding us to be aware of 
our own limitation in relation to the objects of our inquiry and observation. By channeling this 
partiality and limitation into the form and function of philosophy, Cicero’s doubt is a sign and 
acknowledgement of the limitlessness of truth from within human experience.  
 To return to the epistemological debate as it played out between the Hellenistic schools of 
the 3rd and 2nd centuries BCE, the skeptic’s advocation of a “suspense” of judgement in the face 
of akatalēpsia opened their argument up to a charge of apraxia from the Stoics.14 If, the Stoics 
contend, the skeptic completely withholds his assent from all impressions and positions, he has 
surrendered his entire ability to live—to make decisions and take action in the world—not to 
mention to construct and defend philosophical arguments. Cicero’s dialogue is overwhelmingly 
focused on this charge of “inaction” and the skeptic’s defense of ways in which a life could be 
constructed around and lived fully through the suspension of judgement. The irreconcilable 
contention between Cicero and Lucullus concerns this “overturning of life” (eversio vitae) that 
threatens to follow upon the recognition of universal akatalēpsia and the suspension of 
judgement.15 I discuss below in section III, how Cicero interprets the most common response to 
 
13 On this relationship between limitation in experience and the limitlessness of truth, see further below, 
section V.  
14 On the apraxia argument and the skeptic’s response, see below, Section III.  
15 For Lucullus’ attack, see 31-45; for Cicero’s response, see esp. 98-111.  
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the apraxia charge—the Carneadean pithanon. In order to understand better how Cicero himself 
approaches skeptical philosophy, however, we must hold this solution in abeyance and first 
examine the role that he ascribes to doubt as a response to uncertainty.  
 In Cicero’s discussion of similarities (similitudines), he is most explicit about the nature 
of doubt as a symptomatic response to universal akatalēpsia.16 If two impressions are similar to 
such a degree that they cannot be distinguished by the senses, the resultant similarity undermines 
the Stoic claim that a criterion exists that can infallibly discern true from false impressions. An 
example that both Lucullus and Cicero discuss—that of the twins Publius and Quintus 
Servilius—is of the order of stock skeptical examples that are, by Cicero’s own admission, trite 
and intended to stand in for a much larger problem that apparent identities pose to knowledge.17 
Lucullus, in fact, introduces this specific example to ridicule the skeptical position by arguing 
that such an indiscernible similarity could never actually exist—instead, it can only be posed as a 
spurious hypothetical sophism: “Imagine that those ancient Servilii (the ones who were twins) 
were as similar as they are said to have been; do you suppose that they were actually identical? 
They were not recognized apart in public, but they were at home…Or don’t we see that it comes 
about as a matter of course that, once we have had practice (consuetudine adhibita), we 
 
16 Although Cicero does not use a single Latin word to denote “doubt” in this sense, words related to 
dubius appear in the Lucullus and fragments of the Academici libri at a rate higher than in the other 
dialogues of 45-4. These words are used in the Lucullus and the fragments of Ac. Lib. at a rate nearly 
twice that of the Tusculans and significantly more than in the de Fin., although there the difference is less 
pronounced, as we might expect considering the aporetic structure of both works and their overlapping 
compositional dates. From this it is clear that the cluster of senses “doubt, hesitation, suspicion” play a 
particularly important thematic role in these dialogues. The rates of occurrence for Luc. + Ac.: 21/23,021 
= .00091; de Fin. 39/47,778 = .00081; Tusc. 27/47,958 = .0005.  
17 Cicero ironically goads Lucullus, who complains about the skeptics’ choice of simple examples, e.g., 
the ship or the oar, “Why am I talking about the ship? I saw that you were dismissive of the oar. Perhaps 
you’re looking for something a bit bigger. Well, what could be bigger than the sun…?” (quid ego de 
nave? vidi enim a te remum contemni; maiora fortasse quaeris. Quid potest esse sole maius…?, 82). 
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discriminate easily people who we thought we could never tell apart—so easily that they do not 
seem in the slightest degree similar?”18 As often throughout his speech, Lucullus appeals to 
reason, art, and practice (consuetudo) in order to downplay skeptical epistemological critique.  
 Cicero responds directly to Lucullus’ use of consuetudo as the arbiter of knowledge by 
emphasizing that even habitual practice is fallible and, furthermore, due to the false security 
associated with habit, its rupture will, in fact, accentuate the feelings of doubt that emerge:19 
Negas tantam similitudinem in rerum natura esse…ne sit sane: videri certe potest, fallet 
igitur sensum, et si una fefellerit similitudo, dubia omnia reddiderit; sublato enim iudicio 
illo quo oportet agnosci, etiamsi ipse erit quem videris qui tibi videbitur, tamen non ea  
nota iudicabis, qua dicis oportere, ut non possit esse eiusdem modi falsa. 
 
You deny that there is such similarity between things in nature…You may well be right; 
but it can certainly seem to exist. If so, that similarity deceives the senses—and if one 
similarity deceives them, it will render everything doubtful. For without the criterion by 
which he’s supposed to be recognized, even if the person you’re looking at actually is the 
person you think you’re looking at, you still won’t be judging by the mark you say we’re 
supposed to use to avoid false, but exactly alike, impressions.20  
 
Cicero’s response clarifies what is at stake in the example of the twins. First, he takes Lucullus to 
task for relying on a false distinction between being and nonbeing, whereas the true distinction 
lies in the varying intensities of appearance that define the human experience of the world: even 
if such a close resemblance does not “exist in nature,” it can seem to exist (videri certe potest)—
 
18 56, Fac enim antiquos illos Servilios, qui gemini fuerunt, tam similes quam dicuntur: num censes etiam 
eosdem fuisse? Non cognoscebantur foris, at domi; non ab alienis, at a suis. An non videmus hoc usu 
venisse ut, quos numquam putassemus a nobis internosci posse, eos consuetudine adhibita tam facile 
internosceremus uti ne minimum quidem similes esse viderentur? 
19 An assertion that feels particularly meaningful in light of the frequent discussion in the letters about the 
loss of consuetudo under Caesar; see, e.g., the letter to Nigidius Figulus (ad Fam. IV.13[225].1) discussed 
above, Intro., section I. 
20 Luc. 84. 
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i.e., it can have an appearance in the world, which is, after all, the only access to being afforded 
by a materialist worldview.21  
 Cicero then lays out the relationship between uncertainty, which is a function of the 
fallible relationship between the senses and the world, and doubt, a response to this fallibility. 
Given the appearance of indiscernible impressions, the senses are “deceived” (fefellerit), which, 
once it has occurred, “will render everything doubtful” (dubia omnia reddiderit). The verb 
reddo, “to deliver, hand back, give over, restore” speaks to the overwhelming transformation 
brought about by a confrontation with uncertainty. This verb also indicates a return to doubt, 
strongly implying that this response is only one in a series of reiterations in experience. Doubt 
spreads from the recognition of fallibility to undermine the basis on which any certainty had 
rested. Any attempt to achieve certainty by means of this formerly sufficient criterion can only 
fail and, as a consequence, increase feelings of doubt: “For without the criterion by which he’s 
supposed to be recognized, even if the person you’re looking at actually is the person you think 
you’re looking at, you still won’t be judging by the mark you say we’re supposed to use to avoid 
false, but exactly alike, impressions.” Cicero thus uses this stock example to depict the 
uncertainty (akatalēpsia) that undermines any Stoic epistemological claim for katalēpsis. At the 
same time—and more significantly for Cicero’s own project—this passage demonstrates clearly 
how feelings of doubt function as a symptomatic response of the individual’s confrontation with 
that uncertainty.22  
 
21 Cf. e.g., Luc. 111, Ac. Lib. 1.41; on the ontological status of impressions, see esp. Long and Sedley 
1987: i.239 on 39 B 2-3, “The texts do not imply that impressions are internal pictures or images, so that 
what we perceive is images of objects. Rather, like light, impressions are the illuminations of, or means of 
our observing, actual things.’” 
22 When considering the symptomatic resonance in the Latin words for “doubt,” it is important to note 
that the etymologically primary sense of the verb dubitare is “to dwell in two places,” which manifests 
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 Although the narrativity of this scenario—from the uncertainty of faulty perception to a 
return to doubt (fallet igitur sensum, et si una fefellerit similitudo, dubia omnia reddiderit)—is 
rhetorically crafted and not necessarily reflective of experience,23 nevertheless it helps to clarify 
the responsive quality of doubt. Doubt follows upon a confrontation with universal akatalēspia; 
it accompanies epistemic collapse as a symptomatic response to the recognition of the limits of 
knowledge in the present moment and, as I discuss further below, a sense of the limitlessness that 
subtends the finitude of human experience. In this brief narrative, furthermore, the feeling of 
doubt seems to spread from the point of failure to encompass the subject’s experience of the 
world beyond his control or intent. Yet if we return to the idea that Academic skeptical 
philosophy begins from the suspense of judgement, we can see that as a response to uncertainty, 
which is neither assent nor rejection, doubt accommodates well this essential commitment. By 
committing to doubt, this all-too-human response to uncertainty can be transformed into the 
dialectical drive of philosophical inquiry.  
 Doubt thus seems to stand in an analogous place to the Stoic’s rational responses to 
impressions: assent or rejection. Indeed, in Cicero’s rebuttal of the apraxia charge and as part of 
his defense of a skeptical approach to life, he offers this precise parallel as a way of undermining 
 
physically and bodily an experience that in English we tend to think of as principally cognitive and 
internal: on *Du-bh- (i.e., duo-habeo), lit. “to be/dwell in two places,” see Walde-Hofmann 1938: i.375-6. 
This etymological sense was alive for Cicero, cf. Verr. II.2.74, versabat se in utramque partem; cf. also 
Rep. 1.4 and de Am. 1. Additionally, it is clear from Cicero’s frequent use of skeptical divisiones and 
other aporetic argumentative structures throughout the dialogues that he is perhaps more interested in 
dramatizing feelings of doubt than in analyzing the experience theoretically. Aside from Cicero’s 
penchant for theatricality (see esp. Cappello 2019: 177-87), this is also in keeping with an essential goal 
of skeptical argumentation, traceable to the Socratic elenchos, that seeks to demonstrate isostheneia. On 
which, see, e.g., Striker 1980: 59, “The Academics tried to induce suspension of judgement in their 
hearers by arguing on both sides of a thesis, and it is usually assumed that the arguments for and against 
were of equal weight.” Cf. Lévy 1992: 260-63 and Schofield 2012.  
23 In fact, as the last sentence in the passage seems to indicate, the experience often works in reverse: a 
creeping feeling of doubt causes us to question the criteria upon which our certainties are constructed.  
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the Stoic claim that it is impossible to assent to nothing (negatis fieri posse ut quisquam nulli rei 
adsentiatur, 107)—i.e., that action in life requires assent to at least some impressions. To oppose 
this claim, Cicero reminds his interlocutor that Panaetius, “nearly the chief of all the Stoics” 
(princeps prope meo quidem iudicio Stoicorum), used to say that, 
ea de re dubitare se dicat quam omnes praeter eum Stoici certissimam putant, vera esse 
haruspicum responsa, auspicia, oracula, somnia, vaticinationes, seque ab adsensu 
sustineat. quod is potest facere etiam de iis rebus quas illi a quibus ipse didicit certas 
habuerunt, cur id sapiens de reliquis rebus facere non possit? an est aliquid, quod positum 
vel improbare vel approbare possit, dubitare non possit? 
He was in doubt about something that all the other Stoics think is most certain, namely, 
that there is truth in the pronouncements of diviners, auspices, oracles, dreams, and 
soothsayers, and, furthermore, that he refrains from assent. If Panaetius was able to do 
this concerning these things that were held as certain by his teachers, why can’t the sage 
do this for all other things? Is there really anything that the sage can affirm or deny but 
can’t doubt?24  
In this striking formulation, Cicero assigns doubt (dubitare) to a place analogous to the Stoic 
sage’s ability to affirm (approbare) or deny (improbare) an assertion (aliquid, quod positum).25 
If Panaetius can “be in doubt” (dubitare se) and “refrain from assent” (seque ab adsensu 
sustineat) about the veracity of divine messages—a point of the “firmest certainty” (certissimam) 
to his Stoic teachers—what is there to keep the skeptical sage from adopting a similar intentional 
frame of mind with regard to all other such propositions? Cicero’s “doubt” and the skeptic’s 
suspension of assent are thus conceived as parallel and intentional responses to uncertainty. 
Furthermore, the parallelism of Cicero’s final question reasserts that a confrontation with 
 
24 Luc. 107. 
25 Furthermore, Cicero pointedly uses verbs related to probare to describe the affirmation or rejection of 
the Stoic. This word family is typically reserved to refer to the judgments associated with the probabile, 
on which, see below, section III and V. In this local context, however, a sense bordering on the Stoic 
“assent” and “reject” seems to be indicated, at least polemically, since Cicero is referring to the rational 
responses of the sage.  
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uncertainty can lead to doubt in a way that is similar to the Stoic’s affirmation or rejection of an 
impression or proposition. Yet how parallel are these two sequences? On the one hand, Stoic 
katalēpsis is a function of reason and thus serves as the foundation of the school’s entire ethical 
and scientific doctrine.26 On the other hand, doubt, although it may also be adopted as a rational 
frame of mind, corresponds only with a fundamental uncertainty; it can never lead to certainty, 
only to a re-cognition of uncertainty. To what ends can doubt lead beyond this uncertainty? 
 If Ciceronian doubt never leads to certainty, this does not mean that it cannot lead, in 
some sense, to truth. As I argue throughout the rest of the chapter, we can understand Ciceronian 
doubt as positioned between the Descartes’ rational doubt and the spiritual doubt of Dante. Like 
its Cartesian counterpart, Ciceronian doubt is an exercise of reason—an intentionally and 
purposely adopted state of mind that is an appropriate and even “beneficial” response to the 
fallibility of “preconceived opinions” and the senses. Yet, whereas for Descartes, rational doubt 
ultimately makes it “impossible for us to have any further doubts about what we have 
subsequently discovered to be true,” Cicero does not conceive of a simple, uniform movement 
from doubt to truth.27 Instead, like Dante’s spiritual doubt, Ciceronian doubt “is born like a new 
growth from the root of truth” (Nasce per quello, a guisa di rampollo, / a piè del vero il dubbio). 
In other words, doubt emerges and grows from the ungraspable, unbounded truth of which 
uncertainty is a sign in human experience—not in opposition to that truth but as a manifestation 
of its limitlessness from within the partiality and finitude of human experience. In its persistence, 
 
26 On this chain of Stoic thought which links assent and virtuous action, see Inwood 1985; and, on the 
nature of the Stoic sage’s assent, which leads to impregnable “scientific knowledge” (epistēmē), see 
Annas 1980: 92; Long and Sedley 1987: i.257-59 (41A-I).  
27 On the relationship between Cicero as a representative of ancient skepticism more generally and 
modern Cartesian skeptical philosophy, see, e.g., Burnyeat 1982; Groarke 1984; Fine 2000; Broughton 
2002: 10-18.  
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therefore, Ciceronian doubt is the drive that propels human nature, however limited and fallible it 
may be, “from peak to peak” (pinge noi di collo in collo), although it never finally reaches the 
summit (al sommo). Its aim is not to arrive at a Cartesian truth any more than a Stoic certainty, 
but rather to approach truth as it is manifested through the time of human life.  
 In light of these comparisons, we can see that for Cicero philosophy becomes the practice 
and activity by which doubt is harnessed and transformed from a symptomatic response to 
uncertainty into a commitment to inquiry, and the pursuit of this ungraspable truth. Although 
doubt cannot, in and of itself, form a philosophical position or dogmatic “view,” even one such 
as the famous Socratic position “to know that one knows nothing,”28 nevertheless, it sustains the 
movement of the pursuit. Doubt pursues, follows, suspends, and defers the closure of inquiry 
brought on by the recognition of uncertainty. In order to elucidate these connections between the 
drive of doubt and the pursuit of truth, I examine, in section II, Cicero’s transmission and 
development of skepticism especially in relation to the debates surrounding the history of the 
Academy. In section III, I consider the movement in time that Cicero associates with 
philosophical inquiry—the drive itself—by analyzing the semantic range of the verb sequi in the 
Lucullus. In section IV, I expand my view to the relationship between doubt and limitation in 
Cicero’s practice and the history of philosophy more generally; and, finally, in section V, I 
 
28 Cf. Arcesilaus’ position contra Socratem that “nothing can be known, not even that residuum of 
knowledge that Socrates left himself,” i.e., that nothing can be known (Itaque Arcesilas negabat esse 
quidquam quod sciri posset, ne illud quidem ipsum, quod Socrates sibi reliquisset, Ac. lib. 1.45). And 
further, “no one must make any positive statement or affirmation or give the approval of assent to any 
proposition, and a man must always restrain his rashness to give assent either to a falsehood or to 
something not certainly known, and nothing is more disgraceful than for assent and approval to outstrip 
knowledge and perception” (quibus de causis nihil oportere neque profiteri neque adfirmare quemquam 
neque adsensione approbare, cohibereque semper et ab omni lapsu continere temeritatem, quae tum esset 
insignis cum aut falsa aut incognita res approbaretur, neque hoc quidquam esse turpius quam cognitioni 
et perceptioni adsensionem approbationemque praecurrere, ibid.).  
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contend that Cicero’s advocation of a “pursuit of approvability” (sequor probabilitatem) offers a 
mode of conducting life in relation to the limitlessness of truth. 
II. Cicero’s Doubtful Skepticism 
 As we have already seen, Cicero locates the need for philosophy—and for a skeptical 
philosophy specifically—in the inescapable limitations within which humanity exists. These 
limitations are most evident in daily human experience in the relationship between the senses and 
the natural world. Lucullus, in fact, sets up Cicero’s deployment of this skeptical contention by 
arguing, on the contrary, that “there is a great deal of truth in the senses” (maxima in sensibus 
veritas) and that, “if human nature were given the choice—if a god demanded of it whether it is 
satisfied with its senses when they are sound and undamaged or whether it requires something 
better—I can’t see what more it could ask for.”29 Cicero, in turn, responds to this “clichéd 
argument” (communi loco, 79) initially by citing the various ways in which human senses, even 
when functioning correctly and healthily, fail to achieve the “perspicuity” that the Stoics ascribe 
to them:30 our sense of sight, for instance, is hampered by distance or perspective. But more than 
pointing out the deficiencies of our existing senses, Cicero criticizes Lucullus’ claim that we 
could not even wish for more:  
At amplius non desideramus! Quid? talpam num desiderare lumen putas? Neque tam 
quererer cum deo quod parum longe quam quod falsum viderem. Videsne navem illam? 
stare nobis videtur, at iis qui in navi sunt moveri haec villa. Quaere rationem cur ita 
videatur; quam ut maxime inveneris, quod haud scio an non possis, non tu verum te 
testem habere, sed eum non sine causa falsum testimonium dicere ostenderis. 
 
 
29 Luc. 19, Ordiamur igitur a sensibus, quorum ita clara iudicia et certa sunt ut si optio naturae nostrae 
detur et ab ea deus aliqui requirat contentane sit suis integris incorruptisque sensibus an postulet melius 
aliquid, non videam quid quaerat amplius. 
30 Cicero translates the Stoic ἐνάργεια with perspicuitas. On the status of “perspicuity” in skeptical 
Academic critique, see, esp. Allen 1997: 237-43.  
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But we want nothing more.31 What? Don’t you think that a mole desires the light? 
Though I wouldn’t complain to god that I can’t see far enough as much as I would that I 
can see what isn’t true. Do you see that ship there? It seems stationary to us, while to the 
people on the ship this villa seems in motion. Of course, you can investigate the 
explanation for these impressions; but even if you find it—which I am inclined to think 
you won’t be able to—you won’t have shown that you have a truthful witness, but that 
there is a reason why your witness gives false evidence.32 
 
In the figure of a “mole desiring the light” Cicero offers an analogy for the real limitation of the 
senses. The mole, a proverbially blind animal that exists in complete darkness, by analogy thus 
emphasizing the aspects of reality from which human senses are cut off. Yet even more than 
articulating this final limitation of human experience, the metaphor also articulates the 
relationship between human experience and truth as one of blindness to light, limitation to 
limitlessness. The mole still desires (desiderare) the light; although it may not be able to 
articulate this missing element, which exists entirely outside of its experience, it can register and 
circumscribe this lack by means of its desire. Thus, Cicero does not so much lament the 
deficiencies of the senses—e.g., the distance at which an individual can no longer see clearly—
as he desires something the senses lack entirely: the ability to perceive the “truth.”  
 In the stock example that follows what is at stake is thus not the clarity or “perspicuity” 
of any particular view of the ship, but the inability of human senses to register, from the various 
multiple perspectives available, a single “true” impression—i.e., to achieve by means of vision 
something that is not possible by extension of the existing abilities of sight or, for that matter, in 
any other mode of observation—but something that is, on the contrary, lacking from them 
altogether. We may be able to rationalize a difference between two points of view through 
investigation (Quaere rationem cur ita videatur), yet the very need for ratio ultimately only 
 
31 In the translation of Brittain 2006, he italicizes those portions of a speech that paraphrase the arguments 
of the speaker’s opponent, a practice that I maintain in my citations.  
32 Luc. 81.  
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emphasizes the fallibility of the senses and the fundamental lack from which this desire arises: 
“you won’t have shown that you have a truthful witness, but that there is a reason why your 
witness gives false evidence.” The outline of this lack thus demarcates a final limit of 
knowledge, which, while it may perhaps be ameliorated by the development of ratio, can never 
be surpassed or removed entirely. This immovable limit defines humanity’s relationship to the 
limitlessness of the world beyond our circumscribed and finite experience—like the mole’s 
desire for the light—and, furthermore, is the source of the need for a philosophy that 
incorporates uncertainty within its inquiry, instead of viewing it as an obstacle to be overcome.  
 Despite these evident skeptical credentials and Cicero’s claims, in propria persona, to 
adhere to an Academic approach,33 the question of his philosophical commitment has a long and 
dogged critical history. Many readers, since antiquity, have questioned the sincerity of his 
skepticism34 and have preferred instead to read his repeated assertions of a dedication to truth 
alongside his apparently heterogenous philosophical stances as an expression of antiquarian 
 
33 It is true that Cicero’s references to his own scholastic sympathies tend to be delivered in highly 
situational terms, e.g., at Luc. 78, the Ciceronian speaker claims that he trusts Clitomachus’ interpretation 
of Carneades’ dialectic more than Philo’s or Metrodorus’. Yet this should not be taken as a sign of 
allegiance to Clitomachus any more than the various doctrinal arguments of the de Finibus or the 
Tusculans should be taken as indications of his adherence to Antiochean or Stoic ethics. Instead, Cicero’s 
situational treatment of philosophical problems and the movement of his apparent “approval” throughout 
the dialogues is precisely the result of his commitment to doubt. On Cicero’s various methodological 
claims, see above, Intro., section IV and below, Ch. 4, section III.ii.  
34 The most famous ancient skepticism of Cicero’s skepticism comes from Augustine Contra Ac. 3.40, 
“How can the sage pursue what is similar to truth when he is ignorant of what the truth itself is?” 
(quomodo simile sequitur [sapiens], cum ipsum verum sit ignoret?). Cf. Lucullus’ argument for a 
disingenuous reading of Socratic irony (15). Is Cicero, like Socrates, simply a provocateur? This position 
has been recently reinvigorated by Altman 2016 who argues for a Platonic Cicero, whose skeptical 
position is an ironic or at least exoteric posture (see esp. 2016: 81-99). Although my project is 
sympathetic with Altman’s in various ways, I find his often-casual rejection of Cicero’s skepticism 
unwarranted—Cicero’s Plato is, in some sense, a skeptical Plato, therefore his platonism must be a 
skeptical platonism. For a skeptical approach to Plato’s dialogues, see esp. Vogt 2012.  
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eclecticism or a covert form of dogmatism.35 Even in cases, for instance in de Fin., where 
“Cicero’s” role in the dialogue is unavoidably that of the antagonist, a common interpretation has 
been that Cicero-the-author espouses an “unexciting form of mitigated skepticism which allowed 
him to endorse dogmatic views.”36 In this section, I draw from an increasing scholarly awareness 
of the complexities of Cicero’s philosophy to argue that, while it is impossible to understand the 
meaning and function of his dialogues without situating them within the history of Academic 
skepticism, we should not assimilate Cicero to one of his Greek predecessors. Rather than 
arguing in favor of one particular stance as Cicero’s own, I contend that his texts open up the 
categories of Greek thought to new uses and trajectories. In particular, I argue that his skepticism 
possesses a positive, constructive element—i.e., its relationship to truth—while, at the same 
time, incorporating the role of doubt as its drive.  
 
35 The characterization of Academic skepticism as a form of dogmatism has ancient roots in Sextus’ 
defense of Pyrrhonism, which he differentiates in part by arguing that the dogma of the Academics lies in 
Socrates’ claim to “know that he knows nothing” (nihil sciri possit, Luc. 74); see PH I.3 and above, n.28 
for Arcesilaus’ further development of this position. On Cicero’s own apparently dogmatic tendencies, 
see e.g., Douglas 1990: 7, “It is not possible to decide why Cicero chose this particular technique [of 
skeptical argumentation in Tusc.], but it may well be that, apart from an urge to seek some artistic variety, 
he felt that having set out the views of competing schools…in de Finibus, ending with a leaning towards 
Stoicism, he was prepared both to be more dogmatic…and at the same time was seeking so far as possible 
to look for the common ground which might be found at least on the central issues…”. This comment, 
although properly concerning the Tusculans, is instructive in its summation of a number of scholarly 
clichés about Cicero’s philosophical proclivities: 1. a personal affinity for “artistic variety,” i.e., 
“eclecticism,” on which see esp. Glucker 1988; 2. an ethical “leaning towards Stoicism”; and, 3. an 
Antiochean quest for syncretism between schools, a “common ground.” These scholarly arguments are 
especially common with regard to the Tusculans, which is regarded as an “exception” or even marking a 
“Stoic turn.” See, e.g., Görler 1995: 110 or Gildenhard 2007: 19. Many recent scholars, with a more 
historicizing approach, e.g., Strasburger 1990 or Baraz 2012, tend to downplay the importance of the 
philosophical contents of the dialogues altogether, except in so far as they can be construed as political or, 
following a long modern biographical tradition, connect Cicero’s Academic position to his political 
“vacillations,” see., e.g., Fuhrmann 2000 for the 19th century history of this argument.  
36 Brittain 2016: 13.  
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 A history of Academic skepticism and Cicero’s relation to it must inevitably be a circular 
endeavor. Cicero is our earliest and often best source for the skeptical Academy that existed, 
with varying degrees of activity, from the tenure of scholarch Arcesilaus down to that of Philo of 
Larissa.37 Despite this difficulty, scholars have typically reconstructed this history as follows:38 
Arcesilaus, possibly influenced by his older contemporary Pyrrho, first “breaks” from the 
existing Academic and Peripatetic39 traditions in order to launch a critique against Zeno and the 
burgeoning Stoic school. In the process of this critique, he deploys central arguments for 
universal akatalēpsia and epochē, possibly as an ethical good.40 After several generations, during 
which time Chrysippus honed Stoic counter-arguments against Arcesilaus’ critique, Carneades 
rose to the head of the Academy.41 Like Arcesilaus and Socrates before him, Carneades left no 
autographic writings, so inevitably our understanding of his approach is defined by its exegetes. 
It seems clear, however, that he met the Chrysippean reinvigoration of Stoicism with an equal 
 
37 Arcesilaus was scholarch from c. 267/6 until his death in 241/0 BCE. Philo of Larissa was head of the 
school from 110 until c. 83 at which point Antiochus and his brother Aristus may have served as quasi-
scholarchs, after which point the Platonic school ceased to exist as a centralized institution. On the 
controversial status of Antiochus and Aristus in Academic history, see Glucker 1978: 98-120; Dorandi 
1997: 89-106; and Polito 2012.  
38 This picture based largely on the extensive work on ancient Greek skepticism from the 1980s and 
1990s; see esp., Schofield, Burnyeat, and Barnes, eds. 1980; Burnyeat 1983; and, on the Academica in 
particular, Inwood and Mansfeld, eds. 1997. I attempt to present as close to the communis opinio from 
this body of scholarship as possible, although this narrative has been altered in various ways in recent 
years by new work on individual Academic thinkers, see e.g., Brittain 2001 and Sedley, ed. 2012. In 
general this recent work has tended to reject the idea of a skeptical “decline” in favor of a more nuanced 
understanding of the philosophical aims of the later scholarchs.  
39 As noted above, Ch. 1, section III, it is difficult to argue for a unity of the “Academy” even prior to 
Arcesilaus that is not imposed by later authors. So, the severity of Arcesilaus’ “break” from a prior 
Academic tradition will be determined by the allegiance of the later author who is reporting on it.  
40 On Arcesilaus, see Cooper 2004: 81-106; Brittain 2008. 
41 Carneades became scholarch sometime prior to the time of his official legation to Rome in 155 until his 
retirement. See Allen 1997 and 2012.  
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zeal, pushing Arcesilaus’ skepticism to its methodological and conceptual limits.42 Carneades’ 
two primary interpreters, Metrodorus and Clitomachus, however, offered widely differing 
interpretations of his philosophical intent, which has resulted in an ongoing debate especially 
concerning the question of “probabilism.”43 With the introduction of the pithanon into Academic 
argumentation, as summarily lamented by David Sedley, “The subsequent history of the New 
Academy, from Carneades’ retirement in 137 down to the headship of Philo of Larissa…is a 
depressing one of rapid drift into dogmatism.”44  
 According to this traditional reconstruction, therefore, Arcesilaus (certainly) and 
Carneades (possibly) develop forms of “true,” “unmitigated,” “non-dogmatic” skepticism—that 
is, their argumentation remains ad hominem (against the Stoics) and seeks to drive their 
opponents towards an admission of universal akatalēpsia and an ethical valuation of epochē, 
without, importantly, ever holding these as positive, doctrinal positions. On the other hand, to 
varying degrees, Clitomachus, Metrodorus, and Philo all enact a rapprochement with the 
Stoics—whether through a “mitigated” skepticism, as advocated by Metrodorus and Philo, in 
which the wise man may hold opinions45 or in the more limited allowance of Clitomachus, for 
whom the pithanon functions as a mode of judgement at least in philosophical debate, but 
 
42 Carneades is perhaps the most contentious figure in Academic history. An interpretation of this 
scholarch will determine an ancient or modern view on the trajectory of skepticism in the Academy, 
“probabilism,” dialectic, and the ethical value of the skeptical commitment.  
43 For the “dialectical,” “unmitigated” interpretation, which relies on a “weak” understanding of the 
pithanē phantasia, see Burnyeat (Unpublished); Couissin 1983; Frede 1984; Bett 1989; Allen 1994. This 
consensus has been challenged by Obdrzalek 2006 and 2012, who argues in favor of a “strong” 
understanding of the pithanē phantasia as a criterion of judgment, but maintains Carneades’ commitment 
to epochē, at least as a challenge to “epistemic hypocrisy” (278).  
44 Sedley 1983: 18. There are conflicting dates as to Carneades’ retirement. 
45 On Metrodorus’ “mitigated” interpretation of Carneades, see esp. Brittain 2001: 11-37.  
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possibly also for practical decisions and action.46 This “rapid drift into dogmatism” sets the stage 
for the arrival of the ultimate iteration of ancient skepticism—that of Aenesidemus’ revival of 
Pyrrhonism—at which point skepticism has moved beyond the Academy.47 In this understanding 
of Greek philosophical history, therefore, skepticism exists as an institutional gadfly—a 
necessary corrective to the overly theoretical and dogmatizing tendencies of the ancient 
philosophical schools.48 As soon as a school of thought—Peripatetic, Stoic, Academic—becomes 
too dogmatic, a skeptical school—New Academic, Pyrrhonist—will emerge to engage it 
dialectically and seek to undermine the forms of certainty imposed by the positive school. 
 As a supplement to this history, many scholars of Hellenistic philosophy consider Cicero 
to be at best a relatively unimaginative adherent of Philo’s mitigated skepticism,49 who adopts a 
“soft”50—i.e., non-dialectical—view of the pithanon, and at worst purely a doxographical 
resource. Although the latter view is no longer particularly common, it persists in overly 
 
46 There is good evidence that, at least in the case of Clitomachus’ interpretation of Carneades, these 
apparent positive assertions can be traced back to Carneades’ defense of the skeptical position against the 
Stoic charge of apraxia. See esp. Striker 1980. In this case, these apparently dogmatic assertions remain, 
in fact, purely dialectical. Again, cf. Obdrzalek 2006: esp. 261-73 for a reappraisal of this entire debate.  
47 Pyrrhonism lies beyond the scope of this project, but is an important point of comparison in scholarship 
on ancient skepticism generally. See, e.g., Burnyeat, ed. 1983 passim; Groarke 1990.  
48 This view of skepticism can be traced back to a certain understanding of the Platonic Socrates, for 
whose elenchic exchanges with his fellow Athenians, he compared himself to a “gadfly.” For the 
comparison, see Ap. 30e-31a.   
49 Very common until quite recently, see esp. Burnyeat (Unpublished); Sedley 1980; Groarke 1990; 
Glucker 1995; Allen 1997; Cooper 2004. This position has been revised, but persists, e.g., in Woolf 2015: 
2-3, “In Cicero’s hands, this form of scepticism [that of Philo], while denying the possibility of 
knowledge, accepted that some ideas had greater rational credence than others, and that it was therefore 
possible rationally to accept some views over others.” The problem with this approach, even in Woolf's 
measured account, is that it requires us to read “through” the dialectical movements of Cicero’s texts to 
exhume a hidden, authorial belief as “true”—a technique of reading that Cicero himself overtly criticizes 
and problematizes.  
50 Or, confusingly, in Obdrzalek’s terminology, a “strong” pithanon—i.e., one that makes some positive 
claim about the truth of an impression.  
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simplistic conceptions of Cicero’s compositional technique.51 The former view—that Cicero is a 
mitigated skeptic of an increasingly dogmatist strain—although still widely held,52 has been 
challenged by the work of Charles Brittain.53 Yet his work simply aims to understand 
sympathetically Cicero’s own claims for the kind of hard-nosed skepticism that others would 
reserve only for Arcesilaus, the Pyrrhonists, and, perhaps, Carneades.54 I would argue, in fact, 
that Brittain’s reappraisal of Cicero owes much to a former generation of scholars’ 
reconsideration of Carneades.55 In the influential, but unpublished essay, “Carneades was no 
probabilist,” Myles Burnyeat argues that, rather than laying the groundwork for a dogmatic turn, 
Carneades’ maintains the category of the pithanon as a thoroughly dialectical tool, designed to 
further ensnare his Stoic opponents in increasingly untenable positions in relation to their own 
 
51 See, e.g., Hunt 1998: 11, “In the case of the Academici Libri, however, perhaps Cicero did not need to 
do much in the way of research, as he calls these books ‘copies’ (ἀπόγραφα), for which he supplies only 
the words, of which he has plenty (Att. XII.52.3).” An article could be written on the scholarly misuse of 
this brief postscript to a deeply complex letter; for a corrective, see Burkert 1965: 177, “doch ist dieser 
Satz keineswegs Ciceros letztes Wort, schon gar nicht eine Selbstentlarvung, vielmehr voll von 
ironischem understatement.” It also persists in the many studies of ancient argumentation that seek to 
mine Cicero’s texts for all manner of “Greek originals”; see, e.g., Glucker 1995: esp. 133, where he 
refers, apparently without irony, to “the obscurity of [Cicero’s] provincial tongue” as compared to the 
clarity and elevation of the Greek texts he was translating.  
52 For a recent reappraisal of this position, which argues, counter-intuitively, for the logical coexistence in 
Cicero’s writings of Clitomachus’ and Philo’s interpretation of Carneades, see Thorsrud 2012. The 
various ways in which the mitigated reading of Cicero has been propped up following recent critiques can 
be observed throughout the volume Nicgorski, ed. 2012, which aims to resurrect Cicero’s mitigated 
skepticism as a proto-pragmatism.  
53 See 2001, 2006, and 2016.  
54 He accomplishes this mainly through a reconsideration of Philo of Larissa, which helps to emphasize 
the contrasts between the two approaches. See esp., 2001: 169-219.  
55 And his own reappraisal of Philo of Larissa, who, as the quotation from Sedley above indicates, is often 
held up as the dogmatic low point in the history of the Academy. Brittain 2001 challenges this 
understanding and proposes an interpretation of the “Sosus” affair and Philo’s “Roman Books” that 
searches for Academic continuity through skeptical discontinuity. See below, n.86.  
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criterion of certainty.56 In turn, Brittain recasts Cicero as a rigorous dialectician. By engaging in 
the types of meta-argumentation that Carneades was famous for using to elicit epochē in his 
listeners,57 the dialogues of Cicero, according to Brittain, should similarly deliver his readers 
over to a reckoning with uncertainty. While this approach has the benefit of taking seriously an 
important aspect of Cicero’s own characterization of his approach, in some ways it moves too 
far, shutting down other significant avenues of interpretation that the texts open up.  
 Outside the scholarship on Hellenistic philosophy itself, this recent reinvigoration of 
Cicero Scepticus58 has been adopted enthusiastically, if unevenly. Two recent books, Cicero’s 
Philosophy of History, by Matthew Fox (2007), and Cicero’s Skepticism and his Recovery of 
Political Philosophy, by Walter Nicgorski (2016), readdress in particular the political and 
ideological significance of Cicero’s skeptical orientation.59 These works generally consider the 
 
56 Cf. Obdrzalek’s rebuttal of this position (2006: 254-61). Her main points are that Burnyeat’s “weak” 
interpretation of the pithanon 1.) does not satisfactorily meet the Stoic’s apraxia objection to skepticism 
because it renders the kritērion as a causal description of human action (after the fact), rather than a factor 
of judgement (krisis) for taking action (in the moment of decision); and 2.) does not account for the ample 
textual evidence from Cicero and Sextus that links the pithanon with the eikos (or, as Cicero 
provocatively translates them: probabile and veri simile); on this second point, see, from a more critical 
perspective, Glucker 1995 and below, n.152. While Obdrzalek’s argument on the pithanon is an 
interesting one, I think, especially due to its reliance on the more evidently Sextan category of kritērion, 
that it conflates Carneades’ argumentation with the attempts of later skeptics (Cicero and Sextus being the 
two most well-attested) to creatively apply skepticism to a philosophy of life.  
57 For instance, Carneades exercised an almost sophistical tendency to “argue both sides,” perhaps most 
famously exemplified by the story of his expulsion from Rome after he had delivered on two subsequent 
days equally compelling speeches for and against justice. See Lact. Inst. V.14.3-5 = Long and Sedley 
1987: i.442 (68M).   
58 The origins of this new appreciation for Cicero’s skeptical commitment can be traced in part back to 
Charles Schmitt’s Cicero Scepticus (1972), which studied the influence of Cicero’s skeptical philosophy 
on medieval and early modern thought. It is notable how historically contingent interpretations of 
Cicero’s skepticism (and philosophy more generally) are.  
59 Nicgorski 1978 participated in the initial scholarly return to skeptical readings of Cicero, although it 
must be noted that throughout his work, he presents Cicero’s skepticism as a proto-Straussian pragmatism 
rather than a genuine form of ancient skepticism.  
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ways in which a skeptical reading of Cicero’s dialogues, rather than a hunt for the author’s 
philosophical view, can transform his philosophy into a critique of authoritarian ideology and the 
political status quo of the mid-40s BCE.60 Fox argues that a skeptical reading demonstrates how 
Cicero’s creative engagement with intellectual and political history does not support or reform 
aristocratic Republican norms, but rather constantly destabilizes and interrupts those traditions 
and institutions from the very point of their rupture.61 Nicgorski reads the ethical treatises of the 
40s alongside the political philosophy that Cicero wrote in the prior decade (de Republica and de 
Legibus) to argue that, taken as a whole, the philosophical corpus advocates for a politics that is 
untethered from authority and participates in an open-ended search for the goods of the state, at 
least on the part of the statesman, which mirrors the skeptical inquiry into the ethical fines 
bonorum.62 Both of these scholars offer differing, but partially complementary models for work 
on the philosophica that seeks to remain faithful to the skeptical commitment that Cicero avows 
without, however, reducing that commitment to a partisan allegiance.  
 
60 See, e.g., Fox 2007: 7-8 and 67, “The occlusion of skeptical modes of reading seems to me to have 
nurtured the evaluation of the philosophical works as a positive form of self-advertisement, rather than as 
a collective call to self-scrutiny and skepticism, both about Cicero’s own position and more widely, and 
about central aspects of Rome’s political identity…we should be reading the words of his speakers as a 
dramatization of a philosophical quest.” On skepticism generally as a tool of ideological critique, despite 
the fact that it is often associated with conservatism and the preservation of the status quo, see Tsouna-
McKirahan 1996.  
61 For a summary of his argument see 2007: 68.  
62 See, e.g., 2016: 231, “The statesman, says Scipio, is ‘never to cease from forming and examining 
himself’ (ut numquam a se ipso instituendo contemplandoque discedat). Thus, the model statesman’s very 
virtue consists partly in his continual Socratic striving for self-understanding and moral improvement. 
This is no finished incorruptible philosopher-king, nor a Stoic perfect Wise man, of whom Scipio speaks. 
It is a model on a more attainable, human plateau, yet the very incompleteness, the opening in this model 
to self-monitoring and self-improvement, reveals the usefulness of a concept of the model 
statesman/orator.”  
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 These approaches problematize the idea that Cicero’s approach to philosophy can be 
satisfactorily explained using exclusively the labels of the Hellenistic tradition. As both Fox and 
Nicgorski demonstrate, aside from substantive philosophical issues, there is difficulty in 
translating this tradition into a Roman context, which possesses no innate method for 
contextualizing and adjudicating its claims.63 Cicero is clearly not writing philosophy simply to 
participate in the debates of the Hellenistic philosophical schools, which, at any rate, had mostly 
dissipated by the mid-1st century, thanks, in significant part, to the geopolitical collapse and 
Roman subjugation of the Greek world.64 But how, then, should Cicero’s readers, ancient and 
modern, view his advocation of some version of skeptical philosophy in a Roman context? 
Nicgorski’s answer, which follows a long line of non-skeptical interpretations of Cicero’s 
oeuvre, recalls the evident importance of rhetoric for Ciceronian political thought and the so-
called philosophia perfecta that he, at times, seems to advocate.65 While Cicero’s use of oratory 
as a supplement to philosophy is certainly an important facet of his writings beyond the 
philosophica, Nicgorski’s recourse to rhetoric to explain the apparent incompatibility between 
doubt and a political theory based on the individual virtue of the statesman amounts, ultimately, 
to a significant modification of or downright rejection of skepticism, except via the mediation of 
circumscribed and deeply elitist fora of rhetorical debate.66 Fox, on the other hand, in translating 
 
63 Cicero’s own awareness of the difficulty of this cultural translation is frequently on display in the 
prologues, see esp. Luc. 7; Tusc. 1.1-8 etc.  
64 See above, Ch. 1, section III.  
65 See, e.g., Tusc. 1.7 and Nicgorski’s comment, 2016: 73. On this position, cf. Altman 2016: 19. 
66 That is, in Nicgorski’s reading, exercise of philosophical skepticism is reserved exclusively for an 
isolated sphere of debate among ruling elites, which does not necessarily touch on the actual governing of 
the state. Cicero’s political philosophy ends up looking like a speculum principis, in which the sole 
function of skepticism is to hone the rhetorical skills necessary for a statesman to rule. See esp. 2016: 
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Cicero’s commitment into the Roman context, relies on an understanding of skepticism as purely 
negative dialectic, which is familiar also from Brittain’s reappraisal. The “message” of Cicero’s 
philosophica to his Roman (and modern) readers can only ever be a formal imperative: “be in 
doubt,” i.e., “do philosophy.”67   
 While it is clear that this imperative to “do philosophy” is at work throughout the ethical 
dialogues, I wonder about the hermeneutic limitations it places on modern readers of these texts. 
Again, Cicero most likely did not consider himself only a Socratic gadfly, driving his readers to 
doubt their certainties and engage in self-critique. Even more than the political valence of 
Cicero’s skepticism, the deeply personal grief expressed by and the introspective nature of his 
philosophical project should point us away from an understanding of his skepticism as purely 
negative or critical. It is important in this regard to note that Cicero goes to great lengths to stress 
that he writes not just as a “translator” (interpres), but aims to “add something” to the 
development of philosophy through his “judgment and arrangement of composition” (nostrum 
iudicium et nostrum scribendi ordinem adiungimus, de Fin. 1.6). In defense of such an 
innovative and constructive “stance,” Woldemar Görler contends that the position from which 
Cicero argues throughout the dialogues has some basis in, but cannot be reduced to the 
Metrodoran/Philonian interpretation of Carneades.68 In particular, Görler maintains that Cicero’s 
 
205-44. For a more complete rebuttal of Nicgorski’s position, which is consciously modeled on Leo 
Strauss’ views on Plato, see Altman 2016: 18-20.  
67 See, Fox 2007: 26, “[Cicero’s] message for Rome was more complex than the exhortations to control 
the emotions, have faith in the providential order of the universe, or aim for happiness; rather, it was an 
exhortation to ‘do philosophy,’ and the adaptation of philosophy for Roman readers was also a 
justification for the relevance of this vision of philosophy to the Roman context.” 
68 As noted above, this interpretation relies on a corollary to the central skeptical epistemological critique 
of Stoicism that states that the wise man may hold opinions in the face of universal akatalēpsia as a way 
of accounting for human fallibility and avoiding the arrogance of claims to certain knowledge. See, e.g., 
Görler 1997: 48, “The keynote of Luc. 115 is ‘arrogance vs. modesty’; it is held through the rest of the 
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affinity for probabilitas as a mode of judgement in daily life arises from his understanding of 
Academic freedom that has no Greek counterpart: “it is in positive terms that [Cicero] conceives 
of his Academic ‘freedom’: he feels free to opine and to speculate on a grand scale about great 
themes. Every reader of Cicero’s philosophical books knows what themes he has in mind: God, 
the immortality of the soul, freedom of action, the high rank of virtue, human perfection.”69 
Görler thus labels Cicero’s approach “skeptical speculation,” which offers one way of 
formulating the constructive aspect of his skepticism.   
 Görler’s interpretation, however, framed as it is in terms of stance and intent, remains 
wedded to a relatively partisan understanding of Cicero’s skepticism. I propose that we can see 
in Görler’s “skeptical speculation,” with the benefit of Brittain’s and Fox’s advocation of 
skeptical reading, a solution to this problem: we should look for the function of Cicero’s 
skeptical speculation—what does the text enact around or through the speculative ends of 
Cicero’s philosophical inquiry? What, in other words, does “speculative skepticism” do? The 
answer to these questions, as Görler himself indicates, lies in a reconsideration of the role that 
probabilitas or “approvability” plays in Cicero’s texts.70 Rather than approaching Cicero’s 
probabile through its contentious relation to the Carneadean pithanon,71 I focus my attention 
 
section: ‘Is it not rather arrogant…to recommend your own philosophical system?…Lucullus the 
dogmatist, had blamed his opponents for their queer doctrine, irreconcilable with common sense; he 
likened the sceptics to riotous citizens and accused them of ‘upsetting a well-established system of 
philosophy’ (14) and ‘covering clear matters with darkness’ (16)…Cicero, in 115, as it were now turns 
the tables upon Lucullus: it is not we, the sceptics, whose doctrine gives offence to common sense and 
common feelings—what is much more scandalous is the presumption and the self-righteousness of the 
Stoics.”  
69 Ibid.: 54.  
70 On the difficulty of translating this term, see below n.113.  
71 On the debates surrounding Cicero’s use of the word probabile to translate the Greek pithanon, see esp. 
Glucker 1995, Obdrzalek 2006, Auvray-Assay 2006, and Cappello 2019; cf. below n.113. For a different 
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instead on the verb, sequi,72 which Cicero uses to describe the action associated with the 
probabile.73 I contend that in Cicero’s phrase sequor probabilitatem we can locate a procedure 
for confronting the unknowability of limits in experience, while simultaneously maintaining a 
relationship to the limitlessness of truth from within human time. To “pursue/follow 
‘approvability’” is not a method of grasping a truth, nor is it simply a means by which to defend 
an opinion or judge the appropriateness of an action in life. Although these latter two uses are 
undeniably important in Cicero’s translation of Academic skepticism, his speculative inquiry 
aims further to offer the means by which humanity can achieve a relation to the ungraspable truth 
from within our experience of the world—not as an object of knowledge, but in the course of our 
interaction with the uncertain phenomena of temporal existence. The persistence of doubt as the 
 
interpretation of the provenance of the Ciceronian concept, see Brennan 1996, who argues that Cicero’s 
choice is influenced by the Stoic category of “reasonable impression” (eulogon). Cf. de Fin. 3.58, where 
probabilis translates the Stoic kathēkon.  
72 On the importance of the action denoted by this verb for Sextus’ later interpretation of the pithanon, see 
PH 1.230, “For the word ‘believe’ has different meanings: it means not to resist but simply to follow 
without any strong impulse or inclination, as the boy is said to believe his tutor; but sometimes it means 
to assent to a thing of deliberate choice and with a kind of sympathy due to strong desire, as when the 
incontinent man believes him who approves of an extravagant mode of life” (τὸ γὰρ πείθεσθαι λέγεται 
διαφόρως, τό τε μὴ ἀντιτείνειν ἀλλ’ ἁπλῶς ἕπεσθαι ἄνευ σφοδρᾶς προσκλίσεως καὶ προσπαθείας, ὡς ὁ 
παῖς λέγεται πείθεσθαι τῷ παιδαγωγῷ· ἅπαξ δὲ τὸ μετὰ αἱρέσεως καὶ οἱονεὶ συμπαθείας κατὰ τὸ σφόδρα 
βούλεσθαι συγκατατίθεσθαί τινι, ὡς ὁ ἄσωτος πείθεται τῷ δαπανητικῶς βιοῦν ἀξιοῦντι, trans. Bury); cf. 
M 11.175-78. The distinction that Cicero draws for sequi as “pursue” or “follow” falls along different 
lines that have less to do with belief and more to do with the relationality or positionality implied by the 
movement of the verb: to “follow” is to be behind, whereas to “pursue” is to look ahead. These two 
senses, however, do roughly correspond to the meanings assigned by Sextus to τὸ πείθεσθαι: to follow 
“weakly” as a child follows his tutor or to pursue “deliberately” as through a strong desire.  
73 Sequi is the only verb for which Cicero uses probabilitas as a direct object; the combination appears at 
Luc. 104, discussed below. This abstract noun appears only 5 times in Cicero’s corpus, elsewhere in an 
agentive usage with the verbs fallere (Luc. 75, de Fin. 3.72) and in the idiomatic expression animos 
probabilitate percussit (Tusc. 5.33). The other use at Luc. 99 is also discussed below, section V.  
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drive in Cicero’s pursuit puts the limitations of human experience into relation with the 
limitlessness of truth.74  
III. Following Doubt 
 Although the verb, sequi, is used commonly in Latin literature of all genres and periods, I 
contend that the semantic bivalence of the word,75 which means both “to follow”—as in, “to 
come behind, later”—and “to pursue”—that is, “to drive towards, to seek,” unites two key 
conceptual poles of the Lucullus in particular.76 First, Cicero presents philosophy as a historical 
exercise. So, “to pursue” philosophy is “to follow” a tradition, adopting arguments, discourses, 
and terminology developed by previous philosophers.77 At the same time, the belatedness of 
Cicero’s present with respect to that tradition produces awareness of historical and generational 
difference. Thus, and this is the second important meaning of sequi, “to pursue” philosophy, 
especially skeptical philosophy, is also “to seek” an end that is not predetermined or fixed by the 
past. If the goal of philosophy is, as Cicero conceives of it in this text, to “draw out and in some 
 
74 See below, section V.  
75 Significant or poetic exploitation of this bivalence is also not unique to Cicero: cf., Statius’ intriguing 
turn of phrase that closes the Thebaid (XII.816-17), in which the author advises his poem to “follow / 
pursue” the Aeneid “from afar” (nec tu divinam Aeneida tempta, / sed longe sequere et vestigia semper 
adora). 
76 The importance of this word has not been widely noted by scholars previously; cf., however, several 
places where Cappello 2019 notes the word’s significance in related contexts: 122-123, 286, 320; see also 
Obdrzalek 2012: 377-8 for a localized reading of Luc. 61-2 that accounts for the significant valences. 
Sequi, along with compounds like adsequi and persequi, appears 51 times in the extant text. In contexts 
that favor a meaning of “to follow, to come after,” see 3, 7, 13, 60, 61(x2), 70, 98(x2), 107(x2), 118, 
132(x2), 133, 139, 140, 143(x2); in the sense of “to pursue, seek,” see 8, 24(x2), 33, 36, 44, 45, 54, 59, 
74, 94, 99(x3), 104(x2), 109, 117, 121; in the “dialectical” usage see 21, 30(x2), 38, 50, 67, 91, 93, 95, 
101, 108(x3). Notice how the first meaning clusters at the beginnings and ends of speeches, while the 
second and third occur during the argumentation itself.  
77 This is a primary focus of Cappello 2019: esp. 85-220.  
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way mold something that is true or at least approaches truth,”78 then the “pursuit” of this aim 
must take place in the present moment, governed by what is “approvable” (probabile). Each new 
juncture in this movement thus defers the ends of inquiry, producing a new and further moment 
for the “molding” of something that “approaches” truth. Conjoining these two primary meanings 
of sequi, therefore, a dialectical usage, e.g., sequitur, “it follows that…,” is used to communicate 
the advance of this inquiry—an advance that, at the same time, re-stages the fundamental 
confrontation of uncertainty and persistence through doubt. In this section, I first establish the 
contrast in senses of sequi in the prologue of the Lucullus and then examine its use throughout 
the dialogue.  
 After the encomium of Lucullus that begins the text (1-7), Cicero directs a series of 
proleptic defenses against several groups of critics who, he fears, may disapprove of his 
philosophical project: those who have no respect for Greek literature and philosophy, those who 
object to Cicero’s use of the elite Romans of the past to stage philosophical discussion,79 and 
finally,  
Restat unum genus reprehensorum quibus Academiae ratio non probatur. Quod gravius 
ferremus si quisquam ullam disciplinam philosophiae probaret praeter eam quam ipse 
sequeretur. Nos autem quoniam contra omnes dicere quae videntur solemus, non 
possumus quin alii a nobis dissentiant recusare: quamquam nostra quidem causa facilis 
est, qui verum invenire sine ulla contentione volumus idque summa cura studioque 
conquirimus. 
 
78 7, neque nostrae disputationes quidquam aliud agunt nisi ut in utramque partem dicendo eliciant et 
tamquam exprimant aliquid quod aut verum sit aut ad id quam proxime accedat, 7. On this definition, see 
above Intro., section III and below, section V; on Cicero’s representation of philosophical activity more 
generally, see below Ch. 4, section III.ii.  
79 Including those who “deny that the disputants in my books had real knowledge of the subjects they 
debated—but they seem to me to envy the dead as well as the living” (qui mihi videntur non solum vivis 
sed etiam mortuis invidere, 7). This final comment supports of my argument from Ch. 1, section III, 
concerning the dialogues as a place for the living and dead to convene and converse. Despite his apparent 
dismissal of this criticism, Cicero himself will apparently succumb to it, as he tells Atticus, and revise the 
dialogue with different speakers. See below, section IV and cf. Ch. 4, section IV on Cicero’s use of Cato 
as a persona.  
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That leaves a class of critic that does not approve of the method of the Academy. We 
would take this more seriously if anyone approved of any philosophical school other than 
the one he followed himself. As for us, we can’t demur when others disagree with us, 
since it is our practice to say what we think against every position. But our case is 
straightforward, because we want to discover truth without any contention, and we search 
for it conscientiously and enthusiastically.80 
 
Cicero gestures dismissively, if with a dose of ironic self-deprecation, to philosophy as simply a 
pledge of affiliation. He invites the critic who does not “approve” (non probatur) of the 
Academic ratio81 to reexamine the reasons for his own preference and the calcification of views 
that the adoption of a doctrine (disciplina) produces: after all, no one approves “of any 
philosophical school other than the one he follows himself” (probaret praeter eam quam ipse 
sequeretur).82 Thus, the actions of “approving” (probare) and “following” (sequi) the teachings 
or method of a philosophical school are presented with some ambiguity. These actions can 
describe both a doctrinal partisan’s adherence to the teaching of his school and the activity of the 
Academic, who may approve of and follow a specific ratio—that of “say[ing] what we think 
against every position” (contra omnes dicere quae videntur)—but whose “case is 
straightforward” (causa facilis est): “we want to discover truth without any contention, and we 
 
80 Luc. 7.  
81 Note that in this prologue, Cicero does not explicitly differentiate the ratio of “his” skeptical Academy, 
from the Academic approach of his opponent.  
82 Cf. 114-15, where Cicero targets the arrogance of doctrinal philosophers who say that the skeptic is 
“most shameful” (turpissimum) and “excessively full of rashness” (plenissimum temeritatis), but then 
cannot admit that, after adopting a complete “system of wisdom, science of the universe, morality, and 
ethical ends…,” the follower of such a universal system might never “slip up” and have a mere opinion 
(tantum tibi adroges ut exponas disciplinam sapientiae, naturam rerum omnium evolvas, mores fingas, 
fines bonorum malorumque constituas, officia describas, quam vitam ingrediar definias, idemque etiam 
disputandi et intellegendi iudicium dicas te et artificium traditurum, perficies ut ego innumerabilia 
complectens nusquam labar, nihil opiner?).  
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search for it conscientiously and enthusiastically” (verum invenire sine ulla contentione volumus 
idque summa cura studioque conquirimus). 
To explain the difference between the doctrinal and Academic philosopher’s relationship 
to his tradition, Cicero uses sequi in its other primary sense of “to seek or pursue” immediately 
after this passage, in the brief introduction to his own interpretation of Academic philosophy that 
precedes the beginning of Lucullus’ speech. After asserting that the only purpose of “[his] 
discussions” (nostrae disputationes) is to “mold” (exprimant) something that approaches truth, 
he claims,  
Nec inter nos et eos qui se scire arbitrantur quidquam interest nisi quod illi non dubitant 
quin ea vera sint quae defendunt, nos probabilia multa habemus, quae sequi facile, 
adfirmare vix possumus.  
There is no difference between us and those who judge that they have knowledge except 
that they do not doubt that the things they defend are true, whereas we consider many 
things to be approvable that we can pursue readily, but we cannot in anyway affirm 
them.”83  
Simply put, Cicero says, the Academic approach is defined by doubt, whereas philosophies that 
claim certain knowledge do not possess this doubt-as-drive (illi non dubitant). The doctrinal 
philosopher “defends” only those things that the teachings of his own school have already 
established as true (ea vera sint quae defendunt), a practice which forms a self-contained system 
and self-sustaining worldview, unconnected to an ongoing inquiry outside of its teachings. The 
Academic skeptic, on the contrary, finds many things “approvable” (probabilia), not because of 
their pre-established connection to the teaching of his school, but rather because he finds in the 
present moment that he can “pursue them readily” (quae sequi facile). The Academic skeptic 
thus enters into a dynamic pursuit, the ends of which cannot be “affirmed” or “fixed” 
 
83 Luc. 8. 
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(adfirmare), but will develop and transform based on presently unknown factors.84 The skeptic is 
thus “more free and unbound” (liberiores et solutiores sumus) because his “faculty of judgement 
is intact” (integra nobis est iudicandi potestas) and he is not bound by the necessity of defending 
the “prescriptions” (praescripta) of a school.85 Instead, he is able to move through life from 
situation to situation open to the needs that arise and unforeseen circumstances that will 
influence his pursuit.  
 In Cicero’s presentation of the argument of the Lucullus, therefore, sequi appears as a key 
interpretative crux: to understand philosophical inquiry, and Academic philosophy in particular, 
Cicero’s text requires us to grapple with the relationship between what it means to come 
afterwards—to follow in the footsteps of previous thinkers—and to drive forwards—to pursue 
“the approvable” as the philosophical means of negotiating human limitation in the search for 
truth. By understanding how the skeptic should “follow” and “pursue,” the very “obscurity” (in 
ipsis rebus obscuritas) that inheres in the world and the “deficiencies” (in iudiciis nostris 
infirmitas) of our judgment can become, through doubt, the “zeal to inquiry” (studium 
exquirendi). This zeal, in turn, conjoins the pursuit of the philosophers of today with that of the 
“most ancient and learned thinkers” (antiquissimi et doctissimi), who also recognized and 
embraced the limitation of human experience as an aspect of their own pursuits.86 
 
84 The stress on development over time is evident especially in Cicero’s lament that the decision to follow 
a philosophical school often occurs “at the most incompetent time of life” (infirmissimo tempore aetatis, 
8), which hampers an individual’s curiosity and growth. Cf. the return of this theme at 115.  
85 8, hoc autem liberiores et solutiores sumus quod integra nobis est iudicandi potestas nec ut omnia quae 
praescripta a quibusdam et quasi imperata sint defendamus necessitate ulla cogimur.  
86 7, Etsi enim omnis cognitio multis est obstructa difficultatibus, eaque est et in ipsis rebus obscuritas et 
in iudiciis nostris infirmitas, ut non sine causa antiquissimi et doctissimi invenire se posse quod cuperent 
diffisi sint, tamen nec illi defecerunt neque nos studium exquirendi defatigati relinquemus.  
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 As we leave Cicero’s explication of Academic philosophy, however, we are immediately 
confronted by the difficulty of “following” in such a tradition. Lucullus’ speech begins from the 
recent fragmentation of the Academy caused by, he claims, Antiochus’ rejection of the “un-
Academic” innovations of the last scholarch of the skeptical “New” Academy, Philo.87 After 
Lucullus discusses this recent controversy, he turns his polemic toward the originators of this 
tradition—Arcesilaus and Carneades—who, he states, are the true adversary of the Antiochean 
Academic project.88 Rather than speaking directly against the arguments or positions of these 
earlier philosophers, however, Lucullus’ objection to the skeptical Academy starts at the level of 
intellectual history, targeting in particular their tactic of calling on authoritative philosophers of 
the past to support their own assertions that “nothing is able to be known” (sciri nihil possit, Luc. 
74). Adding a further layer of complexity, Lucullus mounts his critique by comparing the 
internecine battles of Academic philosophy to the turbulent political history of the Republic. At 
the heart of this analogy is a debate about what it means to inherit or to follow in a tradition and 
how that tradition should be reconstructed according to the needs of the present:  
“Primum mihi videmini”—me autem [nomine] appellabat—“cum veteres physicos 
nominatis, facere idem quod seditiosi cives solent cum aliquos ex antiquis claros viros 
proferunt quos dicant fuisse populares ut eorum ipsi similes esse videantur. Repetunt 
enim a P. Valerio qui exactis regibus primo anno consul fuit, commemorant reliquos qui 
 
87 After receiving “two volumes written by Philo” (isti libri duo Philonis) while in exile in Alexandria, 
Antiochus, as Lucullus tells us, “began to be very angry…and kept on asking Heraclitus [another 
philosopher there] whether he really thought these things were written by Philo or whether he had ever 
heard any such things being espoused by Philo or any other Academic” (stomachari tamen coepit…ille 
Heracliti memoriam implorans quaerere ex eo viderenturne illa Philonis aut ea num vel e Philone vel ex 
ullo Academico audivisset aliquando, 11). On the “Sosus” affair and Philo’s “Roman Books,” see esp. 
Brittain 2001: 129-68. On the state of the Academy as an institution in Cicero’s time, see above, Ch. 1, 
section III.   
88 12, Sed ea pars quae contra Philonem erat praetermittenda est, minus enim acer est adversarius is qui 
ista quae sunt heri defensa negat Academicos omnino dicere; etsi enim mentitur, tamen est adversarius 
lenior. Ad Arcesilan Carneademque veniamus.  
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leges populares de provocationibus tulerint cum consules essent…Horum nominibus tot 
virorum atque tantorum expositis eorum se institutum sequi dicunt.  
“First, in citing the early physicists, what you are doing”—here he really was addressing 
me—“seems to me to be exactly what seditious citizens do when they list a selection of 
famous men from the past, trying to represent them as populists, in order to make 
themselves look like them. They start with Publius Valerius, who was consul in the first 
year after the expulsion of the kings; and they list all the other consuls who proposed 
populist laws granting rights to appeal during their year of office…Once they have set out 
this long list of names of remarkable people, they claim that they are following in the 
footsteps of what these men began.”89 
Lucullus takes aim at the New Academy’s apparently common practice of constructing an 
intellectual genealogy for itself through the “early physicists” (veteres physicos)90—those named 
here being, “Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Democritus, Parmenides, Xenophanes, and even Plato 
and Socrates.”91 Lucullus argues that, by referring to these ancient authorities as predecessors, 
the New Academic is perverting intellectual history to suit the argumentative ends of the 
moment—assimilating the purpose (institutum, lit. “what was begun”) of the pre-Socratic 
philosophers to the New Academic argument against doctrinal certainty, and ignoring, in the 
process, centuries of philosophical effort and advancement.  
 
89 Luc. 13. 
90 This appellation, which Cicero habitually uses to refer to the pre-Socratics, is notably of Aristotelian 
derivation. On Cicero’s use, cf. de Or. 1.42, 49; Ac. Lib. 1.6. For Aristotle’s account of the beliefs of the 
physiologoi, see, e.g., Metaphys. I.3 (983a-987a). See also below.  
91 14. On the significance of this practice within the skeptical Academy, see Brittain and Palmer 2001; 
Cappello 2019: 133-42. For a politico-historical discussion of the word popularis in this passage see 
Seager 1972: esp. 332-3, although his interpretation leaves no room for ambiguity or irony in the passage, 
“The last important element of the popularis ratio is the imitation of certain accepted models…It 
followed that if a man was accepted as a representative of the tradition, it would naturally be assumed that 
any measure he put forward must be for the good of the people.” See Tracy 2009 for a more recent 
historicist reading of Cicero’s ‘populism,’ which, however, remains wedded to a reductive concern for 
“Cicero’s political ambitions and of his particular need to justify to the senatorial elite his persistent 
dependence on popular support” (181). For a more open-ended reading of the tradition to which Lucullus 
refers, which unfortunately does not address this passage in particular, see Taylor 1962.  
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 Lucullus’ comparison also makes a cross-cultural claim about the transposition of 
skeptical philosophical inquiry into the Roman context. The “seditious citizens” (seditiosi cives) 
that Lucullus names—Publius Valerius, Gaius Flaminius, Lucius Cassius and Quintus Pompeius, 
Publius Africanus, Publius Crassus and Publius Scaevola, and, finally, Tiberius Gracchus and 
Gaius Marius92—comprise, from the mouth of the fabulously wealthy aristocrat and Sullan 
partisan, a counter-history of the Roman Republic, which records the expansion of the franchise 
and the redistribution of land. Not that this list of populares forms an obvious lineage; on the 
contrary, Lucullus draws attention to the incongruous and retrospectively constructed nature of 
these figures’ genealogical relationship93 and offers his own commentary on the accuracy and 
suitability of their selection.94 Through this cross-cultural comparison, Lucullus asserts that 
skeptical philosophy destroys doctrinal certainty in the same way that the populares disturbed 
the peace of the Roman state that had been secured by the power of the optimates.95 And so, 
 
92 Luc. 13. There remains work to be done on this list but see Brittain 2006 ad loc. for a rudimentary 
commentary. The unifying feature of their political careers seems to be that they advocated for either the 
enhancement of tribunate power, more equitable land distribution, and/or an expansion of citizenship 
rights to previously disenfranchised populations. Cf. Cappello 2019: 202, “Philosophy has a divided 
audience at Rome. Furthermore, in the Academica, particularly in the Lucullus, Rome is a divided 
political body. Challenging Philo’s unitarian interpretation of Academic history, Lucullus provokes 
Cicero by casting him in the role of subversive citizen (seditiosi cives) and ‘popularis’…By implication, 
Lucullus is identifying himself with the opposite faction, the ‘optimates.’ Cicero meets this accusation 
with equal vigor, calling Lucullus a seditious tribune who drags Cicero before a ‘public assembly’ 
(contio) in order to bring him into disrepute (Luc. 144).” 
93 E.g. 13, concerning Publius Africanus, illi quidem etiam P. Africanum referre in eundem numerum 
solent.  
94 See esp. the last entry in the list, ibid.: “They also add Gaius Marius, and about him at all events they 
are not lying at all” (Addunt etiam C. Marium et de hoc quidem nihil mentiuntur).  
95 See esp., 15, “After the most authoritative philosophical schools had come to rest is it not the case that, 
just as Tiberius Gracchus disturbed the peace in the best of all possible Republics, so did Arcesilaus 
overthrow the established philosophy, hiding behind the authority of those who denied that it is ever 
possible to know or perceive anything?” (nonne cum iam philosophorum disciplinae gravissimae 
constitissent, tum exortus est, ut in optima re publica Ti. Gracchus qui otium perturbaret, sic Arcesilas 
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Lucullus suggests, a Roman who adopts a skeptical ratio, especially a former consul—note that 
Cicero has Lucullus re-address this accusation directly at himself (me autem [nomine] 
appellabat)—perpetuates a mindset or advocates for a practice that can be linked by analogy to 
the decline of the aristocratic Republic. Lucullus’ lineage of populares draws a direct connection 
between the erosion of Senatorial power and the emergence of increasingly populist rulers, 
culminating in the names Tiberius Gracchus and Gaius Marius.96 At the fictional date of the 
dialogue, 62 BCE—the year following Cicero’s consulship and his suppression of another 
seditiosus civis, Catiline—Lucullus’ claim about the destructive role that the populares played in 
the history of the Republic clearly looks forward to Caesar; yet, at the same time, Lucullus’ 
implication of Cicero himself in this narrative of populist decline draws attention to the power 
wielded by the practice of historical reconstruction at which his criticism is ultimately aimed.  
 While criticizing the skeptics’ tendency to manipulate Academic history to suit their own 
ends, therefore, Lucullus is engaged in a similar exercise in genealogical construction that lays 
the foundation for his own philosophical (and political) views. Lucullus’ own mode of 
philosophical genealogy also aims to recuperate the physici, not as a model to be emulated, but 
as the origin point of a multi-generational process of intellectual and scientific effort that 
resembles the growth of an organism. In a clear Aristotelian echo,97 Lucullus says that, while it 
 
qui constitutam philosophiam everteret, et in eorum auctoritate delitesceret qui negavissent quidquam 
sciri aut percipi posse?).  
96 Of course, this is a deeply complex and perhaps ironic use of Lucullus’ persona, since he was a fervent 
supporter of Sulla and a representative of an increasingly tyrannical, but elitist lineage himself.  
97 Cf. Aristotle’s appraisal of Empedocles at Metaphys. I.3(985a), “If one follows up and appreciates the 
statements of Empedocles with a view to his real meaning and not to his faltering, childlike language, it 
will be found that love is the cause of good and strife of evil” (εἰ γάρ τις ἀκολουθοίη καὶ λαμβάνοι πρὸς 
τὴν διάνοιαν καὶ μὴ πρὸς ἃ ψελλίζεται λέγων Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, εὑρήσει τὴν μὲν φιλίαν αἰτίαν οὖσαν τῶν 
ἀγαθῶν τὸ δὲ νεῖκος τῶν κακῶν). Cicero translates Aristotle’s ψελλίζω with his repeated use of haesito / 
haereo to describe Empedocles’ and the pre-Socratics’ manner of articulation.  
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may be true that the physici used to sometimes “cry out when they became stuck at some point,” 
they did this out of “modesty” (verecundia)98 and a genuine “inability to discover the true nature 
of anything” (nihil omnino quale sit posse reperire).99 When a skeptic like Arcesilaus, however, 
strikes a similar posture, he does so out of “pretension” (calumnia) and betrays an attitude of 
arrogance toward the true progress that has been made by the intervening generations: “Since, if 
those old thinkers found themselves floundering like babies just born into a new world, can we 
really think that all these generations and consummate intellects and comprehensive 
investigations have not succeeded in making anything clearer?”100 Lucullus thus views 
intellectual history as the development of a body of knowledge that affects a real change on its 
objects of inquiry over time. The physici may have “struggled” or “floundered” to discover and 
articulate the reality with which they were confronted like “babies just born into a new world,” 
but later thinkers have, in fact, “made things clearer.” For Lucullus, it is proof of the New 
Academy’s pretension that they ignore this later progress in order to adopt a posture of ignorance 
that is unwarranted and insulting to the lineage in which they claim to take part.  
 In Cicero’s response to this attack, he addresses both Lucullus’ cross-cultural comparison 
and his opposition to the skeptic’s use of the physici as a model. He rejects out of hand the 
comparison between the perverse intentions of the seditiosi cives and the New Academy and 
 
98 14, nec Arcesilae calumnia conferenda est cum Democriti verecundia.  
99 Ibid., Et tamen isti physici raro admodum, cum haerent aliquo loco, exclamant quasi mente incitati—
Empedocles quidem ut interdum mihi furere videatur—abstrusa esse omnia, nihil nos sentire, nihil 
cernere, nihil omnino quale sit posse reperire.  
100 15, quodsi illi tum in novis rebus quasi modo nascentes haesitaverunt, nihilne tot saeculis, summis 
ingeniis, maximis studiis explicatum putamus? 
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focuses instead on strengthening the association between the skeptics and the “eminent thinkers” 
of the past:  
Et primum quod initio dixisti videamus quale sit, similiter a nobis de antiquis philosophis 
commemorari atque seditiosi solerent claros viros sed tamen populares aliquos nominare. 
Illi cum res non bonas tractent, similes bonorum videri volunt; nos autem ea dicimus 
nobis videri quae vosmet ipsi nobilissimis philosophis placuisse conceditis. 
And first let’s see if there’s anything in what you said at the beginning—that we make 
mention of philosophers from the past in the way that seditious people cite famous 
citizens who are also populists. Such people want to look like good men, though they’re 
up to no good. But we say that the views we have are ones that you yourselves allow 
were held by the most eminent philosophers.101 
Cicero carefully restates Lucullus’ accusation from the Roman perspective, driving a wedge 
through his casual association of the seditiosi cives with popularis aims. In Cicero’s rendering, 
men from Roman history who are good (clari, boni) are simply opposed to the men who have no 
concern for the good (seditiosi…illi…res non bonas tractent), but only for the appearance of 
goodness.102 Cicero’s distinction problematizes Lucullus’ partisan divide between optimates and 
populares and, instead, establishes a tradition of boni—or, in the analogy, nobilissimi 
philosophi—that can be agreed upon by both parties because of their undeniable worth.103 After 
listing all the eminent philosophers of the past who share similar skeptical outlooks to the New 
Academy, Cicero asks, “do you finally agree that I am not simply name-dropping illustrious 
 
101 Luc. 72. 
102 Cf. Cappello 2019: 202, “responding to the accusation of fabricating history, Cicero operates the same 
distinction as Lucullus, dividing Roman society between good men (boni) and those who are not 
concerned with the good (res non bonas tractent).” Unlike Cappello, I think the distinction is explicitly 
differentiated, with Lucullus working along party lines and Cicero emphasizing a more abstract 
conception of the “good.” 
103 It is intriguing to consider Cicero’s response as an only semi-veiled recuperation of the very Roman 
historical lineage of populares that Lucullus lays out. 
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personages like Saturninus used to do,104 but in fact never emulate (imitari) anyone but the most 
accomplished and eminent thinkers?”105 Cicero challenges Lucullus’ cynically partisan view of 
history with one that is based on the genuine, and austerely Roman, imitation of worthy models 
from the past.106  
 In the imitative mode of historical engagement that Cicero proposes, the point of 
emulation is specifically the skeptic’s commitment to the drive of inquiry in the face of human 
limitation. For the skeptic, the history of philosophy is the history of the insurmountable limits of 
knowledge. The particular manifestation of these limits may certainly shift and change in a way 
that Lucullus interprets as progress, but it is the underlying continuity of doubt that drives 
philosophical inquiry over the generations, regardless of its contingent and historically-situated 
expressions.107 When Cicero claims that his relation to the philosophers of the past is one of 
emulation and imitation (imitari), he is not claiming to reproduce exactly the content of the 
philosophical inquiries of the past. For example, he goads Lucullus by asking him whether it 
would be tolerable at present simply to restate Anaxagoras’ claim that “snow is black” (nivem 
 
104 Saturninus was one Lucullus’ particular enemies among the populares, see Luc. 14.  
105 75, Videorne tibi non ut Saturninus nominare modo inlustres homines, sed etiam imitari numquam nisi 
clarum, nisi nobilem? 
106 Cf. Cappello 2019: 138 with a more cautious (in relation to the argument of Brittain and Palmer 2001), 
but similar appraisal of Cicero’s skeptical approach to the past, “The relationship between past and 
present in Cicero’s historiographical speeches is shaped by the theme of emulation or imitation (imitari), 
more so than by the theme of a gradual skeptical development as put forward by Brittain and 
Palmer….However, with the focus firmly on the Ciceronian project, his protagonists in the Lucullus and 
the first Academic Book are not mere signposts along the road of philosophical history, but paradigms.” 
107 Cf. esp. Cicero’s claim in the prologue, “it was not without reason that the most ancient and learned 
thinkers distrusted their ability to discover what they desired, but still they did not give up and nor will 
we, becoming tired, leave off in our zeal of inquiring” (ut non sine causa antiquissimi et doctissimi 
invenire se posse quod cuperent diffisi sint, tamen nec illi defecerunt neque nos studium exquirendi 
defatigati relinquemus, 7).  
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nigram) even if done “hesitatingly” (ne si dubitarem); yet, he insists, Anaxagoras remains a 
figure worthy of emulation.108 Similarly, the skeptic should not try to discover in the universal 
“darkness” that Democritus claims shrouds the senses (sensus…tenebricosos)109 and in the 
passionate utterances (furere) of Empedocles110 some disguised or yet-to-be articulated 
knowledge—or even an adumbration of the specifics of the skeptics’ current arguments. Instead, 
the claims of these physici about the deficiency of the senses and the inability of humanity to 
access the truth directly demonstrate the inescapability of human limitation and the need for 
doubt to drive philosophy at all times. Concluding his genealogy of skeptical philosophy, 
fittingly, with Socrates and Plato, Cicero conjoins his own pursuit to Plato’s: “He certainly 
would not have set out (persecutus non esset) this commitment [that he knew nothing] in so 
many books unless he had approved of it (probavisset), for otherwise there was no reason to 
follow through (nulla fuit ratio persequi) the irony of Socrates, especially because it is unending 
 
108 72, Anaxagoras nivem nigram dixit esse: ferres me si ego idem dicerem? tu ne si dubitarem quidem. At 
quis est hic?…Maxima fuit et gravitatis et ingenii gloria.  
109 73, “What should I say about Democritus? We are hardly worthy to be compared to him not only for 
the greatness of his genius but also his spirit…And, he does not, in fact, mean what we do, who do not 
deny that some truth exists but that we cannot perceive it. He flatly denies that truth exists at all; likewise, 
he doesn’t say that the senses are ‘obscured,’ but entirely shrouded in darkness—for that is how he refers 
to them” (Quid loquar de Democrito? Quem cum eo conferre possumus non modo ingenii magnitudine 
sed etiam animi…Atque is non hoc dicit quod nos, qui veri esse aliquid non negamus, percipi posse 
negamus; ille verum plane negat esse; sensusque idem non obscuros dicit sed tenebricosos—sic enim 
appellat eos.  
110 74, “Empedocles seems to you to be raving madly, but to me his utterance pours forth in a manner 
most suited to the matters he is discussing. Surely, therefore, he is not blinding us or depriving us of our 
senses if he thinks that they do not have sufficient force to judge the objects that are submitted to them?” 
(Furere tibi Empedocles videtur, at mihi dignissimum rebus iis de quibus loquitur sonum fundere; num 
ergo is excaecat nos aut orbat sensibus si parum magnam vim censet in iis esse ad ea quae sub eos 
subiecta sunt iudicanda?).  
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(ironiam…perpetuam).”111 Cicero locates the continuity with his project in Plato’s dedication to 
“setting out”(persecutus esset) and “following through” (persequi) the Socratic claim that he 
knew nothing and the “unending irony” (perpetua ironia) that results from this 
acknowledgement of limitation.  
 Lucullus’ analogy of the seditiosi cives and the skeptics, and Cicero’s response to it, 
allows us to see that above all “to follow” the Academic ratio—whether as a Antiochean or as a 
skeptic—is to engage consciously and provocatively with “what these men began” (eorum 
institutum sequi). From Lucullus’ evolutionary or progressivist perspective, the relationship 
between the past and the present is never a simple process of inheritance and re-affirmation. 
Instead, “to follow,” in the sense of “to participate in” a political or philosophical tradition 
always involves a process of creative selection, commentary, or complete revision, which must 
be carried out with the intention to add to or clarify what had come before. Yet, as Cicero’s 
response to Lucullus emphasizes, there persists in Academic (and Roman political history) a 
form of solidarity—in philosophical terms, the commitment to doubt—the emulation of which 
allows the skeptic to draw the past into the present. By choosing to “follow” the commitment to 
doubt found in the models of the past, Cicero maintains this drive of inquiry for the purpose of 
the present.  
 For Ciceronian philosophy, this purpose of the present is clear: to pursue, to seek, to 
inquire (sequi). The Lucullus offers many aims of this pursuit—wisdom, similarities 
(similitudines), impressions, philosophy itself112—but the most common object of the verb sequi 
 
111 Ibid., Quid dicam de Platone? qui certe tam multis libris haec persecutus non esset nisi probavisset, 
ironiam enim alterius, perpetuam praesertim, nulla fuit ratio persequi. For Cicero’s presentation of 
Socratic irony, see also Luc. 15, de Orat. 2.270, Brut. 292-3.  
112 See, e.g., 24, 54, 36, 44, 61. 
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in the text is a form of the substantive adjective probabile or the abstract noun probabilitas.113 In 
the second of two explicit references to Clitomachus’ interpretation of the Carneadean pithanon, 
Cicero draws attention to the relationship between the pursuit of the “approvable” and skeptical 
epochē:  
Quae cum exposuisset, adiungit dupliciter dici adsensus sustinere sapientem, uno modo 
cum hoc intellegatur, omnino eum rei nulli adsentiri, altero cum se a respondendo ut aut 
adprobet quid aut improbet sustineat, ut neque neget aliquid neque aiat; id cum ita sit, 
alterum placere, ut numquam adsentiatur, alterum tenere, ut sequens probabilitatem 
ubicumque haec aut occurrat aut deficiat aut ‘etiam’ aut ‘non’ respondere possit.   
 
113 The adjective is also found in the neuter plural, probabilia; note, however, that nowhere do we find a 
form corresponding precisely to the Carneadean pithanē phantasia, the formulation of which is confirmed 
by M VII.166, 169, 174. For Cicero’s usage see, Luc. 8, 33, 59, 99, 104, 109. Contrary to the recent 
scholarly tendency to render probabile as “persuasive” by reading back to the Greek peithein/pithanon, I 
think that we must take into account the nuance of the translation choice in Latin. In particular, Cicero’s 
habitual wordplay between forms of probabile and the verbs probare / improbare favors the translation of 
“approvable.” This translation shifts the emphasis from the active “persuasiveness” of an impression that 
strikes the subject to the passive “approvability” of an impression that must be bestowed by the subject. 
Certainly, “approval” has something to do with “persuasiveness,” but it cannot be reduced simply to a 
function of persuasion any more than it can be to the “likelihood” of a pre-theoretical notion of 
“probability” (on which, see Hacking 1975: 1-10). In Cicero’s earlier oratorical definition of probabile at 
de Inv. 1.46, it is “that which for the most part usually comes to pass, or which is a part of belief, or which 
contains in itself some resemblance to these qualities, whether such resemblance is true or false” 
(Probabile autem est id quod fere solet fieri aut quod in opinione positum est aut quod habet in se ad 
haec quandam similitudinem, sive id falsum est sive verum). Thus the “approvable” in Cicero’s 
conception is located at the intersection of belief and the resemblance of likelihood—being neither 
“persuasiveness” nor “probability,” but a quality pertaining to judgement that allows for the subject to 
form comparisons and act on the events of a life (probabile quod sumitur ad argumentationem aut signum 
est aut credibile aut iudicatum aut comparabile, de Inv. 1.47-8). The subject may find impressions or 
arguments “approvable” based on different criteria using different faculties at different times; but as a 
category that reflects on judgement and action, the probabile always emphasizes the subject’s role in 
determining the relations that make up his understanding of and interaction with the world. On this view, 
see Cappello 2019: 318-19, “Ultimately, the probabile denotes something that is presented to an audience 
in such a way as to elicit their approval or appear demonstrable to them. The change from active to 
passive [between Carneades’ and Cicero’s formulation] brings about a radical transformation in 
perspective. At Rome, it is up to the subject to judge whether the impression—the percept, argument or 
idea—deserves approval and to be considered persuasive; it is not the impression that persuades the 
subject…[T]he Roman persuasive impression privileges the ‘rôle actif du sujet’…The responsibility is 
squarely placed on the perceiving subject to first and foremost evaluate any impression and evaluate 
whether to approve it or not”; cf. esp. Auvray-Assayas 2006: 40-1. On the extensive debates in recent 
scholarship about Cicero’s use of probabilitas, see, e.g., Lévy 1992: 243-300; Glucker 1995; Obdrzalek 
2006; Auvray-Assayas 2006: 22, 40-46, 121-26; Cappello 2019: 317-22.  
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After expounding these points [that the Academics never argued against truth, but against 
an infallible criterion of truth], Clitomachus added: ‘The sage is said to suspend assent in 
two senses: in one sense, when this means that he won’t assent to anything at all; in 
another, when it means that he will restrain himself even from giving responses showing 
that he approves or disapproves of something, so that he won’t say “yes” or “no” to 
anything. Given this distinction, the sage accepts the suspension of assent in the first 
sense, with the result that he never assents; but he holds onto his assent in the second 
sense, with the result that, by pursuing approvability in whatever direction it is present or 
lacking, he is able to reply “yes” or “no.”’114 
On this deeply complex and much debated passage, I restrict my comments to three points: first, 
this passage, which comes at a key point in Cicero’s argument, is comprised almost entirely of a 
quotation from Clitomachus’ treatise On Suspending Assent. Cicero uncharacteristically 
emphasizes that he is, in fact, quoting directly from another author by providing his name and the 
title of the work.115 Furthermore, as noted above, Clitomachus wrote exegetical works on the 
philosophical approaches of Carneades. Thus, at least three distinct voices and historical 
moments are present in this short passage. As a result, any interpretation will be highly 
contingent upon which voice and moment the reader privileges. Rather than understanding this 
density of mediation as a form of antiquarian retrospection, which would privilege the past, I 
think that we can see here in practice a demonstration of the philosophical emulation favored by 
the New Academy in which the past exists for the present through the solidarity of the skeptic’s 
commitment to inquiry.  
 Second, Cicero selects this passage at this particular point in his own speech as a final 
argument defending the Academic position against the charge of apraxia leveled by Lucullus.116 
 
114 Luc. 104. 
115 See 98 for the title. It is important to remember, of course, that Cicero is translating and transposing at 
the same time that he is quoting.  
116 The series of arguments against apraxia is found at 98-105. On the relationship between Carneades’ 
pithanon and the Stoic charge of apraxia, see esp. Striker 1980; Obdrzalek 2006 and 2012.  
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In a conventional reading of this passage, Clitomachus presents Carneades’ pithanon, at least in 
the dialectical context of the rebuttal of apraxia, as a means by which the various choices and 
decisions required for everyday life and philosophical inquiry may be made without need for the 
Stoic katalēpsis. Thus, Cicero’s citation of this passage within the context of these Academic 
debates provides his own argument against apraxia with an alternate method for governing of a 
life. Yet within the more restricted space of this particular passage, rather than foregrounding the 
role that the pithanon can play in overcoming apraxia, Cicero’s quotation of Clitomachus 
emphasizes the maintenance of epochē alongside the pithanon, carving out a “second form of 
assent,” that enables the sage to suspend assent even while “pursuing approvability”—which is a 
categorically different way of assenting.117  
 My final point about this passage, therefore, is that through his citation of this particular 
aspect of Clitomachus’ theory, Cicero takes pains to conclude his argument against apraxia not, 
for instance, by emphasizing the ease with which practical judgment can be exercised through 
the pithanon, but, instead, by returning his readers to the role of doubt in his inquiry. “Pursuing 
approvability” (sequens probabilitatem) is an action that takes place simultaneously with, not 
instead of “suspending assent” (adsensus sustinere). In this intertwining of practical pursuit and 
doubt’s drive, Cicero formulates the interminable work of his philosophical inquiry in the 
present.  
 This passage, therefore, formulates what it means, under the temporal conditions and 
commitment to doubt that define Ciceronian philosophy, to “be able to respond ‘yes’ or ‘no,’ by 
pursuing approvability in whatever direction it might occur or be lacking” (sequens 
 
117 Cf. Lévy 1992: 300, who interprets Cicero’s dedication to maintaining epochē alongside the probabile 
as a rejection of Philo’s teaching. For the canonical, dialectical interpretation, see Frede 1984.  
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probabilitatem ubicumque haec aut occurrat aut deficiat aut ‘etiam’ aut ‘non’ respondere 
possit). If we preserve Cicero’s phrasing and translation choices, it becomes clear that he does 
not understand probabilitas as attached incontrovertibly to a specific type of impression or 
network of impressions that acts, perhaps even forcibly, upon the rational faculty of the 
subject—like Carneades’ pithanai phantasiai or the Stoics’ katalēptikai phantasiai.118 Instead, 
probabilitas is itself an abstractable quality with which the subject’s judgement chooses to 
engage, functioning like a field of discernment cast through the skeptic’s suspension of assent. 
Notably, in the passage from Tusc. 5 in which Cicero reaffirms M.’s skeptical commitment, he 
writes, “We live from day to day; we assert whatever strikes our mind by means of approvability 
and so we alone are free.”119 The use of probabilitas as the object of the verb sequi in Cicero’s 
translation of Clitomachus, therefore, emphasizes the deferral inherent in the simultaneous 
commitment to epochē and pursuit of approvability. Instead of a potential “practical criterion,” 
inherent in the impressions of daily life, which allows the subject to overcome apraxia by 
applying an inductive rationality to his manner of living, Cicero offers a considerably more 
ambiguous formulation. To “live from day to day…by means of approvability,” rather than 
simply rendering life a seamless transition from one persuasive impression to another, is to be 
“free”—that is, in a real sense, to be returned again and again to the doubt that preserves the 
 
118 On the force of the Stoics’ katalēptikai phantasiai on its object, see, e.g., Zeno’s image of the clenched 
fist, which Cicero provides at Luc. 145.  
119 Tusc. 5.33, nos in diem vivimus; quodcumque nostros animos probabilitate percussit, id dicimus, 
itaque soli sumus liberi. The noun probabilitas is almost certainly a Ciceronian coinage and appears only 
five times in Classical Latin, all of which are found in the philosophica. Cf. also Luc. 75, 99, 104; de Fin. 
3.72. In antiquity, the word appears again only in Augustine esp. with reference to Academic practice, see 
Contra Ac. 2.9.23, 2.10.24, 3.6.13; cf. Serm. 170.7.  
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drive of inquiry. Cicero’s “pursuit of approvability” provides less a sense of relative certainty 
than a deferral of uncertainty—at least until the next day.  
 In Cicero’s usage, therefore, a direct line connects the two primary senses of sequi: to 
follow is always at the same time to pursue. That is, the creative use and imitation of the past is 
the deferral of uncertainty in the present. The inherited ratio followed by the Academic serves as 
the basis for an ongoing and dynamic way of engaging with the world—a way of accepting the 
subjective responsibility for the impressions that “I” say “yes” or “no” to, here and now, as part 
of an inquiry that is constantly being delimited by this immediate experience. It is significant, 
therefore, that the third distinct usage of sequi in the Lucullus marks the advance of dialectic. In 
Cicero’s response to Lucullus’ argument in favor of a certainty based on reason,120 he challenges 
the Antiochean’s definition of dialectic and the logic of Stoic consequentiality on which it relies: 
Quid est quod ratione percipi possit? Dialecticam inventam esse dicitis veri et falsi quasi 
disceptatricem et iudicem. Cuius veri et falsi, et in qua re? In geometriane quid sit verum 
aut falsum dialecticus iudicabit an in litteris an in musicis? At ea non novit. In 
philosophia igitur?…Quid igitur iudicabit? quae coniunctio, quae diiunctio vera sit, quid 
ambigue dictum sit, quid sequatur quamque rem, quid repugnet? Si haec et horum similia 
iudicat, de se ipsa iudicat; plus autem pollicebatur, nam haec quidem iudicare ad ceteras 
res quae sunt in philosophia multae atque magnae non est satis. 
“What is apprehensible by reason?” Dialectic was discovered as the ‘arbiter’ and judge 
of truth and falsity, you say. Whose truths and falsehoods, and according to what topic? 
Is the dialectician to judge what is true or false in geometry? Or in literature? Or in 
music? No. He doesn’t know these things. In philosophy, then?…What, exactly, is he to 
judge? Which conjunctions and disjunctions are true; which statements are ambiguous; 
what follows from something and what is incompatible with it. But if dialectic judges 
these cases and ones like them, it makes judgements about itself—and yet it promised 
more. Being in a position to judge just these cases wouldn’t enable it to adjudicate the 
important questions in the rest of philosophy.121  
 
120 Cf. esp. 45-53.  
121 Luc. 91. 
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Cicero takes aim at both the formal structure and, importantly, the idiom of the Antiochean’s 
Stoic-influenced approach to logic.122 In Cicero’s paraphrase of the Antiochean’s argument, the 
choices and use of words in the statement of the dialectician’s purview—“Which conjunctions 
and disjunctions are true; which statements are ambiguous; what follows from something and 
what is incompatible with it” (quid sequatur quamque rem, quid repugnet)—are reflective of the 
Stoic formulations of “consequentiality” (ἀκολουθία) on which Lucullus’ position rests.123 In this 
case, sequi is used as an antonym of repugnare.124 Thus, if a conclusion “follows” its premises, 
this marks a felicitous advance of dialectic and progress toward certainty; if a conclusion “fights 
against” or “contradicts” its premises, on the other hand, presumably the argument must return to 
those premises to discover where the chain of reasoning had gone astray.  
 In Cicero’s discussion of forms of skeptical dialectic that contravene this formal logic, he 
employs a competing use of sequi in relation to the advancement of thought. This usage is found, 
in particular, in relation to the skeptical Academy’s sorites paradox, which undermines the 
logical relationship between series and type, quantity and quality.125 The essential paradox states 
that given a series, x, xx+1, xx+2, etc., it is impossible to state with certainty at what point quantity 
 
122 On the logical argumentation of the Luc., see esp. Barnes 1997. For the logical issues discussed here in 
other contexts, see also Bett 1989 and Schofield 1999.  
123 On this definition of Stoic “consequentiality,” cf. PH 2.104-6 = Long and Sedley 1987: i.209 (35C). 
See also its role in the ethical “proper function” (kathēkon), which is defined as “consequentiality in life, 
something which, once it has been done, has a reasonable justification” (Stob. 2.85 = Long and Sedley 
1987: i.359 [59B]).  
124 Cf. comparable usage with reference to formal logic at 21, 38, 67, 91, and 95. This is another instance 
of a marked translation choice, where Greek would tend to use ἀκολουθεῖν, not ἕπεσθαι. For repugnare, 
which is one of Cicero’s favorite words for logical “contradiction” or “inconsistency,” cf. e.g., Top. 11.7, 
19.2, 21.1; Ac. Lib. 1.19. 
125 For Lucullus’ critique of the skeptics’ use of this paradox, see 49.  
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affects quality—i.e., that a “small” amount becomes a “heap.” In response to Lucullus’ 
complaint that “Sorites arguments are fallacious!” (At vitiosi sunt soritae), Cicero remarks:  
Frangite igitur eos, si potestis, ne molesti sint; erunt enim, nisi cavetis. ‘Cautum est,’ 
inquit; ‘placet enim Chrysippo, cum gradatim interrogetur (verbi causa) tria pauca sint 
anne multa, aliquanto prius quam ad multa perveniat quiescere, id est quod ab iis dicitur 
ἡσυχάζειν.’ ‘Per me vel stertas licet,’ inquit Carneades, ‘non modo quiescas; sed quid 
proficit? sequitur enim qui te ex somno excitet et eodem modo interroget.’” 
“So crack them if you can, so they don’t bother you—they certainly will, if you don’t 
take precautions. But we do take precautions, you say: Chrysippus thinks that when one 
is asked to specify gradually whether, e.g., three things are few or many one should come 
to rest (ἡσυχάζειν, as they put it) a little bit before one reaches ‘many.’ As far as I’m 
concerned, Carneades replies, you can snore if you like as well. But how does that help 
you? There’s someone coming after you who’s going to wake you from your sleep and 
keep asking you the same questions.126 
This anecdote allegorizes the clash between Stoic consequentiality and skeptical dialectic. The 
idiom of logic is turned back on itself: Carneades challenges Chrysippus’ use of a quasi-
suspension of judgement—or simply evasion (ἡσυχάζειν)—to impose a conclusion on a soritical 
chain by undermining its very status as a conclusion. “What follows” (sequitur) from this 
inconclusive conclusion is not progress toward certainty or even an acceptance of relative 
certainty, but rather a reassertion of skeptical inquiry and a return to doubt: “There’s someone 
coming after (sequitur) you who’s going to wake you from your sleep and keep asking you the 
same questions.” As Cicero’s formulation helps to foreground, therefore, “what follows” from 
skeptical dialectic is, certainly, an advancement—that is, it is the result of inquiry’s movement 
through time, humorously rendered in the anecdote by Carneades’ threat to wake up a “snoring” 
Chrysippus. Yet, unlike the felicitous advance of Stoic-influenced formal logic, the skeptical 
outcome occurs where inquiry collides with the limits of thought in the present moment. “What 
 
126 Luc. 93. 
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follows” from this outcome of inquiry is a renewed confrontation with uncertainty and a return to 
the doubt that drives the work of thought.127  
IV. The Limits of Doubt 
 In this section I examine how the movements of “following” and “pursuing” that shape 
the content of the Lucullus are reflected in its form. In particular, I am interested in connecting 
Cicero’s discussion of the sorites with the process of revision to which he subjects this dialogue 
almost immediately after completing it. I argue that Cicero’s revisory approach to composition 
reflects back the influence of doubt—since “nature didn’t give us any knowledge of limits” 
(rerum natura nullam nobis dedit cognitionem finium, 92)—within Cicero’s experience and 
practice. Cicero’s pervasive interest in the unknowability of boundaries, limits, and endpoints 
aligns his project with a long lineage of skeptical or even “anti-philosophical” thinkers who use 
the uniqueness of individual experience as a way to undermine philosophy’s claims to 
comprehend and encompass truth. After briefly considering Cicero in this lineage by examining 
his approach to limitation in relation to Derrida’s reading of Heidegger, I move in the next 
section to examine how, instead, we might position Cicero, through his dedication to the 
connection between doubt and truth, as a part of a philosophical recuperation and reinvigoration 
of the concept of truth.  
The Lucullus was written as the final book of a trilogy, preceded by the Hortensius and 
the Catulus, which as a whole issued a general exhortation to the Roman reading public to study 
 
127 A helpful comparison for Cicero’s characterization of skeptical dialectic is the Carneadean aphorism 
preserved by Stob. Flor. 2.2.20, “Carneades used to say that dialectic is similar to an octopus; for the 
latter eats its tentacles after they have grown, the former ‘overturns’ (ἀνατρέπειν) also ‘its own bases’ (τὰ 
σφέτερα) as its power grows (προιούσης τῆς δυνάμεως).” As such, the “conclusion” of dialectic is always 
also the destruction of the premises on which it was based, thus re-staging the fundamental recognition of 
uncertainty and the commitment to doubt.  
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philosophy and presented Academic philosophy in all of its complexity and multivalent 
traditions.128 Whether it was intended to convince its readers to pursue, like Cicero himself, a 
skeptical Academic ratio should remain an open question—certainly the end of the Lucullus 
itself offers no clear indication. The conclusion of the dialogue relies on a pun: following the 
interlocutors’ final sparring and a general retrenchment of philosophical views—none of the 
primary participants decide to change their allegiance—Cicero turns to Hortensius, the group’s 
host,129 and asks, “So, what are you thinking?” (sed tibi quid tandem videtur, Hortensi?) To this, 
Hortensius replies cryptically, “Away with it!” (Tollendum). This single word can be taken to 
mean both “Time to weigh anchor!” and “Get rid of assent altogether!”130 That is, in one sense, 
Hortensius is putting an end to the dialogue simply by saying, “It’s time for you all to go home!” 
and, at the same time, suggesting that the only fitting conclusion for such a dialogue on 
Academic philosophy is to reaffirm epochē—the debate contained within the dialogue has turned 
back on itself and caused in its participants and, by extension, readers renewed feelings of doubt, 
which should lead them to suspend judgment.  
 
128 On the historical impact of Cicero’s advocation for Academic skepticism in propria persona, see 
Griffin 1997: 10 and Cappello 2019: 85-114.  
129 It is also significant that Cicero addresses this final question to the speaker of the initial dialogue in the 
original trilogy. Not only does this serve as a fitting formal gesture of closure for the trilogy as a whole, 
but it is thematically important, since it is clear from the frr. that Hortensius maintains the position most 
hostile to a formalized practice of philosophy, favoring rhetoric instead (see esp. frr. 33-55G). Thus, 
Cicero’s final question to Hortensius does not simply refer to the topics addressed in the Lucullus, but to 
the larger project of presenting the practice of philosophy generally to a readership that is, for various 
reasons, opposed to it.  
130 It is important for this double meaning to note that the dialogue has taken place while Lucullus and 
Cicero are waiting for the wind to change so that they can sail from Hortensius’ villa at Bauli to their own 
villas at Naples and Pompeii, respectively, see 9. Cf. Cappello 2019: 177-78, who presents this passage as 
an example of Academic “theatricality.”  
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 The pithy inconclusiveness of this ending, which is no ending, is exacerbated by the 
historical circumstances of the work’s composition. After completing the encomia that preceded 
both the Catulus and Lucullus in late May,131 Cicero soon decided that he was unhappy with his 
choice of interlocutors in these initial dialogues. He writes to Atticus on June 23rd that he had 
already “transferred these same conversations to Cato and Brutus” (eosdem illos sermones ad 
Catonem Brutumque transtuli),132 before Atticus reminded him about an on-going intellectual 
exchange with Varro, who had promised to dedicate some of his de Lingua Latina to Cicero. In 
reciprocation of this promise,133 Cicero ultimately re-writes the material that first formed the 
Catulus and Lucullus into a four-book dialogue, the Academici Libri, featuring Varro as the 
principal speaker of the Antiochean position. Despite continued concerns about the suitability of 
his new choice of interlocutor, by the end of July Cicero had delivered the new dialogues, which 
were intended to supplant the former edition, to Varro.134 The collection of texts referred to as 
the Academica, therefore, comprise three different revisions differentiated by principal speakers 
and setting—Hortensius, Catulus, and Lucullus (c. 62 BCE); Cato and Brutus (probably late 
50s); Varro (present day). Although much attention has been given to the change of speakers, in 
large part since this is the issue that Cicero emphasizes in his letters to Atticus as the reason for 
 
131 See Att. XIII.32(305).3 sent on May 29. Cf. Cappello 2019: esp. 13-35 for a thorough analysis of the 
epistolary documentation of Cicero’s composition of the Academica.  
132 Att. XIII.16(323), a letter in which Cicero laments his inability “to seek out streams and solitudes” (at 
his childhood home in Arpinum this time) because of inclimate weather (nos cum flumina et solitudines 
sequeremur quo facilius sustentare nos possemus, pedem e villa adhuc egressi non sumus; ita magnos et 
adsiduos imbris habebamus).  
133 Or perhaps to compel Varro, who had been dragging his feet, to uphold his end of the arrangement. On 
Cicero and Atticus’ apparent scheming in this regard, see, e.g., Att. XIII.12(320), 13(321).  
134 On Cicero’s concerns about his use of Varro in the dialogues, see Att. XIII.19(325), 21(351), 24(332), 
25(333).  
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his revision, the movement through time that accompanies the alteration of the setting is also 
striking.135 
 The passage through the different versions draws the debates out of the past, represented 
especially by the earlier speakers’ connections to the old Republican elite, toward the present 
day.136 I suggest that the rapidity of revision and the progressive temporality of the three settings 
can be understood best as an inversion of the temporal retrogression found between the three 
dialogues of de Finibus—it is the repeating to de Fin.’s remembering.137 These two works were 
composed over the same period, share similar argumentative strategies and goals, and address in 
tandem the two most important philosophical topics of the day, at least according to Cicero’s 
 
135 For a consideration of the revision of the Academica from a perspective on Cicero’s compositional 
practice that emphasizes collaboration and social distribution, see Gurd 2007. Martelli 2013: 4 offers a 
helpful supplement to Gurd’s approach that emphasizes the “diachronic axis of temporal drift”; and, in the 
context of a project on Ovidian revision, she argues that “the author is always already extended, because 
the authorial subject, like every subject, exists in time. Or, more accurately, that writing submits the 
authorial subject to the temporal extension that is both a symptom of and condition for the written word, 
alienating the author irrevocably from herself and multiplying her identities accordingly.”  
136 See Griffin 1997: 8-10, “One might argue from the speakers, that the original trilogy of Hortensius, 
Catulus, Lucullus, was an exercise in nostalgia through which Cicero paid tribute to the old breed of 
Optimates, there depicted as his friends and social equals (cf. Att. V.2.2), and recalled his old political 
role…Some doubt about the idea that nostalgia was so important, however, is raised by the fact that 
Cicero did not persevere in using that generation but selected speakers from among the contemporaries of 
his own generation for the two revisions of Academica. Of course, that does not rule out nostalgia being 
his original motive, which later came to seem less important to him, but it is not necessary to assume that 
it was ever his only or principal motive…” Although Griffin’s diagnosis of Cicero’s motivation relies on 
an under-examined notion of “nostalgia,” her explanation helpfully draws attention to the increasingly 
presentist temporal setting. Cf. Lévy 1992: 635, who, instead, argues in favor of understanding the 
Hortensius and Catulus in particular as a laudatio funebris for the Republican epoch. For a summary of 
the debates on this topic, see Cappello 2019: esp. 20-35.  
137 On Freud’s famous sequence, “Remembering, Repeating, Working Through,” see SE XII: 145-57. The 
comparison is particularly apt since the rapidity of the revisions and anxiety surrounding the 
compositional choices suggests compulsiveness in Cicero’s repetitive re-writings. Additionally, although 
the state of Ac. offers little evidence on the issue, it is hard to ignore the possibility of the spectral 
persistence of the earlier versions and older time-periods through which the work had passed.  
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representation of Antiochus’ interests: the standards of truth and ethical ends.138 At the same 
time, they differ in internal structure—or lack thereof—and its relation to the time of the setting. 
De Finibus is a tightly organized divisio, the dialectical trajectory of which is cast back into the 
past, drawing together the argumentative “ends” with the origins of life.139 On the other hand, the 
subsequent revisions of the Academica themselves progress like a sorites—that is, according to 
an additive logic and accretive temporality which concludes only by colliding with the limits of 
the present moment and recommencing under renewed doubts. Thus, if the temporal 
retrospection of de Finibus examines the construction of an entire life by recalling the 
relationship between origins and ends, then the process of constant revision—the inconclusive 
ends and false starts—that these “Academic” texts underwent for the better part of six months, 
and which compulsively retrace through the fictional time of the different revisions the last 15 
years of Cicero’s life, should be understood as a repetitive search for different ends altogether.  
 In short, the Academica, in their multiple, lost forms, reflect their content. The 
“following” and “pursuing” that makes up Cicero’s inquiry—his belated awareness of the 
tradition to which he lays claim and the inconclusive ends toward which he drives—are reflected 
in the progressive movement of his compositional practice. For Cicero, the return of doubt—like 
the return of the nagging soritical questioner—marks an aporetic confrontation with the limits of 
thought in the present moment. As indicated above,140 Cicero’s philosophy is concerned with 
limits, ends, and boundaries in their physical and metaphorical manifestations. While this interest 
 
138 See Luc. 29, etenim duo esse haec maxima in philosophia, iudicium veri et finem bonorum. 
139 See above, Ch. 1, section III-V.  
140 See Ch. 1, n.75. 
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is often evident in Cicero’s formal argumentation, the discussion of the sorites found in the 
Lucullus develops a conceptual relation between the finis and human knowledge itself:  
rerum natura nullam nobis dedit cognitionem finium, ut ulla in re statuere possimus 
quatenus. nec hoc in acervo tritici solum, unde nomen est, sed nulla omnino in re 
minutatim interrogati, dives pauper, clarus obscurus sit, multa pauca, magna parva, longa 
brevia, lata angusta, quanto aut addito aut dempto certum respondeamus non habemus.  
 
Nature didn’t give us any knowledge of limits to let us decide how far to go in any case. 
And this isn’t just true for a heap of wheat (the case [the sorites] took its name from): in 
any case at all when we are asked little by little when someone is, e.g., rich or poor, or 
famous or obscure, or things are many or few, big or small, long or short, or wide or 
narrow, we are unable to reply for certain how much needs to be added or taken away.141 
 
Cicero thus uses the sorites paradox to emphasize a fundamental undecidability about the 
concept of the limit itself: because “nature didn’t give us any knowledge of limits” (rerum 
natura nullam nobis dedit cognitionem finium), how can we ever know for certain when we pass 
a limit—of size, quantity, time etc.? If a limit marks an end or a boundary, when will we know 
that we have reached it, especially if we have never done so previously? How can we define 
what is on the other side of a limit without passing through it? 
 Cicero’s thought in the Lucullus and its subsequent revision thus connects a 
circumscribed philosophical problem—the sorites paradox—with the concerns of human 
experience and especially the sense of a forward movement of time.142 He is not interested in the 
human inability to know the finis as a purely logical dilemma, intended to undermine Stoic 
 
141 Luc. 92.  
142 The relevance of the sorites to human experience is also discussed, e.g., by Galen Περὶ τῆς ἰατρικῆς 
ἐμπειρίας 16.1 = Long and Sedley 1987: i.222-23 (37 E), “The doubt and confusion introduced by [the 
sorites] leads to contradiction of fact in the transition of man from one stage of his life to another, and in 
the changes of time, and the changes of seasons. For in the case of the boy one is uncertain and doubtful 
as to when the actual moment arrives for his transition from boyhood to adolescence, and in the case of 
the youth when he enters the period of manhood, also in the case of the man in his prime when he begins 
to be an old man.” 
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certainty—rather, his main concern arises when this limit of knowledge is confronted in the 
course of life. To look ahead to the Tusculan Disputations, the major work, discussed in the next 
chapter, that follows the Academica and de Finibus, Cicero explicitly structures his inquiries 
around a specific type of experience, exemplified in the text by death, pain, grief, and happiness. 
These “limit” experiences, although commonly shared by human beings, escape in some way the 
apprehension of knowledge around the question of the limit in time: at what moment will death 
arrive? Will pain end? When will grief be overcome? Can happiness be achieved? And, if so, 
sustained? These limit experiences become the focus of Ciceronian thought precisely because 
they escape knowledge in life.  
 In the Lucullus, therefore, philosophy offers a way to think about the unknowability of 
the finis. At the same time, however, the unknowability of the finis does not negate or undermine 
the thought itself. To consider, along with Cicero, “what follows” from the confrontation 
between thought and its own limit, we can find many moments in the history of philosophy that 
defer and extend this particular aporia. Cicero wrote at a transitional moment in the history of 
philosophy: within the Academy, skeptical critique had given way to a renewed interest in 
revitalizing older forms of philosophy via a multiplicity of new and resurgent approaches. In the 
process, the certainty of the Hellenistic Stoa had been coopted by its rapprochement with other 
schools, bringing the rigor of the Stoic system into contact with other, more pluralistic modes of 
thought. Philosophical unity was sought above all, yet, at the same time, there was a general 
geographic and linguistic proliferation and decentralization of philosophy. This trajectory, which 
from a skeptical perspective marks a “descent into dogmatism,” can also be usefully compared to 
a more recent juncture that has redefined contemporary philosophy following the anti-
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philosophical trajectory of the 20th century.143 The critical impulse that underlies many disparate 
forms of 20th century thought—the linguistic turn in both the analytic and continental 
philosophical traditions, structuralism, deconstruction, psychoanalysis144—mirrors the skeptical 
Academy’s dedication to a subversion of philosophical certainty and the maintenance of non-
dogmatic relativisms. Additionally, in both cases, these periods of anti-philosophical critique 
gave way to a moment of reckoning, in which the importance of a philosophy dedicated to truth, 
ethical good, and a humanistic subject, is reasserted.145 Cicero is thus a figure who exists on both 
sides of a boundary that has been crossed and re-crossed throughout the history of thought. On 
the one side, Cicero belongs to the tradition of skeptical or anti-philosophical critique, which 
seeks to undermine philosophical certainty and draws attention to the singularity of human 
experience. On the other side, Cicero participates in the reinvigoration and refinement of the 
central philosophical categories that have traversed this critique.  
 As an example of how to negotiate this philosophical boundary, it is useful to consider 
briefly Derrida’s engagement with Cicero.146 Derrida’s work on Aporias, for instance, which 
 
143 My use of the term “anti-philosophy” is here owed to Alain Badiou’s definition: any form of thought 
that seeks to oppose “the singularity of experience to the properly philosophical category of truth” (see 
Badiou 2018a: esp. 84). The examples that he considers in depth are Pascal, Rousseau, and Kierkegaard 
and, apropos of the 20th century, Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, and Lacan. Although I do not mean to imply 
that ancient Academic skepticism is equivalent to Badiou’s notion of anti-philosophy, the two categories 
share similar enough methods and goals to allow for further comparison.  
144 See Badiou 2007: 98-110 for a succinct analysis of the inter-related development of these forms of 
thought throughout the century.  
145 Or, in our case, is still struggling to be reasserted. On the contemporary reassertion of truth, see esp. 
Badiou 2018.  
146 Cicero features prominently in Derrida’s “late” works which were written from the late-1980s until his 
death in 2004. This period corresponds to the “transition” between 20th century critique and the 
contemporary resurrection of philosophy; the period of the “late” Academy spans a similar movement. 
Consequently, Cicero’s presence in Derrida’s works of this period help to solidify him as a transitional 
figure in the history of philosophy as well as mark Derrida himself as a similarly cross-border figure. For 
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begins with the ironically anti-philosophical assertion that it is “a concession to the times” to 
discuss “truth” using only quotations,147 incorporates within itself Cicero’s philosophy as a 
philosophy of finitude—of the condition of the limitations and boundedness of human thought, 
language, and life.148 The affinity is not simply cosmetic. As Derrida’s reading of Heidegger’s 
Holzweg demonstrates, the juxtaposition of the unthinkable finis with the thought of the finis, 
which also defines Cicero’s philosophy, drives the ratio of Derridean deconstruction. Derrida 
asks: “Does one pass through [an] aporia? Or is one immobilized before the threshold, to the 
point of having to turn around and seek out another way, the way without method or outlet of a 
Holzweg or a turning (Kehre) that could turn the aporia—all such possibilities of wandering?”149 
Derrida emphasizes the directionality and temporality of aporetic structures; if an aporetic limit, 
 
Derrida and Cicero see esp. Politics of Friendship (1997), on which see Leach 1993 and Miller 2015. On 
Derrida himself as a transitional figure, see Norris 2012 and Badiou 2016: 125-44.  
147 1993: 1, “‘Limits of truth,’ with the prudence of quotation marks, is of course a citation [of Diderot]. A 
concession to the times: today one would scarcely risk putting forth such a disquieting phrase without 
sheltering oneself behind some kind of paternity.” 
148 See, with reference to Cicero’s defense of his translation of telos with finis at de Fin. 3.26, Derrida 
1993: 6-16, who treats the slipperiness of the senses of finis in relation to the multiple Greek concepts that 
relate to the limit, end, boundary, or line of demarcation, e.g., τέλος / ἀτελής, ὅρος / ἀόριστον, πέρας / 
ἄπειρον. Cf. Cappello 2019: 188 and 196-7 on the similarities between Derridean and Ciceronian 
“philosophies of the limit.” 
149 1993: 33. Holzwege or “Off the Beaten Path” is the title of Heidegger’s first post-war book; cf. 
Heidegger 2002 ad loc., “‘Wood’ is an old name for forest. In the wood there are paths, mostly 
overgrown, that come to an abrupt stop where the wood is untrodden. They are called Holzwege. Each 
goes its separate way, though within the same forest. It often appears as if one is identical to another. But 
it only appears so. Woodcutters and forest keepers know these paths. They know what it means to be on a 
Holzweg.” See further, ix: “In entitling his work Holzwege, literally, ‘Timber Paths,’ Heidegger chose a 
term that carefully balances positive and negative implications. On the one hand, a Holzweg is a timber 
track that leads to a clearing in the forest where timber is cut. On the other, it is a track that used to lead to 
such a place but is now overgrown and leads nowhere. Hence, in a popular German idiom, to be ‘on a 
Holzweg’ is to be on the wrong track or in a cul-de-sac.” Derrida’s Kehre refers to the controversial “turn 
in Being” that many, including Heidegger himself, see marked in his thinking following Being and Time 
(see, e.g., Richardson 1963: 209-98). Derrida points to both these Heideggerian figures as more or less 
failed—even more than failed, treacherous—attempts to “get around” or “get out of” the fundamental 
aporetic structure that he sees subtending Being and Time.  
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such as death, cannot be passed through, the searcher “immobilized before the threshold,” 
reaches “the point” where he can only turn “back around” in a form of circular “wandering” of 
retrospective return, “without method or outlet.” As such, the experience of reaching a limit is 
always one of repetition of the past in the present—because “nature didn’t give us any 
knowledge of limits,” the searcher must turn and return again. According to the interpretation 
made evident by the comparison with Derrida, to “turn around and seek out another 
way…without method or outlet…” is as good a description of Cicero’s philosophical practice as 
can be formulated.150 It captures the wandering course of his inquiry, the belatedness of his 
relation to the tradition to which he lays claim, and his confrontation with the limits of thought in 
the present moment. Cicero’s commitment to doubt embraces “all such possibilities of 
wandering.” 
 Given the dedication of Cicero’s thought to the unknowability of the limit, the debates 
surrounding the nature of Cicero’s philosophical intent represent attempts to understand how it is 
possible that such a form of inquiry—i.e., one that is driven by doubt—can ever be said, as 
Cicero claims it does, to serve as the basis for a genuine philosophy of truth. The question 
remains: what is the purpose of all this wandering? For an anti-philosophical figure like Derrida, 
who can easily incorporate Cicero within his project, the wandering of doubt is the end in itself. 
Yet, as I argued above, this way of thinking about Cicero’s skepticism overlooks the evocatively 
introspective, liberatingly speculative, and constructive element at work in his texts.151 Read, 
 
150 Of course, this practice is not unique to Cicero. Cf., e.g., the organization of the debates on the 
immortality of the soul in Plato’s Phaedo around moments of uncertainty for the interlocutors and their 
expressions of a need to “return to the beginning”; see, e.g., 88d and 107a-b. On this organization of the 
Phaedo and Socrates’ method for managing the repetitious structure of such argumentation, see Blank 
1986.  
151 On the purpose of philosophical activity for Cicero, see further below, Ch. 4, section III.  
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instead, as part of a tradition of philosophical reinvigoration that can conjoin Cicero with, for 
instance, Hegel, the purpose of Cicero’s inquiry—the wandering turn and return to the limits of 
thought in the present—is to place the limitedness of human experience in a relation with the 
limitlessness of truth.  
V. Limitless Doubt 
 In this final section, I sketch a view, which I return to more fully in Chapter 4, of 
Cicero’s philosophy from the other side of the border. How does limitation give way to 
limitlessness in the philosophical pursuit that Cicero describes? Can truth ever be disclosed 
within human time or, better, can the activity of human life itself make truths manifest in time? 
As Cicero indicates in his preface to the Lucullus, his understanding of the Academic ratio is 
shaped by the pursuit of the approvable and the refusal to affirm the approvable as true; yet, at 
the same time, he is insistent that the purpose of this doubt-driven inquiry is to “draw out and in 
some way mold something that is true or at least approaches truth (eliciant et tamquam 
exprimant aliquid quod aut sit aut ad id quam proxime accedat). Cicero follows and pursues the 
probabile in order to inquire into and traverse the world through his commitment to doubt. This 
pursuit is by definition, not a matter of knowledge—that is, not defined by the classification of 
knowledge according to Stoic epistemology. Instead, this mode of situational approvability 
changes from moment to moment based on presently unforeseen circumstances; it is a deferral of 
uncertainty rather than the maintenance of relative certainty. I contend that it is precisely this 
deferral of uncertainty “from day to day” (in diem, Tusc. 5.33) that, in turn, creates space for 
“that which approaches truth” (ad verum quam proxime accedat) or, as it is sometimes rendered, 
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the veri simile.152 Rather than simply allowing an “approximation” of truth, Cicero’s “approach 
to truth” can be understood as a construction—the finite and limited receptacle in human 
experience that belies the unbound and unlimited truth of that experience. Understood in this 
way, the appearance of the veri simile is always based on the unfailing “zeal to inquiry” (studium 
exquirendi) of its “approving” subject—the continuous deferral of doubt that drives the inquiry.  
 Because of the evident relation between probabile and veri simile, which is especially 
exploited by Lucullus’ polemical attacks on probabilitas,153 it is clear that our own approach to 
an understanding of Ciceronian truth must pass, in some way, through the pursuit of 
approvability. If this approach, however, is going to avoid Lucullus’ objections that the 
probabile is a fallacious and deceitful evasion that disguises the need for a genuine criterion of 
truth as certainty,154 we cannot conceive of the probabile as a “step towards” truth. In other 
 
152 Cicero often uses variations on the turn of phrase veri simile in close correspondence with probabile 
(e.g., Ac. Lib. 2.9). This Ciceronian phrase is related conceptually to the Greek eikos, an apparent 
conflation in Cicero’s thought. See Glucker 1995 for an attempt to unravel the lexical difficulties. Cf. 
Altman 2016: e.g., 96, “I am claiming that the simillimum veri constitutes the surface of the Academica, 
over which an Academic ‘Cicero’ presides—just as a Stoic M. will do in the case of the Tusculan 
Disputations—and that it is his text’s deliberately constructed varietas that leads the reader to search 
more deeply for Cicero’s own view.” In Altman’s reading, the veri simile constitutes an outward 
presentation of a hidden truth. Yet, since we, as interpreters of Cicero’s text, have no way of adjudicating 
Altman’s claims for a hidden esoteric truth, this means, ironically for Altman’s project, that we are put in 
the position of the wandering skeptic, not the masterful Platonist having returned from the cave. See 
below, n.152. 
153 See esp. for Lucullus’ polemical interpretation of the relationship, 32, 33, 47, 49, 59; for Cicero’s 
response, 66, 99; cf. 127-28. Note that, in this text at least, the explicit connection is made much more 
frequently in the Antiochean attacks on probabilitas than in Cicero’s exposition. For this reason, I aim my 
reading in this section more toward understanding how the probabile might be dedicated to pursuing a 
limitless, ungraspable truth by engaging with the terms of Cicero’s own presentation. I am less interested 
in the specific term veri simile, which, in fact, does not feature significantly in Cicero’s defense, except in 
response to Lucullus’ attacks.  
154 See esp., 59, “But the most absurd thing is that you say that you can easily pursue approvables if you 
aren’t hindered by anything. In the first place, how can you not be hindered when (you insist) the false is 
no different from the true? In the next place, what mode of judgement can you exercise when there is a 
single common criterion for truth and falsehood?” (Illud vero perabsurdum quod dicitis probabilia vos 
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words, the probabile cannot be conceived of as an indication of the “likelihood” that an 
impression is true rather than false, thus presupposing a knowledge of that truth which, for the 
skeptic, is entirely impossible. It is important to keep in mind, in this regard, that the most 
extensive positive discussions of probabilitas in the Lucullus are found during Cicero’s rebuttal 
of the charge of apraxia. Cicero begins this rebuttal as he ends it, with a quotation from 
Clitomachus’ On Suspending Judgment.155 In this case, Clitomachus refers to Carneades’ 
division of impressions into two categories: apprehensible (or not) and approvable (or not). 
Cicero goes on to quote,  
quare ita placere, tale visum nullum esse ut perceptio consequeretur, ut autem probatio, 
multa. Etenim contra naturam est probabile nihil esse, et sequitur omnis vitae ea quam tu, 
Luculle, commemorabas eversio; itaque et sensibus probanda multa sunt, teneatur modo 
illud, non inesse in iis quicquam tale quale non etiam falsum nihil ab eo differens esse 
possit. Sic quidquid acciderit specie probabile, si nihil se offeret quod sit probabilitati illi 
contrarium, utetur eo sapiens, ac sic omnis ratio vitae gubernabitur. 
‘So [Carneades’] view, Clitomachus says, ‘is that while there is no impression such that 
apprehension is achieved from it, there are many impressions such that approval is 
achieved from them.’ For, I might add, it would be contrary to nature for nothing to be 
approvable—and the result would be the complete overturning of life that you remarked 
on, Lucullus. So many things deserve approval by means of the senses, too, provided 
only that one remembers that none of them is such that there couldn’t be a false 
impression not differing from it at all. Thus the sage will use whatever happens to be 
approvable by appearance, if nothing contrary to its approvability presents itself; and the 
whole manner of his life will be governed in this way.156 
 
On the one hand, Cicero’s translation and citation of this passage at this point in his speech 
serves as a relatively straightforward counterargument to Lucullus’ charge of apraxia—that a 
 
sequi si nulla re impediamini. Primum qui potestis non impediri cum a veris falsa non distent? deinde 
quod iudicium est veri cum sit commune falsi?).  
155 See above section III. 
156 Luc. 99. 
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skeptical outlook will lead to a “complete overturning of life” (omnis vitae…eversio).157 Cicero 
points to Carneades’ pithanon as a satisfactory mode of decision making and a sufficient rational 
justification for action: although there may be no impressions that strike the skeptical sage as 
“apprehensible,” he finds an abundance that are “approvable by appearance” (specie probabile) 
with which he can readily govern “his whole manner of life” (sic omnis ratio vitae 
gubernabitur).158  
 On the other hand, if critical weight is given to the specific choices that Cicero makes in 
his translation, and the connections that these choices create within his thought, a more locally 
situated reading presents itself, which can, perhaps, illuminate a different kind of relation 
between approvability and truth. Cicero configures the pursuit of approvability as the thread that 
runs through the “whole manner of life” (omnis ratio vitae), connecting it with the “complete 
overturning of life” (omnis vitae…eversio). Pursuit of probabilitas trails off toward a limit—the 
vanishing point at which it is “contrary to nature for nothing to be approvable” (contra naturam 
est probabile nihil esse). This statement can be read against the grain to understand that there is a 
“nothing” or “negation” (nihil) that, contrary to nature, subtends the positive expressions of a life 
shaped by the probabile. This nihil forms a constitutive exception to the impressions, ideas, and 
beliefs that make up a subject’s interaction with the world. If “nature” is generally understood as 
 
157 This striking formulation is itself a kind of translation: cf. ζῆν ἀναιροῦσιν, Plu. Col. 1108d, cf. 1119c-
d; D.L. IX.104, Πάλιν οἱ δογματικοί φασιν καὶ τὸν βίον αὐτοὺς ἀναιρεῖν, ἐν ᾧ πάντ᾿ ἐκβάλλουσιν ἐξ ὧν ὁ 
βίος συνέστηκεν. οἱ δὲ ψεύδεσθαί φασιν αὐτούς· οὐ γὰρ τὸ ὁρᾶν ἀναιρεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὸ πῶς ὁρᾶν ἀγνοεῖν. But 
Cicero seems also to be playing with the phrase’s Platonic iteration as well; see de Fin. 5.28, de Rep. 
6.14; and Pl. Phd. 118a7-8. Cf. Altman 2016: 107. 
158 He goes on to point out, somewhat disingenuously, that even the Stoic sage makes use of persuasive 
impressions in the course of his daily life (although he will never assent to them as doxa): Etenim is 
quoque qui a vobis sapiens inducitur multa sequitur probabilia, non comprehensa neque percepta neque 
adsensa sed similia veri, 99. 
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the situation in which a life unfolds, approvability begins and ends with the negation of that 
situation—the nihil that brings about a “complete overturning of life.” The point of apraxia, as 
posited by the Stoics, can serve, for Cicero, as an exceptional limit—marking the point at which 
the finitude of life passes into its negation.159  
 This generative negation can be understood, furthermore, as forming an inflection point 
in the relationship between human experience and truth. A life lived by means of probabilitas 
intentionally preserves the opposition between the finitude of human experience and the potential 
limitlessness of truth by denying the certainty of impressions and constantly reminding the 
subject of the uncertainty within which he lives. This opposition, as argued above, is central to 
Cicero’s commitment to doubt. Because the human senses and reason will always be insufficient 
for the comprehension of truth, that truth stands in an unlimited relation to the limitations of 
human experience. Yet the generative negation at the heart of the pursuit of the approvable raises 
the possibility that this disjunctive relationship between the limitation and limitlessness can, in 
some sense, be developed and transformed over time. As in the figure of the “mole desiring the 
light” or like a sorites that always lacks a definite limit, a life governed by the probabile can be 
structured and oriented in relation to a truth that is ungraspable and illimitable. Under 
 
159 This interpretation of the generative nullity at the heart of life can perhaps help to unravel one of the 
most contested loci in the Lucullus: 74, where Cicero claims that he “seems to have actually lived with 
[Socrates and Plato]—so many conversations have been recorded, from which it can’t be doubted that 
Socrates thought that nothing could be known. He made just one exception, that he knew that he knew 
nothing, and nothing more” (vixisse cum iis equidem videor; ita multi sermones perscripti sunt e quibus 
dubitari non possit quin Socrati nihil sit visum sciri posse; excepit unum tantum, scire se nihil se scire, 
nihil amplius). On this passage, see Burnyeat 1997: 280-90; Glucker 1997: 69, Cooper 2004, Altman 
2016: 92-96. Rather than seeing this passage, and in particular the remarkable phrase scire se nihil se 
scire as evidence of Cicero’s self-contradictory skepticism or his exoteric performance of skepticism that 
masks a form of dogmatic “Platonism,” I suggest that a closer attention to the qualities that Cicero’s 
philosophy attributes to negation—the generative force attributed to the nihil that negates life’s 
limitedness—offers up a reading of this passage that presents Socrates, in true New Academic fashion, as 
a precursor to Cicero’s approach to the construction of truth in the time of life.  
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probabilitas, the cohesion and validity of the decisions and actions that shape a life are always 
traceable to their generative negation. These judgements thus always serve as a reminder that the 
finitude of human life is surrounded and produced by an unknowable limitlessness. The 
limitlessness of truth exists in the boundedness of human life through the generative nullity that 
threatens always to overturn it; yet this limit does not exhaust the existence of this truth outside 
the boundaries of human finitude.  
  As an example of the orientation of life in relation to the limitlessness of truth, Cicero 
offers another stock example from the debates between the Academics and Stoics that focuses on 
the limitations of human sight. Cicero assures his interlocutor that the Academic sage “will see 
the sky, earth, and sea with the same eyes as your sage” (iisdem enim hic sapiens de quo loquor 
oculis quibus iste vester caelum, terram, mare intuebitur, 105). With this claim, Cicero 
undermines the Stoic argument for the “perspicuity” of impressions for the sage. Instead, he 
offers a brief narrative that illustrates the appearance of truth for the skeptic who pursues the 
probabile:  
mare illud quod nunc favonio nascente purpureum videtur, idem huic nostro videbitur, 
nec tamen adsentietur, quia nobismet ipsis modo caeruleum videbatur, mane ravum, 
quodque nunc qua a sole conlucet albescit et vibrant dissimileque est proximo et 
continenti, ut etiamsi possis rationem reddere cur id eveniat tamen non possis id verum 
esse quod videbatur oculis defendere. 
 
This stretch of sea, which now looks dark as the west wind rises, will look the same to 
our sage. Yet he won’t assent, because it looked green to us just a moment ago, and it 
will look gray in the morning, and the patch that is glinting and gleaming where it is 
glittering in the sun is unlike the patch right next to it. So even if you could give an 
explanation as to why this happens, you still couldn’t defend the claim that the particular 
visual impression you had is true.  
 
Although this example can be read as another relatively straightforward argument against Stoic 
katalēpsis and in favor of epochē, its placement in the larger argument following the excursus on 
approvability and apraxia lends it an additional element. This narrative illustrates that what is at 
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stake in a life lead by probabilitas is the importance of time for truth and of truth for a lifetime. 
The truth that the skeptical sage inquires into here is simply the “true” color of the sea. For 
Cicero, if this truth has any appearance—and there is no guarantee that it does—it is accessible 
not in any particularly perspicuous impression (quod videbatur oculis), but in the dialectical 
juxtaposition of the subsequently continuous and contrastive impressions as they appear at 
different moments in time: “dark as the west wind rises” (favonio nascente purpureum), “green 
just a moment ago” (modo caeruleum), “gray in the morning” (mane ravum), and gleaming at the 
points where the sun strikes it so that it is, at the same instant, dissimilar to itself even where it is 
touching and contiguous (dissimileque est proximo et continenti). The truth of the color of the 
ocean, therefore, is disclosed indirectly to the sage through the mediation of these sequential and 
incongruous impressions. It is unified only in the discernment of the faithful observer and, 
specifically, in his “approving” acceptance and adoption of this sequence of impressions as 
joined by an enduring substratum or, perhaps, a Platonic “receptacle” through which they appear 
and from which they cannot be isolated in any part without losing their relation to truth.160 The 
 
160 Cf. Timaeus’ “receptacle” discussed at Tim. 48e-52a; see, e.g., Zeyl and Sattler 2019, “The receptacle 
is posited as the solution to a problem: none of the observable particulars persists as this or that (for 
example as fire or water) over time. We observe the very thing that is fire at one time becoming air, and 
subsequently becoming water, etc., ‘transmitting their becoming to one another in a cycle, so it seems’ 
(49c6–7). Thus the thing that appears as fire here and now is not fire in its own right: its fieriness is only a 
temporary characterization of it. What, then, is that thing in its own right? In a difficult and controversial 
passage Timaeus proposes a solution: In its own right it is (part of) a totally characterless subject that 
temporarily in its various parts gets characterized in various ways. This is the receptacle—an enduring 
substratum, neutral in itself but temporarily taking on the various characterizations. The observed 
particulars just are parts of that receptacle so characterized (51b4–6).” On the Cicero’s understanding of 
the receptacle, see Varro’s discussion of matter at Ac. Lib. 1.27, which seems to conjoin the Aristotelian 
theory of the continuum with the Platonic concept, “they [i.e., the Greek philosophers generally] say that 
a sort of matter underlies all the elements which is without any form and devoid of all ‘quality’…out of 
which all the elements are modeled and formed, which alone can receive all the elements and be altered in 
every way and over its whole extent and even pass away, not into nothing, but into its parts, which can be 
cut up and divided, since there is no minimum whatever in the nature of things that cannot be divided” 
(sed subiectam putant omnibus sine ulla specie atque carentem omni illa qualitate…materiam quandam, 
e qua omnia expressa atque efficta sint, quae una omnia accipere possit omnibusque modis mutari atque 
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ratio at work, therefore, allows the sage to approach the limitlessness of truth—like the lack of 
definite boundaries in the sorites—immanent within life even as life itself progresses in the 
bounded and limited sequence of human time. 
 Considering the, admittedly speculative, potential for reading Cicero’s method in this 
way, which privileges his dedication to truth, I conclude this chapter by offering another 
genealogical gesture. Rather than incorporating Cicero as a footnote to a skeptical or anti-
philosophical tradition, it is also possible to trace a lineage through those thinkers whose 
philosophies seek to reinvigorate the concept of truth—here, I consider a brief passage from 
Hegel. In the first chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel offers a defense of sense-
certainty which relies not on a notion of immediate perspicuity or indivisible unity, but is 
attained through the movement of dialectic:  
The Here pointed out, which I keep hold of, is likewise a this Here which, in fact, is not 
this Here, but a Before and Behind, an Above and Below, a Right and Left. The Above 
is itself likewise this manifold otherness—above, below, etc. The Here, which was to be 
pointed out, disappears in other Heres, and these disappear similarly. What is pointed 
out, held fast, and is permanent is a negative This (das Aufgezeigte, Festgehaltene und 
Bleibende ist ein negatives Dieses), which only is so when the Heres are taken as they 
should be, but therein cancel/sublate/supersede themselves (aber darin sich aufheben); it 
is a simple complex of many Heres. The Here that is “meant” would be the point. But it 
“is” not: rather, when it is pointed out as being, as having existence, that very act of 
pointing out proves to be not immediate knowledge, but a process, a movement from the 
Here “meant” through a plurality of Heres to the universal Here, which is a simple 
plurality of Heres, just as day is a simple plurality of Nows.161 
 
This passage clearly echoes the example that Cicero cites on the color of the sea. In both cases, 
the philosophers are concerned with the dialectical relationship between the limited and bounded 
 
ex omni parte, atque etiam interire, non in nihilum sed in suas partes, quae infinite secari ac dividi 
possint, cum sit nihil omnino in rerum natura minimum quod dividi nequeat). On the relation of this 
passage to the Platonic iteration, see Miller 2003: 116-17.  
161 §108, trans. adapted from Miller 1977.  
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nature of human experience on the one hand and the possibility of the existence of categorical 
and unbounded universals on the other. Of course, Cicero does not take the extra step as Hegel 
does to identify “sense-certainty” as “nothing else than simply this history” of dialectical 
movement (§109). Nevertheless, insofar as Cicero’s pursuit of probabilitas offers a method by 
which the finitude of life attains a constructive relation to the limitlessness of truth, it finds its 
genealogical consummation in Hegel’s formulation of sense-certainty. Reading back from Hegel, 
we can see especially the importance of negation in Cicero’s description of a life lived in 
accordance with the probabile. Just as in Cicero it is contra naturam for nihil to be approvable—
that is, the traversal of the bounded structures of life depends upon the limit at which those 
structures pass over into limitlessness—for Hegel the existence of “what is pointed out, held fast, 
and is permanent” owes the truth of its existence to “a negative This” (ein negatives Dieses) in 
relation to which the This that is pointed out is “canceled out/sublated” (sich aufheben). In this 
untranslatable Hegelian word (aufheben), we find the idea, evident mutatis mutandis in my 
reading above, that the boundaries of finitude in human experience serve as a generative 
negation, around which incongruous and temporally distinct impressions are cancelled out and 
sublated into a truth without limit or boundary.  
 In these passages from the Lucullus and the Phenomenology, both Cicero and Hegel are 
concerned with defending a phenomenological access to truth, based on the multiplicity and 
dialectic movement of human experience, yet which can serve as the basis for a metaphysics of 
the limitlessness of truth. While Hegel, certainly, comes closer to completing the defense, it is 
important to note that for both of these thinkers what is “true” can never be understood as 
univocal or static, but must involve a dedication to extending and playing out the relationship 
between human experience and those aspects of being that lie always just beyond the limitations 
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of that experience. In this philosophical lineage connecting Cicero and Hegel, we can recognize a 
potential for the finitude of human experience to approach the limitlessness of truth—a truth, 
worthy of Dante’s formulation, from which doubt can be born “like a new growth.” 
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Chapter 3. The Discernment of Grief. 
 
There are moods in which we court suffering, in the hope that here at least we shall find 
reality, sharp peaks and edges of truth. But it turns out to be scene-painting and 
counterfeit. The only thing grief has taught me is to know how shallow it is. That, like all 
the rest, plays about the surface, and never introduces me into the reality, for contact 
with which we would even pay the costly price of sons and lovers…Grief too will make 
us idealists.  
 
Ralph Waldo Emerson, “Experience” (169) 
 
When in his heightened self-criticism [the melancholic] describes himself as petty, 
egoistic, dishonest, lacking in independence, one whose sole aim has been to hide the 
weaknesses of his own nature, it may be, so far as we know, that he has come pretty near 
to understanding himself; we only wonder why a man has to be ill before he can be 
accessible to a truth of this kind.  
 
Sigmund Freud, “Mourning and Melancholia” (SE XIV.246) 
 
I. Enough Grief? 
 In the first book of the Tusculan Disputations, the main speaker who, by convention, is 
referred to as “M.” argues against the initial statement of his interlocutor, “A.,”1 that “death 
seems to me to be an evil” (malum mihi videtur esse mors, 1.9).2 In response to A.’s assertion, 
 
1 According to Pohlenz 1911, the letters M. and A. enter the mss. tradition through the 6th century 
Byzantine convention of marking the interlocutors in catechistic texts with the Greek letters Μ and Δ (for 
the Latin magister and discipulus): “Aus Δ kann A auf rein mechanischem Wege entstanden sein” (629). 
The use of this practice to clarify the received text gives the weight of a long hermeneutic tradition to 
Gildenhard’s didactic reading (2007). Without the benefit of a more recent critical work on the mss., it is 
difficult to evaluate Pohlenz’s final claim, “Jedenfalls hat Cicero selbst in diesem Gespräch, in dem er 
bewußt von einer individuellen Charakterzeichnung absieht, den Personenwechsel nicht durch 
Buchstaben, sondern wahrscheinlich nur durch Freilassung von Raum bezeichnet.” Cf. Giusta 1984: 
praef. for a more recent but inconclusive reappraisal.  
 
2 The narrator of the preface indicates that during the conversations of which these dialogues purport to be 
a record, the interlocutors followed “the old Socratic method of arguing against the belief of the other” 
(vetus et Socratica ratio contra alterius opinionem disserendi, 1.8). On the opening “Socratic” dialectical 
argument of book 1, see Gorman 2005: 64-84; Warren 2013. For the various genre tags that are found in 
the prologues of Tusc., see Gildenhard 2007: 7-21.  
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M. contends that, according to the philosophical tradition on death,3 there are two likely 
explanations of the postmortem condition: either the soul survives the death of the body because 
of its immaterial and immortal nature or death simply means the end of all sensation and life. 
Although M. stresses that we have no way of knowing which option will be true prior to each 
individual’s experience, he assures A. that in either case death—both the state of being dead and 
the moment of dying—cannot be considered an evil.4 
 M. loudly performs, for the benefit of the impressionable A.,5 his preference for the 
“ideal”6 option—that the soul survives the body. Yet, notably, he closes his speech in favor of 
the soul’s immortality with a sentiment that veers suddenly from the aspirational tenor of the 
preceding argument: “When we will have arrived there [in the afterlife], then, finally, we shall 
live, for this life is truly death, and I would lament it, if it were allowed me” (quo cum 
venerimus, tum denique vivemus; nam haec quidem vita mors est, quam lamentari possem, si 
 
3 Especially, in this case, Plato’s Phaedo. On the extensive intertextual relationship between Phd. and 
Tusc. 1, see Gould 1968: 125-43 and Stull 2012. It should be noted, however, that because Stull only 
examines the interplay between these two texts, he overstates Cicero’s reliance on Plato and the Phd.; see 
e.g., 2012: 49-50 where he implies that Tusc. 1 is an unproblematic acknowledgment of “the truth of 
Plato’s position on immortality.”  
4 On the structure of this argument, which Schofield 2012 refers to as “neutralizing,” see below, n.57.  
5 M. frequently remarks on A.’s rather naive enthusiasm for the immortality of the soul, e.g., 82, “I see 
that you gaze upward and want to pilgrimage into heaven. I hope that it will happen this way for us” 
(video te alte spectare et velle in caelum migrare. Spero fore ut contingat id nobis). Cf. also M.’s 
comments that precede a “neutralizing” argument portion of his speech, 30-31. 
6 The “ideal” arguments in Tusc. are not ideal in a strictly metaphysical sense, since the Platonism and 
Stoicism from which Cicero tends to draw his arguments find various material explanations to support 
their conclusions. My use of the terms “ideal” and “material” to refer to the contrasting positions 
presented by M. in each of the books is suggested by Görler’s rather imprecise characterization of the 
transition from “‘weiterreichenden’ zum ‘bescheideneren’ Niveau” (1996: 234) in the argumentation as 
well as the comparison to Emerson’s turn to “idealism” through a thwarted desire to find “reality” in 
grief.  
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liberet, 75).7 M. thus concludes his ideal argument, not with the “victory” of death, but with the 
“harshness” of life8—that is, the consummation of life in death comes at the expense of life; the 
nature of our embodied life transforms living into a being-unto-death which, although fortifying 
with respect to the afterlife, is accompanied by grief and lamentation for those trapped in life.  
 Indeed, A. responds to M.’s expression that he could go on “lamenting” or expressing his 
grief, “if it were allowed me” (lamentari possem, si liberet), with his own admission of a 
weariness for life: “You have lamented enough in your Consolation, which, when I read it, I 
want nothing more than to leave this life, and after I’ve heard these things just now, I want it all 
the more” (satis tu quidem in Consolatione es lamentatus, quam cum lego, nihil malo quam has 
res relinquere: his vero modo auditis, multo magis, 76). This exchange between M. and A., and 
the reference to Cicero’s Consolatio, a text that he wrote in the weeks immediately following the 
death of his daughter, marks a turning point in the argument.9 After having passed through the 
 
7 This, and A.’s responsive usage (below), is the only instance of the verb lamentari in book 1. But, cf. 
1.30, “It is true that no one grieves for his own discomfort; perhaps people may feel sorrow and anguish, 
but that mournful lamenting and tearful grieving comes from the belief that the one whom we loved has 
been deprived of life and we believe that they are sensible of it (nemo enim maeret suo incommodo: 
dolent fortasse et anguntur, sed illa lugubris lamentatio fletusque maerens ex eo est, quod eum, quem 
dileximus, vitae commodis privatum arbitramur idque sentire). Thus, in this instance, I would argue that 
lamentari refers specifically to a type of mourning or expression of grief, which would be suitable to A.’s 
further reference to the Consolatio below.  
8 Cf. Marx’s aphorism on human mortality, “Death seems to be a harsh victory of the species over the 
definite individual and to contradict their unity” (1988: 106; emphasis orig.).  
9 For a thorough consideration of the lost Consolatio ad se, which is discussed by Cicero in the letters of 
the period and in the Tusculans, see the treatments of Kumaniecki 1968 and Baltussen 2013. As I discuss 
below, however, Baltussen relies on an understanding of the “stages” of Cicero’s grief that I aim to 
problematize. See, e.g., 2013: 69, “The Consolatio, I suggest, marks a halfway house between unresolved 
and resolved grief. This point about grief stages in the Ciceronian sources becomes important, if we want 
to reach a more realistic interpretation of his bereavement process. Asking about the nature and evolution 
of Cicero’s grief therefore requires analyzing its progression and how this unfolded in his writings” 
(emphasis orig.). While I share Baltussen’s interest in analyzing Cicero’s grief, which certainly changes 
over time, I question the assumption, which is imported from the prescriptive approaches to grief that are 
the objects, not the outcome, of his philosophical inquiry that we should be looking for a movement from 
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edifying argument in favor of the divinity and immortality of the soul, M. and A. end with a 
shared expression of exhaustion in life and a wish for death.10 From this death-wish, the debate 
returns to its starting point to consider an equally strong case for a human being based on 
negation in death. As I discuss in section III, this “material” argument is neither simply a 
counterpoint to the initial “ideal” position nor offered as a foil for the preferred line of reasoning. 
Rather, it is precisely in the dissociation, tension, and underlying undecidability between the two 
options that the true thrust of Cicero’s thought lies.  
 The dynamic pivot which simultaneously conjoins and separates these two positions can 
thus be framed by the question of how much of an “expression of grief” or “lamentation” 
(lamentari) is enough. Has Cicero grieved “enough” or “satisfactorily” (satis) in the Consolatio, 
as the speaker M. now claims he has? What is or was the object of these expressions of grief? 
Could there ever be enough grief? If not, what are the consequences of a surfeit of lamentation? 
In this chapter, I argue that in the Tusculans Cicero incorporates grief at the death of his daughter 
into his philosophy as a tool for thinking about the unthinkable—for engaging closer with the 
thought that “nature didn’t give us any knowledge of limits,” which I examined above in the 
Lucullus.11 In particular, as I consider in section III, his grief enables a confrontation with the 
unknowability of death and the consequences for human life that arise from this aporia. Yet 
Cicero’s use of Tullia in this way entails something important about his own experience of grief: 
 
“unresolved” to “resolved” in Cicero’s experience. In other words, this narrative, while well attested in 
the theoretical aspects of Cicero’s writings, should not necessarily be taken to be reflective of his personal 
experience of and philosophical engagement with grief. See further below, section II.  
10 On the relationship between A.’s wish for death and the text’s relationship to the Phaedo, see below, 
section III.  
11 See above, Ch. 2, section IV.  
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the transformation of his daughter’s death into a philosophical instrument means that he does not 
and cannot process this loss as a loss, at least textually.12 As I discuss below in section II, it is 
notable that Tullia’s name never appears in Cicero’s writings after her death, either in the 
copious letters that describe his experience of grief or in the philosophical works in which he 
treats grief theoretically.13 This explicit erasure of Tullia as the named object of “lamentation” is 
precisely what allows her to become a tool for thinking about what remains outside of 
thinkability. Cicero’s careful excision of Tullia from his writing means that there is an avenue 
within his textual creations for thought that is outside of language or knowledge. Yet, with 
regard to his own grief, does this absence mean that he has mourned “enough”—or not at all? 
 Cicero’s philosophical exercise of grief thus falls somewhere between Freud’s and 
Emerson’s notions of a “failure” in mourning. Writing from an explicitly therapeutic perspective, 
Freud envisions a split between mourning and melancholia: the former being a normative 
process of dealing with and working through grief, while the latter refers to a pathological state 
warped by an individual’s inability to accept and articulate a loss as loss. Freud notes with 
clinical interest how the melancholic develops self-obsessive tendencies, constantly worrying 
away at the wound that cannot be acknowledged as a wound and allowing it to reorient his entire 
experience of the world and perception of himself: “he describes himself as petty, egoistic, 
dishonest, lacking in independence, one whose sole aim has been to hide the weaknesses of his 
 
12 It is important to reiterate that my claims about Cicero’s grief should only extend so far into a 
biographical reading. I am more interested in Cicero’s explicit textualizations of his grief in the letters, 
Consolatio, and Tusculans. The melancholic absence of Tullia as a specific object of loss and mourning is 
most evidently a textual absence, which should not necessarily be taken as a faithful “transcript” of 
Cicero’s experience, but rather its reflection. 
13 This is in strong contrast to the frequency with which she had been named and written about in his 
letters previously; for a thorough biographical consideration of Cicero’s relationship to his daughter 
especially with reference to her role in his correspondence, see Treggiari 2007.  
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own nature.” Writing as a therapist, however, Freud—at least the Freud of “Mourning and 
Melancholia”14—is interested primarily in melancholia as the failure of a normative process. 
Rather than pursuing this experience of failed mourning as a source of a different kind of 
emotional “work,” he wonders, with more than a hint of exasperated sarcasm, while “it may be, 
so far as we know, that [the melancholic] has come pretty near to understanding himself…why a 
man has to be ill before he can be accessible to a truth of this kind.” Freud leaves in abeyance, 
and for others, an examination of the kind of self-knowledge or contact with reality that might be 
accessible to the melancholic.   
 In Emerson’s essay on “Experience,” by contrast, we find an example of what a 
philosophical exercise of grief as a product of “failed” mourning might look like. Although, like 
Cicero, Emerson never explicitly names his recently deceased son, the imprint of this loss 
defines the “elegiac” approach to experience that the essay represents.15 Rather than mourning 
the loss of Waldo as a particular loss, Emerson writes that he “grieve[s] that grief can teach [him] 
nothing, nor carry [him] one step into real nature.” For Emerson, “we court suffering, in the hope 
that here at least we shall find reality, sharp peaks and edges of truth” only to find ultimately that 
“grief too will make us idealists.” As Sharon Cameron argues, it is through this dissociation 
 
14 On the post-Freudian applications of this division, which has been thoroughly re-wrought by later 
psychoanalysts and thinkers, see, e.g., from a clinical perspective esp. Abraham and Torok 1994, who 
recuperate some of the “melancholic” processes that Freud describes; for a literary approach which 
helpfully contextualizes the advancements in the psychotherapy of melancholia, see Rickels 2011. On the 
application of melancholia to the formation of gendered and political subjectivities, see esp. Butler 1995 
and Traverso 2016.  
15 In the essay itself, Waldo is referred to only once as “my son”: “In the death of my son, now more than 
two years ago, I seem to have lost a beautiful estate—no more. I cannot get it nearer to me. If tomorrow I 
should be informed of the bankruptcy of my principal debtors, the loss of my property would be a great 
inconvenience to me, perhaps, for many years; but it would leave me as it found me,—neither better nor 
worse. So is it with this calamity; it does not touch me…” (169). For Emerson’s very different responses 
to Waldo’s death in his journals and letters, which offers a further interesting avenue for comparison with 
Cicero, see Cameron 2007: 64-5.  
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between a desire for truth and a retreat into idealism, between the profundity and the shallowness 
of grief, that Emerson’s essay transforms his “failed” work of mourning into a philosophically 
realized expression of that inexpressible experience: “dissociation in ‘Experience’…always 
seems resorted to so as to sustain at a remove what cannot be sustained in immediacy.”16 
Emerson puts his grief to work in order to hold open access to what is unthinkable and 
ungraspable in the experience of loss.  
 Like Freud’s melancholic, Cicero articulates his experience of grief, especially in the 
letters, as a form of self-abnegation and obsession over generalized loss. This form of 
articulation can be understood as symptom of his inability to acknowledge the death of Tullia as 
a specific loss, tied to this unique lost object. Additionally, like Freud, Cicero had a strong sense 
of a normative mourning process—derived both from Roman culture and Greek philosophy—
against which he compared his own experience and to which his expressions of grief were 
compared by others.17 I argue in this chapter, however, that we should understand the Tusculans 
and their manifestation of grief more like Emerson’s elegiac essay than either the realization of a 
normative healing process or, conversely, its simple failure. Like Emerson’s text, the Tusculans 
are produced by and produce a dissociation between the materiality of experience and a retreat 
into idealism when the reality of that experience cannot be grasped in full. Similarly, the 
dissociation between these mutually exclusive manifestations of the experience of grief preserves 
for Cicero the efficacy or, in Emerson’s terms, the “Power,” of that experience to serve as a 
 
16 Cameron 2007: 77. 
17 In my project I am more concerned with the normativity imposed by philosophy; for the relation to 
traditional Roman forms of mourning, see Wilcox 2005 and Treggiari 2007: esp. 143-54; for a general 
consideration of Roman practice, see Hope and Huskinson 2011.  
 180 
philosophically generative tool.18 Thus while we may not be able to think about the Tusculans as 
a part of a “working through” of grief in a normative and personal way, this philosophical work, 
like Emerson’s essay, is a “work.” I propose that what Cicero’s work with grief accomplishes is 
to create an approach to the unthinkability of death in experience through time and “will” 
(voluntas).  
 In the sections that follow I move from examining, in section II, how Cicero’s grief for 
Tullia is represented in the letters and biographical tradition, arguing that we can identify his 
experience as “melancholic,” or at least as a failure to treat her loss as a particular loss. In 
Section III, I trace the influence of this melancholic grief on the arguments of the first book of 
the Tusculans. I contend, in particular, that Tullia’s death and the Consolatio, which serves as 
her textual cipher, functions as the force of dissociation between the ideal and material 
conceptions of humanity’s relation to death. As a structuring absence in the text, the loss of 
Tullia thus preserves the obliquity that is reflective of Cicero’s experience of grief. Transitioning 
in section IV to consider the application of this dissociation to the experience itself, I examine 
how Cicero’s presentation of Hellenistic philosophical therapies foregrounds the loss of a 
subjective sense of time and a confrontation with the chronology of nature that accompanies 
proximity to death. This temporal disturbance opens up in experience an approach to the 
unthinkability of death and the human relation to time that the first book treats philosophically. 
In the final section, drawing in particular on Chrysippus’ therapeutic emphasis on the 
voluntariness of grief and feelings of obligation to mourn, I contend that Cicero locates this 
approach in the “will” (voluntas), or as I propose an alternate localized translation, a form of 
 
18 See Cameron 2007: 77, “Power is not so much a consequence of obliquity per se, then, as it is a 
consequence of the driving force that marginalizes objections to primary claims without ever 
emasculating those claims…” 
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“discernment.” This voluntas is not a subjective will to recover or forget grief, but an adoption of 
a general “human” will that allows the mourner to live in grief as a manifestation of the 
divergent temporalities that define his existence.  
II. A Philosophy of Grief 
 
 In Plutarch’s biography of Cicero, he describes the death of Tullia in a peculiarly round-
about fashion. After briefly summarizing the events of Cicero’s failed first marriage to Terentia, 
Plutarch introduces a new unnamed bride, whom Cicero chose either, as Terentia publicly 
maintained, “because of his desire for her youthful beauty” (ἔρωτι τῆς ὥρης), or as Tiro relates, 
in his lost biography,19 because of his need for her money, of which she had plenty, to repay his 
debts, of which he had a mountain (ὡς δὲ Τίρων ὁ τοῦ Κικέρωνος ἀπελεύθερος γέγραφεν, 
εὐπορίας ἕνεκα πρὸς διάλυσιν δανείων, 41.4). In the context of this new, strategic matrimonial 
partnership, Plutarch informs us of Tullia’s death: 
γήμαντι δ᾽ αὐτῷ μετ᾽ οὐ πολὺν χρόνον ἡ θυγάτηρ ἀπέθανε τίκτουσα παρὰ Λέντλῳ· 
τούτῳ γὰρ ἐγαμήθη μετὰ τὴν Πείσωνος τοῦ προτέρου ἀνδρὸς τελευτήν. καὶ συνῆλθον 
μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν παραμυθίαν τῷ Κικέρωνι πανταχόθεν οἱ φιλόσοφοι20· βαρέως δ᾽ ἄγαν 
ἤνεγκε τὸ συμβεβηκός, ὥστε καὶ τὴν γαμηθεῖσαν ἀποπέμψασθαι δόξασαν ἡσθῆναι τῇ 
τελευτῇ τῆς Τυλλίας.  
 
And when he had married, his daughter died not a long time afterwards in childbirth in 
the house of Lentulus (this was the man she had married after the death of Piso, her 
former husband). The philosophers came together from all sides to offer Cicero 
consolation, but he bore what had happened too hard, so that he even divorced the wife 
he had married because she seemed to have taken pleasure in Tullia’s death.”21  
 
 
19 On this biography written by Cicero’s freedman and secretary, which he prepared in part under Cicero’s 
own guidance in the last years of his life, see Görler 1990: esp. 169-70.  
20 This text (1964 Teubner ed. Ziegler) prints the mss. reading; other editors adopt φίλοι (Graux after 
Volkmann).  
21 Plut. Cic. 41.7-8; trans. Moles, modified. On the inaccuracies of this account, see Moles 1988: ad loc. 
Most notably, Tullia did not marry and die in the house of Lentulus, but rather Publius Cornelius 
Dolabella.  
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This is the only passage in Plutarch’s biography that names Tullia and even within this passage 
she seems only to be a means to an end. The effects of her death on Cicero are described in two 
clauses: “he bore what had happened too hard” (βαρέως δ᾽ ἄγαν ἤνεγκε τὸ συμβεβηκός) and “he 
even divorced the wife he had married because she seemed to have taken pleasure in Tullia’s 
death” (τὴν γαμηθεῖσαν ἀποπέμψασθαι δόξασαν ἡσθῆναι). Neither effect tells us anything about 
Cicero’s relationship with his daughter, her role in his life, or the emotional content of his grief. 
Instead, the second statement describes the domestic consequence of her death: divorce and, we 
are meant to understand, forfeiture of the wealth that the new bride had promised. The first 
statement refers solely to Cicero’s state of grief. Expressed in a pointedly abstract phrase, he 
grieved excessively (ἄγαν) and beyond consolation at “what had happened” (τὸ συμβεβηκός). 
Neither Cicero’s excessive mourning nor his new bride’s apparent sadism reveals the content of 
his grief—Tullia’s death becomes a precipitating occurrence, a circumstantial catalyst.  
 The peculiar emptiness of Plutarch’s account finds ample corroboration in Cicero’s own 
letters. As Andrew Erskine notes, “In fact, after her death, he never once mentions Tullia by 
name in any of his letters or other writings. Instead, he concentrates on his own suffering and his 
attempts to ‘cure’ himself.”22 Readers of these letters throughout history have found Cicero’s 
simultaneous overwhelming “performance” of grief and absence of the cause of that grief 
possibly disingenuous, likely self-serving, and certainly self-pitying.23 If, however, we read 
 
22 Erskine 1997: 36.  
23 On ancient (unfavorable) characterization of Cicero’s relationship with his daughter, see the heavily 
suggestive Ps.-Sallust Invectiva in Ciceronem, esp. 2, “But, I suppose, your spirits are raised by the 
brilliance of your home, by a wife guilty of sacrilege and dishonoured by perjury, by a daughter who is 
her mother’s rival and is more compliant and submissive to you than a daughter should be to a parent” 
(Verum, ut opinor, splendor domesticus tibi animos tollit, uxor sacrilega ac periuriis delibuta, filia matris 
paelex, tibi iucundior atque obsequentior quam parenti par est, trans. Rolfe). Cf. Baraz 2012 on Cicero’s 
self-serving use of his grief, e.g., 93: “A reason for writing that is based on the personal feelings of grief 
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Plutarch’s or Cicero’s own account of his grief with Freud in mind, we find melancholia in the 
stark separation of mourning and its lost object. It is Cicero’s inability to mourn Tullia—to 
remember her and speak about her fully—that transforms his grief into a self-perpetuating and 
centripetal cycle without clear beginning and end. Freud compares the “behavior of melancholia” 
to that of an “open wound, drawing investment [cathectic] energies to itself from all sides…and 
draining the ego to the point of complete impoverishment.”24 Melancholia turns grief on itself, 
interrupting and redirecting the ego’s outward activity and attachments back onto itself in an 
exhaustive loop. Everything is pulled toward that open wound and given new melancholic order 
and meaning—everything, that is, except the lost object, which remains at the center of the 
abscess without feature or function beyond its formal, structuring absence.  
 Cicero eloquently articulates the empty self-referentiality and complete egoic 
impoverishment of melancholia in his April 45 response to a formal letter of consolation from 
his colleague Servius Sulpicius.25 In this letter, Cicero distinguishes between the loss he felt 
about the demise of the Republic before and after Tullia’s death:  
 
and dislocation will counteract [..] potential hostility by locating his motivation for the project and, 
implicitly, its goals, within the more personal sphere of the author’s life. Such a shift relieves some of the 
anxiety provoked by the public claims: a multiplicity of causes diminishes the importance of any single 
one…” 
24 SE XIV.253, trans. modified. As indicated above, Freud also describes the tendency toward self-
diagnosis of the melancholic in terms of a “loss of ego”: “The patient represents his ego to us as 
worthless, incapable of any achievement and morally despicable, he reproaches himself, vilifies himself 
and expects to be cast out and punished” (246). These utterances of self-reproach and self-pity are 
precisely those that Freud feels need to be analyzed, and in Cicero’s case this kind of self-diagnosis is 
abundantly present in the letters, see below.  
25 The two had a long-standing professional friendship; see Mur. 10 (63 BCE), which refers to their 
familiaritas, despite being on opposite sides of a court case (cf. Brunt 1988: 375). On the nature of their 
relationship in the context of epistolary consolation, see Wilcox 2005: 246-49, “These three letters [of 
consolation] show how an ongoing friendship was also a campaign waged through letters. The partners in 
this contest were not ‘zero-sum’ adversaries because there was no absolute winner or loser. Rather, 
Cicero and Sulpicius use adversarial rhetoric in a [sic] epistolary tug-of-war: now to exhort one another, 
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non amicorum negotiis, non rei publicae procuratione impediebantur cogitationes meae, 
nihil in foro agere libebat, aspicere curiam non poteram, existimabam, id quod erat, 
omnis me et industriae meae fructus et fortunae perdidisse. sed cum cogitarem haec mihi 
tecum et cum quibusdam esse communia, et cum frangerem iam ipse me cogeremque illa 
ferre toleranter, habebam quo confugerem, ubi conquiescerem, cuius in sermone et 
suavitate omnis curas doloresque deponerem.  
 nunc autem hoc tam gravi vulnere etiam illa, quae consanuisse videbantur, 
recrudescunt. non enim, ut tum me a re publica maestum domus excipiebat, quae levaret, 
sic nunc domo maerens ad rem publicam confugere possum, ut in eius bonis 
adquiescam. itaque et domo absum et foro, quod nec eum dolorem quem de re publica 
capio, domus iam consolari potest nec domesticum res publica.  
 
[Previously,] my thoughts were not hindered by the business of my friends or by service 
to the Republic, there was nothing for me to do in the forum—I could not even look 
upon the senate building—and, as was truly the case, I judged that the fruits of my effort 
and fortune had perished; but since I reflected that these losses were shared with you and 
certain others, and I could subdue myself and compel myself to bear them patiently, I 
had, so to speak, a place of refuge, where I could rest, in whose conversation and 
sweetness I could set down all my cares and pains.  
 But now, even those wounds which seemed to have healed are gaping open again 
under such a heavy blow; for I am not able now, as in the past when my home received 
me in sadness from service to the Republic and lightened my sorrow, to flee in my 
gloom from my home to the Republic so that I might find a haven in its benefits. And so 
I am absent at home and in the forum because home cannot console the pain inflicted on 
me from the Republic and the Republic cannot console the pain inflicted on me at 
home.26  
 
In keeping with the pattern of his letters and Plutarch’s account, nowhere does Cicero explicitly 
name Tullia or write directly about her or her death. Yet, through a series of circumlocutions 
(e.g., “such a heavy blow,” hoc tam gravi vulnere) and the virtual space (quo confugerem, ubi 
conquiescerem) that brings together Tullia and the entire domestic sphere (domus), her death 
comes to represent for Cicero a decisive moment, a point from which his position and idea about 
 
now to enforce behavioral expectations, now to display self-control through eloquence as well as 
admirable comportment” (249).  
26 ad Fam. IV.6(249).2. 
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himself changes irremediably.27 In Cicero’s reflection, Tullia’s sudden and unanticipated passing 
forms a limit from beyond which he is confronted by the subtractive Spaltung that proximity to 
death reveals.28 The dominant metaphors Cicero uses here and throughout the letters to allude to 
his daughter’s death are those of the rupture, schism, or, as here, the gaping wound.29  
 Cicero demonstrates awareness that Tullia’s death is already a doubling of his own—in 
Lacanian terms, a “symbolic death.”30 Is he truly lamenting his daughter’s passing or his own 
erasure from Roman society? How can he tell the difference? Certainly, Tullia’s death is a 
moment of focalization. Prior to it, thanks to the assuagement (suavitas) provided by the 
sympathy of his compatriots, Cicero was able to keep himself under tight control, expressed here 
with the violent verb frangere (to break, break down, subdue). Her death removes this externally 
imposed, superegoic structuration. It rises up to reopen the wound that could never truly be 
healed, to confront Cicero with the negation of self that Lacan identifies in Oedipus’ “last words” 
μὴ φύναι—“rather not to be.”31 Cicero melancholically identifies his being (sum) with absence 
 
27 On the role of Tullia in Cicero’s domestic life from a biographical perspective, see Treggiari 2007: esp. 
118-54. On the specific association between her and a refuge in grief, see also Treggiari 1998: 16-22.  
28 For Freud, the “splitting” (Spaltung) of the subject was a defense mechanism that occurred in fetishism 
or psychosis that allowed for two different, dissociative positions to exist simultaneously in the ego, such 
as “acceptance” and “disavowal”; see, esp. SE XIII.273. In Lacan’s influential reinterpretation of the 
concept all subjects are always already “split” by the fact of speech, which “separates” the subject from 
the enunciation from the self, like truth from knowledge; see, e.g., 1977: 269-90.  
29 Cf. e.g., ad. Att. XII(254).18 where Cicero’s memories are “like a bite” (quasi morsu).  
30 Cf. e.g., ad Att. XII(262).23 (discussed above, Ch. 1, section II), “But, as you say, my house is the 
forum. What good is that house to me if I lack the forum? I am dead, dead I say, Atticus, and have been 
so for a long time, but I am only now admitting it after losing the one thing I was clinging to” (sed domus 
est, ut ais, forum. quid ipsa domo mihi opus est carenti foro? occidimus, occidimus, Attice, iam pridem 
nos quidem, sed nunc fatemur, postea quam unum quo tenebamur amisimus). On Cicero’s symbolic 
death, see also Martelli 2016: 426-9; Butler 2018: 2-3.  
31 Lacan 1992: 306. This is (the English translation of) Lacan’s translation of the Greek, but a fuller 
translation (and truer to the Sophoclean meaning as well) would be “better not to be born,” “not to come 
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(ab-) both “at home and in the forum” (domo et foro), those spaces that belong above all to the 
living.32 Thus, as Cicero represents his experience of grief in this letter, the lost object of Tullia 
serves only as an orienting absence for the splits and fractures of his own sense of self and his 
relations to the world. Tullia allows him to mourn for himself and for his country. But to mourn 
for her, in fact, would destroy the fragile balance of negation and contradiction that his life has 
become.  
 Within this fragile and melancholic balance, defined by the absence of his former places 
of refuge, Cicero struggles to construct philosophy as a viable alternative. If we return to the 
passage from Plutarch, it is clear that philosophy and Cicero’s grief are so interrelated as to be 
the source of textual confusion. The textual crux φιλόσοφοι/φίλοι33 reveals the strength of the 
association, but also, if we accept the manuscript reading φιλόσοφοι, presents a spectral image, 
familiar from de Finibus and the letters, of philosophical texts personified as their undead 
authors, coming from everywhere to console Cicero.34 As Woldemar Görler notes, Cicero 
 
to be.” The phrase, in fact, derives not from a line of Oedipus himself, but from the chorus prior to 
Oedipus and Antigone’s reunion with Polyneices: “Not to be born is, beyond all estimation, best; but 
when a man has seen the light of day, this is next best by far, that with utmost speed he should go back 
from where he came” (μὴ φῦναι τὸν ἅπαντα νι- / κᾷ λόγον· τὸ δ᾽, ἐπεὶ φανῇ, / βῆναι κεῖθεν ὅθεν περ ἥ- / 
κει, πολὺ δεύτερον, ὡς τάχιστα, O.C. 1224-7, trans. Jebb).  
32 To follow the line of thought from Lacan, this locates Cicero in that region “between two deaths” where 
the world of good/s falls away and, like Oedipus or Antigone in Lacan’s readings, the hero acts through 
conformity to his desire. Cf. Lacan 1992: 280 on Antigone’s lamentation, “from Antigone’s point of view 
life can only be approached, can only be lived or thought about, from the place of that limit where her life 
is already lost, where she is already on the other side. But from that place she can see it and live it in the 
form of something already lost.” Cicero finds himself in an analogous position—absent from the world of 
the living (absum) but living still.  
33 καὶ συνῆλθον μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν παραμυθίαν τῷ Κικέρωνι πανταχόθεν οἱ φ., Plut. Cic. 41.7, see above, n.20.  
34 Moles 1988: ad loc., although he retains the mss. reading, comments, “this mass philosophical 
deputation is elsewhere unattested and presumably invented by P.,” i.e., he reads the φιλόσοφοι literally. I 
argue that φιλόσοφοι is a better reading than the emended φίλοι if, instead, we regard φιλόσοφοι as 
referring to Cicero’s technique for composing his Consolatio, see, e.g., Tusc. 3.76: “There are also some 
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consistently develops a narrative about the course of his life from his very earliest impressions in 
which, “Die Philosophie ist ein Hafen, die Politik das wilde und gefährliche Meer.”35 The image 
of philosophy as the “harbor” or “haven” in which Cicero finds refuge is also closely related to 
maternal metaphors and memories of Cicero’s youthful philosophical instruction.36 In the preface 
to Tusc. 5, for instance, Cicero writes that, “the correction of this fault [the tendency to blame 
circumstance rather than personal weakness] and all our other short-comings and failings must 
be sought entirely from philosophy; into whose bosom (in sinum) from the earliest age (a primis 
temporibus aetatis) my desire and enthusiasm drove me and in the midst of heaviest calamities 
we find refuge (confugimus), being battered by a great storm, in this same haven (in eundem 
portum) from which we first departed.”37 The sinus of philosophy—its harbor (portum) or its 
bosom—offers up an image of the fold or curve in which Cicero spent a protected childhood (a 
 
who gather together all these types of consolation—for each person is affected by a different method—
almost just as in our Consolatio we threw every type into one consolation” (Sunt etiam qui haec omnia 
genera consolandi colligant—alius enim alio modo movetur—ut fere nos in Consolatione omnia in 
consolationem unam coniecimus). On this passage, see below, section IV. On the spectral presence of 
dead philosophers elsewhere in the Ciceronian corpus, see above Ch. 1, section III.   
35 1990: 159. Cf. e.g., ad Att. IV.18(92).2 (54 BCE); ad Fam. VII.30(265).2 (44 BCE). 
36 The image of philosophy as a harbor is present also in Philodemus and the Virgilian Catalepton esp. 5, 
in which the youthful speaker bids farewell to the “vacuous pots of rhetoricians” (inanes…rhetorum 
ampullae, 1) and “sets sails” for the “port” of “Syro’s learned words,” where he “will claim a life free of 
all worry” (Nos ad beatos vela mittimus portus / magni petentes docta dicta Sironis, / vitamque ab omni 
vindicabimus cura, 8-10). Syro was most likely an Epicurean, who taught at Rome and was a friend of 
Cicero’s. See Mooney 1916: ad loc.; cf. Longo Auricchio 2004: 37-42.  
37 Tusc. 5.5, sed et huius culpae et ceterorum vitiorum peccatorumque nostrorum omnis a philosophia 
petenda correctio est; cuius in sinum cum a primis temporibus aetatis nostra voluntas studiumque nos 
compulisset, his gravissimus casibus in eundem portum, ex quo eramus egressi, magna iactati tempestate 
confugimus. 
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primis temporibus aetatis), but has since been excluded. He desires now to return and “find 
refuge” (confugimus) again in this virtual space of womb-like wholeness and inclusion.38  
 Emphatically, Cicero also uses this verb, confugio, in the letter to Servius Sulpicius to 
describe Tullia: prior to her death she was a “place of refuge where I could rest, in whose 
conversation and sweetness I could set down all my cares and pains (habebam quo confugerem, 
ubi conquiescerem, cuius in sermone et suavitate omnis curas doloresque deponerem).39 Tullia 
and “philosophy” overlap as virtual spaces: both daughter and abstraction are characterized first 
and foremost as places of refuge from which Cicero has been excluded, but into which he 
fantasizes about returning. Perhaps, more accurately, “philosophy” as the maternal-sinus rises up 
as the dominant fantasy of protection and escape after his exclusion from the filial-refuge; but, in 
either case, the circuit of Tullia-Philosophy traces an imaginary field within which Cicero is 
confronted with the inextricably related issues of death and exclusion, origin and inclusion.40 
Although we might be tempted to see “philosophy” simply as a remedy and replacement for the 
losses of forum and domus, the absent figure of Tullia complicates such a straightforward 
 
38 Cf. Cicero’s characterization of the Tusculans as his senilis declamatio (T.D. 1.7) a formulation that 
similarly brings together Cicero in his old age (senilis) with the childhood activity of “declaiming.” On 
the debates around this formulation, see esp. Gildenhard 2007: 16-17; cf. Gunderson 2003: esp. 81-89.  
39 Note the use of the adverb ubi in reference to a person, which features prominently in the vows of the 
bride and groom at the formal Roman wedding ceremony (confarreatio), e.g., ubi tu Gaius, ego Gaia. 
See, e.g., Treggiari 1991: ad loc.  
40 Cf. Dressler 2016: 135, who, citing a letter from 58 BCE in which Cicero calls Tullia the “image of my 
face, my speech, my mind” (effigiem oris, sermonis, animi mei, ad Quint. Frat. I.3[3].3), proposes that 
Tullia represents for Cicero “the partly external, third-person character of personhood.” In the context of 
Dressler’s general argument about the relationship between elite Roman men and their daughters, Tullia 
enables the “‘outsourcing’ of the work of subjection in the gender-based division of labor in classical 
Rome. In other words, with the effigies of their daughters, these men used women, not only to ‘think,’ but 
also to feel and exist” (136). While this is certainly right in large part, what is interesting to me, which 
Dressler does not address directly, is what happens when this externalized personhood is voided by the 
death of the daughter.  
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substitution. Through Tullia, who had previously represented the domestic sphere, the 
construction of philosophy as a viable emotional and discursive alternative to public and private 
life is problematized and, at least in part, thwarted. How can philosophy provide safe harbor 
from Cicero’s grief at the loss of his daughter when her absence is what creates and structures 
that harbor? 
 In Cicero’s melancholic world, therefore, philosophy is foremost among the activities 
that are reoriented by the absence of Tullia’s absence. As Erskine’s observation indicates, in the 
letters of the period Cicero frequently calls upon philosophy as a “cure” for his grief. Likewise, 
in the Tusculans, we find insistent claims couched in medical metaphors that philosophy can 
serve as a form of therapy, and specifically self-therapy, which guides a normative process for 
bereavement and a resolution of grief:41 “Of course, after all, there is a therapy of the soul (est 
profecto animi medicina), philosophy, whose assistance (auxilium) must not be sought, as in the 
case of bodily disease, outside ourselves, and we must bestow its care with all our means and 
strength so that we might become able to heal ourselves.”42 As Bernhard Koch argues, the 
frequent depiction in this text of philosophy as primarily therapeutic owes much to a tendency in 
Hellenistic philosophy to consider ethics as the purpose of the philosophical endeavor.43 The 
“assistance” (auxilium) of philosophia in the struggle against human failings and the tyranny of 
 
41 Cf., e.g., Tusc. 3.76, 4.63. These claims are found in both the voices of the narrator (as at 3.6) and of M. 
(3.76 etc.).  
42 Tusc. 3.6, est profecto animi medicina, philosophia, cuius auxilium non ut in corporis morbis petendum 
est foris, omnibusque opibus atque viribus, ut nosmet ipsi nobis mederi possimus, elaborandum est. 
43 For Koch 2006, the Tusculans especially reflect Philo of Larissa’s characterization of ethics as 
comprising protreptic, therapeutic, and preservative phases; see esp. 50-60 and 61-193. For this approach 
to the Tusculans, see also Schofield 2002. On Philo’s tripartite distinction in ethics more generally, cf. 
Brittain 2001: 255-95.  
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circumstance is applied not, as in the case of a medical doctor, by an external practitioner, but 
through guided self-care and strengthening of internal fortitude. 
 Certainly, it is possible to read the Tusculans as a more or less faithful exposition of the 
Philonian ethical modes, as Koch does, or of the Stoic principles of extirpation and apatheia, like 
Margaret Graver.44 According to these readings, the aim of the dialogue as a whole is roughly 
equivalent to the stated goal of its primary speaker: to “be bold enough not only to trim the 
branches of wretchedness, but to tear out all the fibers from its roots” (nos autem audeamus non 
solum ramos amputare miseriarum, sed omnes radicum fibras evellere, 3.13).45 Yet, I think, 
Cicero’s association of philosophy with Tullia—the therapy with the object of that therapy—
complicates from the beginning the notion of a normative and “resolved” therapeutic outcome in 
the Tusculans along the lines of Stoic extirpation. What would it mean to “rip out from the roots” 
any feeling of grief when the tools with which Cicero attempts this surgical intervention have 
been shaped and are maintained by those very feelings? Without articulating Tullia as the object 
of grief, and instead using her loss to structure the sinus of philosophy itself, the Tusculans are 
an elegiac product of Cicero’s melancholic state of mind much more than they are the 
summation of a therapeutic theory that would extirpate the “roots” of this tension altogether.  
 As I discuss further in the next section, Cicero’s commitment to representing the 
dissociation of grief in the philosophical arguments of the dialogue makes it difficult to read the 
 
44 E.g. 2002: xii, “Cicero is not himself a Stoic...it is the Stoic position which he recommends to his 
readers in these books as the best-reasoned view…”; for similar readings of the Tusc. cf., e.g., Nussbaum 
1987 and 1994. See also Thorsrud 2008: 172, “Cicero’s presentation of this ideal [of apatheia] is Stoic in 
inspiration, but it also reflects his skeptical reservations about the viability of Stoic ethics. Throughout the 
Tusculans, Cicero makes a point of reserving his Academic freedom to endorse whichever position seems 
most probable (Tusc. 4.7, 47). That is, he does not report the Stoic views as a Stoic.”  
45 The language of extirpation is at work across the text to refer to the desired impact of philosophy on the 
sources of pain for the animus, see, e.g., 1.111, 3.13. Cf. Nussbaum 1987: e.g., 163, 172-175.  
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Tusculans as a simple exposition of therapeutic practice, or as the advocation of a singular 
normative approach to mourning. If they are not satisfactorily read as exposition, then perhaps 
they can be understood as a new stage in Cicero’s own mourning process—a working through of 
grief in their own right.46 This understanding has the benefit of recognizing the representational 
aspect of the work, which can, therefore, offer therapeutic guidance not contained explicitly 
within the doctrinal debates found therein. Additionally, this more biographical approach helps 
to identify the connections between the philosophical arguments of the Tusculans and the model 
of literary self-therapy that Cicero develops in his Consolatio ad se.47 Along these lines, both 
Han Baltussen and Walter Englert have recently argued that we should understand Cicero’s grief 
for Tullia as playing out over time in a process that is reflected in the different genres of writing 
which treat his experience.  
 For Baltussen, in fact, the temporal progress of this process seems almost ancillary to the 
evident shift in literary perspective from the letters written soon after Tullia’s death, to the 
Consolatio, which serves as a rhetorical address from Cicero to himself,48 and finally to the 
theoretical work of the Tusculans. With reference to the changes in Cicero’s treatment of grief 
between these genres, Baltussen notes, “The different degrees of privacy found in the three types 
 
46 Cf. Douglas 1995: 214, “In the Tusculans we see the physician of the soul trying to heal himself.” 
47 Intriguingly, prior to Tullia’s death and Cicero’s writing of the Consolatio, he attributes a “faculty for 
self-consolation” to Nigidius Figulus, see Fam. IV.13(225).4 (discussed above, Intro., section I), “But you 
have in the highest degree, if ever any man had, the faculty of consoling yourself or another” (at ea 
quidem facultas vel tui vel alterius consolandi in te summa est, si umquam in ullo fuit).  
48 On the apparent rhetorical organization and aim of the Consolatio, see Aug. De civ. dei 19.4, who refers 
to it as a “a mere speech,” and questions whether it was efficacious, “For who has the sufficient capacity 
to explain away the miseries of this life with a stream of eloquence? When Cicero lamented at the death 
of his daughter, he did what he could. But how much could he actually do?” (Quis enim sufficit quantuvis 
eloquentiae flumine uitae huius miserias explicare? Quam lamentatus est Cicero in consolatione de morte 
filiae, sicut potuit; sed quantum est quod potuit?). Cf. the differing judgment of Lact. Inst. I.15.16.  
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of evidence show that reading [Cicero’s] progression in the proper order illuminates the grief 
process. The day-to-day thoughts in his letters on his own mental state, its causes and proposed 
solutions should not be ignored: they show how he struggles with a desperate situation and 
moves through a progression towards acceptance of his loss…When he next started to write a 
self-consolation (in parallel to the correspondence and his first philosophical treatises), he was 
seeking an unusual solution for unusual circumstances.”49 For Baltussen, then, the shift in 
literary genre and the relative “privacy” of each type maps the progression of a “grief process,” 
which, like the Freudian conception of a normative mourning, marks the trajectory from the early 
expressions of an “unresolved” grief in the letters to the affirmation of a “resolution” in the Stoic 
philosophical commitments of the Tusculans.  
 Similarly, but with a focus on the Tusculans, rather than the Consolatio, Englert argues 
that this philosophical dialogue reveals Cicero at a point in his mourning process after he has 
worked through his initial excessive and unrestrained responses.50 Like Baltussen, Englert 
locates this initial response in Cicero’s letters and, particularly, in his repeated expressions of a 
desire to build a shrine (fanum) to a divinized Tullia—a desire that, notably, Cicero never 
 
49 2013: 81. Baltussen also aptly emphasizes the reason for Cicero’s “unparalleled” consolation to 
himself; ibid.: 82, “In view of his status Cicero would have been expected to mourn for his daughter 
publicly, but in the context of the breakdown of the Republic he did not have the opportunity to do so in a 
dignified way. As a result he resorted to ‘performing’ his duties in his writing. His strategy to deal with 
the loss of his daughter is in one sense typical for a Roman male of the upper classes in the first century 
BC, determined by social pressures to restrain emotions and rationalise the meaning of the event. Less 
typical are his admission that he is not coping well, his limited use (or explicit rejection) of philosophical 
ideas, and his decision to find a way out of his grief by writing about it in a work addressed to himself.”  
50 See, e.g., Englert 2017: 54-55, “The form and content of the Tusculan Disputations show that Cicero is 
using the work, at least partially, to help him put the grief he felt at Tullia’s death into a broader 
philosophical perspective…In the Tusculan Disputations he seems to have reached a new stage in dealing 
with the death of his daughter that he was unable to attain when he wrote the Consolatio.” 
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realizes in physical form.51 When Cicero arrives at the point of writing the Tusculans, Englert 
argues, his efforts at “diminishing his grief” (luctu minuendo) in the Consolatio52 had been more 
or less successful and, furthermore, he is now in a position to reflect on his experience and offer 
it as a model for others who might also be suffering. In particular, Englert finds Cicero in the 
Tusculans efficaciously applying, and recommending to others through his own testimony, 
Chrysippus’ therapeutic approach: “Part of getting over his daughter’s death, Cicero implies, is 
discovering that mourning is at least partially voluntary, caused by the mistaken belief that it is 
right and a duty for the mourner to mourn.”53 Englert thus identifies a similar progression in time 
and genre to the one that Baltussen notes, and he takes the further step of pairing the experience 
of this progress from unresolved grief to its resolution with a specific form of therapy that Cicero 
addresses theoretically and recommends publicly.  
 I agree with both Baltussen and Englert that it is correct to look for a movement or 
change in Cicero’s writings that deal with his grief. And, furthermore, it may be the case that 
Chrysippus’ therapeutic guidance held value for him at a point in his experience.54 I take issue, 
however, with the assumption, shared by both scholars, that we should map Cicero’s experience 
of grief so readily onto the prescriptive therapeutic model of the Hellenistic schools or, by 
comparison, Freud’s normative “mourning.” In particular, there is a slipperiness that should give 
 
51 On this desire in ad Att. XII, see esp. Martelli 2016.  
52 See ad Att. 12.20(258).2, where Cicero refers to the Consolatio as a “the book which we are writing 
concerning the diminishing of grief” (librum quem de luctu minuendo scripsimus).  
53 Englert 2017: 57; on Cicero’s treatment of Chrysippus’ theory, see 3.61-66; cf. 79. The importance of 
this discussion was established by White 1995. I discuss Cicero’s presentation of Chrysippus’ therapy 
below, sections IV and V.  
54 But cf. M.’s critique of Chrysippus’ approach, which in particular addresses the infeasibility of its 
timely application (79), discussed below.  
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pause in conceiving of this trajectory as temporal—commencing with Tullia’s death in February 
45 and completing more or less summarily in July—and as literary—passing from the intimate 
confessions of the letters, to the self-address of the Consolatio, to the public face of the 
Tusculans. Is this evident progress from unresolved grief to resolution really a function of 
Cicero’s experience or is it simply a literary construct? Could this literary construction, in fact, 
be intended to satisfy performatively the societal expectations of one type of normative 
mourning process—which, furthermore, the text uses Greek philosophy to critique? Of course, 
there is no way to answer these questions definitively, yet, I think, a different solution presents 
itself if we pursue instead the notion that the Tusculans do not mark a “resolution” of Cicero’s 
grief, but rather a transformation of it into philosophy.55 The stubborn absence of Tullia as the 
object of mourning throughout these modes of expression and periods of time suggests that we 
should look not for a movement from “sickness” to “health,” but to a more melancholic 
development from the obsessive and depressive self-abnegation of the letters toward an 
instrumentalization of loss in the philosophical texts. It is this textual absence of the loss of 
Tullia as loss that creates an opening for Cicero’s philosophy to approach an experience that is 
beyond the grasp of speech and knowledge.   
III. Grief unto Death 
 In light of this more melancholic trajectory, I contend that, to understand the explicit 
discussion of the therapy of loss that occurs in the later books of the Tusculans, we must first 
grapple with the way in which Cicero’s grief is instrumentalized in the debate of the first book 
 
55 On this view, cf. esp. Butler 2018: e.g., 15-6, “The sensitive reader cannot fail to conclude that, in 
mourning his daughter, Cicero was just as surely mourning himself, a living corpse in a dying world. If 
Cicero’s letters of this period provide the picture of a man who is something of an emotional wreck, then 
his literary productions achieve something slightly different: a self-portrait as ‘a ruin amidst ruins’…”  
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on the postmortem condition. In the undecidable choice that M. presents between the survival of 
the soul or absolute mortality, Cicero uses philosophy to put his grief over Tullia in the service of 
articulating something that humanity cannot access about its existence, something we cannot be 
present to, something we cannot grasp. In particular, as indicated in the first section, I argue that 
the Consolatio functions as a textual cipher for the unnamed and unnamable Tullia.56 This 
cipher, in turn, operates as a force of tension between ideal and material arguments, both binding 
them together and keeping them irreconcilably apart. In other words, the divided structure of the 
argument in Tusculans represents philosophically the dissociation of Cicero’s experience of loss. 
Furthermore, in this section, I begin to trace how Cicero conceives of this dissociation in 
temporal terms. I explore how, through the divergent material and ideal arguments, Cicero aligns 
the thought of the unthinkability of death with the unknowability of humanity’s relation to time.  
 The structure of the first book of the Tusculans establishes a pattern of argumentation that 
Cicero pursues in each the following debates.57 In response to A.’s assertion that “death is an 
 
56 On Cicero’s marked use of quotation in the Tusculans more generally, and especially of tragic authors 
(both Latin and Greek), see Michel 1983; Caston 2015; Schierl 2015 and 2017. On the political valence of 
the quoted translations from Greek authors specifically, see Gildenhard 2007: 36-37; cf. 65-67.  
57 Schofield 2012 refers to this pattern as a “neutralizing argument,” although his analysis works 
specifically from the apparent harmonization of Stoic and Peripatetic positions on virtue and happiness at 
Tusc. 5.120 (cf., the often-repeated claim by various speakers that the dispute between these two schools 
is a matter of verba not res: e.g., Fin. 5.89). The idea of a “neutralizing argument” helps to clarify what 
Görler identifies as the “Wechsel des philosophischen Standpunkts” (1996: 234) that generally structures 
the Tusculans. As Görler’s analysis demonstrates, each book juxtaposes a Platonic or Stoic thesis on the 
topics of death, pain, grief, the emotions, and happiness with an equally tenable materialist position—
usually influenced by Epicurean and Peripatetic views—that excludes it and is excluded by it. Rather than 
deciding in favor of one or the other—contra the many interpretations of the text that assume a doctrinal 
and usually Stoic “turn” (e.g., Graver 2002)—Cicero’s method at the structural level remains skeptical, 
i.e., he does not seek to ameliorate these aporias directly. As Görler argues further, “ein Standpunkt ist der 
eigentlich ‘erwünschte,’ aber er ist nur schwer in Einklang zu bringen mit der Erfahrung in unserer Welt; 
der andere ist weniger erhebend aber leichter beweisbar und einleuchtender für jedermann” (235). On this 
structure of the Tusculans, see also Knapp 1927. The juxtaposition between a rarified (usually Stoic) 
philosophical ideal and a position based in the material experience of human life leads to a series of 
concessions or “neutralizations” that require neither position to be regarded as true. Importantly, these 
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evil,” which M. quickly demonstrates is untenable and inconsistent,58 M. suggests two logically 
sound, but ultimately unverifiable alternative arguments. Rather than choosing between these 
two alternatives, the discussion finally settles on a “neutralized” concession—that regardless of 
the truth of the postmortem condition, death is not an evil. This concession is intended, and does 
in fact, have a fortifying and therapeutic impact on A.59 In an echo of Socrates’ ironic 
comparison of himself to those “rather boorish people” (οἱ πάνυ ἀπαίδευτοι) who “give no 
thought to how the matters under discussion are, but are eager only to make the things that they 
themselves have proposed seem true to their audience,”60 A. desires persuasion over continued 
inquiry, therapeutic effect over a dedication to truth. He hopes that “we may be able to free 
ourselves from the fear of death,” if at all possible, without first arriving at a better understanding 
 
concessions are the source of the therapeutic value that many identify in the text; thus, in book 1, 
regardless of whether the soul survives or perishes upon death, death cannot be considered an evil; in 
books 2, 3, and 4, pain, grief, and emotion do not affect the perfect wisdom of the sage, even if they may 
affect the rest of us; in book 5, virtue can always secure happiness, although it may not be true that only 
virtue can secure happiness. While most therapeutic readings of the Tusculans focus on these neutralized 
conclusions of the arguments, I consider the more profoundly aporetic tension that subtends these 
concessions.  
58 On the opening “Socratic” exchange between M. and A., which initially problematizes A.’s belief, see 
esp. Warren 2013.  
59 Notably, at the beginning of the second dialogue, A. celebrates his newly achieved liberation from the 
dread of death and states that he has been “freed” entirely from “this kind of distress” (hoc genere 
molestiae…sum liberatus) thanks to “yesterday’s discussion” (hesterna disputatione, 2.10). M. responds, 
“It’s hardly surprising since this is what Philosophy does: it heals souls, it removes empty anxieties, it 
frees us from desires and drives away fears” (minime mirum id quidem; nam efficit hoc philosophia: 
medetur animis, inanes sollicitudines detrahit, cupiditatibus liberat, pellit timores, 11). This dynamic 
between M. and A. speaks to a narrative reading of the Tusculans that revolves around the development 
of A. as a student of philosophy through the teaching of M. as instructor. On this reading, see esp. 
Gildenhard 2007, who argues that the dialogues are a depiction of a philosophical-cum-political 
catechistic education, which results, over the course of the five days of discussion, in the transformation 
of A. from “mega nepios to familiaris” (72).  
60 καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι ὅταν περί του ἀμφισβητῶσιν, ὅπῃ μὲν ἔχει περὶ ὧν ἂν ὁ λόγος ᾖ οὐ φροντίζουσιν, ὅπως 
δὲ ἃ αὐτοὶ ἔθεντο ταῦτα δόξει τοῖς παροῦσιν, τοῦτο προθυμοῦνται, Phd. 91a. For the specific Socratic 
resonance, see Stull 2012: 41-3. 
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of the nature of the soul (qua re si, ut ista non disserantur, liberari mortis metu possumus, id 
agamus, 1.23). A. positions the aim of the discussion, therefore, as liberation from the fear of 
death and M. ultimately delivers to A. a therapeutic “mantra” in the form of the neutralized 
conclusion that satisfies this desire to be persuaded.61 Similar neutralizing procedures are 
reproduced throughout the succeeding books on the topics of pain, grief, the emotions, and the 
sufficiency of virtue for happiness. In each case, A.’s initial untenable belief is rejoined by a 
bifurcated argument that in the end serves up a practical bit of philosophical therapy for the 
benefit of A.  
 Yet it is important to recall that in each instance this neutralized concession—the 
practical effect that is A.’s desire—is produced because of and in order to turn away from an 
underlying aporia.62 The therapeutic concession emerges precisely to mask a fundamental 
tension developed to the point of exhaustion by M. that, far from being neutralized, persists 
within it. In fact, it is the very unavoidability of this undecidability that gives meaning to the 
apparent conclusion of the argument. Without the aporetic uncertainty regarding, in the case of 
Tusc. 1, the experience of death, there would be no need for such a therapeutic mask in the first 
place. By focusing on this dissociative tension rather than the performatively therapeutic 
conclusion, I contend that we can trace the instrumentalization of Cicero’s melancholic 
experience of loss on his philosophy. I turn now to examine the ideal argument and material 
 
61 A. is particularly taken with the divinity of the soul. When M. proposes to move on to consider the 
alternative, A. replies, “If you want to, but no one will drive me from immortality” (ut videtur, sed me 
nemo de immortalitate depellet, 77). Cf. Phd. 91a-b. 
62 In continuing to follow the thread of comparison between Tusc. 1 and the Phaedo, it is notable that in 
Plato’s dialogue Socrates does not, in the end, assuage Simmias’ lingering doubts about the immortality 
of the soul with a rational argument, but with a muthos (see 108d-115a). In the comparison between these 
two texts, then, M.’s “neutralized” conclusion stands in a structural relation to Socrates’ muthos, which is 
introduced explicitly for the purpose of persuasion.  
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arguments in turn and to consider how the references to the Consolatio that cluster at the turning 
point of the dialogue preserve the aporetic tension between these positions.  
 According to M.’s ideal argument, the immortality of the soul, if indeed it exists, must be 
due to its divine nature. M. looks for evidence of this divinity in the functions and capacities of 
the animus, starting, first of all, with its powers of memory. M. explains that, according to a 
Platonic understanding, an individual’s capacity for memory is really the result of a recollection 
of an “infinity of numberless things” (infinitam rerum innumerabilium), which are stored in the 
mind as an imprint from a “previous life” (quam Plato recordationem esse vult superioris vitae, 
57).63 To support his claim for this theory of ἀνάμνησις, M. explicitly cites the Meno, but also 
refers implicitly to the complementary discussion of the topic from the Phaedo.64 With the 
support of this authority, M. contends that the soul partakes of a form of remembrance which 
stretches beyond a single lifetime to encompass “ideas inborn and as it were stamped on our 
souls of so many and such great things, which are called ἔννοιαι,” (tot rerum atque tantarum 
 
63 Cf. the Ciceronian speaker’s use of this memoria rerum innumerabilium at de Fin. 2.113 to argue 
against Torquatus’ Epicurean contention that the purpose of life and philosophy is pleasure, “No, believe 
me, Torquatus, we were born for certain higher and more magnificent purposes. This is not only evident 
from functions of the mind, in which there is a memory of innumerable things—indeed in you it reaches 
infinity—and a power of forecasting the sequence of events that is not much different from divination…” 
(ad altiora quaedam et magnificentiora, mihi crede, Torquate, nati sumus, nec id ex animi solum 
partibus, in quibus inest memoria rerum innumerabilium, in te quidem infinita, inest coniectura 
consequentium non multum a divinatione differens…).   
64 Cf., e.g., Men. 81c-e, and Phd. 73a. On the reference to the Meno cf. 1.24 with Gould 1968: 164, “Since 
he was not content with a mere rehearsal of the Platonic doctrine of reminiscence as it pertained to the 
previous existence of the soul, Cicero went far beyond this view of memory. He appears to have been 
illustrating his own power of memory as an orator in giving this detailed account of the marvelous powers 
of memory and mental capacity of the man who is engaged in the discovery and observation of various 
phenomena in the universe.” On Platonic ἀνάμνησις, see Allen 1959 and in the broader context of 
theories of a priori knowledge, see Scott 1987.  
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insitas et quasi consignatas in animis notiones, quas ἐννοίας vocant, 57).65 Yet, for the benefit of 
the incredulous, M. stresses that he does not need Platonic ἀνάμνησις to prove his point about the 
divinity of the soul. He claims further that there is sufficient capacity in what can be achieved by 
even “the common memory” of someone engaged in “elevated study and art” (de communi 
hominum memoria loquor et eorum maxime, qui in aliquo maiore studio et arte versantur, 59) to 
demonstrate that this function of the soul comes from a divine source. Through this concerted 
study, an individual’s memory embraces a contemplation and knowledge of the universe that 
stands independently from, but complementary to the Platonic theory of intergenerational 
ἔννοιαι. In both the individual’s capacity for memory, therefore, and its apparent connection to 
an intergenerational store of inherited impressions, M. sees evidence of the soul’s divinity.  
 The implication of memoria as both an individual and collectively shared capacity of the 
soul plays out over the course of M.’s argument. M. turns next to consider a specific 
understanding of human being, as differentiated from animal life, that is based, on the soul’s 
ability to “investigate what is hidden through inquiry and invention” (illa vis quae tandem est, 
quae investigat occulta, quae inventio atque cogitatio dicitur, 62). This power is, certainly, 
exercised on an individual basis by the unique contributions of humans throughout time,66 but 
 
65 Cicero may conflate aspects of Platonic and Stoic theories of memory. For the Stoics, as Lucullus 
informs us (Luc. 30), ἔννοιαι are the “conceptions of objects” (notitiae rerum) that are formed by the 
sense-perception of external objects; these impressions are imprinted as ἔννοιαι in the mental storage that 
records everyday life (cf. on Stoic memory, Long and Sedley 1987: i.53 [G]). Cicero is attracted to the 
notion of “imprinting” (consignatas) emphasized in the Stoics. Otherwise, the phenomenon he describes 
here is derived from the more recognizably Platonic ἰδέαι. It is also worth noting, however, that in the 
discussion of the theory of ἀνάμνησις starting at Phaed. 72d, from which M. quotes just below, Plato does 
not use vocabulary of ἰδέαι, but rather of ἔννοιαι and ἐννοέω (see ἔννοιαν 73d, ἐννοεῖν 74a, ἐνενοήσαμεν 
74b etc.). Thus M.’s word choice also might simply reflect the section of text to which he is referring and 
from which Cicero is working.  
66 M. ascribes significant advances in human life to nameless individuals in a brief anthropology: “The 
man who first gave names to everything, which act Pythagoras thought was of the highest wisdom, or the 
one who gathered scattered humanity and called them all together to the communion of shared life or the 
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the true importance of “inquiry and invention” is realized only with respect to the totality of 
humanity: “it is only through the civilizing and refining influence of [the former generations who 
dedicated themselves to inquiry and invention] that we have succeeded from concerns of brute 
existence to more delicate pursuits” (a quibus mansuefacti et exculti a necessariis artificiis ad 
elegantiora defluximus, 62). If the soul is immortal, and therefore divine, the essence of this 
divinity in human being lies not in any particular or individualized instantiation, but in the 
“determined action, wisdom, inquiry, and memory” (vigere, sapere, invenire, meminisse, 65)67 
that at all times conjoins the lifetime of a definite individual to the totality of humanity’s 
historical existence. By engaging in these activities, which are unique to the human soul, the 
individual participates in the shared collective of divine human being. In light of this true essence 
of humanity, not only is death not an evil, it is a moment of consummation,68 when the profound 
relationship between individual and collective human being manifests itself and, according to 
M., is realized physically in the afterlife of souls.69 
 
one who defined the seemingly infinite sounds of our voice using the marks of only a few letters or the 
one who recorded the paths of the planets, their intersections, their boundaries of movement…” (qui 
primus, quod summae sapientiae Pythagorae visum est, omnibus rebus imposuit nomina, aut qui 
dissipatos homines congregavit et ad societatem vitae convocavit, aut qui sonos vocis, qui infiniti 
videbantur, paucis litterarum notis terminavit, aut qui errantium stellarum cursus, praegressiones, 
insti[tu]tiones notavit, 62).  
67 The translation of vigere as “determined action” is suggested by the wordplay in this section between 
the divina vis and vigere: the verb denotes the basic “activity” that defines the divine mind. Cf. also, de 
Fin. 2.45, homines enim, etsi aliis multis, tamen hoc uno plurimum a bestiis differunt, quod rationem 
habent a natura datam mentemque acrem et vigentem celerrimeque multa simul agitantem…” See further 
below.  
68 Indeed, M. goes so far as to claim that it is a good (bonum), see 16, 23, 76.  
69 M. provides an extended narrative tracing the path of souls after death (42-49), on which see Setaioli 
2001. I discuss this passage below, Ch. 4, section III.ii.  
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 M. caps this argument in support of the divinity of the soul with an explicit quotation 
from Cicero’s Consolatio. In fact, from the resonances in diction made evident by the quotation, 
it becomes clear that M. has been paraphrasing a line of thought that had already been 
thoroughly developed in this previous work. Furthermore, the quotation makes explicit that, 
given the divinity and immortality of the soul, the relationship of humanity to time is realized in 
eternity (aeternitas).70 M. recalls that “we have expressed and pursued this view in the 
Consolatio in these very words” (hanc nos sententiam secuti his ipsis verbis in Consolatione hoc 
expressimus),  
“Animorum nulla in terris origo inveniri potest; nihil enim est in animis mixtum atque 
concretum aut quod ex terra natum atque fictum esse videatur, nihil ne aut humidum 
quidem aut flabile aut igneum. His enim in naturis nihil inest quod vim memoriae, 
mentis, cogitationis habeat, quod et praeterita teneat et futura provideat et complecti 
possit praesentia: quae sola divina sunt nec invenietur umquam unde ad hominem venire 
possint nisi a deo. Singularis est igitur quaedam natura atque vis animi, seiuncta ab his 
usitatis notisque naturis. Ita quidquid est illud, quod sentit, quod sapit, quod vivit, quod 
viget, caeleste et divinum ob eamque rem aeternum sit necesse est.” 
 
“No source or origin of souls can be found on earth. For there is nothing in souls that is 
blended or combined, or which seems to have been generated and shaped from earth—
nothing at all that is either moist or airy or fiery. For there is nothing in these elements of 
nature that have the force of memory, thought, and understanding, which holds onto the 
past, foresees the future, and embraces fully the present. These things can only be divine, 
and the source for their arrival in humanity will never be found except from god. 
Therefore, there is a unique and particular nature and force of the soul, separate from the 
common and well-known elements. And so, whatever it is that feels, that is wise, that 
lives, that is active, it is heavenly and divine, and for that reason it must be eternal.”71 
 
70 The identification of the temporality of the soul as “eternal” enters M.’s argument as a Pythagorean 
notion (39; cf. 50), and is then discussed in an extensive quotation from Plato’s Phaedrus (via a 
translation that Cicero had previously rendered for his de Rep.; see Tusc. 1.54-55). In the ideal argument, 
M. thus only discusses the eternity of the soul without an explicit Greek source in this quotation from his 
author’s own Consolatio; cf. 80-81.  
71 Tusc. 1.66 = Cons. fr. 10M = 21V = 12K.  
 202 
This passage, which likely came from the final section of the Consolatio,72 draws together M.’s 
ideal argument in a torrent of eloquentia. The combination of activities that demonstrates for M. 
the divinity of the human soul—vigere, sapere, invenire, meminisse—are present in “the force of 
memory, thought, reflection” (vim memoriae, mentis, cogitationis), which serves to differentiate 
the nature of the soul from the “common and well-known elements of nature” (His…in 
naturis…his usitatis notisque naturis). The source of these qualities and activities of the soul 
cannot be traced back to any material element, such as fire, earth, or air; instead, “whatever it is 
that feels, that has wisdom, that lives, that is active, is heavenly and divine, and for this reason is 
eternal” (ita quidquid est illud, quod sentit, quod sapit, quod vivit, quod viget, caeleste et divinum 
ob eamque rem aeternum sit necesse est).73 Thus, the exceptional uniqueness and divine origin of 
the soul is realized in experience through a particularly human sense of time, which has the 
power to “hold onto the past, foresee the future, and embrace fully the present” (et praeterita 
teneat et futura provideat et complecti possit praesentia).74 The metaphysical quality of the soul 
as “heavenly, divine, and therefore eternal” (caeleste et divinum ob eamque rem aeternum sit 
necesse est) produces in humanity’s embodied existence a capacity for embracing diachrony 
through synchrony. Human time and experience reflect back the aeternitas of its constitutively 
immortal soul.  
 
72 For the most recent reconstruction of the fragments, drawing together the various attempts of previous 
scholars, see Baltussen 2013: 70-6.  
73 Note the wordplay especially between vis and vigere throughout this section (see above, n.67). But cf. 
also the collocation with vigere and vivere at de Nat. De. 2.83, Div. 1.33; Sen. Quaest. Nat. 6.16.1, which 
adds an additional sense of “growth” to vigere here. See Kennedy 2010: ad loc.  
74 Cf. de Fin. 2.45, discussed above, Ch. 1, section IV.  
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 As we arrive at this climax of the ideal argument, however, we are confronted with the 
realization that this thought about the unthinkability of death—this tenuous and aspirational 
construction—has been founded on the loss of Tullia or, more specifically, Cicero’s 
transformation of his loss of her as loss into philosophy. The three explicit references to the 
Consolatio in Tusc. 1, which function as ciphers for structuring absence of Tullia, cluster in the 
middle portion of M.’s speech, where the transition between ideal and material arguments takes 
place. As a subtext within the Tusculans, therefore, the Consolatio surfaces particularly to 
demarcate gaps or sensitive moments where the dissociation of thought is most evident. In this 
first instance, which is the only direct quotation of the Consolatio in the first book—and, in fact, 
is the longest extant fragment from this lost work—the incorporation of Tullia into the text 
subtends the summation of the ideal argument and ties the realization of this defense of the 
divine and immortal soul to an expression of Cicero’s melancholic experience of grief.  
 The second reference, introduced above in section I, functions as an explicit segue 
between the ideal and material arguments. This segue comes in an exchange between M. and A., 
and culminates in A.’s admission, “when I read [your Consolatio], I want nothing more than to 
leave this life” (quam cum lego, nihil malo quam has res relinquere, 76). A.’s reading of 
Cicero’s Consolatio and his resultant desire for suicide introduces an additional source of textual 
complexity to this transitional moment. The interlocutor’s comment serves not only to bring 
Cicero’s Consolatio to the textual surface of the Tusculans, but also isolates the further 
intertextual relation between the Consolatio, the Tusculans, and Plato’s Phaedo. The latter was 
often read in antiquity as an exhortation to suicide; and A.’s comment seems to refer directly to 
this tradition, transferring its influence from “Plato’s book” onto Cicero’s work of self-
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consolation.75 In light of the many textual references and reflections, it is notable that Plato’s 
dialogue uses the death of Socrates to think about the unthinkability of death in a way that 
Cicero’s Tusculans intentionally emulates and continually comments upon.76 Yet in A.’s 
comment, the explicit comparison is drawn between the experience of reading the Phaedo and 
Cicero’s self-consolatory text—not the Tusculans themselves.77 The Tusculans thus stand in an 
analogous relation to both the Consolatio and to the Phaedo—and so, by extension, to the deaths 
of Tullia and the death of Socrates. At this pivotal moment in M.’s divided argument, we find, 
therefore, a refraction of the incorporation of grief into philosophy. A.’s layered comment 
gestures to the textual history of Cicero’s philosophical transformation of his inability to accept 
the loss of Tullia as loss.  
 A.’s suicidal response thus reveals the incorporation of Socrates’ death into Plato’s text, 
the influence of Plato’s text on the Consolatio’s incorporation of Tullia’s death, and, finally, the 
instrumentalization of this whole assemblage within Cicero’s Tusculans. This transmission of 
 
75 This characterization of the Phaedo as an exhortation to suicide is explicitly referred to by M. at 84, 
where he recalls, “There is a certain epigram by Callimachus about Cleombrotus of Ambracia, who, he 
says, after reading Plato’s book threw himself from a wall into the sea although nothing bad had happened 
to him” (Callimachi quidem epigramma in Ambraciotam Theombrotum est, quem ait, cum ei nihil 
accidisset adversi, e muro se in mare abiecisse, lecto Platonis libro). Cf. Callim. fr. 53 Gow and Page 
with Williams 1995 and Warren 2001: 93-4.  
76 For the close textual correspondences, see Tusc. 57 with Phd. 72d; Tusc. 69 with 78c; 73 with 84e; 73 
with 85d; and 74 with 67d. Cf. Degraff 1940; Poncelet 1957 passim; Gould 1968: 125-43; and Stull 2012.  
77 It is interesting to note further that A. addresses M. as a reader to the author, drawing a correspondence 
between the speaker of the dialogue and Cicero the author; on this identification, see below. Yet this 
correspondence is already slightly destabilized because M. stresses the self-address of the Consolatio as a 
text. What does it mean for A. to be configured as an external reader of M.’s self-addressed consolation? 
On the long scholarly history of speculation on the relationship between M. and A., as, e.g., ciphers for 
different aspects of Cicero’s personality, see, Douglas 1995: 212, “The debate is in effect with himself”; 
for a similar perspective see also Görler 1996: 210 n.26, who specifically identifies A. as an “alter ego.” 
For a rebuttal of this argument that emphasizes the independence and growth of A. throughout the 
dialogue, see Gildenhard 2007: 70-6. 
 205 
grief into philosophy and back again reaches its culmination in the final reference to the 
Consolatio in Tusc. 1. At the beginning of his material argument, M. identifies as the source of 
anxiety about death—of the “kicking-the-bucket” kind—the thought of leaving behind all that is 
good and pleasant in life.78 In response to this anxiety, M. directs A. to “this book in which we 
have done everything in our power to console ourselves” (fecimus hoc in eo libro, in quo nosmet 
ipsos quantum potuimus consolati sumus, 83), where he has already laid out in detail a litany of 
the cruelties of life and examples of the power of death to liberate an individual from suffering. 
Despite directing A. to the Consolatio for this type of lament,79 M. goes on to cite a number of 
these examples of which the crowning entry is Cicero himself: “I pass over the others. What do 
they help us? We have been deprived of solace and distinction in both private and public life, and 
if we had died before, death would have saved us from evil, not good things” (Mitto alios: 
etiamne nobis expedit? qui et domesticis et forensibus solaciis ornamentisque privati certe, si 
ante occidissemus, mors nos a malis, non a bonis abstraxisset, 84). At the very beginning of the 
material argument, therefore, Cicero’s own autobiographical experience of grief expressed by a 
reference to the Consolatio provides the speaker M. with evidence for his contention that death 
liberates human being from its worldly existence defined by suffering and evil.  
 This final reference to the Consolatio thus draws Cicero-the-author explicitly into the 
chain of grief and philosophical intertexts that has been building throughout this transitional 
 
78 83, “What does cause anxiety or rather torment is the thought of departing from all that is good in life. 
But take care that it might not be more truly said from all its evils!” (Illud angit vel potius excruciat, 
discessus ab omnibus iis, quae sunt bona in vita. Vide ne a malis dici verius possit).  
79 Ibid., “What need do I have to now bemoan human life? Truly and justly I could. But what need is 
there, when I am trying to make it so that we won’t think that we will be miserable after death?” (Quid 
ego nunc lugeam vitam hominum? Vere et iure possum. Sed quid necesse est, cum id agam, ne post 
mortem miseros nos putemus fore, etiam vitam efficere deplorando miseriorem?).  
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section. The emphatic injection of Ciceronian autobiography into the voice of the anonymized 
M. might point to a simple identification between writer and character.80 Yet, in light of the 
textual complexities that are revealed by the references to the Consolatio, I think that it instead 
focuses attention on the dissociative nature of the argument and the melancholic Spaltung of its 
author. M., the speaker in the dialogue, is an enthusiastic advocate for the first, ideal, position 
that the soul is immortal and divine. To make this point, the speaker draws on Platonic theory, 
and quotes directly and abundantly from Plato’s dialogues.81 Yet this ideal argument is capped 
by a quotation from the Consolatio, which belies the pervasive underlying relationship between 
the ideal of an immortal soul and the melancholic grief of the author. In the second passage, A.’s 
suicidal response to reading the Consolatio marks the turning point between ideal and material 
arguments, serving as both the link and source of dissociative tension of these two positions. A’s 
comment also reveals another side of the intertextual relation between Plato’s Phaedo and 
Cicero’s texts by emphasizing the philosophical incorporation of grief as a way of accessing the 
unthinkability of death. Finally, at the beginning of the material argument, M. explicitly draws 
his author into his speech by calling on him as an example among examples, bringing to the fore 
the transmission of grief that binds together the multiplicity and divisions of the text.  
 
80 Of course, there are many incidental attributes that indicate some level of identification between M. and 
Cicero: the villa in Tusculum, the apparent connections between the narrator of the prefaces and the main 
speaker of the dialogue, the direct addresses to Brutus that occur in both prefaces and dialogue. These 
points of identification, however, only belie the peculiarity of Cicero’s choice to depart from his practice 
of explicitly using himself and other named speakers as interlocutors in favor of the riddling anonymity of 
the Tusculans. On the long debate about the dramatis personae, see Gildenhard 2007: 21-34; cf. his own 
solution to the problem, 69-76. 
81 In addition to the references to the Phaedo and the Meno discussed above, see also citations of the 
Timaeus 38 and 47b at 63 and 64. 
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 Considering this multiplicity of texts, authors, readers, and lost objects, it is notable that 
in the two instances where M. introduces the Consolatio he markedly employs the first person 
plural to refer to his interaction with this text (expressimus, 66; fecimus…consolati sumus, 83).82 
By contrast, A. refers to M. as the author of the Consolatio in the singular (tu…es lamentatus). 
How should we understand this difference? Is M.’s plural intended to reflect an “authorial 
whole” that embraces both the speaker M. and Cicero as the author of the Consolatio and the 
Tusculans? Or, noting especially the difference from A.’s singular address, could it be that the 
plural in M.’s usage is occasioned by Cicero’s role in the Consolatio ad se as both author and 
audience? Or, does M.’s plural usage reflect the textual incorporation of grief that conjoins the 
death of Socrates and Plato’s Phaedo with the death of Tullia and Cicero’s Consolatio—an 
assemblage in which A., as a reader who is led to wish for death by this transmission of 
philosophical grief, may also be included? However we construe the constituents of M.’s plural 
subject, it is clear that this plurality is a dissociative plurality. In M.’s adoption of a plural subject 
he is attempting to contain and preserve the multiplicity and divergence that this chain of textual 
incorporations of grief manifests.  
 From this final reference to the Consolatio, M. turns to consider the implications of an 
absolute death for human life. In my reading of this material argument for what it can tell us 
about humanity’s relationship to time, I consider three interrelated points. First, and most simply, 
if death is the end of human existence, then the time of life, in all its brevity and uncertainty, 
 
82 Although Cicero and other Latin authors commonly use the first person plural to refer to themselves 
singularly without, apparently, a change in sense (on the linguistic basis of this practice see, e.g., 
Sauerland et al. 2005), the use of the plural at 66 and 84 seems marked and formal, especially in contrast 
to the intimacy of the statements’ contents. Cf. the contrast at 84 with the preceding singular verb, mitto, 
or the narrator’s use of the first person singular at 1.7-8, iubebam…disputabam etc.  
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becomes essential for human being. Drawing on Epicurean doctrine,83 M. argues that the 
question of what one feels at the moment of death is “entirely trivial” (totumque hoc leve est), 
since, whether it occurs with a sensation of pain or even pleasure, “it occurs in a prick of time” 
(fit enim ad punctum temporis, 82). The briefness of death in relation to a lifetime is mirrored by 
the length of a lifetime in relation to eternity: “What lifetime is actually long or what is there that 
belongs to humanity that is long-lasting?…Compare even our longest life with eternity and we 
will be found nearly in the same category of brevity as the little bugs [which Aristotle says live 
only for one day] (Quae vero aetas longa est aut quid omnino homini longum?…Confer nostram 
longissimam aetatem cum aeternitate: in eadem propemodum brevitate qua illae bestiolae 
reperiemur, 94).84 Just as death is only the smallest moment on the scale of a lifetime, a lifetime 
(aetas) is barely registered in the measurement of eternity (aeternitas). The use of the duality 
aetas / aeternitas here draws attention to the ineffectiveness of a quantifiable duration to measure 
a human lifetime: on an absolute scale, an aetas cannot compare to aeternitas. 85 
 At the same time, however, the very inconsequentiality of the measurement of life with 
respect to eternity, and of death with respect to life, belies the qualitative effect that these puncta 
temporum may have on their extensive counterparts. The quantitative shortness of the time of 
death is counterposed to its omnipresence in life as possibility: “Death looms daily imminent on 
account of the uncertainty of chance and can never be far off because of the brevity of life” 
 
83 The statement combines the second and fourth of the Kuriai Doxai: death is nothing to us and pain is 
easy to endure since, even if it is intense, it will last only a short time. On Cicero’s engagement with 
Epicureanism in the Tusculans, which problematizes his polemical treatments elsewhere (e.g., de Fin. 2), 
see Gildenhard 2007: 37-38; 67-68. Cf. Maso 2015: 184-6. Cicero comments on his Epicurean leanings at 
this period (perhaps unwilling) at ad Fam. IX.20(193); see also below, Ch. 4, section III.i.  
84 For the Aristotelian reference, see H.A. 5.19(553a), where the author refers to these insects as 
ἐφήμερον. Cf. also Pliny H.N. 11.36.  
85 See above, Intro., section III.  
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([mors] propter incertos casus cotidie imminet, propter brevitatem vitae numquam potest longe 
abesse, 91). This omnipresent possibility of death courses through every moment of life, which, 
in turn, adds a sense of posterity to every decision and action made in the present time of life: 
“Death…does not deter the sage any less from taking counsel for his state and his own family for 
all time, and so, even though he will have no sense of it, he will think that posterity does matter 
to him” (Itaque non deterret sapientem mors…quo minus in omne tempus rei publicae suisque 
consulat, ut posteritatem ipsam, cuius sensum habiturus non sit, ad se putet pertinere).86 If death 
is the end of human being, the potentialities of that being can only be acted upon within the time 
of life; as such, humans have the opportunity to think and act in such a way as to ensure that our 
thoughts and actions live on after our creaturely-being has been negated. Death, despite and, 
indeed, because of its brevity, gives meaning to life, just as a life, for all its measurable 
inconsequentiality, can similarly attain a purchase on eternity. If death severs human being from 
existence, this liberates human being to achieve an aspect of eternity from within the finite 
confines of life. The oppositional quality of aetas / aeternitas in this passage, in fact, enables 
human being to struggle against death.87  
 
86 Cicero’s use of the verb pertinere marks an interaction with the Epicurean “symmetry argument,” a 
basic version of which states that the prenatal and postmortem conditions are “symmetrical” and, 
furthermore, just as what happened prior to birth does not “matter” to us (pertinet), neither will the time 
after death; on the symmetry argument generally, see esp. Warren 2001a and 2004: 57-108; and below, 
n.94. Cicero’s particular use of this argumentative form here reflects the substance of many modern 
objections to the symmetry argument; see, e.g., Nagel 1970, who emphasizes that our concern for the 
projects we begin in life extends into the future after death, even if our cognizance might not. Cicero here 
notes that these projects might relate to one’s “state and family” (rei publicae suisque). Interestingly, 
though, Cicero does not treat this as an objection, but presents it alongside as an augmentation of the 
doctrinal form of symmetry argument. For the Epicurean response to the objection, which emphasizes, in 
turn, that none of our concern for projects in life can make death an evil for us and, furthermore, that 
worry about staying around to complete our projects can only spoil our happiness, see the discussion of 
Warren 2004: 109-60.  
87 For further consideration of how Cicero conceives of the future in the face of death, see below Ch. 4, 
section V, which examines similar themes and diction in the de Sen.  
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 Alongside this strong assertion of life against death, M. defends, as my second 
consideration of the material argument, a definition of human life and experience that is founded 
on lack. In his extended discussion of the semantic range of carere, “to lack” or “to feel the need 
of,” M. argues against the belief that the dead are wretched because they “lack” the pleasantries 
of life and makes the basic point that “feeling the need of” is, instead, an essential condition of 
life:  
An potest is, qui non est, re ulla carere? Triste enim est nomen ipsum carendi, quia 
subicitur haec vis: habuit, non habet, desiderat, requirit, indiget. Haec, opinor, 
incommoda sunt carentis: caret oculis, odiosa caecitas: liberis, orbitas. Valet hoc in vivis, 
mortuorum autem non modo vitae commodis, sed ne vita quidem ipsa quisquam caret. 
De mortuis loquor, qui nulli sunt. 
 
Or is it possible for someone, who does not exist, to feel the need of something? For the 
very term ‘lacking’ sounds sad, because of the sense that underlies it: ‘she had, she has 
not; she desires, longs for, desperately needs.’ These, I think, are the misfortunes of 
someone who ‘feels the need of’: for someone who lacks eyes, hateful blindness; for 
someone who lacks children, bereavement. It has this sense for the living, but among the 
dead no one 'feels the need,’ not just of the comforts of life, but even of life itself. I’m 
talking about the dead who do not exist.88  
 
Apart from reiterating the primary argument that the dead can feel nothing because they are 
nothing, this discussion emphasizes that “to lack” or “to feel the need of” is a basic condition of 
life. The condition of “feeling the need” is precisely what is denied to the dead. It is, 
paradoxically, this lack that has been negated for the dead, and this is what defines their state—
they no longer “feel the need” of life. Conversely, what defines life is the persistence of lack, 
desire, and longing, which produces, not just the “misfortunes” (incommoda) listed here—the 
 
88 1.87. Although the text of this passage is sound, the sections immediately following it, which I discuss 
below and continue the consideration of carere, are the most contentious editorial loci in the text: see 
Giusta 1984: ad loc. for a highly interventionist revision; cf. Powell 1987: 31 for a corrective.  
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pointedly chosen “blindness” (caecitas) and “bereavement” (orbitas)89—but even apparently 
positive states of being, for instance, when someone may be said to “lack a fever” (inest enim 
velle in carendo, nisi cum sic tamquam in febri dicitur alia quadam notione verbi, 88) or to 
“desire” moral improvement90 and, emphatically, to seek political liberation from tyranny.91 
Through the multiple uses and senses of the word carere, M. accounts for the manifold 
experiences of human life that are denied categorically to the dead. The condition of lacking 
becomes the sole purview of the living with all the dynamism, uncertainty, but also moral 
conviction and commitment that this view of human being entails.  
 The human being that M. defines in the material argument, therefore, is bound temporally 
and circumstantially. Yet it attains its meaning and purpose precisely by acknowledging and 
 
89 The autobiographical resonance of M.’s repeated references to bereavement are clear: see also, Fin. 
5.84, Tusc. 3.58, 5.16, 5.24. His preoccupation with blindness is not as easily explainable from what we 
know of Cicero’s life (was he struggling with his eyesight at this time? There is no indication in the 
letters), but it features even more prominently than bereavement as an object of discussion in Tusc.: 3.4, 
3.11, 3.81, 4.40, 5.15, 5.29. The end of book 5 is dedicated to a consideration of whether happiness is 
possible given the loss of senses, especially sight and hearing: 5.110-18. It is hard not to read a 
metaphorical sense into the physical blindness discussed in these places; cf. the blindness of the mole who 
desires the light at Luc. 79; or, Tusc. 1.64, where M. elevates philosophy to a proof of the soul’s divinity, 
since it has the “power to cast darkness, as it were, from the eyes of the mind so that we might see all 
things above and below, from first to last and in between” (eadem [philosophia] ab animo tamquam ab 
oculis caliginem dispulit, ut omnia supera infera, prima ultima media videremus). On the relationship 
between sight and blindness in Platonic theoria, to which this passage seems to refer, see esp. Nightingale 
2004: 98-118.  
90 “‘To feel the need’ is not said with respect to what is morally bad, for then it would not cause suffering; 
instead, we say ‘to feel the need of what is good,’ since that means the current situation is bad. But not 
even a living man feels the need of a good, unless he also wants it” (carere in malo non dicitur: nec enim 
esset dolendum: dicitur illud, bono carere, quod est malum. Sed ne vivus quidem bono caret, si eo non 
indiget, 88).  
91 The digression on carere closes, rather unexpectedly, with a direct address apparently to Brutus, who is 
the general addressee of the Tusculans (see 1.1, 2.1 etc.): “For a living man, it can make sense to say that 
he ‘feels the need of a kingship’—although that can’t be said quite accurately for you, though it could 
have been said for Tarquin after he was expelled from his reign” (Sed in vivo intelligi tamen potest regno 
te carere—dici autem hoc in te satis subtiliter non potest, posset in Tarquinio, cum regno esset expulsus, 
88).  
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acting within this finitude. Given the briefness of life with respect to eternity, the living have an 
obligation to consider the possibilities of thought and action hic et nunc, and, furthermore, must 
maintain an awareness of how their thoughts and actions could affect a posterity of which they 
will have no direct knowledge. Similarly, since all human life is based on lack, the living are free 
to desire and to strive—indeed these are the very manifestations of their essential state of 
“feeling the need,” which separates them from the dead. The limitations set by the absolution of 
death turn out to be the precipitating factors for the liberation and fulfillment of humanity from 
within the time and material conditions of life itself. 
 The third and final aspect of this conception of human being, however, while not 
negating those powers, contextualizes them by emphasizing an ultimate non-relation between 
human being and nature. The challenge that mortality presents to human creativity and resilience 
is to conceive of the world without oneself, to exist with the awareness of humanity’s severance 
from the world into which it is born, to come to terms with the fact that our being as such 
belongs to nature—not to the “human”:  
Natura vero si se sic habet, ut, quo modo initium nobis rerum omnium ortus noster 
adferat, sic exitum mors: ut nihil pertinuit ad nos ante ortum, sic nihil post mortem 
pertinebit…Pellantur ergo istae ineptiae paene aniles, ante tempus mori miserum esse. 
Quod tandem tempus? Naturaene? At ea quidem dedit usuram vitae tamquam pecuniae 
nulla praestituta die. Quid est igitur quod querare, si repetit, cum vult? Ea enim 
condicione acceperas.  
 
If the way of nature is such that, just as our birth brings the beginning of everything for 
us, thus death brings the end, then just as nothing mattered to us before birth, so will 
nothing matter after death…Let all these foolish old wives’ tales be cast aside such as 
thinking it is wretched to die “before our time.” And what “time” are we talking about? 
Nature’s? It was nature that gave use of life like a loan of money without settling on a 
day of repayment ahead of time. What is there to complain about, then, if she asks for it 
back when she wants? For you accepted the deal on this condition.92  
 
 
92 91-93. On this passage, see also Intro., section III. 
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Despite the real and vital powers that humanity possesses in its struggle against death and the 
magnitude of eternity, human life comes into existence according to a condition (condicio),93 set 
by nature and agreed to by the simple fact of birth. This condicio, furthermore, is subject to 
“repayment” like a “loan of money,” which may be required at any time. This material position 
is thus bound to a view of nature (Natura) that maintains humanity within a strict metabolic 
mechanism: just as the world does not exist for us prior to our birth or after our death, so we do 
not exist for the world (nihil pertinuit ad nos ante ortum, sic nihil post mortem pertinebit).94 
Humanity exists in non-relation to the world of its incarnation, except through the condicio by 
the terms of which we pass into the time of Nature.  
 M. expands on this thought at the conclusion of the argument. His discussion ends by 
enumerating examples of individuals who have faced death steadfastly and courageously in 
different contexts. He begins this list with those “who are able to be consoled upon death by their 
 
93 On this word, see below section V. 
94 As noted above, n.86, Cicero employs the verb pertinere to flag his engagement with the Epicurean 
symmetry argument. In this instance, he essentially reproduces the version found in Lucretius, who also 
uses this verb: “Therefore death is nothing to us, it matters not at all, since the nature of the mind is 
understood to be mortal and as in time past we felt no distress…so, when we shall no longer be…then 
sure enough nothing at all will be able to happen to us, who will then no longer be, or to make us feel…” 
(Nil igitur mors est ad nos neque pertinet hilum / quandoquidem natura animi mortalis habetur; / et, velut 
anteacto nil tempore sensimus aegri…sic, ubi non erimus…scilicet haud nobis quicquam, qui non erimus 
tum, / accidere omnino poterit sensumque movere, 3.830-42; trans. Rouse). It is interesting to note, 
however, that in Tusc. 1 Cicero adapts the symmetry argument to support both the ideal and material 
strands of thought: in this iteration within the material argument he faithfully replicates the Epicurean 
contention that “nothing pertains” (nihil pertinere) to the both prenatal and postmortem states (91-2; cf. 
24). M. also modifies the argument to address the specific insignificance of burial practices for the dead at 
104 and 109. Yet, as cited above, just before this passage he employs a modified version to argue that, 
though the state of death may be as irrelevant to us as was the prenatal state, the projects undertaken in 
life attain a relation of consequence to posterity (posteritatem…ad se pertinere, 91). Strikingly, a similar 
modification is used earlier in the ideal argument to defend the immortality of the soul. In this “ideal” 
version, Cicero contends that the concern of individuals for their projects in life is proof that “the coming 
ages are their concern” (postera saecula ad se pertinere, 31). Furthermore, they will be able somehow to 
perceive and sense this consequentiality (see 35). Cf. also the further transformation of this modified 
version in de Sen. 24-25 and 82, discussed below Ch. 4, section V.  
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life full of public acclaim” (suis se laudibus vita occidens consolari potest, 109) and, once again, 
speaks emphatically as “Cicero” himself:  
Multa mihi ipsi ad mortem tempestiva fuerunt, quam utinam potuissem obire! Nihil enim 
iam acquirebatur, cumulata erant officia vitae, cum fortuna bella restabant. Qua re si ipsa 
ratio minus perficiet ut mortem negligere possimus, at vita acta perficiat ut satis 
superque vixisse videamur.  
 
In my own life there have been many moments timely for death, how I wish I could have 
died then! For there was nothing left to be sought afterwards; the duties of life had been 
fulfilled; only the war with fortune remained. For this reason if all these arguments fail 
to make it possible for us to disregard death, a life having been passed through will bring 
it about that we will think that we have lived enough, if not more than enough.95  
 
The counterfactual expressed both in si ante occidissemus and quam utinam potuissem obire 
operates according to an anterior temporality: it begins from the premise, what if Cicero had died 
before—prior to the “war with fortune” (cum fortuna bella), which is all that remains after a “life 
has been passed through” (vita acta).96 Unlike the “condition of repayment” set by nature, which 
sets an end of life beyond human understanding or control, Cicero’s vita acta suggests an 
awareness of a different form of “completion”—not biological completion, but an end of life 
determined by the accomplishments of the individual with respect to himself and his community. 
Yet the counterfactual anteriority through which Cicero arrives at this realization suggests that it 
may be only through the contemplation and retrospection on life that grief produces that 
humanity can come to terms with the facts of its existence and condicio with nature: perhaps, 
only a “a life having been passed through (vita acta) will bring it about that we will think that we 
have lived enough, if not more than enough (satis superque).” Before reaching this point of 
surfeit, how can we know when our vita has been passed through (acta)? What would be the 
 
95 109. 
96 On this phrase, see ad Fam. VI.4[244].4, discussed below, Ch. 4, section I.  
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accomplishments that would allow an individual to understand that his vita is over, contra 
naturam? At what point have we lived “enough” (satis)?97 
 Despite the inconclusiveness of these questions, which I hold in abeyance for Chapter 4, 
it is evident that M.’s material argument constructs an independent and self-contained theory of 
human life via its relation to death. In particular, where the ideal argument conceives of the 
human relation to time as one of a reflection between aeternitas and the synchronic grasp of 
“past, future, and present” (praeterita…futura…praesentia) from within life, the material 
argument offers a more combative and contingent relation between human time and the 
chronology of nature. Yet the condicio, which binds humanity to the time of Nature, does not 
mean that humanity is debarred from struggling to attain a relation with posterity from within the 
aetas. Indeed, in some ways, M.’s material argument demonstrates that the material position 
valorizes an ethical approach to time. If the soul is immortal, then human being is constituted by 
our exception from the laws and relations of nature, and our capacity for thought and action 
extends to meet the divine eternity of our souls. On the other hand, if the body and soul are 
together mortal, then we must first decide how we should act within the time of life and in 
recognition of our subjection to Nature—a condition that offers our only possibility for thought 
and action. And, furthermore, we must decide for ourselves as mortals whether, in fact, we 
should strive to attain a relation of consequence to posterity. In these divergent relations to 
eternity and to posterity, M.’s framing of the ideal and material arguments stretches toward its 
exhaustion. Each offers fully elaborated, yet mutually exclusive grounds upon which to 
understand humanity’s relation to itself, to nature, and to time. This duality is not capped or 
 
97 I return to these questions in the final Ch. 4, which examines issues of “completion” and “failure” in 
Cicero’s treatment of the vita and the aetas.   
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synthesized but is held in tension by the orienting absence of Tullia. In the references to the 
Consolatio that mark the transition from ideal to material, we can see the persistence of Cicero’s 
melancholic experience of grief in the dissociative structure of the argument. By incorporating 
his grief as an exercise of philosophy, Cicero employs his inability to mourn for Tullia as a tool 
for thinking about the unthinkability of death.  
IV. A Time for Grief 
 Following the structure established by the first day’s discussion,98 each of the subsequent 
debates that follows is comprised of an ideal and a material argument. The ideal arguments in 
Tusc. 2-5 are drawn in particular from the Stoic classification of physical pain, grief, and the 
other passions as misapprehensions of external indifferents, and their defense of the self-
sufficiency of virtue for securing happiness. The text frequently makes the point that the 
“sage,”99 if he existed,100 would embody and manifest these ideals. Additionally, as we saw in 
 
98 On the organization of the Tusculans according to days, see 1.8, cf. Luciani 2010: 49-66 and above, Ch. 
1, section II.  
99 The arguments of books 2, 3, and 4 are framed explicitly in terms of the sage: e.g., A.’s assertion to 
begin the discussion in book 3 is “It seems to me possible for distress to befall the sage” (videtur mihi 
cadere in sapientem aegritudo, 7). Generally, it seems that Cicero means by this a specifically Stoic sage, 
yet he never makes this explicit—certainly he insists that he is not talking about the Epicurean sage (see 
3.33-34, 51, etc.); on the identification of the sage, see Gawlick and Görler 1994: 1042. This framing 
device significantly simplifies the “neutralization” of the conclusion: since the proposition is framed in 
terms of the theoretical attributes of the sage, the neutral position between ideal and material arguments 
can simply be that “ideal x is true, given the existence of the sage (omitting consideration of the 
material).” This simplification, however, does not diminish the importance or presence of the material 
arguments. M. frequently recalls himself and his audience to the ideal argument after he has been carried 
away by material considerations by reminding us that they are supposed to be only talking about the sage, 
see e.g., 3.12, 25, 27, 54, 66, 80.  
100 Following what appears to be a common tag in skeptical discussions of the sage (see e.g., Sextus M. 
VII.432), Cicero frequently expresses doubt about the possibility that such a wise man has or could ever 
exist: see e.g., de Fin. 4.65, Tusc. 2.51, de Div. 2.61, de Am. 18, de Off. 3.14-16. This theme is thus one of 
the most sustained threads of criticism of Stoicism and unites the more explicitly skeptical works with 
those, like Tusc., that have often been seen as more doctrinal, or at least accepting of Stoic positions as 
the most “reasonable.” On this trope in Stoicism and its critics more generally, see Brouwer 2014: 97-
106.  
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book 1, the ideal arguments are often presented as aspirational and alluringly persuasive—
without, however, being verifiably true or sufficient for the satisfactory conclusion of inquiry. 
Juxtaposed to and divorced from these ideals of the sage are a series of material arguments that 
are based in the more common “everyday” experiences of individuals who struggle and suffer 
without attaining perfect wisdom. Also in keeping with the structure of book 1, Cicero’s 
incorporation of his melancholic grief into his philosophical activity, which is disclosed 
especially through references to the Consolatio, consistently serves to maintain the dissociative 
tension between ideal and material positions.101 Cicero thus represents the dissociation of the 
experience of grief in the argumentative structure of the dialogue by drawing together, yet 
holding apart the ideal and material positions and disallowing a satisfactory conclusion beyond 
A.’s desired therapeutic concessions.  
 In this section, I turn to Cicero’s explicit discussion of grief in book 3. I argue that 
Cicero, by creatively engaging with the categories of Hellenistic philosophy on the emotions, 
presents a theoretical understanding of “distress” or “grief” (aegritudo) that emphasizes its 
temporal aspect.102 Cicero identifies in an individual’s experience of loss a profound breakdown 
 
101 In addition to the passages of book 1 discussed above, see e.g., the transitional passages, 2.42, 3.71-6, 
3.83, 4.60-3. Görler provides a schematized layout of the structure (1996: 233) and identifies tamen as an 
important transitional conjunction or, perhaps more aptly, “disjunction” for the movement between the 
ideal and material arguments. He does not note the correspondence between these passages and references 
to the Consolatio. For a consideration of book 5, which is structured differently, see Ch. 4, section IV.  
102 The word that Cicero uses consistently, but not exclusively in books 3 and 4 to refer to “sorrow at the 
death of a loved one” (i.e., grief) is aegritudo. This word is rare prior to Cicero’s usage and found 
primarily in drama; see esp. Ter. Heaut., e.g., 123, 422, 424; it is notable that Cicero refers explicitly to 
this play once and to Terence twice in book 3., where M. also claims that the playwright drew ideas from 
philosophy into his poetry (see 3.31; cf. Caston 2015: 144-5). Much of the beginning of book 3 is 
concerned with defending and defining specifically the use of this word in Latin, initially with reference 
to an Ennian line, animus aeger semper errat (5) and then by contrast with Greek terms for emotion 
(πάθη; see esp. 7, 23). As seen in the passage below, the meaning of aegritudo is further modified by 
analogy with the Stoic technical term “distress” (λύπη). The word subsequently falls from favor in 
Cicero’s writing: it is used only twice in de Nat. De. (1.9, 2.70), once in de Div. (2.2), and once in de Off. 
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in the subjective sense of temporal continuity and a confrontation with the time of nature. In the 
ideal of Stoic apatheia and the various therapies that Cicero discusses in the material argument 
he likewise stresses the role that time plays in avoiding the onset of grief and in the successful 
application of treatment. As Englert and others have noted, Chrysippus’ interpretation of Stoic 
therapy, which involves restoring an individual’s voluntas by confronting the belief in an 
obligation to mourn, seems to be particularly favored by M.103 The content of the discussion in 
this book thus offers an individualized, theoretical, and therapeutic view that adheres to a 
normative prescription for grief: the aim of the ideal argument is to advocate for the extirpation 
of grief by means of the sage’s apatheia and the material argument offers philosophical therapies 
by which those who have already “come to grief” might resolve their suffering and restore a 
sense of self and time. As I discuss also in the final section, however, this therapeutic content 
must be understood within the dissociative form of the dialogue as a whole. The outcome of the 
philosophical exercise of grief that the Tusculans represent, while in some ways mirroring the 
normative processes that it considers, results not in the restoration of voluntas as “resolution” of 
grief, but in the transformation of this will into a form of “discernment”—a more general and 
 
(1.69). On the difficulty of consistently translating Cicero’s use of aegritudo in Tusc., see Graver 2002: 
xxxviii, “The word aegritudo is used in book 3 especially for distress at the death of a loved one, what 
3.81 calls ‘that one type of distress which is the most grievous of all’; in book 4, however, aegritudo is 
used only in its broad generic sense (as at 4.14), distress specifically at bereavement being called luctus.” 
Graver’s solution to the problem—to translate aegritudo generically throughout—suppresses the 
importance of Cicero’s own experience of grief for the development of the argument in the Tusculans. 
Thus, as in the previous chapter on “doubt,” there is some difficulty in identifying a single Latin term that 
encompasses the various expressions of grief that can be found in Cicero’s writing and are discussed in 
this chapter. 
103 For Cicero’s specific references to Chrysippus in the third and fourth books, see 3.52, 3.59, 3.61, 3.76, 
3.79, 4.23, 4.53, and 4.69; cf. Graver 2002: 203-14 for a consideration of Chrysippus as a source for these 
books. On M.’s preference, see White 1995; Englert 2017: 56-7.   
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“human” understanding of voluntas that embraces rather than restores the divergent temporal 
frames manifested by loss.  
 Just prior to the point in Tusc. 3 where M. turns aside from the ideal argument that the 
sage should never feel grief, the speaker puts forward a Stoic definition of λύπη as his preferred 
understanding of “distress” (aegritudo) precisely because of its consideration of temporality:  
Satis dictum esse arbitror aegritudinem esse opinionem mali praesentis, in qua opinione 
illud insit, ut aegritudinem suscipere oporteat. Additur ad hanc definitionem a Zenone 
recte, ut illa opinio praesentis mali sit recens. Hoc autem verbum sic interpretantur, ut 
non tantum illud recens esse velint, quod paulo ante acciderit, sed quam diu in illo 
opinato malo vis quaedam insit, ut vigeat et habeat quandam viriditatem, tam diu 
appelletur recens. Ut Artemisia illa, Mausoli Cariae regis uxor, quae nobile illud 
Halicarnasi fecit sepulcrum, quam diu vixit, vixit in luctu eodemque etiam confecta 
contabuit. Huic erat illa opinio cotidie recens; quae tum denique non appellatur recens, 
cum vetustate exaruit.  
 
Enough has been said, I think, to establish that distress is the belief of a present evil in 
which belief inheres a sense of obligation to feel sorrow. It was added rightly by Zeno to 
this definition that this belief of a present evil is fresh. But by this word the Stoics 
interpret not only that it is recent, in the sense that it happened a little while ago, but also 
that for as long as a certain force inheres in this conceived evil so that it has vigor and a 
certain greenness, so long can it be called fresh. For instance, that Artemisia, the wife of 
the king of Caria Mausolus, who built that noble tomb at Halicarnasus, for as long as she 
lived, she lived in grief and finished her days in the same state until she was consumed. 
For her this belief was fresh every day; and it finally is no longer called fresh when it 
shrivels up from old age.104  
 
As a part of the Stoic classification of the four genus-type emotions, “distress” (aegritudo) is a 
“belief” (opinio), as all “passions” are conceived, about the presentness of an “evil” (malum).105 
In the case of distress at the death of a loved one, this basic judgment is sustained by an ancillary 
belief that it is an obligation to feel “distress” or “grief” (aegritudinem suscipere oporteat)—i.e., 
 
104 3.74-75.  
105 On the Stoic system of the passions, see Inwood 1985: 127-81; Nussbaum 1987 and 1994; and Graver 
2002. 
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that it is socially expected and morally correct to feel and express the presence of the perceived 
malum.  
 To this basic definition, Zeno “rightly” (recte) adds that the belief in a present evil must 
be “fresh,” which Cicero translates as recens from the Greek πρόσφατος.106 As Inwood explains 
concerning the Stoic theory, “The most important fact about this fresh opinion is that, for both 
Zeno and Chrysippus, it does not refer primarily to a temporal recentness of the object about 
which the opinion is made, but rather to the fact that a fresh opinion is one which still has a 
certain kind of force for the agent…In terms of the psychology of action, we may explain the 
fresh opinion as assent to the proposition that such and such a state of affairs is the appropriate 
sort of thing to have this or that affective reaction to.”107 For a Stoic theory of the passion 
“distress,” “freshness” has much more to do with a continued psychological assent to a 
proposition than with the chronological “recentness” of a trauma. In M.’s definition, this 
understanding of “freshness” is communicated in the vital and even vegetal metaphors that he 
uses to describe the “certain force [that] inheres in this conceived evil so that it has vigor and a 
certain greenness (vis quaedam insit, ut vigeat et habeat quandam viriditatem). Likewise, he 
envisions that the recens opinio finally loses its force “when it shrivels with old age” (cum 
vetustate exaruit). Yet Cicero’s choice of translation activates something latent in this Stoic 
conception: while the Greek word πρόσφατος relies on a metaphor of decomposition—its basic 
 
106 For sources and commentary on the original Greek definition, see Inwood 1985: 150 and Graver 2002: 
117-20. On Cicero’s choice of recens, cf. significantly Ter. Adelph. 311-12, where Geta says, “I want 
nothing more than to run into the whole lot of them so that I can pour out all my anger on them while my 
aegritudo is still recens (nil est quod malim quam illam totam familiam dari mi obviam / ut ego iram hanc 
in eos evomam omnem, dum aegritudo haec est recens). Given the prominence of citations of Terence in 
Tusc. 3 it is hard not to feel the influence of this passage in Cicero’s choice of translation. 
107 Inwood 1985: 147-48.  
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meaning is “freshly slain,” “not yet decomposed”108—Cicero’s choice of recens emphasizes 
rather the newness of the belief. What is πρόσφατος has only been temporarily suspended in an 
inevitable process of decomposition; it looks forward to its destruction. Conversely, what is 
recens has only just come into existence; it looks back toward its origin.109 It is the proximity of 
the belief to its origin that matters for Cicero and this proximity, in turn, affects the subjective 
sense of time.  
 The fact that we are meant to understand the effect of grief, at least in part, as a disruption 
of a subjective sense of time is made clear in the example of Artemisia. After the death of 
Mausolus, Artemisia lives “daily” with her “fresh belief” (Huic erat illa opinio cotidie recens). 
For as long as she lived her very presentness was defined by the presence of her husband’s 
absence (quam diu vixit, vixit in luctu). Her own body is consumed and rots away (contabuit), 
but she remains in the same state (in luctu eodemque etiam confecta) until the very end of her 
life. Biological time moves forward around her, but her own sense of temporal sequence and 
structure is determined by the recentness imposed by her grief. Artemisia’s contact with death 
profoundly interrupts her subjective sense of time as it was priorly constituted. Her grief creates 
its own presentness by binding her to a past moment—whether as it was actually or belatedly 
experienced. This re-tethering of presentness to the recens opinio defines the temporality of 
grief.  
 
108 In non-philosophical contexts, πρόσφατος is used especially of corpses that have been impossibly 
protected from decay through divine intervention (Il. 24.757; cf. Hdt 2.89 on embalming) and meat that 
has not been preserved in salt (Diod. Sic. 3.31). In both cases, the view is toward the suspended, but 
inevitable final decomposition of the organic matter. 
109 See Walde-Hofmann 1938: ii.423-4, ‘frisch…neu, jung’ (opp. vetus); ‘unmittelbar nach; jüngst 
unlängst’…als re-cen-t (re- wie in renidere).” The shift in perspective is marked clearly by the change in 
prefix: πρόσ- to re-.  
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 As Englert astutely notes, the parallels between Artemisia’s story and Cicero’s own 
melancholic reactions to Tullia’s death assimilate their experiences.110 Her construction of “that 
noble tomb at Halicarnassus” (nobile illud Halicarnasi fecit sepulcrum) enacts in extremis 
Cicero’s fantasy of a return to the sinus following the death of Tullia. Notably, this fantasy is 
expressed in his letters to Atticus by the never-fulfilled desire to divinize his lost daughter 
through the erection of a shrine (fanum).111 For Englert, however, through this pairing of the 
sepulcrum that was built and the fanum that was not, Artemisia serves as a contrastive exemplary 
figure. He argues that M. introduces this story in order to look back on Cicero’s initial 
experience of grief and to demonstrate how, with the help of philosophical therapy, he had been 
able to overcome the consequences of contact with death. Artemisia is thus conceived of as a 
negative exemplum, who helps Cicero to gauge his progress along a normative trajectory from 
unresolved grief to resolution. It is notable, however, that M. does not offer this commentary on 
the story explicitly; instead, he seems to offer Artemisia as an example simply to demonstrate 
that some experiences of grief are never resolved: he sums up the anecdote with a reassertion that 
“For her this belief was fresh every day” (Huic erat illa opinio cotidie recens), before ever 
considering the possibility that a recens belief might fade into old age (vetustas). Confronted 
suddenly by the primacy of natural chronology as revealed in the death of her husband, she loses 
 
110 Englert 2017 reads this passage from the normative perspective that in the Tuculans M. is commenting 
on Cicero’s earlier experience of grief and demonstrating the resolution of his bereavement process; see, 
e.g., 58,  “While writing the Tusculan Disputations, Cicero came to see in Artemisia a sad image of his 
own predicament if he had built the fanum and, as he had planned, lived out the rest of his life in its 
shadow. Artemisia represents an almost dystopian vision of Cicero’s earlier plans for the fanum. She 
shows that no matter how glorious the monument one builds, and how famous it becomes, it does not 
necessarily help one’s grief to go away. In fact, far from bringing him peace, Cicero came to realize that it 
might keep his grief, or as he had called it at Att. 12, 18 (SB 254), his vulnus, always fresh (recens) and 
thus never allow him fully to get over it.”  
111 See above, n.51; on the religious aspect of Cicero’s plans to build a fanum, see also Boyancé 1944.  
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the ability to construct a viable subjective sense of time. Instead, she erects “that noble tomb” in 
order to maintain a space—like Cicero’s various fantasy-places—in which the only temporality 
is the “recentness” of her grief.  
 It is true that Cicero, unlike Artemisia, never fulfilled his desire to construct a physical 
shrine for Tullia to which he might tether his “presentness.”112 He may, however, be understood 
to have transformed this desire into the work of philosophy within which Artemisia and her tomb 
are themselves enclosed.113 As a way of dealing with grief and its temporal incongruities, tombs 
and entombment hold a highly ambiguous place in the Tusculans. At the beginning of M.’s ideal 
argument in book 1, for instance, tomb burial provides anthropological evidence for the survival 
of the soul after death (see e.g., 1.13, 27, 29). Yet, at the close of the first day’s discussion, the 
speaker returns to the theme of funeral rites to argue that, in fact, the arbitrariness of such 
cultural practices suggests only that they have nothing to do with the dead—burial customs can 
offer no insight into the experience of death, only the coping mechanisms of the living.114 
 
112 On the inconclusiveness of Cicero’s plans for the fanum from a perspective that allows for a more 
melancholic experience of grief, see esp. Martelli 2016: 418, “His mourning for her expresses a mourning 
for other lost objects: for his place within and connection to the world of meaning that was that order, or, 
rather, for a memory of wholeness within this res publica (that never actually was). And the strange shape 
that Cicero’s mourning takes in this book [ad Att. 12]—namely, his obsessive preoccupation with 
building a religious shrine to Tullia to the exclusion of virtually all other concerns—demonstrates a need 
to lend concrete form to the emptiness of his desire for that prior state of belonging.” 
113 On the specific idea that Cicero’s philosophical works stand in for or supplant the fanum in Cicero’s 
mourning-work, see esp. Altman 2016: 101-23, who focuses in particular on the de Finibus; but see also 
his reading of the Tusc. which stresses the submerged influence of the loss of Tullia, esp. 2016: 127-57. 
Cf. for a slightly different approach, Fuhrmann 1992: 57 and White 1995: 223-5, who argue along similar 
lines that Cicero’s transformation from a statesman to self-styled philosopher occurs through his 
bereavement. This notion has been criticized in recent historicist work that emphasizes the political 
function of the philosophica to the exclusion of considerations of his grief; see, e.g., Baraz 2012: esp. 86-
95.  
114 See 1.108; the list includes Egyptian and Persian embalming practices as well as the more “alien” 
customs of the Magi and Hyrcanians.  
 224 
Likewise, in a translated passage from Plato’s Phaedo, Cicero recalls Socrates’ disdainful 
response to Crito when the latter asked “how he wished to be buried” (quem ad modem sepeliri 
vellet): “Indeed have I wasted much effort since I have not convinced our dear Crito that when I 
fly away from here I will leave nothing of myself behind.”115 Yet, in a metaphorical usage that 
summarizes the ideal/Stoic argument in book 2, M. urges that, “either courage must be lost or 
pain must be entombed” (amittenda igitur fortitudo est aut sepeliendus dolor, 2.32). This image 
of the corpus as a tomb for pain ironically elevates the Socratic notion of the body as a “prison” 
for the soul to the level of a highest philosophical ideal.116 Thus, the Stoic sage’s bodily 
indifference to human pain, while fortifying and efficacious in preserving courage in the face of 
physical harm, risks becoming a “tomb” in its own right.117 Taken together, therefore, these 
examples of tombs in the text demonstrate a concern about the false sense of certainty and 
finality that such structures represent emotionally and philosophically. Like Artemisia’s tomb or 
the arbitrary cultural practices of burial, Stoic apatheia holds out the enticing possibility of 
finality, which cannot be sustained in the everyday and must, in turn, be “opened up.”  
 Drawing both from Englert’s reading and the ambivalence towards entombment within 
the text itself, we can see that Artemisia and her sepulcrum encapsulate in a single exemplum 
both the dangers of confronting the death of a loved one without philosophical therapy and, 
 
115 multam vero, inquit, operam, amici, frustra consumpsi; Critoni enim nostro non persuasi me hinc 
avolaturum neque mei quidquam relicturum, 1.103. Cf. Phd. 115c-d.  
116 For the Socratic image, see esp. Phd. 82e and 92a; cf. Olshewsky 1976.  
117 Cf. Thorsrud 2008, who contends that, in contrast to the Stoic argument that the error which causes a 
misapprehension of indifferents arises from “believing something to be genuinely good or bad when in 
fact it is not,” Cicero’s goal in the Tusculans is to demonstrate that “there is another sort of error…: 
thinking one knows what in fact he does not. Thus Cicero promotes a Socratic medicine that works by 
eliminating the vigorous opinion that some object is worthy of pursuit or avoidance, when in fact it is not” 
(184). This “Socratic medicine” is identifiable with Philo’s “therapeutic” stage of ethical teaching; for this 
reading, see Koch 2006: 82-164, esp. 119-36 on book 3.  
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furthermore, the alluring temptation of thinking that, perhaps even with therapy, a normative 
resolution of grief can always be achieved. I think it would be a mistake to acknowledge, as 
Englert does, the first warning and not to consider the second, more complex, concern about the 
lure of certainty and closure in grief. With regard to the painful experiences of life Cicero is 
equally as wary of the temptation to be persuaded—to give up on the drive of doubt—as he is 
with regard to the epistemological quandaries of the Lucullus or the ethical ends of de Finibus.118 
The Tusculans may advocate, at times, for apatheia and for philosophical therapies, but 
importantly they also, in their dedication to divergent possibilities and arguments, never pursue 
these paths towards normative resolution outside of a philosophical exercise of grief that 
embraces the variability and inconclusiveness of human experience. This dedication to the 
philosophical exercise of grief rather than its therapeutic resolution means that its outcome will 
not be final, certain, or resolved. Thus, in a significant way, Cicero’s incorporation of his loss of 
Tullia as loss into the Tusculans demonstrates a trajectory of grief that looks more like 
Artemisia’s than Englert’s reading allows. At the very least, the “recentness” of the text, if not 
also Cicero’s personal experience, is tethered to the absence of Tullia as a lost object, just as 
Artemisia lives day to day (cotidie) “the same” in grief. If we accept this parallel between 
Artemisia’s tomb and the Tuculans themselves, the question, which I consider in the next 
section, then becomes, what is the outcome of Cicero’s philosophical incorporation of grief in 
the Tusculans? If it is not a resolution, what does it look like? 
 Before turning to this question, I consider briefly the ideal and material arguments of 
book 3 and examine how both respond to the concerns made evident in the exemplum of 
 
118 See above, Chs. 1 and 2.  
 226 
Artemisia: the temporal manifestations of grief and the problematization of resolution as the 
outcome of grief. 
 The “ideal” argument of book 3 is focused primarily on the sage’s ability to adequately 
consider and foresee all events of fortune that might befall him. M. introduces this idea in 
response to the Cyrenaic position that the source of mental distress comes from the unexpected 
nature of an evil (Cyrenaici non omni malo aegritudinem effici censent, sed insperato et 
necopinato malo, 28).119 While M. disagrees that unexpectedness is the true source for aegritudo, 
he nevertheless acknowledges that “all sudden events seem more serious” (videntur enim omnia 
repentina graviora)—a consequence of “suddenness” that can be avoided by careful forethought 
and consideration of all possibilities. M.’s defense of the praemeditatio futurorum malorum as a 
central aspect of the sage’s immunization from aegritudo shapes the ideal argument especially 
through M.’s opposition to the Epicurean approach.120 He contends that, “they wrongly censure 
the consideration of future evils. For there is nothing that so blunts and alleviates distress than 
the continual life-long consideration (perpetua in omni vita cogitatio) that there is nothing that 
cannot happen, and meditation on the human condition (mediatio condicionis humanae), and 
mental preparation for obeying the law of life (vitae lex), which does not make it so that we are 
always gloomy, but that we are never.”121 According to M., Epicurean doctrine, by forbidding 
 
119 On the Cyrenaic approach to grief, see esp. Annas 1993: 227-36 for an overview.  
120 See 29, Haec igitur praemeditatio futurorum malorum lenit eorum adventum, quae venientia longe 
ante videris. For M.’s lengthy rebuttal to the Epicurean approach to grief, see 32-51. On the relationship 
between Cyrenaic and Epicurean positions in the text and more generally, see Graver 2002: 195-201. For 
Cicero’s complex antipathy to Epicurean positions across the dialogues, see above, Ch. 1, section IV and 
below Ch. 4, section III.i. 
121 34, principio male reprehendunt praemeditationem rerum futurarum. Nihil est enim quod tam 
obtundat elevetque aegritudinem quam perpetua in omni vita cogitatio nihil esse, quod non accidere 
possit, quam meditatio condicionis humanae, quam vitae lex commentatioque parendi, quae non hoc 
adfert, ut semper maereamus, sed ut numquam. 
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the contemplation of future evils, in fact, denies its practitioners the most powerful technique for 
proleptically excising the harmful effects of grief. 
 The perfect exercise of praemeditatio renders the sage immune to the temporal 
disturbances of grief and preserves a seamless sense of temporal continuity in life (perpetua in 
omni vita) through the constant consideration of “the human condition” (meditatio condicionis 
humanae) and “the law of life” (vitae lex).122 Indeed, M. asserts that, “Nearly the same 
consequence seems to happen for those who take consideration beforehand as those whom the 
passage of days heals, except that an exercise of reason heals the former while nature on its own 
suffices for the latter (et mihi quidem videtur idem fere accidere iis, qui ante meditantur, quod 
iis, quibus medetur dies, nisi quod ratio quaedam sanat illos, hos ipsa natura, 58). By exercising 
reason (ratio) in order to “consider beforehand” (ante meditantur) all future possibilities, the 
sage forestalls the temporal collapse that threatens to suspend the mourner in the recentness of 
his grief. This incorporation of the time of grief into an exercise of ratio ensures temporal 
continuity regardless of the events or calamities that befall the sage: ratio supplants the unaided 
passage of time (dies).  
 The sage’s super-human ability to foresee future events and to incorporate the 
temporality of grief into the seamless duration of his life is juxtaposed to the material argument 
that considers therapeutic approaches for those who are not sages and, therefore, will inevitably 
come to grief at some point in life. As in book 1, M. develops the sustaining tension between 
ideal and material arguments with explicit references to Cicero’s Consolatio. These reference to 
his experience of grief preserve the dissociation of the argument and maintain the connection of 
 
122 On this strategy of praemeditatio in Seneca, see esp. Hadot 1969: 60-3. On the condicio humana and 
lex vitae, see also below, section V.  
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the text to its lost object. At the beginning of the comprehensive list of medicinae in 
consolationibus, for instance, M. recalls that at the time of writing the Consolatio, “my soul was 
swollen and I attempted every type of cure for it” (erat enim in tumore animus et omnis in eo 
temptabatur curatio, 76).123 The attempted cures that M. goes on to list are gathered from every 
school of philosophy that has already been considered in book 3: a Stoic treatment, like the one 
advocated by Cleanthes, aims to convince the mourner that “the evil does not exist at all” 
(docere malum illud omnino non esse, 76), the Peripatetic approach seeks simply to alleviate the 
sense of magnitude (non magnum malum), the Epicurean method distracts the sufferer by 
focusing only on the good (abducant a malis ad bona), the Cyrenaics attempt to show that 
“nothing unexpected had occurred” (ostendere nihil inopinati accidisse), and, finally, 
Chrysippus’ refinement of the Stoic approach emphasizes the importance of removing a sense of 
obligation from mourning. 
 As noted above, throughout his speech M. seems to single out Chrysippus’ therapeutic 
approach as of special interest and, possibly, efficacy.124 Chrysippus represents a modified 
version of the strongly normative mode of Stoic therapy, the aim of which is to “entirely root out 
[distress/grief] by disentangling is cause” (tota poterit evelli, explicata…causa aegritudinis, 61). 
Thus, like other Stoics, Chrysippus is interested in treating emotions as beliefs—judgements of 
the rational faculty that assent to certain kinds of propositions. In the case of grief, as with the 
 
123 The other explicit reference to the Consolatio in book 3 comes at 70, marking another transitional 
passage, in this instance between the discussion of Chrysippean Stoic therapy and Crantor’s more 
tempered approach, see below, section V.  
124 Aside from any connection to Cicero’s own battles with grief, this prominence in the text may be due 
to the author’s use of Chrysippus’ On Emotions as a primary source for both books 3 and 4. For a 
consideration of this possibility, with parallels drawn from Galen PHP, see Graver 2002: 203-14. For a 
proposed reconstruction of this lost work, which was highly influential in the consolatory tradition, see 
Tieleman 2003: esp. 288-320 for a thorough discussion of the Ciceronian evidence.  
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other passions, however, the faculty of reason is misapprehending the presence of an evil, instead 
of grasping the truth of the impression. For all Stoics, therefore, the treatment of the passions is 
essentially aimed at restoring the rational faculty to itself; i.e., the treatment of grief, like grief 
itself, is an exercise in reason and judgement. As a modification of this approach, Chrysippus’ 
therapy acknowledges that in the throes of distress (λύπη), which he defines etymologically in 
Greek as a “dissolution of the whole person,”125 the sufferer will likely not be susceptible to the 
kind of rational argument that would bring about a resolute “disentangling of the cause” of 
grief.126 Chrysippean therapy aims instead at guiding the sufferer to resolve primarily or at least 
initially (caput) the ancillary belief that the activity of grieving or mourning “is a duty justly and 
rightly performed” (se officio fungi putet iusto atque debito).127 The “removal” (detrahere) of 
this ancillary belief may, in turn, allow the sufferer to be accessible to rational argument, which 
would eventually result in the final disentangling of reason from grief.128  
 
125 61, ex quo ipsam aegritudinem λύπην Chrysippus, quasi solutionem totius hominis appellatam putat.  
126 On the “excessive impulsiveness” of sufferers, see the vivid Chrysippean image recorded by Galen 
PHP 4.6.35 of angry people who “are like those persons at the races who are carried forward through 
what is excessive [in their impulse]: in the one case [the impulse is] contrary to one’s impulse in running; 
in the other, contrary to one’s own reason” (trans. Graver 2002: 208). The importance of the ancillary 
belief for treatment of sufferers who may not be susceptible to rational argument is attested clearly at 
Orig. Contr. Cels. 8.51 = SVF 3.474, “during the critical period (kairos) of the inflammation one should 
not waste one’s efforts over the belief that preoccupies the person stirred by emotion, lest we ruin the cure 
which is opportune by lingering at the wrong moment over the refutation of the beliefs which preoccupy 
the mind” (trans. Graver 2002: 212-3). 
127 76, Chrysippus autem caput esse censet in consolando detrahere illam opinionem maerenti, si se 
officio fungi putet iusto atque debito. On Cicero’s characterization of consolation as an officium in the 
letters, see Zehnacker 1985.  
128 On the strong normativity of Chrysippus’ approach, see esp. the comparisons that Cicero attributes to 
him that equate conditions of the mind with conditions (e.g., illnesses) of the body, 4.23, 4.30-1; cf. 3.7 
and esp. Galen PHP 5.22-4 = SVF 3.471.  
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 Apart from any special significance that Chrysippus’ approach may hold in the text or in 
the author’s own experience, M. stresses that in the event of coming to grief—for all those who 
are not sages—no one treatment will be sufficient. Starting from the “every cure” (omnis 
curatio) that Cicero attempted on himself in his Consolatio, the material argument embraces the 
perspective that every person may require a different therapeutic combination or sequence. M. 
insists that “the duties of the consolers are to tear out distress root and branch—or to soothe it 
and diminish it as much as possible, or to stop its spread and not let it seep in deeper or to divert 
its energies onto other things” (haec igitur officia sunt consolantium, tollere aegritudinem 
funditus aut sedare aut detrahere quam plurimum aut supprimere nec pati manare longius aut ad 
alia traducere, 75-76). This conceptualization of responsibility to others’ grief extends far 
beyond the strictures of the ideal argument or any particular doctrinal approach to therapy.129 
Consolation is conceived as an exercise in empathetically responding to the particular nature of 
an individual’s suffering and arriving at a course of treatment that addresses the material 
manifestations of grief.  
 Key among these material manifestations is, of course, temporality. Regardless of which 
course of treatment is applied, “we must consider time no less in relation to diseases of the mind 
than those of the body” (sed sumendum tempus est non minus in animorum morbis quam in 
corporum, 76). As an illustration of the importance of timeliness in addressing grief, M. adduces 
a short exchange from Aeschylus’ Prometheus Bound: in response to Oceanus’ assertion that 
“speech can heal anger” (mederi posse orationem iracundiae), Prometheus clarifies, “Only if 
there is someone to apply a timely cure who doesn’t aggravate the wound with a biting hand” (Si 
 
129 See e.g., M.’s rebuttal of the Stoic approach: “Cleanthes consoles the sage who does not need any 
consolation” (Nam Cleanthes quidem sapientem consolatur, qui consolatione non eget, 77).  
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quidem qui tempestivam medicinam admovens / non adgravescens vulnus illidat manu).130 M. 
furthermore concludes his discussion of the Chrysippean approach with an expression of concern 
that it is “the most secure with regard to truth, but difficult with regard to the time of grief” 
(Chrysippi ad veritatem firmissima est, ad tempus aegritudinis difficilis, 79). Chrysippean 
therapy places the responsibility of choosing the consolatory approach most suited “to time” or 
“to opportunity” (ad tempus) squarely on the consoler, who must recognize the emotional state 
of the sufferer and respond accordingly.  
 Yet, read in a slightly different way, this brief critique of the Chrysippean approach 
condenses the dilemma around which the entire argumentative structure of the discussion turns: 
the coherent and convincing positions put forward by Chrysippus and the Stoics seem in the 
abstract to border closest on “truth” (ad veritatem firmissima), but they are difficult to render in 
the material—that is, temporal—conditions of human life (ad tempus…difficilis). Consequently, 
a philosophical exercise of grief cannot dispense with either perspective. Time is the stratum of 
material experience that philosophy struggles to grasp and form in its own image; conversely, 
from within the experience of time, humanity strives in vain to accomplish the ideals of 
philosophy.131  
 
130 Cf. Aesch. Prom. Vinct. 379-82. On Cicero’s use of dramatic quotations in book 3, see Caston 2015: 
143-48.  
131 In this regard, one of M.’s chief pieces of evidence in favor of the material argument—that not only is 
grief an inevitable part of human experience, sometimes it is also justified and necessary—is an otherwise 
unattested story about Alcibiades (possibly extrapolated from Plato Symp. 215e-216c; cf. Graver 2002: ad 
loc.). In opposition to the Cleanthean Stoic contention that all distress arises from “foolishness” (stultitia) 
and a misapprehension of what is truly evil, M. argues, “It seems to me that Cleanthes does not recognize 
well enough that sometimes distress arises from that very thing that even he himself admits is the greatest 
evil. For what shall we say—when Socrates had convinced Alcibiades, as we are told, that he was in no 
way a real man nor was there any difference between him, despite his lofty birth, and any pathetic mule, 
and when Alcibiades then was shattered and weeping begged Socrates to teach him virtue and to drive off 
his shamefulness, what shall we say, Cleanthes? Surely not that in this cause that made Alcibiades feel 
distress there was no true evil? (Et tamen non satis mihi videtur vidisse hoc Cleanthes, suscipi aliquando 
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 The expositional content of the material argument thus pertains to the reestablishment of 
a sense of subjective temporality through the timely treatment of grief. The effect of timely or 
“opportune” treatment on the temporality of grief is indicated in the metaphor that concludes the 
final statement of the material argument. This comparison aligns an effective application of 
philosophical therapy with a convincing forensic argument. M. says, “It’s no wonder, then, that 
in court cases (in causis) we do not always use the same construction (eodem statu)—for we 
refer thus to the types of argument—but we take into account the time, the nature of the dispute, 
and the character of those involved (ad tempus, ad controversiae naturam, ad personam); in just 
this same way with regard to alleviating distress we must consider how each individual person 
will be able to receive each type of cure.”132 The explicit analogy reiterates the need to take into 
account the timeliness of treatment in order for it to be successful in alleviating distress. Yet, 
within the comparison to “court cases” (in causis) itself, there is an implicit comment on the 
“constitution” (status) of the mourner. In this context status is used as a translation of the Greek 
στάσις to refer to the technical legal framing of a point of order.133 Yet, as we saw above in 
 
aegritudinem posse ex eo ipso, quod esse summum malum Cleanthes ipse fatebatur. Quid enim dicemus, 
cum Socrates Alcibiadi persuasisset, ut accepimus, eum nihil hominis esse nec quidquam inter 
Alcibiadem summo loco natum et quemvis baiulum interesse, cum se Alcibiades adflictaret lacrimansque 
Socrati supplex esset, ut sibi virtutem traderet turpitudinemque depelleret, quid dicemus, Cleanthe? num 
in illa re, quae aegritudine Alcibiadem adficiebat, mali nihil fuisse, 77). This story compresses several of 
the most important aspects of the material argument: the difficulty of students of philosophy to attain the 
ideals of philosophy within life, the inevitability of grief, and a certain perception or insight that 
accompanies melancholic grief. On the latter, cf. Freud’s discussion of the clarity of self-perception and 
knowledge afforded to the melancholic, see section I.  
132 79, nimirum igitur, ut in causis non semper utimur eodem statu—sic enim appellamus controversiarum 
genera—, sed ad tempus, ad controversiae naturam, ad personam accommodamus, sic in aegritudine 
lenienda quam quisque curationem recipere possit videndum est. 
133 For Cicero’s only other use of the word in a rhetorical sense, where it has the even more specific 
meaning of a refutatio accusationis, see Top. 93-4. The common forensic sense in Latin is developed later 
by Quint., e.g., Inst. 3.6.  
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Chapter 1, status is more commonly used in the philosophical texts of this period to denote the 
durative structures that make up a lifetime.134 What is at stake in the timely application of 
philosophical therapy as in the appropriate choice of legal argument is the status—the durative 
whole that is defined by “time, nature, and persona.” Just as the choice of a status ensures a 
successful court case, kairotic therapy restores a coherent status to the mourner, allowing him to 
overcome the temporal disturbances of grief that threaten to redefine entirely, as it did for 
Artemisia, a subjective sense of time.  
V. A Will to Grieve 
 If a normative treatment of grief results in such a restoration of the mourner’s status and 
sense of subjective time, what is the outcome of Cicero’s philosophical exercise of grief? If we 
resist reading through the dissociative multiplicity of the arguments of the Tusculans to impose a 
singular trajectory from unresolved grief to its resolution, how can we understand the result of 
Cicero’s philosophical use of Tullia’s death? What sense of time and self awaits the melancholic 
philosopher? In heeding the warning against the lure of finality communicated by Artemisia’s 
story, the answer to these questions will not take a single, definitive form. Rather, as I have 
suggested above, the dissociative tension between the arguments of the dialogue is aimed at 
holding open and preserving access to the divergent temporal and existential frames produced by 
the melancholic experience of loss. In this section, therefore, I consider how we might conceive 
of the inconclusive outcome of this melancholic development. In particular, I examine the 
relationship between “will” (voluntas) and grief that Cicero sketches in Tusc. 3. If the normative 
treatment of grief restores the individual, through voluntas, to a cohesive subjective sense of self 
 
134 E.g., de Fin. 2.45, discussed Ch. 1, sections IV-V. It is notable that the other word used by Cicero (and 
later Seneca) to refer to the durative structures of a human life, constitutio, also has a significant forensic 
sense essentially the same as status. Cf. Inv. 1.8; Auct. Her. 1.11.  
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and time, then, I argue, a philosophical exercise of grief creates in voluntas a “discernment” of 
the different forms of temporality that touch upon human life universally. Importantly, this “dis-
cernment” does not collapse or conflate these temporalities but maintains, by means of the 
dissociative experience on which it is based, their distinction.  
 As a way of approaching this general, human voluntas, we must return to M.’s 
explication of Chrysippus’ innovations on Stoic therapy.135 In the discussion of Chrysippean 
treatment, M. diagnoses the desire for solitude (solitudo) as a clear symptom of the rootedness of 
aegritudo, which should instruct the consoler to focus on removing the ancillary belief that 
mourning is an obligation. As we saw in the example of Artemisia, M.’s incorporation of an 
aspect of his author’s own experience of grief into his argument might seem to indicate, first, that 
Cicero’s desire for solitude was, in fact, a manifestation of a melancholic (i.e., non-normative) 
response and, second, as would be suggested by Englert’s reading, that in the Tusculans the 
author is now aware of this aberrance from the norm and is reflecting on his success at removing 
the beliefs that had caused it:136  
Ex hoc evenit ut in animi doloribus alii solitudines captent, ut ait Homerus de 
Bellerophonte:  
Qui miser in campis maerens errabat Aleïs,  
Ipse suum cor edens, hominum vestigia vitans, 
et Nioba fingitur lapidea propter aeternum, credo, in luctu silentium; Hecubam autem 
putant propter animi acerbitatem quandam et rabiem fingi in canem esse conversam. Sunt 
autem alii, quos in luctu cum ipsa solitudine loqui saepe delectat, ut illa apud Ennium 
nutrix:  
Cupido cepit miseram nunc me proloqui 
Caelo atque terrae Medeaï miserias. 
 
 
135 For the longest continuous discussion on Chrysippus’ emphasis on the belief in a “duty” (officium) to 
grieve and its consequences, see 61-71. Chrysippus’ innovation is discussed above, section IV.  
136 On Cicero’s expressions of a desire for solitude following Tullia’s death, see above, Ch. 1, sections I 
and II. Although Englert does not comment on this resonance in the Tusculans, he begins his 
consideration of Cicero’s grief from his desire for solitude, see 2017: 41-51.  
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Because of this [feeling of obligation] some people seek out lonely places when their 
minds are in pain, as Homer says of Bellerophon:  
Wretchedly he wandered lamenting throughout the Aleian plain 
Eating his heart out alone and avoiding the footsteps of men 
And Niobe is rendered in stone, I believe, to represent her eternal silence in grief, while 
they think Hecuba is imagined to have been turned into a dog because of a certain 
bitterness and fury of the soul. There are other mourners who often take pleasure in 
conversing with solitude itself, like the nurse in Ennius:  
 A desire has seized me now in my misery to speak 
 with heaven and earth about the miseries of Medea.137  
 
The speaker of the dialogue here criticizes, on the one hand, “some people” who, when their 
minds are in pain (in animi doloribus alii), seek out solitude (solitudines captent)138 and avoid, 
like Bellerophon, the presence of other people (hominum vestigia vitans).139 These people, in 
their solitary stubbornness and silence, are likened to Niobe who, according to M., is transformed 
into stone precisely because of her unwillingness to vocalize and expel her grief at losing her 
children (propter aeternum…in luctu silentium).140 This first group of solitaries represents the 
extremity of melancholia: all of their energies are focused inwards, calcifying their grief and 
consuming their own vitality (suum cor edens).  
 Yet M. also specifically targets those mourners who “take pleasure in conversing with 
solitude itself” (quos in luctu cum ipsa solitudine loqui saepe delectat). This paradoxical 
formulation strikingly recalls Cicero’s own association between solitudo and sermo (ad Att. 
 
137 Tusc. 3.63.  
138 On Cicero’s use of the plural solitudines, “solitudes,” as “lonely places,” cf. de Rep. 6.20 and de Div. 
2.45 where the noun is modified by the clarifying adjectives vastae and desertae. With more ambiguity, 
see also ad Fam. II.16(154); ad Att. XI.9(220), XII.23 (262; discussed above, Ch. 1, section II), and 
XIII.16(323).  
139 For the translation, see Il. 6.201-2. Bellerophon is a pariah figure in the Iliad who grieves after 
becoming “hated by all the gods” (κεῖνος ἀπήχθετο πᾶσι θεοῖσιν, 6.200).  
140 M.’s view of Niobe recollects Achilles’ depiction of her in his speech to Priam at Il. 24.602-17, 
continuing the Homeric resonance of the passage.  
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XII.15) and the descriptions of his philosophical and writerly endeavor as conversation in or with 
solitude.141 Thus, Cicero’s speaker—the product of his own desire to “speak with solitude itself” 
(cum ipsa solitudine loqui)—delivers a rebuke to his creator. In this peculiar plaiting of the 
therapeutic and incorporative strands in the text’s treatment of grief, the self-awareness of M.’s 
relationship with his author is thrown into ironic relief: without Cicero’s desire to converse with 
solitude, there could be no character M. to chastise his author about time spent talking to 
solitude. M.’s critique of the melancholic’s desire to speak with solitude is the direct result—
even the “transcript” of—Cicero’s own conversation with solitudo.  
 M.’s choice of a passage from Ennius’ Medea Exul as an example of speaking with 
solitude complicates this textual interaction further.142 In this context, the quotation is striking, 
and in an attempt to understand why he introduces it to support his point I raise two questions: 
first, in M.’s implication that this line is related to a “conversation with solitude,” are we meant 
to understand the nurse in Ennius’ Medea as being alone on stage or addressing someone else? 
And, second, what is the connection between “speaking with solitude” and speaking “to heaven 
and earth”? With regard to the first question, Ennius’ Medea Exul is usually thought to adhere 
closely to the plot of Euripides’ Medea.143 In this case, M.’s citation of the line, which in its 
recontextualized application might seem to indicate that the Nurse is delivering these lines as a 
soliloquy, clashes with the staging of the Euripidean play.144 In the Euripidean version, of which 
 
141 On the connection between solitudo and sermo, See above, Ch. 1, section II.  
142 The Ennian citation is fr. 91 Goldberg-Manuwald = 106 Jocelyn.  
143 For a proposed reconstruction of the prologue, from which this quotation would be drawn, see Rosato 
2005: 48-9. Cf. the comments in Goldberg and Manuwald 2018: 92-3.  
144 Although it seems untenable as a reading, if we are meant to understand the Nurse in M.’s 
recontextualized rendering as delivering a kind of soliloquy, it is notable that this does not remove the 
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this line is a faithful rendering,145 the Nurse (Τροφός) is speaking onstage to the Teacher 
(Παιδαγωγός). Thus, in the reflection of this line back on Cicero’s experience, M. is assimilating 
his author to Medea’s Nurse, who expresses a desire to an onstage (but offstage in the Tusculans) 
Teacher that she wants to leave his presence and converse with nature.146 Furthermore, it is 
notable that the Nurse, unlike Bellerophon or Niobe, is not grieving over her own personal 
predicament or of the death of a relative. Instead, she is expressing her concern over her 
“mistress’s fate” (δεσποίνης τύχας, Eur. Med. 58), which places the Nurse in the position of the 
consoler more than mourner.147 M.’s choice of Ennian quotation, therefore, emphasizes the 
division of Cicero’s persona in the Tusculans, which is articulated especially by the offstage 
presence of the Teacher. Additionally, by extending the intertextual relation back from Ennius’ 
play back to Euripides’ Medea, M. literarily introduces the layering of voices within his 
discussion of solitude in a manner that mimics Cicero’s conception of solitudo as a convergent 
moment in which many presences meet, especially as a consolatory response to grief.  
 
underlying multiplicity of voices and texts that are achieved through the dramatic quotation: as a 
theatrical device, a soliloquy is far from a purely solipsistic and indulgent exercise in navel gazing 
because it establishes a direct connection between the innermost thoughts of a character and the audience. 
A soliloquy is solitary only in form; in function, it is a meeting and a focalization of various perspectives 
and voices.  
145 ἐγὼ γὰρ ἐς τοῦτ᾽ ἐκβέβηκ᾽ ἀλγηδόνος / ὥσθ᾽ ἵμερός μ᾽ ὑπῆλθε γῇ τε κοὐρανῷ / λέξαι μολούσῃ δεῦρο 
δεσποίνης τύχας, Eur. Med. 56-8.  
146 With reference to this division between the role of Nurse and Teacher as two archetypal figures of 
concern and care for the plight of Medea and her family, it is notable that in many interpretations the 
figure of M. is primarily thought of as a teacher to the student A. (see esp. Gildenhard 2007 passim). Thus 
in delivering this quotation in a rebuke to his author, M. is using the Ennian/Euripidean intertext to claim 
the position onstage of Παιδαγωγός, reflecting back and critiquing the Nurse’s/Cicero’s melancholic 
response from a pedagogic perspective.  
147 In the various versions of the drama, Medea’s Nurse usually holds a peripheral role in the events of the 
drama, yet functions as a character that can articulate and focalize for the audience Medea’s emotional 
struggles and frustrations in an empathetic manner. On the connection between the nurse and Medea’s 
interiority in the tradition (esp. Seneca), see Henry and Walker 1967: 173.  
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 These textual indications of the multiplicity of solitude are rendered succinctly in the 
content of the quotation, which speaks to the second question: what is the relationship between a 
“conversation with solitude” and the Nurse’s explicit desire? Again, contrary to what the context 
might seem to demand, the Nurse does not say that she wishes to speak with solitude about her 
own grief. Rather she expresses her desire to converse “with heaven and earth” about Medea’s 
lamentable situation (Cupido cepit miseram nunc me proloqui / Caelo atque terrae Medeaï 
miserias). Through the reference, therefore, M. draws an equation between solitude and the 
whole universe (caelo atque terrae), thereby realizing in his apparent critique of his author’s 
solipsistic and solitary proclivity the very empathetic and universal access that Cicero claims for 
his writerly pursuits in solitude. To put it simply, conversation with solitude is conceived of as 
speaking with nature, the elements, the heavens, the order of the world.  
 M.’s explicit intention in introducing these examples is to indicate the kind of self-
indulgent behavior in which mourners engage from the perspective of the normative ideal. In the 
Chrysippean view from which he is presently speaking a “conversation with solitude” is not a 
part of a therapeutic process, but is an expression of—and even an indulgence in—a misplaced 
belief in the propriety of mourning: “They do all these things believing, in their pain, that they 
are right true and obligatory” (haec omnia recta, vera, debita putantes faciunt in dolore, 64). Yet 
the peculiarities of M.’s example of speaking with solitude and Cicero’s own associations 
between solitude and literary production offer us instead an image of what the outcome of a 
philosophical exercise of grief might look like: what if, Cicero’s text asks, we could converse 
with solitude—that is, “with heaven and earth”—not as the manifestation of a pathological need 
to grieve, but as an act of true volition and ethical choice? The Tusculans themselves might be 
taken as the outcome of such a conversation: the emotional and intellectual will that produces 
 239 
them transforms a sermo cum solitudine from a melancholic indulgence into philosophical 
contemplation of the unthinkable aspects of human existence, time, and experience.148  
 The recuperation of will (voluntas) is precisely what is at stake in M.’s Chrysippean 
concern for the feelings of obligation that attach themselves to mourning.149 Indeed, he refers to 
this type of pathological grieving as “willful wretchedness” (miseria voluntaria, 3.32).150 To 
expel this miseria, therefore, means to recover one’s voluntas for oneself and to turn it toward 
other, non-pathological, emotions, actions, and goals. Yet M. stresses that the misattribution of 
 
148 In M.’s consideration of Stoic therapy, the importance of voluntas is not only evident in overcoming 
the passions, but also for the defending the possibility that the sage can turn his judgement and properly 
functioning reason toward a true grasp of and rational control over emotional impulses. For Cicero’s 
explicit discussion of the “consistencies” (eupatheia or constantia), see 4.10-14; cf. Inwood 1985: esp. 
173-5; Brennan 1998: esp. 31-5 and 54-7; Graver 2002: 134-39; and Thorsrud 2008. Stoic eupatheia are 
movements of the rational mind that are analogous to yet categorically different from the irrational 
movements caused by the passions. It is notable, however, that the Stoics do not theorize a corresponding 
consistency to the passion of distress. There is no “present evil” for the Stoic sage that can ever be 
grasped through the proper functioning of his reason. See Graver 2002: 137, “the consistencies are 
directed only at those objects or states of affairs which are either genuinely good in Stoicism…or in the 
case of caution [the consistency of an impending evil] genuinely bad…This interpretation is confirmed by 
the absence of any consistency directed at present evils, since genuine evils (i.e., moral failings in the 
self) are excluded by definition from the best human life. To such commonly supposed evils as 
bereavement or poverty, as to all indifferents, the wise person will have no response except for the short-
lived and morally insignificant ‘pre-emotion’ which is produced without assent.” This intentional gap in 
Stoic theory might provide another conceptual access point for understanding Cicero’s transformation of 
grief into philosophy through voluntas. I am not suggesting that M. explicitly argues for a corresponding 
eupatheia for distress, but that this gap helps to orient the divergent perspectives that he offers on the 
relation between voluntas and grief: through these divergences the text opens up an understanding of grief 
as an exercise of volition in a way that would be impossible for the Stoics.  
149 On the contentions surrounding Cicero’s use of voluntas and its connection to a post-Augustinian 
notion of “will,” see esp. Begley 1988, who argues for continuity between Cicero and Augustine and 
arrives at the definition: “a desire or inclination arising from within, undetermined by natural 
temperament, external compulsion, or the demands of an obligation.” On the relationship between 
Cicero’s and Augustine’s voluntas, see esp. Byers 2006: 187-8 and, with a greater focus on Augustine, 
Frede 2011: 153-74. See Dihle 1982: 132-134 (w. extensive bibliography at n.66) for an attempt to 
catalogue the Greek terms translated by Cicero with voluntas.  
150 Similar uses, which Graver 2002: 112 argues are renderings of the Stoic tag “what is up to us” (τὰ ἐφ᾽ 
ἡμῖν), are found at 3.64, 66, 71, 80, 83; cf. the use of voluntas at 4.12 to translate βούλησις as one of the 
eupatheiai; compare further, however, 4.34, 65, 76, 79, 82, 83. Cicero expands the semantic range of 
voluntas to cover a variety of Greek terms, see esp. Begley 1988 passim.  
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voluntas in “willful wretchedness” is deeply ingrained in human social interaction. In particular, 
the speaker repudiates the tendency to use grief to police the expression of emotions in others: he 
calls out for particular blame “mothers and teachers” who “punish children not only with words, 
but even with whips, if in the midst of domestic grief they do or say anything a bit too cheerfully, 
and force them to weep” (pueros vero matres et magistri castigare etiam solent, nec verbis 
solum, sed etiam verberibus, si quid in domestico luctu hilarius ab iis factum est aut dictum, 
plorare cogunt, 64). These forms of punishment condition us to feel the obligation to mourn 
more than to recognize our own voluntas, and thus a more consistent connection between our 
emotions and experience.  
 In addition to this societal tendency to exert external control over an individual’s 
emotional responses, M. also emphasizes that a self-imposed dedication to “wretchedness” also 
perverts the voluntas, and can, furthermore, prevent the individual from recognizing and 
responding to the demands of his circumstance. Drawing again a quotation from drama—this 
time Roman comedy151—M. contends that a retrospective clarity follows grief, which reveals 
this impotence:  
Ipsa remissio luctus cum est consecuta intellectumque est nihil profici maerendo, nonne 
res declarat fuisse totum illud voluntarium? Quid ille Terentianus ipse se poeniens, id 
est, ἑαυτὸν τιμωρούμενος? Decrevi tantisper me minus iniuriae, / Chreme, meo gnato 
facere, dum fiam miser. Hic decernit ut miser sit.  
 
When sorrow has ceased finally and there follows a realization that nothing was 
accomplished in grieving, does not the truth of the matter demonstrate that it is entirely a 
matter of will? What does the self-punishing character—in Greek, ἑαυτὸν 
τιμωρούμενος—say in Terence? Chremes, I have decided for the moment that I will do 
my son less harm so long as I am miserable. He thus resolves to be miserable.  
 
 
151 On M.’s frequent use of Roman comedy and especially Terence in Tusc. 3, see Caston 2015: 143-6; 
she does not, however, discuss this passage.  
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For M. the example of Terence’s anhedonic character demonstrates that an individual’s stubborn 
belief in the duty to “feel wretched” perverts the will and disguises the fact that grief is, in fact, a 
function of judgement (res declarat fuisse totum illud voluntarium). Furthermore, the dramatic 
context to which the quote belongs demonstrates that such self-imposed wretchedness causes the 
individual to ignore the connections between his feelings and circumstance.152 The anger of the 
speaker, Menedemus, had previously caused his son to run away from home, and, now, the range 
of emotion—frustration, sorrow, remorse—that he feels after his son’s departure has all been 
turned inwards as an intentional miserableness (Hic decernit ut miser sit). Yet none of this 
wretchedness changes Menedemus’ situation, and, in Terence’s play, in fact, will go on to create 
the confusion and misunderstandings that drive the plot. Whether maintained by external or 
internal forces, therefore, the sense of obligation to feel and indulge in wretchedness coopts an 
individual’s voluntas. This cooptation becomes especially evident when “sorrow has ceased 
finally” (Ipsa remissio luctus cum) without having effectively responded to or altered the reality 
of the individual’s present condition (nihil profici maerendo).  
 According to M.’s application of Chrysippean therapy, therefore, the removal of a belief 
in the obligation to mourn helps to restore volition to the mourner and enables him to see the 
misapprehension on which his grief is based. In particular, this restoration manifests itself as a 
certain relationship to circumstance and time: “It is therefore in our power to cast out pain, 
 
152 This is another instance of significant recontextualization through quotation. Notably here M. seems to 
construe the comment of Terence’s comic character Menedemus as a sincere reflection of his thought 
process. In the context of the play, Menedemus is expressing remorse to his neighbor Chremes that his 
inability to live with his son’s choice of mistress has caused his son to run away from home to join the 
army. The comment reflects the fact that he is now prepared to settle for living with the low-born lover in 
exchange for his son’s return. Of course, this resolution to be miserable is the source for the comedy of 
manners that unfolds in the play. For the source, see Ter. Heaut. 147-8; Cicero also quotes this passage at 
de Fin. 5.28. 
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whenever you want, in accommodation to the time/circumstance/opportunity. Or, since the 
matter is entirely in our power, is there any time to which we cannot accommodate ourselves for 
the sake of laying aside anxiety and distress?” (Ergo in potestate est abiicere dolorem, cum velis, 
tempori servientem. An est ullum tempus—quoniam quidem res in nostra potestate est—cui non 
ponendae curae et aegritudinis causa serviamus? 66). The rejection of a misplaced sense of duty 
to be miser and the recovery of voluntas thus enables the mourner to realize a relation of 
opportuneness to the demands of the moment. Importantly, this recovery of voluntas is not a 
matter of “control” over events—tempus remains an unalterable given—but is constituted in our 
ability to “accommodate ourselves to any time/circumstance/opportunity” (an est ullum 
tempus…cui non…serviamus?) by “laying aside anxiety and distress” (ponendae curae et 
aegritudinis causa).  
 As an example of this opportune relationship to tempus that the recovery of voluntas 
allows, M. veers suddenly into the political realm.153 When Pompey was “subsiding under his 
wounds” (concidentem vulneribus, 66),” those watching from their ship felt only their own fear 
and “did nothing else at that time but encourage the rowers and secure their own safety by flight” 
(nihil aliud tum egisse nisi ut remiges hortarentur et ut salutem adipiscerentur fuga). It was only 
after they arrived at Tyre that they began to understand and express their pain, sorrow, and 
remorse (postea quam Tyrum venissent, tum adflictari lamentarique coepisse).154 The explicit 
lesson that M. draws from this story buttresses his ideal argument: “Therefore fear was able to 
drive away distress from them, shall reason not be able to do the same from the sage?” (Timor 
 
153 On this anecdote, cf. Dio 42.3-4, Livy Ep. 112.  
154 On range of emotions intended by the combination of adflictari and lamentari, cf. Tusc. 2.32, 3.83-4, 
and 4.16.  
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igitur ab his aegritudinem potuit repellere, ratio ab sapienti viro non poterit?).155 Interestingly, 
however, this explicit lesson does not comment on the relationship between voluntas and tempus, 
the point for which the exemplum is introduced as support. Certainly, from a Chrysippean 
perspective, the role that fear (timor) plays in suspending the observers’ feelings of grief until 
after the fact proves that the belief in an obligation to mourn is circumstantial and, therefore, 
always subject to reason (ratio). Read from a more partisan perspective, however, the story can 
be understood to comment implicitly on the observers’ inability to respond effectively and in 
accordance to the “true”—i.e., politically necessary—demands of the occasion: to intervene 
rather than run away and, perhaps, prevent or alter the disastrous circumstances of Pompey’s 
death. In this sense, if they had been able to reassert their misplaced voluntas at the time of the 
event—a misplacement for which they will later mourn uselessly —then perhaps that event 
would not have taken place or, at least, their emotional response to it would have affected the 
outcome of the event differently and more in line with their political commitments. 
 However we understand the precise point of this anecdote, it is clear that from M.’s 
normative, therapeutic perspective, the resolution of grief for the individual reconstitutes tempus 
as a field in which voluntas can be applied effectively and in accommodation to the needs of the 
occasion. I turn, therefore, to consider what role “will” might play in Cicero’s melancholic and 
philosophical exercise of grief. In a transitional moment, marked again by a reference to Cicero’s 
Consolatio,156 M. moves from his explication of Chrysippean therapy to consider, in opposition, 
 
155 Mss. ac sapientia vera: corr. Bentley.  
156 For the reference, see 70; as elsewhere, M. refers to the Consolatio in order to introduce a series of 
exempla, in this instance regarding men who outlived and had to bury their sons while holding prominent 
political office: esp. Quintus Maximus and Marcus Cato.  
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Crantor’s more permissive understanding of human grief.157 From this new and divergent 
position, M. swiftly calls into question the entire Stoic premise that grief is a matter of judgement 
and belief by asking, “Who is so out of their mind as to grieve by their own will?” (quis tam 
demens, ut sua voluntate maereat?). And, further recalling Crantor’s position, he says, “It is 
Nature that brings a sorrow…that must be given in to. For it presses and attacks and cannot be 
resisted.”158 The outcome of Cicero’s philosophical exercise of grief lies in between and as a 
preservation of the disjunctive combination of these two positions: to mourn as an exercise of 
philosophy is to “give into” the irresistible grief that is “Nature’s” and to do so as a normatively 
impossible or “out of mind” (demens) exercise of voluntas.  
 Acting through and in service of the divergences and dissociated frames of Cicero’s text, 
therefore, this form of voluntas offers the means by which melancholic responses to suffering 
and loss can be transformed by philosophy into an empathetic and humanistic expression of 
grief. This expression of grief, as the philosophical manifestation of a melancholic experience, is 
not particular in its object—not bound exclusively to the individual death of a loved one—but 
rather is constituted by the variety and totality of human experiences of loss. In fact, this 
possibility of grief as an exercise of voluntas may be the basis on which humanity can lay claim 
to the sympathy and solidarity that enables us to talk about human being in its relationship to 
 
157 Crantor appears in book 3 as the primary representative of the Academic and Peripatetic approach to 
grief, see 12-3 for the introduction. Notably Crantor also wrote an On Grief that Cicero seems to have 
consulted in the first weeks after Tullia’s death (see Att. 12.14[251]) and there is evidence in the later 
tradition that he “followed” Crantor in his Consolatio ad se (see Pliny N.H. pref. 22, Jer. Ep. 60). M., in 
fact, refers to Crantor’s text by the title “Consolation” at Tusc. 1.115. For a collection of fragments from 
this lost work and comments on its importance in the ancient consolatory tradition more generally, see 
Graver 2002: 187-201. Cf. Scourfield 2013 for further discussion of the tradition.  
158 71, Natura adfert dolorem, cui quidem Crantor, inquiunt, vester cedendum putat. Premit enim atque 
instat nec resisti potest.  
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nature. Concluding his rejection of the Epicurean approach to grief, M. issues a statement that we 
can take as encapsulating what this humanistic grief might look like:  
Nam et necessitas ferendae condicionis humanae quasi cum deo pugnare prohibet 
admonetque esse hominem, quae cogitatio magno opere luctum levat, et enumeratio 
exemplorum, non ut animum malevolorum oblectet, adfertur, sed ut ille, qui maeret, 
ferendum sibi id censeat, quod videat multos moderate et tranquille tulisse. Omnibus 
enim modis fulciendi sunt, qui ruunt nec cohaerere possunt propter magnitudinem 
aegritudinis.  
 
For the need of bearing the human condition prevents us from, as it were, contending 
with god and reminds us that we are human. Contemplation of this greatly lightens 
sorrow, and the listing of examples is given not to satisfy the mind of the wicked, but so 
that the one who is in mourning might understand that he must bear his burden which, he 
sees, has also been borne by many others with moderation and calmly. For we must prop 
up in every way those who are collapsing and not able to hold together because of the 
enormity of their grief.159 
 
Aside from enumerating the areas in which M.’s approach differs from the Epicureans, we see 
the elements that Cicero identifies in a humanistic understanding of grief and mourning.160 First 
and foremost, grief is never singular. A philosophical expression of grief is not defined by 
cultural norms or by personal emotion, but by “bearing the human condition” (necessitas 
ferendae condicionis humanae). Consideration of this condicio humana, in turn, sublates or 
“lightens” an individual’s sense of grief over a particular loss (luctum levat) and creates a 
solidarity and empathy among humanity—a solidarity, however, that also serves as an 
“admonishment” or “warning” to remain human (admonetque esse hominem).161 This act of 
“bearing” (ferendae), in fact, clarifies the placement of humans with respect to “god” and 
 
159 3.60-1.  
160 On the importance of this passage for Cicero’s project the Tusculans, see Caston 2015: 147-8. 
161 On the admonition against theomachy contained in this call for human solidarity, see Kamerbeek 
1948: 272; cf. de Sen. 5, “What is it to go to war with the gods like the Giants other than to fight against 
nature” (quid est enim aliud Gigantum modo bellare cum diis, nisi naturae repugnare?).  
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reminds us of the shared experiences that conjoin humanity.162 The final ethical imperative to 
“prop up in every way those who are collapsing and not able to hold together because of the 
enormity of their grief” (Omnibus enim modis fulciendi sunt, qui ruunt nec cohaerere possunt 
propter magnitudinem aegritudinis) seeks to transform the individual experience of sorrow into 
an opportunity to solidify and cement, as it were, the inextricably connected and interdependent 
bulwark of humanity.  
 Yet our understanding of this passage is ultimately dependent on how we define the 
condicio humana.163 I think it is best to read back to book 1, in which, as noted above,164 the 
phrase is used as part of the material argument to describe the temporal “agreement” between 
humanity and nature, which allows for humanity to “use” natural chronology as the time of life. 
Thus, “the need of bearing the human condition” is concerned with negotiating the 
undecidability of the relationship between human existence and nature, and especially how 
humanity comes to have a share in the time of nature. Grief and mourning can and should 
produce a sense of human identity. The solidarity created thereby may be helpful for alleviating 
the individual pangs of suffering and loss. But what is truly at stake in a conceptualization of 
grief as an exercise of will is an ability to confront productively and assertively the different 
forms of existence—the different strata of time—that contact with death reveals. The condicio 
humana is variable, changeable, and entirely determined by nature. Bearing up to it is thus a 
 
162 Note that in this passage M. is specifically defending the practice of using exempla to treat grief, 
which others—notably Carneades (see 59)—criticize for “bringing comfort to malicious people by 
rehearsing the evils of others” (nam illam quidem orationem ex commemoratione alienorum malorum ad 
malevolos consolandos esse accommodatam, 60). M. rejects this effect of Schadenfreude in favor of a 
more genuine human solidarity produced through exemplarity.  
163 On the history of the phrase, see Balmer 1994.  
164 See section III. On this specific phrase in Tusc., see also 1.15; 3.34, 59; cf. de communi condicione 
vitae et proprie, 3.77; condicio lexque vitae, 4.62. 
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matter of coming to terms with the divergent temporalities within which humanity has its 
existence. Therefore, it is perhaps even less a matter of human solidarity than it is of guiding 
humanity to a realization of and a reconciliation with the shifting ground on which it stands.  
 In the contemporary context of climate change and the mounting certainty that we are 
living through a new global extinction event, new meaning can be given to Cicero’s 
subordination of individual suffering to human grief and his demonstration that the 
transformation of grief into philosophy produces a form of discernment by which humanity can 
embrace its place within the divergent temporal strata of nature.165 The implications of Cicero’s 
argument for our world can be traced in an essay by James Hatley that questions what “virtue” 
means in the face of the possibility of human extinction:  
What then of our responsibilities to creation in a time of mass species 
extinction?…One’s first responsibility would be to nurture in oneself and others a 
renewed virtue of what could be termed temporal and prayerful discernment, which 
would involve the cultivation of sensitivity to the diverse temporal boundaries against 
which one’s creatureliness, one’s solidarity with all other living entities and the early 
womb that gestates them, finds its particular shape(s). In doing so, we should come to 
recognize more fully how our responsibilities to the living world engage us not only in 
personal and historical temporalities but also in ones that are geogenetic and zoogenetic. 
Indeed, we should not be unwilling to imagine how the very malleability of our own 
genetic heritage is already carrying our future progeny beyond the time of the human in 
a manner we are unable to discern or to control. Only by carefully attending to 
qualitatively distinctive and ethically incompossible temporal frameworks will we gain 
 
165 This connection between Cicero’s grief and the forms of melancholic mourning that are occasioned by 
climate change is also made, in a more poetic mood, by Butler 2018: 16, “Looking out on Rome from the 
Capitol in those final years of the Republic, Cicero already saw what Poggio and Byron would see: a 
wasteland. And at Astura? Gazing out on the Tyrrhenian Sea, perhaps Cicero contemplated the apparent 
alternative of a world unmarked by ruin. Such, in any case, are Byron’s thoughts, surveying the same 
vista at the end of Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage, and unwittingly thinking his way forward to what our 
warming planet may well look like, once human time comes fully to an end: “The shores of empires, 
changed in all save thee— / Assyria, Greece, Rome, Carthage, what are they? / Thy waters wasted them 
while they were free, / And many tyrants since; their shores obey / The stranger, slave, or savage; their 
decay / Has dried up realms to deserts:—not so thou, / Unchangeable save to they wild waves’ play— / 
Time writes no wrinkle on thine azure brow— / Such as creation’s dawn beheld, thou rollest now.” 
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greater clarity about how our actions might become engaging of and caring for the 
earthly.166  
 
Hatley draws from recent scientific work on chronology in order to envision a human 
subjectivity that is aware of its relation to a series of temporalities: not just personal and 
historical senses of time, but also “geogenetic” and “zoogenetic” timeframes. While the 
specificity of Hatley’s consideration of time obviously outstrips Cicero’s two temporalities—
subjective duration and the time of nature—both thinkers share an underlying idea. Hatley’s 
“virtue of temporal discernment” arises from a confrontation with the mass extinction of species 
(humanity included) to produce a “sensitivity to the diverse temporal boundaries against which 
one’s creatureliness, one’s solidarity with all other living entities and the early womb that 
gestates them, finds its particular shape(s).” Similarly, we can see in Cicero’s transformation of 
grief into philosophy a potential to discover the grounds for human solidarity, but, even more 
than that, an ability to “discern” and embrace between the temporal conditions that determine the 
shapes and qualities of human life. Cicero’s melancholic grief at the loss of Tullia, himself, and 
the Republic is joined with the universality of Hatley’s sorrow for the extinction of species; both 
thinkers envision an ethical exercise of their grief. In this philosophical transformation of grief 
and the expansion of temporal frames in which the ethical subject can operate, perhaps there is 
also, as M. contends, a restoration of will—the will to think and act in accordance to and with an 
awareness of all times that define human existence.  
 
 
166 2012: 17. 
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Chapter 4. The Future of Failure. 
 
By the term ‘futural’, we do not here have in view a “now” which has not yet become 
‘actual’ and which sometime will be for the first time. We have in view the coming 
[Kunft] in which Dasein, in its ownmost potentiality-for-Being, comes towards itself. 
Anticipation makes Dasein authentically futural, and in such a way that the anticipation 
itself is possible only in so far as Dasein, as being, is always coming towards itself—that 
is to say, in so far as it is futural in its Being in general….As authentically futural, 
Dasein is authentically as “having been”. Anticipation of one’s uttermost and ownmost 
possibility is coming back understandingly to one’s ownmost “been.” Only so far as it is 
futural can Dasein be authentically as having been. The character of “having been” 
arises, in a certain way, from the future. 
 
  Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (325-26, II.3) 
 
Both my own and non-mine, a possibility of myself but also a possibility of the other, of 
the Beloved, my future does not enter into the logical essence of the possible. The 
relation with such a future, irreducible to the power over possibles, we shall call 
fecundity. Fecundity encloses a duality of the Identical. It does not denote all that I can 
grasp—my possibilities; it denotes my future, which is not a future of the same—not a 
new avatar: not a history and events that can occur to a residue of identity, an identity 
holding on by a thread, an I that would ensure the continuity of the avatars. And yet it is 
my adventure still, and consequently my future in a very new sense, despite the 
discontinuity. 
 
  Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity (267-68) 
 
I. Failed Futures 
 
 The question of how to measure the success or failure of a life looms large over Cicero’s 
intellectual labors under Caesar’s dictatorship. His consideration of this question in letters and 
dialogues offers a unique opportunity to examine the relationship that Cicero himself saw 
between his actions as a statesman and his writings in which he debates the nature of the 
philosophical life and the possibility of attaining happiness. In this chapter, I argue that Cicero 
recognized in profound ways the failures1 of his own life and sought to address them through 
philosophy. The manner of this address, however, is not one of face-saving amelioration, 
 
1 On the application of this category to Cicero’s experience, see below, section II.  
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political “spin,” or an imposition of literary success over an underlying political failure.2 Rather, 
I contend in this chapter, Cicero’s philosophical work aims at persisting in and holding open the 
heterogeneity of failure, thereby emphasizing the ways in which his present is tied to and 
produced by an unknowable future. In particular, I argue that he reorients the ancient debate 
surrounding the genera vitae by drawing attention to the limits of eudaimonistic ethics and adds 
futural complexity to the ideal of the philosophical life by emphasizing the “incompleteness” 
(ateleia) of philosophy’s defining activity, contemplatio. Returning to the philosophical problem 
from which this dissertation began—the vis et mutatio omnium rerum atque temporum—I 
demonstrate further that Cicero locates the conditions of his personal failures within the breaking 
down of intergenerational time at the end of the Republic. By contextualizing contemplatio 
within this crisis of diachrony, Cicero envisions a mode of living for the philosopher that inhabits 
the proliferation of heterogeneous futures caused by the temporal disjointedness of his aetas.3  
 In order to begin to sketch the connection between failure and the future that Cicero’s 
writing discloses, it is necessary to reexamine how he separates conceptions of the time of life 
(aetas) from the ethically composed life (vita). As we saw in the cradle argument of de Finibus, 
both of these categories pertain to the bounded structures within which humans exist and, 
especially in Piso’s Antiochean interpretation, a vita can be understood to consist entirely of 
aetates progredientes. Yet the distinction between the two will matter especially in this chapter, 
which looks beyond the boundaries of the individual to the lifetime’s placement in a series. The 
semantic range of aetas conjoins a singular lifetime, a particular stage of life, and an “age” 
 
2 This is often the interpretation of modern readers. See below, section II. 
3 For the relationship between vita as an ethical structure and aetas as the time through which life is lived, 
see the Intro., section III; Ch. 1, esp. sections IV and V; and below.  
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comprised of separate and diachronically sequential lives; thus, aetas, as discussed above, is best 
understood in Cicero’s writing as a marker of the temporal sedimentation or arrangement that 
enables human life.4 On the contrary, a vita is properly the substance of a life—it is a manner, 
mode, or course of life, which has character and narrative, and can be judged accordingly.5 In 
Cicero’s thought these concepts are often complementary in describing the form of human 
temporality. When considering the future, however, the dissociation between the temporal and 
ethical structure of life comes into sharp focus.  
 Cicero frames the nexus of vita and aetas, and their relationships to the future in one of 
the philosophically-rich letters that he writes to Aulus Manlius Torquatus in the first weeks of 45 
BCE.6 The latter, a Pompeian partisan from an old aristocratic family, had left Rome during the 
civil war and was now, after Pompey’s death but prior to Caesar’s final defeat of his heirs, living 
in exile in Athens.7 In these first days of the new year—the first, it must be stressed, to be 
determined by the recently instituted Julian calendar8—before Tullia’s death, before the end of 
 
4 See above, Intro., section III.  
5 Cf. the distinction in Greek between βίος and αἰών, discussed above Intro., section III. See also the 
different understandings of the status vitae considered in Ch. 1, sections IV and V. Only the Antiochean 
conception of the vita is temporally durative.  
6 On the dating of the correspondence with Aulus Torquatus (ad Fam VI.1-4[242-245]), see Shackleton 
Bailey ad loc., “The state of suspense in Rome is consonant with early January 45.” On this Torquatus, 
see Mitchell 1966. The letters addressed to him appear to be among the last that Cicero composed before 
Tullia’s death. On Cicero’s use of philosophical discourse in his correspondence generally, see Griffin 
1995 and McConnell 2014.  
7 The “Battle of Munda” (17 March 45 BCE) is usually regarded as the end of open conflict in the 
Caesarian civil war. See the post-Caesarian Comm. de Bello Hispan. 27-42; App. 2.103-5. On the political 
circumstances surrounding the defeat of the Pompeian resistance, see, e.g., Murphy 1986; Rawson 1992: 
esp. 437-61; Sirianni 1993.  
8 On the significance of the Julian calendar in a global historical perspective, see Feeney 2007; on 
Cicero’s own reaction to this transformation of traditional Republican chronology, see Plut. Caes. 59 with 
Holleman 1978: 498, “[Cicero’s] reaction to the Julian calendar, though ringing as a shout of triumph, 
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open conflict, and before Cicero had more than conceived of his philosophical trajectory for the 
next months, he opens this correspondence with a prediction about the future: “even though it is 
always difficult to speak about the future, still it is sometimes possible for a guess to land near 
the mark, especially when the nature of the matter makes it possible to foresee the outcome. For 
we seem to understand well enough now that the war will not last long” (De futuris autem rebus 
etsi semper difficile dicere, tamen interdum coniectura possis propius accedere cum est res eius 
modi cuius exitus provideri possit. Nunc tantum videmur intellegere, non diuturnum bellum, ad 
Fam. VI.4[244]). In face of the true inexpressibility (semper difficile dicere) of the future (de 
futuris…rebus), Cicero ventures to predict, correctly, the imminent collapse of the last vestiges 
of the Pompeian opposition. His guess, in this case, is able to “land near the mark” (propius 
accedere) especially in this case because the “nature of the matter” (res eius modi cuius) makes 
its “outcome” (exitus) evident from the present. The proximity of this knowable future to the 
present, in fact, manifests it as an “outcome” in the first place: an exitus is a departure, a “going 
out” from a place or time.  
 The knowability and expressibility of this proximate future becomes especially relevant 
when Cicero considers how his own life intersects with the historical circumstance in which he 
finds himself. After elaborating on his prediction of defeat and death for Torquatus’ friends and 
allies, Cicero addresses how they should manage their grief at this moment. In comments that 
will only gain significance after Tullia’s death, he lists aspects of Torquatus’ and his own life in 
which they might find solace despite the political maelstrom: the knowledge of “right intent” 
 
reveals at the same time at least his misgivings about that human being who from sheer perversity, from 
peccandi libido (Off. 2.84), went so far as to conquer the sky and order up the constellations.”  
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(conscientiam rectae voluntatis, 2), the respite of literature, and, most of all, the passage of time 
(non tantum litterae…quantum longinquitas temporis).9 “Next,” he says, 
Deinde, quod mihi ad consolationem commune tecum est, si iam vocer ad exitum vitae, 
non ab ea republica avellar qua carendum esse doleam, praesertim cum id sine ullo sensu 
futurum sit. Adiuvat etiam aetas et acta iam vita, quae cum cursu suo bene confecto 
delectat tum vetat in eo vim timere quo nos iam natura ipsa paene perduxerit.  
 
There is that form of consolation which I share with you: if I were now summoned to the 
end of life, I would not be snatched from a Republic that I would be sorry to be without, 
especially since the coming time will be without any sense. My age also helps and a life 
already lived, which at once delights because its course was run well and also forbids me 
to fear any violence in that event to which nature herself has nearly already brought 
me.10  
 
The exitus that Cicero is able to foresee regarding the end of the war is now recast as the exitus 
of his own life (ad exitum vitae). The correspondence between Cicero’s own predicted death and 
the collapse of a form of the Republic that he “would be sorry to be without” (qua carendum esse 
dolea[t]) provides consolation especially in light of his “age” (aetas) and a “life already lived” 
(acta iam vita). In this collocation of the two words that Cicero uses for human time, their 
difference is foregrounded: aetas stands for the accumulation of time that makes the proximity to 
death evident from the present. Vita is the shape of a life as—or after—it is lived; it is the 
activity of life that “has been completed” (acta). A vita gives pleasure (delectat) when its “course 
has been run well” (cursu suo bene confecto) and the experiences that comprise it allow Cicero 
to face his impending death without fear (vetat…timere) since, through them, he can understand 
that “violence” (vis) and “nature herself” (natura ipsa) will both lead to the same end 
 
9 On the importance of “will” or “intent” (voluntas) and time for Cicero’s experience of grief, see Ch. 3, 
sections IV and V.  
10 Ad Fam. VI.4.4. 
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(perduxerit).11 The end of Cicero’s life (ad exitum vitae) thus coincides with the collective 
outcome (exitus) of the war and the Republic, and this final mutuality provides Cicero a feeling 
of consolation and fitting closure.  
 In this letter from the first days of the first Julian year, therefore, we find Cicero 
expressing the end—the completion of his political activity, his “right intent,” his vita act(iv)a—
in such final terms that his own life takes on the image of the historical impasse through which 
he is living. Considering the proximity of death that Cicero sees to his life at this juncture, the 
question that we must ask of his philosophical texts that he wrote following this moment is: what 
happens for the life that continues to be lived after its vita has been completed? That is, if Cicero 
conceives of his vita as iam acta, what form of temporal existence is left for him in the coming 
months? Is it, in other words, possible to live a bare aetas without the narratival and ethical 
structuration of a vita? In this letter, the answer to this question seems to be simply, no. The only 
further future accessible to Cicero writing at this moment is a time “without sense” (id sine ullo 
sensu futurum sit)—a death without any continued connection to the world or to the diachrony of 
time. As in Heidegger’s temporality of care (Sorge),12 Cicero sees the coming of death as a 
consummation of the “uttermost and ownmost possibility” of his vita.13 For Heidegger, the 
futural orientation or “anticipation” of Dasein’s “coming towards itself,” in fact, produces the 
 
11 Cf. Shackleton Bailey: ad loc., “Cicero did not, of course, believe himself secure from a violent 
death…but after a long and meritorious career it should, he says, have no terrors for him.” 
12 On the concept of care (Sorge), which Heidegger initially derives from Hyginus’ fable of Cura (§220 in 
Grant 1960) and from Seneca Ep. 124, see Heidegger 1962: 243(I.6), “Man’s perfectio—his 
transformation into that which he can be in Being-free for his ownmost possibilities (projection)—is 
‘accomplished’ by ‘care.’ But with equal primordiality ‘care’ determines what is basically specific in this 
entity, according to which it has been surrendered to the world of its concern (throwness). In the ‘double 
meaning’ of ‘care,’ what we have in view is a single basic state in its essentially twofold structure of 
thrown projection.” See also Wheeler 2018, esp. 2.2.7. 
13 See epigraph above. 
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“coming back…to one’s ownmost been. Only so far as it is futural can Dasein be authentically as 
having been.” Thus, there is no aetas without vita; the potentiality-for-Being of Dasein lies 
exclusively in its future—i.e., death—which in turn produces its past. The narrative of a life that 
is lived authentically as anticipation of Dasein’s “always coming towards itself” contains within 
itself all the possibilities of the time of that life.14  
 As I argue throughout this chapter, however, the failures that Cicero experiences and 
grapples with in his dialogues transform this understanding of the ethical vita as the source of 
futural possibility. Certainly, the vita as an ethical denomination and cohesive narrative structure 
remains an important object of inquiry, especially as it relates to the eudaimonism of the 
Hellenistic schools and his discussions of the Republican tradition of memorialization through 
gloria.15 Yet, by extending and developing a skeptical approach to the judgement of a life, 
Cicero’s dialogues display a countervailing tendency to look for ways in which the future 
orientation of human time can be tied not exclusively to the “well-lived life” but to the bare 
temporality of the aetas. In this configuration, which is realized through Cicero’s reconsideration 
of the philosopher’s form of life, the future does not belong to the possibilities—and failures—of 
 
14 On this interpretation of the temporality of care, see Lin 2013: 37, “As long as we are futural we have 
possibilities, and the horizon of choices and possibilities available to us as futural includes also the 
possibility to return to our past and reinterpret the choices we have made. However, we can come-back to 
what we have-been, reinterpret our past, only as long as we are futural, that is as long as we have 
possibilities, since once our possibilities end, we actually no longer exist. The momentousness of the 
future lies also in Dasein’s ‘being-toward-death.’ ‘Being-toward-death’ is not the unavoidable termination 
of Dasein’s life, but is the anticipatory appropriation of death to its own existence that makes Dasein 
finite…It is only through anticipating death that Dasein is able to understand itself as a possibility rather 
than as an actualized, fallen, ontical, being. If Dasein turns its attention to its death, it does not understand 
time as a public sequence of ‘nows’, but rather as its own, and since Dasein is finite so is its time. 
Through the acknowledgement of the mineness (Jemeinigkeit) of my death the corresponding thought is 
revealed to me: only I can live my life, and only I can be responsible for the meaning that my life has for 
me.” 
15 Discussed below, sections III.i and IV.  
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the present vita. Rather, much like Levinas’ fecundity, this understanding of the future is 
“irreducible to the power over possibilities”—that is, it embraces the incompletion and faults of 
the present as products of an unknowable and discontinuous temporal horizon.16 By holding open 
the future of the aetas, Cicero aims to liberate the present from “a history and events that can 
occur to a residue of identity, an identity holding on by a thread,” and consider, instead, the 
unbound possibilities of the future of failure.  
 In the next section of this chapter, I examine more generally how Cicero conceives of the 
genera vitae and how the conflicting biographical judgements of his life have been used to 
decipher, often incompletely, his philosophical intent. In section III, I consider in detail Cicero’s 
treatment of the philosophical life and its characteristic activity of contemplatio. In the first part 
of this section (III.i), I survey Cicero’s treatment of the inconclusive relationship between 
contemplation, happiness, and the consummation of the philosophical life found in Hellenistic 
eudaimonism. Working in the second part (III.ii) from the Platonic connection between 
contemplation and truth, I argue that Cicero’s skeptical approach to philosophical activity creates 
a potential form of life that is fundamentally atelic and anachronous. In section IV, I return to the 
problem of vis et mutatio and contend that, by locating the anachrony of the philosopher’s life 
within the breakdown in intergenerational time in the late Republic, Cicero envisions a future for 
the aetas that is distinct from the vita. Finally, in section V, I consider more closely this future of 
the aetas by weighing two modes of diachronic continuity evident in de Senectute: paternity and 
fecundity. Sections II and III thus treat the nature and limitations of the vita as a way of 
understanding human futurity, whereas sections IV and V are concerned with the future of the 
aetas.  
 
16 On Levinas’ “fecundity,” see below, section V.  
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II. The Vita Contemplativa as a Failure of the Vita Activa? 
 The final book of the Tusculans begins with a bid to liberate philosophical life from 
conventional Roman narratives that undermine its coherence and characterize it as the outcome 
of a failed life in politics.17 Against contemporary Roman ignorance and dismissal of 
philosophical life, the narrator emphasizes its ancient roots, which stretch back to a time long 
before there was a word to describe philosophia: “this error, I think, and this darkness obscures 
the minds of the uninstructed because they are not able to look back far enough into the past nor 
do they understand that those who were first to provide the means of human life were themselves 
philosophers” (sed, ut opinor, hic error et haec indoctorum animis offusa caligo est, quod tam 
longe retro respicere non possunt nec eos, a quibus vita hominum instructa primis est, fuisse 
philosophos arbitrantur, 5.6).18 The “uninstructed” or, simply, “ignorant” (indoctorum) disregard 
philosophy as of recent and foreign origin, and as of little or no importance in the functioning of 
society. Their error is caused by an inability “to look back far enough” (tam longe retro 
respicere non possunt) to see, as the narrator proposes, that “philosophy,” with or without that 
name, offers nothing less than the very means of human existence—a human way of life (vita 
hominum). The content of this ancient instruction, while perhaps lost to unmediated access in the 
present, is nonetheless still available to those who know how to look back.  
 
17 On the pre-Roman development of the slippery oppositions between bios philosophikos and bios 
politikos or bios theoretikos and bios praktikos in Greek culture (and specifically the Athenian political 
milieu), see e.g., Connor 1971: esp. 196-97; Donlan 1980; Scholz 1998; and Jordović 2018. On the 
application of these categories in contemporary philosophy, see, e.g., Taminiaux 1996 on Hannah Arendt. 
For the Roman context, see below.  
18 On this association of prehistoric wisdom with the activity of philosophy, see esp. the “anthropological” 
section of M.’s ideal argument, Tusc. 1.62, where he cites Pythagoras as regarding the act of “the man 
who assigned a name to everything” to be one of “supreme wisdom” (qui primus, quod summae 
sapientiae Pythagorae visum est, omnibus rebus imposuit nomina). Cf. also esp. Sen., Ep. 90. 
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 Cicero commences, therefore, to look back—first, to the time prior to, and then to the 
very moment of philosophy’s naming. The narrator tells a story, the source of which he attributes 
to Heraclides Ponticus, “the student of Plato and a learned man of the first degree” (auditor 
Platonis Ponticus Heraclides, vir doctus in primis), about a meeting between Pythagoras and 
Leon, the ruler of Phlius. In this fable, Leon is so impressed with Pythagoras’ “talent and 
eloquence” (ingenium et eloquentiam) that he asks Pythagoras what the art (ars) is in which he 
was instructed. Pythagoras replies that he has no knowledge of any art, but rather is a 
“philosopher” (at illum artem quidem se scire nullam, sed esse philosophum, 5.8). In awe at this 
new name, Leon asks Pythagoras to explain what he means:19   
Pythagoram autem respondisse similem sibi videri vitam hominum et mercatum eum, 
qui haberetur maximo ludorum apparatu totius Graeciae celebritate; nam ut illic alii 
corporibus exercitatis gloriam et nobilitatem coronae peterent, alii emendi aut vendendi 
quaestu et lucro ducerentur, esset autem quoddam genus eorum, idque vel maxime 
ingenuum, qui nec plausum nec lucrum quaererent, sed visendi causa venirent 
studioseque perspicerent, quid ageretur et quo modo, item nos quasi in mercatus 
quandam celebritatem ex urbe aliqua sic in hanc vitam ex alia vita et natura profectos 
alios gloriae servire, alios pecuniae, raros esse quosdam, qui ceteris omnibus pro nihilo 
habitis rerum naturam studiose intuerentur; hos se appellare sapientiae studiosos—id est 
enim philosophos; et ut illic liberalissimum esset spectare nihil sibi adquirentem, sic in 
vita longe omnibus studiis contemplationem rerum, cognitionemque praestare.  
 
Pythagoras then responded to him that the life of humans seemed to him to be similar to 
the market which was held along with the splendor of the greatest games before the 
throng of all Greece. For, there, some men, whose bodies had been trained, sought the 
glory and fame of a crown, others were drawn by the prospect of gain and profit of 
buying and selling, but there was also a certain type, and one possessing the greatest 
inborn quality, who were seeking neither applause nor profit, but came for the sake of 
seeing and looked ardently upon what was happening and how. Likewise, we, as if we 
had come from another city to some thronged market, in the same way had come into 
this life from another kind of life, some to be slaves to ambition, some to money; but 
there were some few, who considering all other things of no consequence were gazing 
 
19 This fable is also told at D.L. VIII.1.8: καὶ τὸν βίον ἐοικέναι πανηγύρει· ὡς οὖν εἰς ταύτην οἱ μὲν 
ἀγωνιούμενοι, οἱ δὲ κατ᾽ ἐμπορίαν, οἱ δέ γε βέλτιστοι ἔρχονται θεαταί, οὕτως ἐν τῷ βίῳ οἱ μὲν 
ἀνδραποδώδεις, ἔφη, φύονται δόξης καὶ πλεονεξίας θηραταί, οἱ δὲ φιλόσοφοι τῆς ἀληθείας. On 
Heraclides and the variant versions of this story, see Gottschalk 1980: 23-36. For the relationship between 
this variant and Cicero’s, see also below, ns. 21, 22, 23, and 103. 
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ardently on the nature of things; and these men were called “devoted to wisdom” (this is 
the meaning of philosopher); and, just as at the market it was most honorable to look on, 
seeking nothing for oneself, so in life the contemplation and consideration of things far 
surpasses all other pursuits.20  
 
In Pythagoras’ analogy of the mercatus,21 the third type (genus) of life is defined against the 
others. The first class, the “athletes,” seek gloria and nobilitas as guaranteed by a mark of 
victory—the corona. The second class, the “merchants,” are driven by a desire for the reward of 
money (emendi aut vendendi quaestu et lucro). The members of the third class, by contrast, hope 
for no recognition or gain for themselves individually (nec plausum nec lucrum quaererent). In 
their pursuit, they display the “greatest inborn quality” (maxime ingenuum).22 Yet this pursuit is 
simply and emphatically to look:23 they pass among the “throng” of society (Graeciae 
 
20 Tusc. 5.9. 
21 Cicero’s translation of πανήγυρις, a “general festival” or “general assembly,” which was held in the 
Greek world around important religious holidays and athletic events; on the Greek tradition, see, e.g., Ligt 
and Neeve 1988: 392-400; Dillon 2013. Note how Cicero’s translation mercatus foregrounds the 
economic rather than religious or “cultural” aspect of such an event, of which there was no equivalent in 
Roman society; on the importance of Cicero’s version for our understanding of this phenomenon, see 
Nightingale 2004: 17-18. On issues of translation in this story, see also below, ns. 23 and 103. 
22 Note the run of related words connecting “character,” “status,” and “type”: ingenium (5.8) / ingenuum / 
genus. Is the third group noble or free (ingenuum) because they are born (genus) that way or do they 
belong to a “type” (genus) because of their talent and disposition (ingenium)? In Diogene’s version the 
first two groups are described as “servile” (ἀνδραποδώδεις), which implies that the third group is “free.” 
Cicero picks this post-Socratic characterization of philosophers as “free” up in his definition, but by 
introducing these puns emphasizes the question of the source of that freedom. On the characterization of 
the philosophers in Diogenes’ version as “hunters” of truth, see below, n.103. 
23 There is another interesting issue of translation here: does Cicero’s choice of visere to translate the 
Greek θεωρεῖν (cf. in D.L. above n.19) affect the pursuit of the philosopher? The Greek verb has a basic 
meaning of “to be a spectator at an event” and so “to consider,” “to contemplate” (LSJ A.II-III), and a 
θεωρία refers to “being a spectator at a festival or game” (LSJ A.II). Thus, the use of this vocabulary in 
the Pythagorean fable throughout its Greek variations is culturally overdetermined: cf. Dillon 2013: xv, 
“Nothing was allowed to interrupt the worship at these festivals and shrines: when Xerxes invaded Greece 
in 480, the Olympic festival and its contests continued, and the Greeks ‘watched’ the athletic and 
equestrian events. Kleomenes II attacked the city of Argos during the Nemean festival when the city was 
full of the ‘festival crowd and spectators.’” For the wide-reaching implications of theoria in the Greek 
philosophical tradition, see esp. Nightingale 2004 passim. The Latin visere means “to come and see,” “to 
visit” (L&S II.A-B), which is supplemented by studioseque perspicerent in order to draw the Latin closer 
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celebritate) only “for the sake of seeing” (visendi causa) and “look on ardently” (studioseque 
perspicerent).24 They observe “what was happening and how” (quid ageretur et quo modo). 
These pronouns quid and quo are, by necessity, placeholders—their content may change, but 
their form remains the object of vision. We are meant to understand this action as being 
analogous to the philosopher’s occupation. The philosopher “comes into this life from another 
kind of life” as if into “some thronged market” (in mercatus quandam celebritatem ex urbe 
aliqua sic in hanc vitam ex alia vita) to spend his time “gazing ardently on the nature of things” 
(rerum naturam studiose intuerentur) and in “contemplation and consideration” of nature 
(contemplationem rerum, cognitionemque). Therefore, the philosopher is, most simply, one who 
looks.  
 Perhaps the best way to distinguish between these three forms of life—the athletic, the 
mercantile, and the philosophical—is the question of their goals or marks of completion.25 Both 
athletic and mercantile lives are governed by explicit marks of completion. The presence of a 
victorious crown or profit from a sale offers a clear measure of success upon the consummation 
of the activities that define these modes of life, whereas the absence of these tokens 
unambiguously spells a failure to achieve this consummation. An athlete cannot be an athlete 
without a crown, just as a merchant cannot remain a merchant for long without turning a profit. 
 
to the Greek. Yet in neither case can the Latin approach the underlying cultural associations of the Greek 
verb. Even with Cicero’s supplements, how much gets lost in this translation? 
24 On the opposition of philosophical activity to “busyness” (celebritas) in Cicero’s thought, see above, 
Ch. 1, sections II and III.  
25 For my purpose at this point in the argument, this distinction should be held apart from the question of 
“usefulness,” e.g., that is suggested by Diogenes’ description of the philosophers as “hunters of truth” 
(θηραταί, οἱ δὲ φιλόσοφοι τῆς ἀληθείας). I discuss below the various “uses” that Cicero considers in 
relation to philosophical activity. Here, I am interested only in establishing the absence of a mark of 
completion in relation to the other two types.  
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The third genus, on the other hand, comes to the mercatus for neither “applause nor profit,” but 
simply “for the sake of seeing” (qui nec plausum nec lucrum quaererent, sed visendi causa 
venirent). In this pursuit there is no extrinsic mark or token which indicates the completion of a 
task. There is, certainly, an internal quality or intensity (studium, ingenuum) that characterizes 
the philosopher’s pursuit; this quality, however, does not easily provide a normative measure of 
completion or incompletion, success or failure.  
 According to this anecdote, therefore, far from being a perverted form of vita activa, the 
philosophical life possesses its own coherent activity and place in the world. It is furthermore 
distinct from and in some way superior (liberalissimum) to other modes of life because it lacks 
an extrinsic mark, which would allow it to be judged as completed and regulated as such 
socially. Given this distinction and the philosophical life’s apparent differentiation from more 
immediately social forms of living that make up the “throng” (celebritas) of the market, how can 
we know when the philosopher has completed his task of looking? What marks the success or 
failure, the completion or incompletion, of this characteristic activity? 
 These questions become important beyond purely “theoretical” considerations when we 
consider the public trajectory of Cicero’s life—both politically and with regard to his role as 
paterfamilias—and the general tendency among commentators from antiquity onwards to 
consider Cicero a “failure” in these realms.26 Although, as we have already seen, Cicero 
possesses the conceptual resources with which to diagnose the infelicitous state of his life—e.g., 
in the recognition of his vita as iam acta—it is important to note that the notion of “failure” is a 
modern interpretative imposition. Cicero’s Latin lacks a single word that can easily convey the 
 
26 On the state of political and economic ruin in which Cicero finds himself in 46-4 BCE, see, e.g., Plut. 
Cic. 39-41; cf. Dixon 1986; Claassen 1996; Treggiari 1998; Wilcox 2005.  
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range of meanings governed by “failure” with its characteristic denotation of “wanting an 
achievement,” which comes to entail a “moral lapse.”27 The Latin words that might be used, such 
as defectio or vitium, communicate either a failure to fulfill a certain measure or refer exclusively 
to a moral fault without an additional sense of incompletion. In neither case does the word refer 
to a totalized condition of failure.28 Regardless of this lexical difficulty, failure remains a useful 
category of experience with which to interrogate Cicero’s writings because from within the texts 
there is clearly an interest in the relationship between incompletion and the possibilities of an 
ethical life, such as the attainment of happiness. As I discuss below, this interest is most 
prominent in Cicero’s treatment of the Hellenistic ethical philosophies. 
 Additionally, failure is an important interpretative category because of its pervasiveness 
in critical judgements of Cicero’s life in relation to his literary output. There has been a 
prominent trend throughout the long reception history of the dialogues that regards them as 
reflective of the shortcomings of the author’s active life, especially the failure of his political 
aims. These political failures, in turn, tend to be interpreted in light of his subsequent concern 
over publicly taking on the mantel of philosopher. To an extent, this connection is undeniable. 
Cicero, in the voice of his autobiographical narrator, insists frequently in the prefaces of the 
philosophica that he approaches his writerly endeavor to educate his fellow citizens (doctiores 
cives mei) with the same “effort, enthusiasm, and concern” (opera, studio, labore) that he used to 
handle “the juridical and political actions (forensibus operis), concerns (laboribus), and dangers 
 
27 See OED 1a & b; 2. 
28 Yet Cicero is clearly interested in the relation between these two concepts at this period; see, e.g., de. 
Sen. 29, “although that very failure of strength is brought about more often by the faults of youth than by 
old age” (etsi ipsa ista defectio virium adulescentiae vitiis efficitur saepius quam senectute). 
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(periculis)” of the former public role to which he “had been appointed by the Roman people.”29 
By drawing an equivalence between his former work as a political actor, sanctioned by 
governmental processes of the Republic, and his current, solitary intellectual work—indeed, by 
characterizing philosophical writing as work (opera, labor)—Cicero invites us to consider his 
whole life as dedicated to a single effort, not divided into distinctive phases. This performatively 
autobiographical assertion, however, raises as many questions as it answers, especially 
surrounding the relationship between the different aspects of Cicero’s life: how are the political 
and the philosophical related? What is the nature of the work that can be accomplished in both 
modes of life? Does Cicero ever succeed in completing it?  
 Rather than seeing the continuity that Cicero himself stresses in his autobiographical 
claims about his writerly intent, many readers throughout the centuries have responded by 
reifying the distinction between political and intellectual activity in his life.30 These responses 
are informed largely by an inconcinnity in ancient judgements of Cicero-the-writer as opposed to 
Cicero-the-“man of action.” By the time of Quintilian there was a strong tradition, probably 
begun even in Cicero’s own lifetime, that regarded him as the unparalleled master of Latin style. 
Quintilian’s judgement that Cicero’s name had become synonymous with eloquence 
(nomen…eloquentiae, 10.1.112) emphasizes Cicero’s writerly achievements without drawing 
attention to the failures of his life, preferring instead to isolate his stylistic virtues as laudable in 
 
29 de Fin. 1.10, Ego vero, quoniam forensibus operis, laboribus, periculis non deseruisse mihi videor 
praesidium in quo a populo Romano locatus sum, debeo profecto, quantumcumque possum, in eo quoque 
elaborare ut sint opera, studio, labore meo doctiores cives mei. 
30 For foundational work that resists this approach to the relation between politics and philosophy in 
Cicero’s life, see, e.g., Kretschmar 1938; Grilli 1953; André 1966; Boyancé 1970: esp. 89-134. For 
proponents of this approach, see below.  
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their own right.31 Yet already Quintilian’s appraisal of Cicero was reacting against an opposed 
and equally well-established strain of judgement, evident, for instance, in Seneca the Younger’s 
dismissiveness of Cicero as a model for the “working philosopher,” that regarded Cicero with 
disdain, in particular for his political ineffectiveness and his perceived personal weakness.32 
These two contrasting judgements—of literary success and political failure—become 
increasingly intertwined, as readers of Cicero attempt to make sense of the complexities of his 
life. By the time of Augustine the contradictions of Cicero’s biography had become so solidified 
as to be converted into a commonplace,33 which will be invigorated once again by Petrarch and 
other Renaissance humanists as they grapple with the rediscovery of Cicero’s letter collection 
and the ensuing reopening of old wounds and historical perplexities.34  
 
31 On Quintilian, see esp. Inst. Orat 10.1.105ff. with Bishop 2019: 1-7.  
32 On the near-contemporaneous judgements of Cicero’s political achievements, see Kurczyk 2006: esp. 
76-103. For Seneca’s sentiments, which probably can be traced back to his father, see, e.g., de Brev. Vit. 
5, “How tearful the words he uses in a letter written to Atticus, when Pompey the elder had been 
conquered, and the son was still trying to restore his shattered arms in Spain! ‘Do you ask,’ he said, ‘what 
I am doing here? I am lingering in my Tusculan villa half a prisoner.’ He then proceeds to other 
statements, in which he bewails his former life and complains of the present and despairs of the future. 
Cicero said that he was ‘half a prisoner.’ But, in very truth, never will the wise man resort to so lowly a 
term, never will he be half a prisoner—he who always possesses an undiminished and stable liberty, being 
free and his own master and towering over all others. For what can possibly be above him who is above 
Fortune?” (Quam flebiles uoces exprimit in quadam ad Atticum epistula iam uicto patre Pompeio, adhuc 
filio in Hispania fracta arma refouente! “Quid agam,” inquit, “hic, quaeris? Moror in Tusculano meo 
semiliber.” Alia deinceps adicit, quibus et priorem aetatem complorat et de praesenti queritur et de 
futura desperat. Semiliberum se dixit Cicero. At me hercules numquam sapiens in tam humile nomen 
procedet, numquam semiliber erit, integrae semper libertatis et solidae, solutus et sui iuris et altior 
ceteris. Quid enim supra eum potest esse qui supra fortunam est?, trans. Basore). On the reception of 
Cicero in the early Empire in general, see Dressler 2015 and Keeline 2018. 
33 See e.g., Conf. 3.4, where Augustine praises Cicero’s “speech, which almost all admire, but not so his 
heart” (cuius linguam fere omnes mirantur, pectus non ita); cf. Contr. Ac. 3.18. It often seems odd that 
Augustine so frequently reproduces this cliché, since he almost invariably refers to the deep and 
transformative impact Cicero’s Hortensius had on his study of philosophy and his conversion to 
Christianity.  
34 See esp. Petrarch’s series of “Letters to Cicero,” in Abbott 1897: e.g., 321, “Do thou in turn, wherever 
thou art, listen to this one word, which is inspired by true love for thee, a word not now of advice but of 
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 In the modern era of scholarship, this divergence in the biographical judgement of Cicero 
has influenced two schools of thought concerning the relationship between Cicero’s political and 
intellectual labors: first, there are those who, following Drumann and Mommsen in the 19th 
century, viewed Cicero with such personal distaste that they largely denied significance to his 
literary and philosophical endeavors beyond an impotent form of consolation for his political 
ineffectiveness.35 This extreme view was cemented in the mainstream of Anglophone scholarship 
by Ronald Syme, who expressed the sentiment in no uncertain terms: “Political failure, driving 
him back on himself, had then sought and created consolations in literature and in theory: the 
ideal derived its shape from his own disappointments.”36 Although this position has somewhat 
fallen out of favor, in large part due to shifts in contemporary political attitudes, its influence can 
still be felt in the more cynical interpretations of Cicero’s philosophical intent. For example, in 
an echo of Syme, which is softened only by her conditional phrasing, Catherine Steel clearly 
articulates this position: “Cicero’s actions, at least as a public figure, could be seen ultimately not 
 
regret, which one of the after world who is most devoted to thy memory has given utterance to not 
without tears. Thou who wert ever restless and full of anxiety, or that thou mayest hear again thine own 
words, O headstrong and unfortunate old man, why hast thou plunged into so many struggles and quarrels 
which would profit thee in no wise whatsoever?” On Petrarch and Cicero, see McLaughlin 2015.  
35 On Mommsen’s appraisal, which emphasizes the precarious position of Cicero outside of the 
aristocracy, see, e.g., 1904 (vol. 5): 168, where he refers to Cicero as “notorisch ein politischer 
achselträger.” He also thought very poorly of Cicero’s literary merit: e.g., “Als Schriftsteller dagegen 
steht er vollkommen ebenso tief wie als Staatsmann. [. . .] Eine Journalistennatur im schlechtesten Sinne 
des Wortes, an Worten, wie er selber sagt, überreich, an Gedanken über alle Begriffe arm” (vol. 3: 619). 
For Drumann’s extensive and complex antipathy toward Cicero and its legacy in Germanic scholarship, 
see, for a contemporary response, esp. Boissier 1897: 23-78. Cf. Zielinski 1908: esp. 280-88; Weil 1962; 
Altman 2015; Begemann 2015.  
36 1939: 144, see further, “Fanatic intensity seems foreign to the character of Cicero, absent from his 
earlier career: there precisely lies the explanation. Cicero was spurred to desperate action by the memory 
of all the humiliations of the past…He knew how little he had achieved for the Republic despite his talent 
and his professions, how shamefully he had deserted his post…”; for a rebuttal of Syme, see Altman 
2016: xxx-xxxi. 
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to have achieved their ends, and his failures demonstrate either that the brilliance of his writings 
was an irrelevance, or that they were in fact not as effective as their subsequent critical 
reputation—with the exception of his poetry—would suggest…In [any] case Cicero used writing 
to impose a form of success upon a situation which was, actually or potentially, one of failure.”37 
According to this more contemporary version of the 19th century German historicist position, 
Cicero turns to write philosophy out of a self-interested need to “impose a form of success” upon 
his personal shortcomings and political failures.  
 The other school of thought concerning the relationship between Cicero’s philosophy and 
his political activity can more properly be grouped under Woldemar Görler’s 
“Ersatzbeschäftigung” thesis.38 This interpretation shares a similar initial biographical judgement 
to the more extreme view: that Cicero is to be regarded as a failed politician first, and a writer or 
philosopher second. This approach, however, finds in the philosophica a purpose beyond self-
interested consolation. In its most common form, this purpose has been political—whether with 
specific reference to Caesar or in a more general sense.39 Yelena Baraz offers a summary of this 
position: “Writing and the writing of philosophy in particular, became not a facet of his political 
life, but rather an alternative way of being in politics, a substitution that he struggled to construct 
as viable.”40 In another mode, Caroline Bishop’s recent work applies a similar approach to 
Cicero’s self-promotional and autobiographical impulses. She argues that Cicero’s literary works 
 
37 2005: 115.  
38 Görler 1990: 158. See above, Ch. 1, section II.  
39 This approach is based in the same Germanic historicist tradition, especially through the work of, e.g., 
Strasburger 1938 and Bringmann 1971; cf. Altman 2015 for a critical analysis of this tradition. 
40 Baraz 2012: 9. For readings that unearth more specific opposition to Caesar, see e.g., Strasburger 1990; 
Gildenhard 2007; and Lefèvre 2008. 
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are an attempt to overcome political failures in order to achieve success outside of politics, by 
attaining the status of a literary classic: “Another consequence of Cicero’s turn to intellectual 
labour as a substitute for politics is that the eternal fame he had once assumed would result from 
his glorious political career (especially as preserved in his own written works that illuminated 
and glorified it) was now more likely to result from the writing itself.”41 These recent 
permutations of the Ersatzbeschäftigung thesis attempt to recuperate Cicero’s intellectual labors, 
but they are fundamentally based on a distinction between the political and writerly pursuits of 
his life, which can, in turn, be traced back to the originally conflicting ancient biographical 
judgements. 
 The limits of the Ersatzbeschäftigung thesis to explain Cicero’s own claims about his 
philosophical project have not gone unnoticed. For instance, commenting on Cicero’s letters 
from the early 40s, Baraz contends, “Just as he tried to incorporate philosophy as much as 
possible into his practice as an active statesman, and gestured towards a whole-hearted 
acceptance of the contemplative life in times of political difficulties, so in the post-civil war 
period, when he is debarred from politics, he is yet unable to resign himself to ‘pure’ philosophy. 
The political ends up permeating everything he does….It reflects his desire to reject the divisive 
view and bring the two spheres, politics and philosophy, together in a harmonious whole.”42 
Baraz sees Cicero as essentially a political actor, whose turn to intellectual activity under Caesar 
cannot be considered “pure” since “the political ends up permeating everything he does.” 
Consequently, even as she notes Cicero’s “desire” to bring politics and philosophy into a 
“harmonious whole,” she nevertheless denies this desire by explaining his entire project under 
 
41 Bishop 2019: 6.  
42 2012: 76-77. 
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the rubric of politics. For Baraz, Cicero can only ever be a politician, and thus a failed politician, 
whose turn to philosophical activity is ultimately an admission of this failure.  
 With opposite result, William Altman also notes the limits of the Ersatzbeschäftigung 
thesis to account for the way in which Cicero presents his life’s work as a unified effort. In 
particular, he criticizes the central idea that Cicero should be considered a politician first, and 
that his turn to philosophy is necessarily the result of his political failure: 
“It is perfectly true that it was a political defeat—the complete and total victory of 
Caesar over the Republic—that made it possible for Cicero to do nothing else but think 
and write. But just as it takes years of political preparation to be in a position of 
influence from which to benefit the Republic in its hour of need, so also did it take years 
of contemplation (cf. contemplans ea quae extra sunt) to take advantage of the enforced 
otium that Caesar’s dictatorship created for Cicero. Cicero did not turn to philosophy 
because his politics had failed; he turned to politics in the first place because Plato’s 
philosophy had long since won the undying approbation of his innermost self.”43 
 
While Altman’s focus on Cicero’s “revival of Platonism” is his own emphatic contribution to the 
field of Ciceronian philosophy,44 his essential point is an important one: any view that considers 
the political as the principal type of life that Cicero leads is overlooking the longevity and 
seriousness of his engagement with philosophy.45 Thus, whereas Baraz considers Cicero’s life 
pursuit as unified only under the rubric of politics, Altman defends the position that his life’s 
work is principally philosophical, with his political action a manifestation of philosophical 
contemplation and belief.  
 While Baraz and Altman both address the pervasive and contradictory judgements 
underlying the Ersatzbeschäftigung thesis, the problem that I see in this common view arises less 
 
43 2016: xxx-xxxi.  
44 See ibid.: 27-123.  
45 In addition to Altman 2016, see esp. André 1966; Görler 1990; Lévy 2012.  
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from issues of biography and more from within the philosophical debates of the texts 
themselves.46 What is at stake in the appraisal of Cicero’s life is not simply whether he should be 
remembered as a failed politician, a politician who overcame his failure through his intellectual 
ability, or a philosopher who dabbled ineffectually in politics. At the heart of this biographical 
disagreement is a series of questions about the nature of the human experience of failure—
whether it can be overcome, whether there exists a form of life that is insulated from it, and 
what, in essence, it means to fail in life. Furthermore, these are not simply hermeneutic questions 
for us to ask of Cicero’s life and work; they are also the same questions that Cicero himself asks 
when he subjects the genera vitae to philosophical analysis and critique. What all of these 
biographical approaches to Cicero’s philosophical writings overlook are the ways in which he 
ensures that they do not “impose a form of success” upon failure, but rather, through them, seeks 
to inhabit that failure through inquiry, to complicate the consideration of success and failure, 
and, finally, to offer up failure itself as the product of the unknowable future.  
III. A Life Beyond Failure 
 I turn now to consider more closely how Cicero conceives of philosophical life and the 
role that the characteristic activity of “contemplation and consideration” (contemplatio 
cognitioque), familiar from the Pythagorean fable, plays in it.47 In the first part of the section, I 
 
46 It is notable that many of the scholars cited in this section as proponents of the Ersatzbeschäftigung 
thesis focus their analysis on Cicero’s pragmatic presentation of his work—especially by means of the 
prologues—rather than on the content of the dialogues themselves. The limitations of this approach are 
sometimes acknowledged, see e.g., Bishop 2019: 15 n.55: “It should be noted that I am not suggesting 
that the Greek authors Cicero adapted into Latin meant nothing more to him than models on which he 
could build his own canonicity. Though discussion of this aspect of his adaptations is largely outside the 
scope of this study, it is clear that he engaged deeply with Plato, Aristotle, and Demosthenes, and adapted 
them because he thought there was real benefit in such adaptations for Roman readers” (my emphasis). 
For my purposes, the latter bears more interpretative weight than the former.  
47 Following a prevalent Academic strain of intellectual history, Cicero traced his understanding of the 
characteristic philosophical activity, defined as the “observation” or “consideration” of nature, to pre-
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examine Cicero’s skeptical treatment of the equation between the consummation of life and 
happiness that the Hellenistic schools inherited from the Aristotelian model of philosophical 
theoria. In doing so, I propose that Cicero offers an understanding of philosophy’s characteristic 
activity as, in Aristotelian terms, atelic—that is, lacking an internal perfection and functioning as 
part of an ongoing process. I then ask, in the second part of the section, if Cicero’s practice of 
contemplatio is atelic and processual, what is the external goal or aim that it seeks or produces? 
In answer to this question, I consider the relationship between Cicero’s contemplatio and the 
Platonic model of theoria, which aims at “seeing” truth. I contend ultimately that Cicero extends 
his skeptical treatment of philosophical activity also to Platonic theoria in order to envision a 
mode of living for the philosopher that is defined not as much by the present act of seeing, but by 
the inhabitation of the ateleia or failure of observation as the manifestation of an unknowable 
future horizon. In Cicero’s philosophical life, contemplatio becomes an activity not done for its 
own sake, nor to realize happiness or truth in the present life, but for the sake of something—an 
event, a change, a form of life—that has not yet, and may never, come about.  
III.i. Contemplation, Completion, and Happiness 
 Aristotle’s conception of philosophy as the pursuit of a vita contemplativa or bios 
theoretikos informs much of the Hellenistic debate concerning the possibilities of a life. 
 
Socratic philosophy; see, e.g., Tusc. 5.10. Jaeger 1960 [1928] argued that this form of historical 
argumentation may be an anachronistic retrojection of the Academy’s Lebensideal onto the pre-Socratics; 
for critiques of this position, which emphasize the importance of the observation of nature for the Ionian 
philosophers, cf. Festugière 1950: 20-44; Gottschalk 1980; Nightingale 2004: 29-34. Regardless of its 
ultimate provenance, the forms of the vita philosophica and the role of contemplatio in Cicero’s dialogues 
are most notably of Platonic and Aristotelian articulation: on Platonic theoria, see, e.g., Reeve 1988: 81-
117; Nightingale 2004: 94-138; and on Aristotle, Lear 2004: 175-208; Nightingale 2004: 187-251. The 
relationship between theoria and the eudaimonistic ethics of the Hellenistic schools has often been seen 
as a source of contention. On these debates, see esp. Bénatouïl and Bonazzi, eds. 2012 passim. For my 
purposes, I am less interested in the historicity of the different arguments among the Greek schools and 
more in Cicero’s representation of them.  
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Establishing a series of distinctions in Metaphysics IX, Aristotle characterizes the activity of 
“theorizing” or “seeing” as an “actualization” (ἐνέργεια).48 This means that, before coming to the 
question of the “theoretical” life, Aristotle has constructed a metaphysical basis for the 
characteristic activity of the philosopher as one that has no external limit (πέρας), but contains its 
own end (τέλος) or “complete condition…at any moment of its duration—it is an ‘entelechy.’”49 
Contemplation is thus conceived of as an end in itself and not a means to an end, a form of 
“actuality” not of becoming. In Nicomachean Ethics X, then, Aristotle formulates the character 
of a life that partakes in this energeia. He defines the theoretical life in relation to other forms of 
life that have the potential to be virtuous and happy, especially the political life.50 By 
comparison, the activity of a life spent in intellectual observation is superior (κρατίστη τε γὰρ 
αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ἐνέργεια) to that offered by politics because it is based on an exercise of “the mind” 
(ὁ νοῦς), is the “most continuous” (συνεχεστάτη), and permits of pleasures that are “marvelously 
pure and permanent” (θαυμαστὰς ἡδονὰς…καθαρειότητι καὶ τῷ βεβαίῳ), which are all the more 
secure because contemplation is “self-sufficient” (αὐτάρκεια).51  
 
48 For the Aristotelian definitions, see esp. Metaphys. IX.6 (1048b18-36). 
49 Nightingale 2004: 201. By contrast, Aristotle defines “motions” (kineseis), such as walking or building, 
as a means to an end, not supplying their own end—so, therefore, ateles: “For it is not the same thing 
which at the same time is walking and has walked, or is building and has built, or is becoming and has 
become…But the same thing at the same time is seeing and has seen, is thinking and has thought” (οὐ γὰρ 
ἅμα βαδίζει καὶ βεβάδικεν, οὐδ᾽ οἰκοδομεῖ καὶ ᾠκοδόμηκεν, οὐδὲ γίγνεται καὶ γέγονεν…ἑώρακε δὲ καὶ 
ὁρᾷ ἅμα τὸ αὐτό, καὶ νοεῖ καὶ νενόηκεν, 1048b31-34; trans. Tredennick).  
50 As Nightingale 2004: 189 points out, theoria for Aristotle constitutes less a “form of life” comparable 
to activities of the practical bioi and more of “the actualization of nous, which is the divine part of man; it 
is the pure noetic activity that gods engage in, and is only done ‘for its own sake.’” All the same, Aristotle 
introduces the theoretical life in Eth. Nic. X by contrasting it with practical ways of living and by 
describing the conditions of leisure and happiness that are its embodied aspects.  
51 See ibid.: 209 for the ideological implications of this formulation.  
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 But perhaps even more important for Aristotle’s argument, and certainly for the whole 
Hellenistic tradition and Cicero’s response to it, is his contention that, contrary to active forms of 
life, contemplation exists as the ultimate end for human life itself, and thus is “identical to or 
coextensive with happiness”:52 
δόξαι τ᾿ ἂν αὐτὴ μόνη δι᾿ αὑτὴν ἀγαπᾶσθαι· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀπ᾿ αὐτῆς γίνεται παρὰ τὸ 
θεωρῆσαι, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν πρακτικῶν ἢ πλεῖον ἢ ἔλαττον περιποιούμεθα παρὰ τὴν πρᾶξιν. 
δοκεῖ τε ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐν τῇ σχολῇ εἶναι· ἀσχολούμεθα γὰρ ἵνα σχολάζωμεν καὶ 
πολεμοῦμεν ἵν᾿ εἰρήνην ἄγωμεν…εἰ δὴ τῶν μὲν κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς πράξεων αἱ πολιτικαὶ 
καὶ πολεμικαὶ κάλλει καὶ μεγέθει προέχουσιν, αὗται δ᾿ ἄσχολοι καὶ τέλους τινὸς 
ἐφίενται καὶ οὐ δι᾿ αὑτὰς αἱρεταί εἰσιν, ἡ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ ἐνέργεια σπουδῇ τε διαφέρειν δοκεῖ 
θεωρητικὴ οὖσα καὶ παρ᾿ αὑτὴν οὐδενὸς ἐφίεσθαι τέλους, ἔχειν τε ἡδονὴν οἰκείαν (αὕτη 
δὲ συναύξει τὴν ἐνέργειαν), καὶ τὸ αὔταρκες δὴ καὶ σχολαστικὸν καὶ ἄτρυτον ὡς 
ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τῷ μακαρίῳ ἀπονέμεται, τὰ κατὰ ταύτην τὴν ἐνέργειαν φαίνεται 
ὄντα· ἡ τελεία δὴ εὐδαιμονία αὕτη ἂν εἴη ἀνθρώπου, λαβοῦσα μῆκος βίου τέλειον· 
οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀτελές ἐστι τῶν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας. 
 
Also the activity of contemplation may be held to be the only activity that is loved for its 
own sake: it produces no result beyond the actual act of contemplation, whereas from 
practical pursuits we look to secure some advantage, greater or smaller, beyond the 
action itself. Also happiness is thought to involve leisure; for we do business in order 
that we may have leisure, and carry on war in order that we may have peace…If then 
among practical pursuits displaying the virtues, politics and war stand out pre-eminent in 
nobility and grandeur, and yet they are unleisured, and directed to some further end, not 
chosen for their own sakes: whereas the activity of the intellect is felt to excel in serious 
worth, consisting as it does in observation, and to aim at no end beyond itself, and also to 
contain a pleasure peculiar to itself, and therefore augmenting its activity: and if 
accordingly the attributes of this activity are found to be self-sufficiency, leisuredness, 
such freedom from fatigue as is possible for man, and all the other attributes of 
blessedness: it follows that it is the activity of the intellect that constitutes complete 
human happiness—provided it be granted a complete span of life, for nothing that 
belongs to happiness can be incomplete.53 
 
For Aristotle, theoria is the only (αὐτὴ μόνη) activity for human life that is pursued as an end in 
itself. Unlike politics or war, which must be directed towards attaining a further end—as war is 
fought for the sake of peace (πολεμοῦμεν ἵν᾿ εἰρήνην ἄγωμεν)—contemplation is “loved for 
 
52 Ibid.: 218.  
53 Eth. Nic. X.5-7 (1177b). Trans. Rackham.  
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itself” (δι᾿ αὑτὴν ἀγαπᾶσθαι). The manifestation of this self-reflexivity in the life of the 
theoretician is given the specific name of “leisure” (ἐν τῇ σχολῇ). This state of “leisuredness” 
and “freedom from fatigue” (καὶ σχολαστικὸν καὶ ἄτρυτον), which is the end for which other 
activities strive, is for theoria the condition of its activity. According to Aristotle, therefore, the 
activity of intellectual contemplation “constitutes complete human happiness” (ἡ τελεία δὴ 
εὐδαιμονία αὕτη ἂν εἴη ἀνθρώπου)—that is, it constitutes the “consummation” or “end” (τελεία) 
of happiness for human forms of life. This climax of the argument comes with a caveat, 
however, that in order to achieve consummation (τελεία), this activity must be extended 
throughout the “complete span of life” (“the span of life up until its end,” μῆκος βίου τέλειον),54 
since “nothing that belongs to happiness can be incomplete” (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀτελές ἐστι τῶν τῆς 
εὐδαιμονίας). Thus, for Aristotle, the essential features of the philosopher’s life spent in theoria 
are its completeness (τελεία, τέλειον) and its coextension with human happiness.55 The point of 
its self-reflexivity and self-sufficiency is to realize the utmost possibility of human life—filling 
the lifetime with happiness up until its very end. By crafting this definition, Aristotle ensures that 
happiness is likewise defined by antonymy to incompleteness. Happiness must be a state that 
allows nothing to be ἀτελές.  
 
54 On the nature of this bios teleios, see Eth. Nic. I.16 (1098a), “Moreover, to be happy takes a complete 
lifetime; for one swallow does not make spring, nor does one fine day; and similarly one day or a brief 
period of happiness does not make a man supremely blessed and happy” (ἔτι δ᾿ ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ· μία γὰρ 
χελιδὼν ἔαρ οὐ ποιεῖ, οὐδὲ μία ἡμέρα· οὕτω δὲ οὐδὲ μακάριον καὶ εὐδαίμονα μία ἡμέρα οὐδ᾿ ὀλίγος 
χρόνος, trans. Rackham). Cf. Irwin 1985: 104-6; Farwell 1995. 
55 On the relationship to happiness, see also the analogy between sight and pleasure earlier at Eth. Nic. 
X.4 (1174b): “Now the act of sight appears to be perfect at any moment of its duration; it does not require 
anything to supervene later in order to perfect its specific quality. But pleasure also appears to be a thing 
of this nature” (δοκεῖ γὰρ ἡ μὲν ὅρασις καθ᾿ ὁντινοῦν χρόνον τελεία εἶναι· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἐνδεὴς οὐδενός, ὃ 
εἰς ὕστερον γενόμενον τελειώσει αὐτῆς τὸ εἶδος. τοιούτῳ δ᾿ ἔοικε καὶ ἡ ἡδονή). On the connections 
between the perfection of pleasure and that of happiness, see González 1991.  
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 In tracing the influence of this formulation on Cicero’s dialogues, we can see how he 
exploits the connections between completion and happiness drawn by Aristotle’s definition to 
interrogate the inconclusiveness of Hellenistic eudaimonism. Cicero’s presentation of Stoic and 
Epicurean ethics across the dialogues demonstrates that, while they preserve the association 
between the consummation of human life and happiness, they conceive of contemplatio 
specifically—and philosophical activity more generally—as an atelic process.56 For the 
Hellenistic schools, philosophical activity is aimed always at producing an end outside itself: in 
particular, virtus or voluptas. By treating these atelic philosophical processes in a skeptical mode, 
Cicero’s own representation of philosophical activity puts the ends of the Hellenistic schools into 
a dialectical relationship with one another.57 Cicero’s approach to the eudaimonism of post-
Aristotelian ethics, therefore, is doubly atelic: it both demonstrates the inconclusiveness of the 
Stoic and Epicurean identification of happiness with the consummation of life and it shows how 
the atelic philosophical activities through which these schools realize their fines are bound to a 
further, and also inconclusive, process.  
 
56 See, e.g., Rorty 1980: 386 for the characterization of philosophical theorization as a kinesis rather than, 
as it is for Aristotle, an energeia.  
57 As we saw in Ch. 1 and 2, Cicero frequently employs skeptical divisiones within his individual 
dialogues in order to show up the inconclusiveness of Hellenistic eudaimonism. The explicit presentations 
of this type of meta-argument are found at de Fin. 2.33-43, 4.49-50, 5.16-22; cf. Luc. 138-41. See also 
Lévy 1992: 335-444; Algra 1997. A similar skeptical approach can be seen at the macro-level across 
Cicero’s life and work. While a full consideration of this lifelong pursuit lies beyond the scope of this 
section, it is notable that even within the writing of 45-4 we find a fluctuation of opinion or the movement 
of situational approvability that characterizes a skeptical divisio. The foundation for such a biographical 
study is readily available, see, e.g., Kretschmar 1938; Görler 1990, etc. 
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 In Cicero’s most elaborate defense of Stoic ethics from the final book of the Tusculans, 
M. introduces contemplatio, understood specifically as an “investigation” (indagatio)58 into the 
natural world, as an important tool for attaining invulnerable virtue.59 By returning to a pre-
Aristotelian, pre-Socratic understanding of theoria60 M.’s Stoic mode emphasizes how 
observation of the world stands not as the consummation, but at the beginning of a longer 
sequence of activities that define the philosophical life.61 Asking his interlocutor to “imagine a 
man preeminent in the best abilities” and to “play in our minds for a moment with this depiction” 
(Sumatur enim nobis quidam praestans vir optimis artibus isque animo parumper et cogitatione 
fingatur, 5.68), M. lays out a course of philosophical education that would bring his ideal pupil 
to the fulfillment of his potential. After deciding to pursue a study of the “threefold offspring of 
the mind” (triplex ille animi fetus), he embarks on the first of philosophy’s logoi: physics (in 
cognitione rerum positus et in explicatione naturae). The study of physics arises from the 
 
58 A rare word in classical Latin, occurring in Cicero to refer to the investigation of truths; see Luc.127-8 
(addressed below), Off. 1.15 (indagatio atque inventio veri); cf. Vitruvius’ application of the word to 
specific mathematical and physical inquiries (de Arch. 5.3, 5.5).   
59 In Cicero’s presentation of Stoic philosophy, he tends to downplay the role of contemplatio. In keeping 
with the emphasis of the school, he prefers to present cognitio rerum as an exercise of logic, not natural 
observation. For a more characteristic presentation, see de Fin. 3.17-8, where he uses the term cognitiones 
rerum alongside comprehensiones and perceptiones to translate the basic Stoic epistemological term, 
κατάληψις. This is not to say that the Stoic model of philosophical activity is irreconcilable with theoria, 
only that in Cicero’s presentation this reconciliation is not emphasized except in the present passage; on 
the Stoic basis for this depiction of theoria, see esp. Forschner 2002. On Stoic theoria more generally, see 
esp. Sen. de Otio with Graver 2012; and Inwood 2009.  
60 On the relationship between this pre-Socratic understanding of theoria and later applications, see 
above, n.47.  
61 Although this passage demonstrates that an investigation of nature can be understood as part of a Stoic 
education and, as Forschner 2009 argues, some of its specific formulations can be traced to Zeno, there is 
a notable confluence of influences in M.’s description: cf. esp. the shared diction with Lucretius (n.64 and 
66 below) and also a closely parallel passage at Tusc. 1.61-3, where the “discovery and 
conceptualization” (inventio atque cogitatio) of “hidden matters” (occulta) is attributed explicitly to the 
philosophical heritage of Pythagoras and Plato. On this aspect of Stoic theoria in Seneca, see Graver 
2012: esp. 98-100.  
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wondrous joy (gaudium) that the philosophical student feels spending his nights “discovering the 
movements and rotations of the whole universe and seeing the innumerable stars adhering to 
motion of the vault of heaven.”62 From this impulse to observe, M. contends, 
Inde est indagatio nata initiorum et tamquam seminum, unde essent omnia orta, generata, 
concreta, quaeque cuiusque generis vel inanimi vel animantis vel muti vel loquentis 
origo, quae vita, qui interitus quaeque ex alio in aliud vicissitudo atque mutatio, unde 
terra et quibus librata ponderibus, quibus cavernis maria sustineantur. qua omnia delata 
gravitate medium mundi locum semper expetant, qui est idem infimus in rotundo.  
 
…was born the whole investigation into the beginnings and, as it were, seeds from which 
everything arose, was propagated and consolidated: what was the origin of every type of 
thing, whether inanimate or animate, mute or speaking, what is life, what is death, what 
is the change and transformation of one thing into another, from where the earth came to 
be and by what weights it is balanced, and by what caverns the seas are upheld, by what 
force of gravity all things are carried to the center of the universe, which is just like the 
lowest place in a sphere.63  
 
The ideal student’s journey through philosophy commences fittingly where, M. contends, 
philosophy itself begins. The study of the movements of the universe allows the praestans vir to 
understand the “the seeds from which everything arose, was propagated, and consolidated” 
(seminum, unde essent omnia orta, generata, concreta),64 enabling him to discover the “origin of 
every type of thing” (quaeque cuiusque generis…origo). Consideration of origins also creates a 
general understanding of change (ex alio in aliud vicissitudo atque mutatio)65—including life and 
 
62 Quo tandem igitur gaudio adfici necesse est sapientis animum cum his habitantem pernoctantemque 
curis! ut, cum totius mundi motus conversionesque perspexerit sideraque viderit innumerabilia caelo 
inhaerentia cum eius ipsius motu congruere certis infixa sedibus… 
63 Tusc. 5.69.  
64 Cf. Lucr., who uses Cicero’s wording here to refer to similar phenomena: semina, e.g., 1.59, 1.169, 
1.176 etc; concretus < concerno, e.g., 1.1019, 5.466 etc. Yet here the semina seem to refer explicitly to 
the Stoic σπερματικοὶ λόγοι, from which the world begins anew after the ekpurōsis; on this process, see 
Long and Sedley 1987: i.274-79 (46).  
65 On this particularly Ciceronian collocation, see above Intro., section I. Cf. with the variant commutatio, 
de Orat. 3.225, de Rep 1.45; Tusc. Disp. 1.68, de Nat. De. 1.52, 1.100 (both of these usages are 
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death (vita…interitus)—as well as a more granular familiarity with the organization of the 
universe, including the “weights” (libata) by which the earth is balanced, how the seas remain in 
place,66 and the shape of the “universe” (mundus) as a whole. M.’s argument thus maintains the 
connection between philosophical activity and a form of contemplation. Yet this activity is 
conceived not as the consummation of the philosophical life but as the first step in an ongoing 
education. It is in itself incomplete and aims ultimately to enable the student to progress to “the 
art of living” (in ratione vivendi).67  
 In M.’s Stoic argument, only this further pursuit of the “art of living” offers the praestans 
vir the possibility of a happiness that consists in living in accordance with virtue, which is 
equivalent to living in agreement with nature.68 Instead of, like Aristotle, attempting to ensure 
happiness by proposing theoria as an entirely self-reflexive and self-sufficient activity that 
constitutes its own circumstance in the form of leisure, the Stoics argue that happiness can only 
be secure if it is based, not on this specific activity, but in attainment of unassailable virtue. As 
M. argues in support of this position against the Peripatetic, “In my opinion, virtuous men are 
also supremely happy. For if a man is confident of the goods that he has, what does he lack for 
living happily?…Yet a man who adopts the threefold division of goods [i.e., a Peripatetic or 
Antiochean] inevitably lacks confidence…No one can be happy without a good which is secure, 
 
specifically concerning astronomy). On the connection between this passage and Cicero’s interest in the 
vis et mutatio omnium rerum atque temporum, see below, section IV.  
66 For an elaboration of this theory, see de Nat. De. 2.116; for a competing theory, cf. Lucr. 5.261-272, 
6.608-638.  
67 Tusc. 5.68; the mss. for this phrase are corrupt. This is Wesenberg’s correction, cf. Pohlenz in ratione 
bene vivendi.  
68 Cf. e.g., Stob. 2.77 = Long and Sedley 1987: i.394 (63A).   
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stable, and lasting.”69 Speaking as a Stoic, M. rejects an Aristotelian Lebensideal and the division 
of goods on which it is constructed: since contemplation is an activity of the intellect, it involves 
the goods of the mind, yet at the same time it is contingent, from the Stoic perspective, on the 
“indifferents” of circumstance in the presence or absence of leisure and freedom from 
disturbance. Following the Stoics, M. ties happiness exclusively to virtue, thereby logically 
freeing the attainment of happiness from the circumstances of a life. The self-sufficiency and 
completeness that Aristotle locates in the contemplative life, the Stoics place in the only good 
that is “secure, stable, and lasting” (stabili et fixo et permanente bono).  
 On the form of the philosophical life, therefore, the Stoics take a broader view. To live in 
accordance with nature as a human being inevitably involves considerations of community and 
the determining factors of a shared life.70 M.’s defense of the Stoic position in the final book of 
the Tusculans and Cicero’s own dedication to public life would seem to indicate that he himself 
found these arguments, at certain times and in certain states of mind, persuasive or compelling. 
Yet this situational “approvability” should not be confused for the conclusion of an inquiry. The 
strong defense of Stoic eudaimonia in the Tusculans indicates only the continuation of an 
ongoing investigation into the post-Aristotelian framework that conjoins the perfection and 
completeness of a life with the attainability of happiness. It is especially significant in this regard 
that one of Cicero’s most clearly stated formulations of the skeptical prerogative occurs at the 
 
69 Sed mihi videntur etiam beatissimi: quid enim deest ad beate vivendum ei, qui confidit suis bonis?…At 
diffidat necesse est qui bona dividit tripertito…Atque nisi stabili et fixo et permanente bono beatus esse 
nemo potest, 5.40 
70 Cf. the old Stoic doctrine, attributed to Chrysippus by D.L. VII.121: “The wise person will engage in 
politics if nothing hinders him” (Πολιτεύσεσθαί φασι τὸν σοφὸν ἂν μή τι κωλύῃ, 7.121). The emphasis on 
Stoic dedication to community is especially evident in the theory of oikeiosis (on which, see above, Ch. 1, 
section IV) and in the later Stoics, e.g., Marc. Aurel., 5.16.  
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climax of the argument in Tusc. 5 in M.’s response to a request from A. to consider the Stoic 
ideal in relation to the other schools: “Let us therefore employ our freedom, which is allowed for 
us alone among the philosophical schools, concerning these things of which our speech itself 
makes no judgement, but instead considers all the parts, in order that the question might be 
decided by others on its own bases without invoking any particular authority.”71 Any 
consideration of Cicero’s advocation of a virtus-oriented political life—or his choice to pursue 
such a life—must be made in relation to this skeptical process. The incompletion of Cicero’s 
own inquiry into how best his life might be led is made evident, in particular, by his frequent 
expressions of a thwarted desire to live, not a life of political ambitio, but a quietist life as 
adduced by Epicurean ethics.72 Cicero’s engagement with the positions of these two schools, 
therefore, is best understood within the context of a skeptical and inconclusive inquiry into 
happiness as the consummation of the possibilities of a vita.  
 In a parallel to his depiction of a Stoic education in the Tusculans, Cicero’s presentation 
of the Epicurean system locates contemplation of the natural world at the beginning of an 
ongoing process of philosophical activity aimed at securing the school’s finis: voluptas.73 In 
Torquatus’ summary of Epicureanism, for instance, he challenges other philosophies’ reliance on 
 
71 Utamur igitur libertate, qua nobis solis in philosophia licet uti, quorum oratio nihil ipsa iudicat, sed 
habetur in omnis partis, ut ab aliis possit ipsa per sese nullius auctoritate adiuncta iudicari, 5.83. Note 
the particular emphasis on letting others decide the question.  
72 On this pattern in Cicero’s life, see esp. Kretschmar 1938; André 1966; Lévy 2012.  
73 On the relationship between Epicureanism and theoria in general, see Grilli 1953: 48-89. Cf., however, 
Bénatouïl and Bonazzi 2012: 2-14, who argue for a much stronger continuity of theoria among all the 
Hellenistic schools. For a more recent perspective on Epicurean theoria, see esp., Erler 2012.  
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dialectic, claiming that it “has no bearing on living well nor in improving the incisiveness of 
thought.”74 Instead, he explains,  
In physicis plurimum posuit. ea scientia et verborum vis et natura orationis et 
consequentium repugnantiumve ratio potest perspici. omnium autem rerum natura 
cognita levamur superstitione, liberamur mortis metu, non conturbamur ignoratione 
rerum, e qua ipsa horribiles existunt saepe formidines. denique etiam morati melius 
erimus, cum didicerimus quid natura desideret. tum vero, si stabilem scientiam rerum 
tenebimus, servata illa, quae quasi delapsa de caelo est ad cognitionem omnium, regula, 
ad quam omnia iudicia rerum dirigentur, numquam ullius oratione victi sententia 
desistemus.  
 
[Epicurus] located [these guides] especially in physics. Through this knowledge we can 
understand the meaning of words, the nature of speech, and the laws of consistency and 
contradiction. Moreover, by our understanding of universal nature we are freed from 
superstition and fear of death, no longer being disturbed by our ignorance of the world, 
from which terrible fears often arise with no other basis. Finally, we will become better 
civilized after we learn what nature desires. Only then, if we hold fast a well-established 
knowledge of the world, preserving the canon, which, as it were, fell from heaven to be 
understood by all, against which all our judgements are measured, will we be able to 
persist in our belief, never being conquered by the eloquence of any man.75  
 
Torquatus locates the bedrock of the Epicurean system in a “knowledge” (scientia) or 
“understanding” of the nature of the world (omnium…rerum natura cognita). Thus, as with the 
Stoic use of cognitio rerum in Tusc. 5, we find inquiry into nature as the key component of an 
ongoing philosophical development that is used to defend the school’s finis. In the Epicurean 
mode, this basis of philosophical activity entirely supplants logic in order to provide a non-
dialectical “canon” (regula) by which the practitioner can stand firm in his knowledge against 
the “eloquence” of the other schools.76 Yet the more fundamental use of contemplation for 
 
74 In dialectica autem vestra nullam existimavit esse nec ad melius vivendum nec ad commodius 
disserendum vim. 
75 de Fin. 1.63.  
76 On the Epicurean “canon” (κανών, regula) as an alternative formulation to philosophical logic, see D.L. 
X.30-5. The essential idea is that “our sensations and preconceptions and our feelings are the standards of 
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Epicurean ethics is the liberation “from superstition and fear of death” (levamur superstitione, 
liberamur mortis metu) that Torquatus tells us comes with an “understanding of universal 
nature” (omnium autem rerum natura cognita).77 This liberation, in turn, allows the Epicurean to 
be a more “civilized” or “moral” person (morati melius erimus) because he will understand 
“what nature desires” (quid natura desideret)—i.e., pleasure. The tranquillitas that results from 
this process of liberation through natural inquiry constitutes the circumstances of the sage’s 
beata vita and cements the post-Aristotelian association between happiness and the 
consummation of life in the Epicurean context.78 Torquatus’ formulation of a philosophical life 
thus converts aspects of Aristotle’s Lebensideal, especially in its equation of happiness with the 
enjoyment of leisure and an untroubled retirement from obligation, for the Epicurean’s own 
chosen life-pursuit.79 At the same time, however, the philosophical activity of cognitio rerum, for 
the Epicurean as for the Stoic, is conceived of as a means to a further end, not as an end in itself.  
 
truth” (κριτήρια τῆς ἀληθείας εἶναι τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ προλήψεις καὶ τὰ πάθη, D.L. X.31). Cf. Long and 
Sedley 1987: i.87-97 (17-18).  
77 Cf. KD 11-12, “Were we not upset by the worries that celestial phenomena and death might matter to 
us, and also by failure to appreciate the limits of pains and desires, we would have no need for natural 
philosophy…Hence without natural philosophy there is no way of securing the purity of our pleasures,” 
(εἰ μηθὲν ἡμᾶς αἱ τῶν μετεώρων ὑποψίαι ἠνώχλουν καὶ αἱ περὶ θανάτου, μή ποτε πρὸς ἡμᾶς ᾖ τι, ἔτι τε τὸ 
μὴ κατανοεῖν τοὺς ὅρους τῶν ἀλγηδόνων καὶ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν, οὐκ ἂν προσεδεόμεθα φυσιολογίας…ὥστε 
οὐκ ἦν ἄνευ φυσιολογίας ἀκεραίους τὰς ἡδονὰς ἀπολαμβάνειν). Note that the purity of the pleasures 
achieved by Epicurus through the exercise of φυσιολογία recalls the “marvelously pure and permanent 
pleasures” (θαυμαστὰς ἡδονὰς…καθαρειότητι καὶ τῷ βεβαίῳ) that Aristotle locates in contemplation. Yet 
the philosophical contemplation that Aristotle holds as the end of happiness in itself is converted into a 
means through which pleasure can be attained and secured. In the pursuit of an undisturbed life outside of 
conventional social activities, Epicurus appropriates the form of Aristotle’s contemplative life, while 
repurposing its content—philosophical speculation (φυσιολογία)—to a further end. 
78 For Torquatus’ account of Epicurean tranquillity and its relation to the beata vita, see esp. 1.40-4; 71-2.  
79 On the relationship between Aristotelian theoria and Epicurean physiologia, see esp. Erler 2012: 48-55. 
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 Cicero’s opposition to Epicurean ethics arises particularly from the popularity of the 
school among the Roman political elite.80 His anti-Epicurean persona specifically takes aim at 
the Garden’s apparent rejection of public service in the manner of the mos maiorum in favor of a 
self-interested, pleasure-oriented life apart from politics.81 For instance, in the Ciceronian 
speaker’s response to Torquatus in de Fin. 2, he sarcastically asks, “What do you wish to earn, 
when soon you will enter into a magistracy and you will address the meeting (for you will need 
to pronounce how you will administer justice, and perhaps even, since it will occur to you, you 
will say something about your ancestors and the mos maiorum)—what, therefore, will you earn 
by saying that you will perform all the duties of the magistracy for the sake of pleasure and that 
you have done nothing in life except for the sake of pleasure?”82 Cicero protests that the choice 
of voluptas as the ultimate end of life destroys the viability of a political life for an Epicurean in 
the Roman context. Torquatus is presented with the scenario of standing in front of a contio and, 
while recalling his noble, stalwart ancestors, pledging his adherence to pleasure as the guiding 
principle of his life. In keeping with the tendencies of the skeptical divisio, Cicero thus locates 
 
80 On the complexity of Cicero’s anti-Epicureanism, see Howe 1951; Maslowski 1974; Lotito 1981; Lévy 
2003a; Hanchey 2013. On Epicureanism at Rome, see e.g., Griffin 1989; Sedley 2009; for literary 
approaches via Lucretius, see Fowler 1989; Auvray-Assayas 2003; Schiesaro 2009.  
81 It is clear that this is not the best understanding of Epicurus’ teaching on the preferability of an 
undisturbed life, but rather Cicero’s own polemical position. Epicureanism more likely counseled its 
adherents to avoid public life when such a life would place undue obstacles and discomfort in their path. 
In the case of the many well-born, prominent, and already active Epicureans, however, no such injunction 
would necessarily be forthcoming. On this issue, see esp. Fish 2011 and Armstrong 2011. The basis for 
Cicero’s rejection of Epicurean ethics seems to have been based more in how he saw the pursuit of 
voluptas being applied in the consumption-centered lifestyles of the ruling elite; see esp., Howe 1951; 
Lotito 1981: 84-93; and Hanchey 2013.  
82 quid enim mereri velis, iam cum magistratum inieris et in contionem ascenderis—est enim tibi 
edicendum quae sis observaturus in iure dicendo, et fortasse etiam, si tibi erit visum, aliquid de maioribus 
tuis et de te ipso dices more maiorum—quid merearis igitur, ut dicas te in eo magistratu omnia voluptatis 
causa facturum esse, teque nihil fecisse in vita nisi voluptatis causa?, de Fin. 2.74.  
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the Epicurean teaching of withdrawal from public life more fundamentally in Torquatus’ choice 
of summum bonum, while at the same time contextualizing that choice in a explicitly Roman 
public context. Confronted with this “clear” absurdity, Torquatus, and Cicero’s readers, are 
meant to understand the immediate incompatibility of an ethics of pleasure with a Roman public 
life.  
 Cicero’s perspective on private otium or philosophical tranquillitas as the circumstance 
of a happy life, however, muddies the picture of the stalwart anti-Epicurean. Throughout his life 
prior to his return to philosophy in the mid-40s, Cicero frequently expresses a thwarted desire to 
live a philosophical life in otium.83 As Carlos Lévy points out, this tension is especially evident 
in the frequent comparisons that Cicero draws between his own choice of life and that of 
Atticus—the well-positioned and socially respected Roman Epicurean.84 This desire is not 
simply on the order of an envious wish, but one that Cicero addresses in philosophical terms: for 
instance, in an early letter from their collected correspondence, Cicero juxtaposes his own 
political ambition (ambitio), which led him in pursuit of honors (ad honorum studium), to 
Atticus’ philosophical reason (ratio), which led him to honest leisure (ad honestum otium).85 As 
Lévy also notes with respect to the relationship between Cicero’s youthful studies and his later 
return to philosophy under Caesar, “la situation qui prévalait lorsque Cicéron terminait ses 
études, n’était pas très différente…de celle provoquée par la guerre civile et la victoire César, le 
 
83 On Cicero’s expressions of this desire for otium, see e.g., Boyancé 1941; Görler 1990; and Gildenhard 
2007: 37-9; 43-49; 52-69 for a more political perspective.  
84 On Atticus’ Epicureanism, see, e.g., Lindsay 1998; Shearin 2012. 
85 Ad Att. I.17(17).5, Neque ego inter me atque te quicquam interesse umquam duxi praeter voluntatem 
institutae vitae, quod me ambitio quaedam ad honorum studium, te autem alia minime reprehendenda 
ratio ad honestum otium duxit; cf. Lévy 2012: 58-9.  
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tout évoquant une circularité, une coïncidence, qui ne semble pas avoir été remarquée, entre le 
jeune homme assidu aux leçons de Philon et le vieil homme qui se remettait à la philosophie.”86 
Because of this circularity of circumstance, the otium that is forced upon Cicero by Caesar’s 
dictatorship causes him to confront, in a manner similar to the period of his youthful education, 
the choice of political or philosophical life. In the reopening of the question of the genera vitae 
in Cicero’s writings of the period, we find the continuation of a lived inquiry, driven by his own 
doubt, into the possibility and paths to happiness as the consummation of the vita.  
 This is not to say, however, that Cicero simply adopts the otium-filled lifestyle of Atticus 
in his old age. As noted above, Cicero never ceases to designate his philosophical activity as a 
type of labor. Yet within the dialogues of 45-4, especially those following the Tusculans, we find 
elaborations on an Epicurean-influenced approach to the happy life, focused especially on the 
virtues of tranquillitas and societas.87 In one of the most strongly stated of these defenses in de 
Amicitia, a text fittingly dedicated to Atticus, Laelius argues in favor of a life passed in private 
friendship88 that “is a condition in which all the qualities that humans believe desirable come 
together: honor, glory, peace of mind, enjoyment. If they are present, life is happy. If they are 
missing, it cannot be” (haec est, inquam, societas, in qua omnia insunt, quae putant homines 
expetenda, honestas, gloria, tranquillitas animi atque iucunditas, ut et, cum haec adsint, beata 
 
86 Lévy 2012: 59-60. 
87 See, e.g., his recuperation of the Roman Epicurean, Titus Albucius, a frequently cited negative 
exemplum, at Tusc. 5.108-9; cf. de Fin. 1.8-10. On this feature of the late dialogues more generally, see 
Kretschmar 1938: 119-52 with a focus on Off.; and Maso 2015: 207-14 with a focus on de Am.  
88 Cf. Philod. On Property Management (PHerc. 1424 xxiii 23-30), where Philodemus claims that the 
very best way for a philosopher to support himself is “to get in return for philosophical discourses shared 
with men receptive of them a grateful [friend], but with all reverence, as happened to Epicurus” (πρῶτον 
δὲ | καὶ κάλλιϲτον ἀπὸ λόγων | φιλο[ϲό]φων ἀνδράϲιν δεκτι|κοῖϲ μεταδιδομέν[ων] ἀν|τιμεταλαμβάνειν 
εὐχάριϲτο[ν `φίλο]ν΄, [ἀλλ]ὰ μετὰ ϲεβαϲμοῦ | παντ[όϲ], ὡϲ ἐγένετ’ Ἐπικο̣[ύ]|ρωι). 
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vita sit et sine his esse non possit).89 It is clear from this formulation that Cicero does not seek to 
co-opt a dogmatically Epicurean approach; the presence of gloria in Laelius’ list of otherwise 
recognizably Epicurean virtues—tranquillitas animi atque iucunditas—indicates the non-
dogmatic complexity of Laelius’ argument. Yet such a reading of the late dialogues demonstrates 
clearly that there was, for Cicero, a reopening of the question of the genera vitae caused by the 
enforced otium of Caesar’s dictatorship. In this clearing of the personal and political significance 
that had accrued around his own youthful choice to pursue political ambitio in the manner of the 
mos maiorum, Cicero reconsiders the alternative that he had rejected 40 years previously.  
 Cicero’s skeptical treatment of Hellenistic eudaimonism, both within specific dialogues 
and in his lifelong pursuit as a whole, demonstrates the inconclusiveness of this way of 
structuring the possibilities of a life. Following Aristotle’s association of philosophical activity 
with the consummation of human happiness, the Hellenistic schools seek to justify and shape 
ethics as an “art of living” (τέχνη περὶ τὸν βίον)90 that, without the basis of Aristotelian theoria, 
will nevertheless ensure the successful attainment of happiness from within the human lifespan. 
As Aristotle warns, however, “nothing that belongs to happiness can be incomplete” (οὐδὲν γὰρ 
ἀτελές ἐστι τῶν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας); and so, these eudaimonistic arguments, by interpreting 
philosophical activity as an ongoing atelic process, open up a problem of teleological judgement 
for the philosophical life: the realization of virtus or voluptas and the concomitant attainment of 
 
89 de Am. 84. On this passage, see Maso 2015: 209. For Epicurus on friendship, cf. VS 23; 52; 56-7; for 
Cicero’s explicit presentation of Epicurean friendship see de Fin. 1.66-68. For debates about the nature of 
Epicurean friendship in this period beyond Cicero’s depiction, see, e.g., O’Connor 1989; O’Keefe 2001; 
Armstrong 2011.  
90 On the origin of this tag, which Cicero’s Torquatus attributes to the Epicureans (beatae vitae 
disciplinam, de Fin. 1.72), but modern scholars generally locate in a Platonic or Stoic context, see, e.g., 
Schmid 1991: 25-32, 58-68; Sellars 2003.  
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happiness mark the fulfillment of the possibilities of life, while a lack of happiness comes to 
entail an ethical failure. Even Laelius’ tranquil beata vita is structured around this goal, although 
it shifts the burden of judgment from the public to the private sphere: consummation of his 
chosen form of life is the presence of honestas, gloria, tranquillitas animi, and iucunditas—
“when they are present, life is happy. If they are missing, it cannot be.” By locating the post-
Aristotelian association between the consummation of a life and happiness within a further 
incomplete and ongoing process of investigation, Cicero’s lifelong engagement with the genera 
vitae thus demonstrates not only the inconclusiveness of the Hellenistic schools’ attempts to 
secure the coherence of a happy life, but also the dialectical dependence of their arguments on 
each other and on the circularity of circumstance. In the recurrence of the question—what makes 
a successful life?—and the variously persuasive answers that Cicero considers and lives out we 
can see the conceptual impasse that arises at the end of the eudaimonist approach to the 
consummation of a life.  
III.ii. Contemplation, Incompletion, and Truth 
 Cicero’s presentation of Stoic and Epicurean ethics makes evident a formal agreement in 
these schools’ characterization of philosophical activity. In particular, Cicero’s parallel 
interpretation of the Stoic and Epicurean approaches to physics accentuates how they divorce 
cognitio rerum from contemplatio.91 In other words, in Cicero’s interpretation of Hellenistic 
ethics we find philosophy’s characteristic activity understood exclusively as an atelic process, 
counterposed to Aristotle’s metaphysical identification of theoria as an entelic “actualization” 
(energeia). The Hellenistic schools conceive of the study of nature as instrumental in attaining 
 
91 It should be reemphasized that this division is within Cicero’s presentation and not necessarily 
reflective of the principles and practices of the Hellenistic schools.  
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the ends favored by their own school. Cicero’s own skeptical approach to philosophical activity, 
in turn, redoubles its kinetic constitution: the dialectic into which he introduces the atelic 
philosophical activity of the Hellenistic schools is itself atelic. Furthermore, this doubling means 
that, just as the Stoics and Epicurean schools employ philosophical activity to attain a further 
end, so Cicero’s philosophy should also aim at something beyond itself. Yet, if this goal, which 
Cicero’s philosophical activity seeks to realize, is emphatically not contained in the Hellenistic 
fines bonorum, it becomes more difficult to articulate precisely what this end might be.  
 The most obvious answer to this question comes from the Platonic tradition: the end 
toward which philosophical activity and life strives is truth. As Andrea Nightingale 
demonstrates, theoria in Plato’s dialogues is consistently likened to a “journey to ‘see Being.’”92 
Rather than interpreting this analogy as an empty literary metaphor, Nightingale offers an 
understanding of Platonic theoria in which the activity of speculation is conjoined with the 
practice of dialectic to describe the defining feature of the philosopher’s life.93 For Plato, she 
argues, “The activity of theorizing takes place in the context of a personal life that is historically 
specific. But, at the same time, the particular person is an immortal soul whose life on earth is 
 
92 Nightingale 2004: 107.  
93 See e.g., in the analogy of the Cave, Rep. VII.532b-c, “[And dialectic is] the release from bonds, and 
the turning away from shadows to the images and to the light of the fire and then the ascent out of the 
cave into the sunlight and, there, the inability to look at the plants and animals and the light of the sun, 
though one can see the phantasms of these reflected in water and the shadow of real things, not the 
shadows of images cast by a light which is quite different from the true sun. All this labor in the 
disciplines we have mentioned [including dialectic] has the power to lead the best part of the soul up to 
the vision (thean) of the best among realities” (ἡ δέ γε, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, λύσις τε ἀπὸ τῶν δεσμῶν καὶ 
μεταστροφὴ ἀπὸ τῶν σκιῶν ἐπὶ τὰ εἴδωλα καὶ τὸ φῶς καὶ ἐκ τοῦ καταγείου εἰς τὸν ἥλιον ἐπάνοδος, καὶ 
ἐκεῖ πρὸς μὲν τὰ ζῷά τε καὶ φυτὰ καὶ τὸ τοῦ ἡλίου φῶς ἔτι ἀδυναμία βλέπειν, πρὸς δὲ τὰ ἐν ὕδασι 
φαντάσματα θεῖα καὶ σκιὰς τῶν ὄντων, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ εἰδώλων σκιὰς δι᾽ ἑτέρου τοιούτου φωτὸς ὡς πρὸς ἥλιον 
κρίνειν ἀποσκιαζομένας—πᾶσα αὕτη ἡ πραγματεία τῶν τεχνῶν ἃς διήλθομεν ταύτην ἔχει τὴν δύναμιν καὶ 
ἐπαναγωγὴν τοῦ βελτίστου ἐν ψυχῇ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἀρίστου ἐν τοῖς οὖσι θέαν, trans. Nightingale, with 
discussion 2004: 108-9).  
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but one chapter in its lengthy history. The philosophic theorist, then, acts at the interface between 
time and eternity, the personal and the transcendental.”94 In short, theoria, in conjunction with 
the τέχνη of dialectic, enables the human philosophos to attain a clearer “vision” of the eternal 
Forms, and to “return” to his own specific, temporal world with a better understanding of its 
nature and a more virtuous way of living in it.95 A Platonic bios philosophikos would thus be 
formed around the completion of a “roundtrip journey” to see those truths that are beyond its 
particularity and historical specificity, which nonetheless touch on its embodied life.    
 As we saw in Chapter 2, Cicero conceives of an approach to truth not as a transcendental 
journey, but in the finitude of human experience through doubt.96 It is undeniable, however, that 
there remains in his method a Platonic influence that connects dialectic, contemplation, and truth. 
For example, in his argument against Lucullus, the Ciceronian speaker describes what the three 
major divisions of philosophy mean for the Academic skeptic. In a formulation that recalls both 
the Stoic and Epicurean applications discussed above, Cicero argues that, for the Academic, 
contemplation is at the heart of physics and, therefore, stands at the beginning of all 
philosophical activity:  
 
94 Ibid.: 95.  
95 On this “return” to the earthly realm and to the city specifically, see esp. Rep. V-VII; cf. Nightingale 
2004: 123-38. As Nightingale argues, for Plato there is no real distinction between “active” and 
“contemplative” lives as there is for Aristotle. Rather, there is a contingent distinction, familiar also from 
treatments of Cicero’s own life, between political and philosophical lives, which interact with the 
relations of the world and the requirements of social organization in different ways. For an extensive 
argument that Cicero leads a philosophical life in this Platonic sense, conjoining speculation with virtuous 
civic engagement, see Altman 2016: 239-84.  
96 There is a further debate concerning interpretation of Plato’s dialogues themselves as to how 
“transcendental” we should understand Platonic truth to be and, furthermore, how “clear” or “direct” we 
should conceive of the philosopher’s vision of the Forms. For the purpose of clarity in my argument, I 
adopt a dogmatic perspective on Platonic theoria in order to draw out a distinction, but the continuities 
between Plato’s and Cicero’s conceptions of philosophical activity are clear throughout. On the more 
“skeptical” interpretations of Plato’s theoria, see esp. Nightingale 2004: 98-100, 105-7.  
 289 
Nec tamen istas quaestiones physicorum exterminandas puto. Est enim animorum 
ingeniorumque naturale quoddam quasi pabulum consideratio contemplatioque naturae. 
Erigimur, elatiores fieri videmur, humana despicimus, cogitantesque supera atque 
caelestia haec nostra ut exigua et minima contemnimus. Indagatio ipsa rerum cum 
maximarum tum etiam occultissimarum habet oblectationem. Si vero aliquid occurrit 
quod veri simile videatur, humanissima completur animus voluptate. Quaeret igitur haec 
et vester sapiens et hic noster, sed vester ut adsentiatur credat adfirmet, noster ut vereatur 
temere opinari praeclareque agi secum putet, si in eius modi rebus veri simile quod sit 
invenerit.  
 
And yet I don’t think that such physical investigations should be dismissed. The 
observation or contemplation of nature provides the natural food, so to speak, for our 
minds and intellects. We rise up, we seem uplifted, we look down on human affairs, and, 
by thinking about lofty and celestial matters, we scorn our own affairs as small and 
petty. The process of investigation into the greatest (if also most hidden) matters has its 
own delight; and if we come across something that strikes us as truth-like, our minds are 
suffused with a thoroughly human pleasure. So both your wise person and ours will 
investigate these questions, but yours to assent, believe, and affirm, ours with the fear of 
forming rash opinions and the thought that things are going wonderfully for him if he 
finds something truth-like in questions of this sort.97  
 
In the Academic mode as in the Stoic and Epicurean,98 contemplatio is associated explicitly with 
its pre-Aristotelian and pre-Socratic roots in the realm of natural science. The philosopher should 
commit himself to “the observation and contemplation of nature” (consideratio contemplatioque 
naturae), a combination of activities that we find in nearly identical form in Pythagoras’ fable 
(sic in vita longe omnibus studiis contemplationem rerum, cognitionemque praestare). Yet, 
through an explicit Platonic quotation, we can see the influence of the theoretical “journey” on 
Cicero’s skeptical activity: as the dedicated study of the physical world, contemplatio orients the 
gaze of the philosopher heavenward (cogitantesque supera atque caelestia), which allows him 
 
97 Luc. 127-8; trans. Brittain. 
98 In the comparison between these passages (Luc. 127-8, Tusc. 5.69, and de Fin. 1.63), note also the 
explicit relationship between physics and ethics. This relationship is here described as a process of 
sustenance and growth: observation of the natural world provides the “natural food, so to speak, for our 
minds and intellects” (animorum ingeniorumque naturale quoddam quasi pabulum). On this closeness of 
physics and ethics in Stoic theoria, see Graver 2012: 84-6.  
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“to look down on” the stuff of human life (humana despicimus…nostra ut exigua et minima 
contemnimus). Likewise, in Plato’s Phaedrus, through contemplation the incarnate soul recalls 
“those things which it once saw, when it journeyed with the god [before it was born], lifting up 
its vision to the things which are really real and disregarding those things which we now say are 
real” (ἀνάμνησις ἐκείνων ἅ ποτ᾽ εἶδεν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ συμπορευθεῖσα θεῷ καὶ ὑπεριδοῦσα ἃ νῦν 
εἶναί φαμεν, 249c). In Cicero’s translation of ὑπεριδοῦσα with despicimus to describe the 
vantage point of contemplation, he preserves an aspect of the transcendental detachment familiar 
from the Platonic narrative of theoria.99  
 The commitment to “the process of investigation” (indagatio) in this passage also extends 
a Platonic relationship between contemplatio and dialectic.100 Yet it is in the nature of skeptical 
dialectic that we confront the problem with simply ascribing “truth” as the aim of Cicero’s 
philosophical activity. The “investigation” of nature fulfills an irreducibly human desire to 
uncover “the greatest (if also most hidden) matters” (Indagatio ipsa rerum cum maximarum tum 
etiam occultissimarum habet oblectationem). Consequently, while simultaneously allowing the 
philosopher to “look down on” the human lot, contemplatio also connects him to a pleasure that 
is the most quintessentially human (humanissima…voluptate). This humanissima voluptas of the 
skeptical contemplatio is achieved, not through direct sight, but through a sense of proximity to 
truth (Si vero aliquid occurrit quod veri simile videatur, humanissima completur animus 
voluptate). Because of the process of skeptical dialectic, furthermore, this proximity will never 
be fixed or certain. While the Antiochean sage rashly assents to his perception and opinion 
(vester ut adsentiatur credat adfirmet), the skeptical sage, instead, fears assent and finds pleasure 
 
99 Cf. also Lucretius’ use of despicere in similar contexts, 2.9 and 4.18.  
100 On the word indagatio, see above, n.58.   
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simply in a sense that truth is not far away (noster ut vereatur temere opinari praeclareque agi 
secum putet, si in eius modi rebus veri simile quod sit invenerit). This fear of rash certainty and 
the deferral of “true” discovery in favor of what is veri simile complicates the question of any 
external endpoint which contemplation might seek to realize—to say nothing of a form of life 
structured around the ateleia of this combined form of investigation. “Assent” or “affirmation”—
the confirmation of truth—from an Antiochean perspective serves as a mark of successful 
consummation for philosophical activity; but, from the skeptical perspective, it is feared and 
perpetually deferred.  
 For the skeptic, the completion of philosophical activity is never certain and certainty is 
not the mark of success for the philosophical life. Since, for the skeptic, “nothing is able to be 
known” (sciri nihil possit, Luc. 74), the skeptical sage achieves the pleasure of contemplatio in 
his perseverance through the incompleteness of his inquiry—a form of failure according to the 
normative Antiochean perspective—oriented only by a sense of proximity to the ungraspable 
truth. Likewise, in Cicero’s formulation of the deferral of doubt, “we live from day to day…and 
so we alone are free” (nos in diem vivimus…itaque soli sumus liberi, Tusc. 5.33). The skeptic 
carries nothing from “day to day” except the deferral of uncertainty afforded by probabilitas.101 
This characterization of the relation between skeptical dialectic and contemplation complicates 
the assignment of a Platonic model of theoria to Cicero’s philosophical activity.102 If 
contemplatio takes the form of a deferral of seeing rather than the sight of truth itself, can we 
 
101 See Ch. 2, sections III-V.  
102 Indeed, there is an evident lack of a vocabulary of sight in this account of contemplatio in the Lucullus 
as opposed, e.g., to the Pythagorean fable with which it shares other similarities. The focus is rather on an 
empirical and proto-scientific mode of “inquiry” and “discovery” (Quaeret, invenerit)—processes that 
necessarily strive toward a felicitous outcome, even if it is only in the direction of verisimilitude. On the 
relationship between this articulation and the later Pyrrhonist interpretation of theoria, see Spinelli 2012.  
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consider truth to be the aim for the sake of which Cicero’s philosophical life is lived? It is telling 
in this regard that if we return to Cicero’s formulation of the philosophical life in the 
Pythagorean fable, we find a notable absence of any indication that truth is the end toward which 
the vision of the spectators is aimed.103 As discussed above, the mode of life of those who come 
to the market for the sake of seeing is contrasted to the other two forms of life by a lack of 
extrinsic mark that indicates the consummation of their activity. They are said simply to be 
“looking ardently upon what was happening and how” (studioseque perspicerent, quid ageretur 
et quo modo). The potentially endless iterability of these pronouns (quid…et quo modo), like 
Cicero’s mode of living “from day to day,” frees the philosophers from reaching a limit of their 
activity. The philosophers distinguish themselves in life only through the “study and 
contemplation of nature,” and “seek nothing for themselves” (spectare nihil sibi acquirentem).104 
 Cicero’s skeptical presentation of the philosopher’s activity both rejects the Aristotelian 
model that conjoins theoria with the consummation of life in happiness and complicates the 
Platonic model that envisions theoria as access to transcendental truth from within human time. 
In the place of these two modes of philosophical activity, Cicero emphasizes above all the 
ongoing process and development of observation, as one object of vision gives way to another 
over time. If this activity of philosophical “seeing” neither manifests an external goal nor is 
 
103 This absence is all the more notable because it is in direct contrast to the variant version of this fable 
found in Diogenes Laertius (see above, n.19), where the “moral” that Diogenes draws is that “servile men 
are born as hunters of fame or wealth, but philosophers are born as hunters of truth” (οἱ μὲν 
ἀνδραποδώδεις, ἔφη, φύονται δόξης καὶ πλεονεξίας θηραταί, οἱ δὲ φιλόσοφοι τῆς ἀληθείας). Rather than 
adopting this simple parallelism, Cicero avoids ascribing any external goal—even truth—to the 
philosophical activity that would mimic the aims of the other classes.  
104 We can perhaps understand this as the point at which Cicero’s skeptical presentation of the 
philosopher’s activity folds back on itself. Entelic energeia and atelic kinesis, like virtue and pleasure, 
always exist in dialectical relation to one another.  
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constituted by an entelic perfection, how can we understand its relation to the endlessly reiterable 
object of contemplation? In a passage from Tusculans 1, we find again the emphatically atelic 
and peculiarly disembodied function of looking with which Pythagoras identifies the 
philosophers at the market. In this context, the function is attributed to the deceased soul, which, 
after becoming separated from its body by death, rises up through the dense, moist atmosphere 
until it “comes to a stop and makes an end of ascending” (insistit et finem altius se efferendi 
facit) in a region of lightness and heat which mirrors the soul’s own nature.105 In this state of 
equilibrium, which comprises the “natural home” (naturalis…sedes) of souls, it exists in a 
wholeness and perfection (nulla re egens) that is unimaginable for earthly life: 
Cumque corporis facibus inflammari soleamus ad omnis fere cupiditates eoque magis 
incendi, quod iis aemulemur, qui ea habeant quae nos habere cupiamus, profecto beati 
erimus, cum corporibus relictis et cupiditatum et aemulationum erimus expertes; 
quodque nunc facimus, cum laxati curis sumus, ut spectare aliquid velimus et visere, id 
multo tum faciemus liberius totosque nos in contemplandis rebus perspiciendisque 
ponemus, propterea quod et natura inest in mentibus nostris insatiabilis quaedam 
cupiditas veri videndi et orae ipsae locorum illorum, quo pervenerimus, quo faciliorem 
nobis cognitionem rerum caelestium, eo maiorem cognoscendi cupiditatem dabant. haec 
enim pulchritudo etiam in terris ‘patritam’ illam et ‘avitam,’ ut ait Theophrastus, 
philosophiam cognitionis cupiditate incensam excitavit. praecipue vero fruentur ea, qui 
tum etiam, cum has terras incolentes circumfusi erant caligine, tamen acie mentis 
dispicere cupiebant.  
Etenim si nunc aliquid adsequi se putant, qui ostium Ponti viderunt et eas 
angustias, per quas penetravit ea quae est nominata  
Argo, quia Argivi in ea delecti viri  
Vecti petebant pellem inauratam arietis,  
aut ii qui Oceani freta illa viderunt, ‘Europam Libyamque rapax ubi dividit unda,’ quod 
tandem spectaculum fore putamus, cum totam terram contueri licebit eiusque cum situm, 
formam, circumscriptionem, tum et habitabiles regiones et rursum omni cultu propter 
vim frigoris aut caloris vacantis? nos enim ne nunc quidem oculis cernimus ea quae 
videmus.  
 
Since we usually are enflamed by the fires of the body toward nearly every desire and 
we burn even more because we envy those who have the things that we desire to have, 
 
105 Quam regionem cum superavit animus naturamque sui similem contigit et agnovit, iunctis ex anima 
tenui et ex ardore solis temperato ignibus insistit et finem altius se efferendi facit, Tusc. 1.43. With this 
whole passage, cf. Pl. Phd. 108e-114c.  
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certainly we will be happy when, with our bodies left behind, we will be free of desires 
and jealousies. As now we do, when we are unburdened of cares, we wish to look at 
something and to see, this we will do then much more freely and we will place our whole 
being in the contemplation and observation of things, because by nature there is in our 
minds a certain insatiable desire to see truth and the very borders of those places, to 
which we will have arrived, will grant us as much an easier consideration of celestial 
matters, as it will make our desire of considering greater. For even on earth this beauty 
first aroused that “fathers’ and grandfathers’” philosophy, as Theophrastus calls it, which 
was sparked by a desire of considering. And they will especially enjoy these things who 
even then, when they lived on earth besieged by darkness, nevertheless desired to look 
through it with the gaze of the mind.  
For now, if people think it is really something when they have seen the mouth of 
Pontus and the very narrows, through which that ship passed, which was named  
Argo, because on it chosen Argive men  
 sailed out in search of the ram’s golden fleece, 
or those, who have seen the straits of Ocean, “where the rapacious wave divides Europe 
and Libya,” what, in the end, do they think the spectacle will be, when it will be possible 
to gaze at once upon the whole earth, both its placement, shape, circumference, as well 
as its habitable zones and, elsewhere, those which are vacant of any cultivation because 
of the force of cold and heat? For we do not even now perceive with our eyes, those 
things which we see.106  
 
The posthumous journey of the soul crosses both the boundary of death and a subsequent 
physical limit that separates the earth from its “natural home.” Once the soul has “made an end” 
(finem…facit) to its heavenly journey and arrived on “the very borders of those places” (orae 
ipsae locorum illorum), it will have crossed the point of aporia that marks the end of life. Both 
Aristotle’s consummation of happiness (profecto beati erimus) and the Platonic vision of truth 
(veri videndi) are here situated beyond the limits of human life. Passing this ultimate limit 
enables the soul to attain a perfect and completely disembodied faculty of sight: since “we do not 
even now perceive with our eyes” (nos enim ne nunc quidem oculis cernimus)—with the 
corporeal organs of sight—but rather with the animus itself, after the animus has been freed from 
the corpus, what will be left is the pure function of seeing. The isolated, imperfect, and 
necessarily sequential sight-seeing of people who visit “the mouth of Pontus” or the “straits of 
 
106 Tusc. 1.44-46.  
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Ocean” will be replaced by a total and synoptic gaze that arises neither from the individual soul 
nor the object of gaze, but from the “insatiable desire of seeing truth” (insatiabilis quaedam 
cupiditas veri videndi).107 During life, corporeal desires and jealousies inflame the body and 
cause it to be always in motion, searching for satisfaction (Cumque corporis facibus inflammari 
soleamus ad omnis fere cupiditates eoque magis incendi, quod iis aemulemur, qui ea habeant 
quae nos habere cupiamus). This desire, on the contrary, because it arises from the animus and 
not the body, remains perfectly insatiable even, or especially, after death. Even as the soul attains 
a synoptic vision of the universe, its being is sustained by the perfect insatiability of its desire to 
see the truths that it is seeing. In fact, this loop of insatiable desire becomes the very condition of 
the soul’s posthumous existence, maintained in the physical equilibrium of the region and 
through the pleasure afforded by its spectrality—its ability to see all, without ever being seen.  
 By situating the consummation of happiness and the attainment of a truly synoptic vision 
beyond the ends of life, Cicero challenges both the eudaimonism of post-Aristotelian ethics and 
an understanding of the Platonic bios philosophikos as a journey from within life to see truth. In 
its place we find the philosopher’s life characterized as the earthly instantiation of a spectral 
haunting. By recognizing the similarities between the Pythagorean characterization of the 
philosopher as the one who comes to the market visendi causa and Cicero’s description of the 
 
107 Cicero develops this concept of an insatiabilis cupiditas of the mind elsewhere, cf., Tusc. 5.70 
(discussed below) and de Fin. 4.12, where an “insatiable pleasure” is afforded by the study of nature and 
from “observing things,” “when we are able to live honestly and freely devoid of all business” (inest in 
eadem explicatione naturae insatiabilis quaedam e cognoscendis rebus voluptas, in qua una, confectis 
rebus necessariis, vacui negotiis honeste ac liberaliter possimus vivere). This is a more classical 
formulation of contemplatio. The significance of Tusc. 1.44 is that this activity is transferred from vita to 
mors. On synopsis as the outcome of dialectic, see Pl. Rep. VII.537c and Phdr. 265d. 
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soul’s posthumous existence videndi cupiditate,108 we are confronted with the uncanny 
resemblance of the disembodied soul and the philosopher’s form of life. Indeed, as Cicero says, 
the souls of former philosophers will find the most enjoyment of all once they have attained the 
vision of the disembodied soul (praecipue vero fruentur ea, qui tum etiam, cum has terras 
incolentes circumfusi erant caligine, tamen acie mentis dispicere cupiebant).109 The one who 
desires to see truly in life enjoys the very unsatisfiability of the soul’s desire to see, which is 
realized fully only after death. If, therefore, for Aristotle the philosopher undertakes theoria for 
its own sake, thereby fulfilling the conditions of happiness from within a life and for Plato the 
journey of theoria is undertaken for the sake of returning to earthly life having glimpsed truth, 
for Cicero contemplatio is done for the sake of something that has not yet come to pass and may 
not ever occur during or after an individual’s own lifetime. At the same time, however, it is still 
done for that thing. 
 This vision of the world of the living ringed on all sides by the disembodied souls of the 
dead, whose only existence is a function of seeing, recalls the spectral experience that Cicero 
depicts in the Academy.110 In that experience of solitudo, Cicero and the other characters of de 
Finibus have the fleeting perception that their moment is being shared by the deceased remnants 
of the past. In the Tusculans, however, Cicero imagines how this sensation of a spectral haunting 
is produced by the intensity of the gaze with which the dead watch the world. In his work on 
 
108 In addition to the lexical similarities in the vocabulary of vision (e.g., spectare, visendi / videndi, 
perspicerent / perspiciendis etc.), cf. the use of caligo (5.6, 1.45) to describe the general incapacity of 
human perception on earth and Cicero’s mention of Theophrastus at 1.45 as the recipient of the “fathers’ 
and grandfathers’” philosophy (‘patritam’ illam et ‘avitam’)—i.e., pre-Socratic, “natural” philosophy, 
which Cicero associates also with Pythagoras.  
109 For the strong Platonic echoes of this sentiment, see esp. Phd. 67d and Tusc. 1.30-1 with Gould 1968: 
140.  
110 See above, Ch. 1, section III.  
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“hauntology,” Jacques Derrida describes the importance of sight for understanding the 
phenomena of haunting and proposes a temporality of the specter that is created by its 
disembodied sight.111 For Derrida, the specter is precisely the Thing that sees without being seen. 
A ghost achieves a total vision, without itself being an object of sight. He further connects this 
“spectral asymmetry” with a temporal anachrony: “This Thing meanwhile looks at us and sees us 
not see it even when it is there. A spectral asymmetry interrupts here all specularity. It de-
synchronizes, it recalls us to anachrony. We will call this the visor effect: we do not see who 
looks at us.”112  
 By means of this “visor” effect, Derrida frames the connection between observation and 
temporality. For the “Thing” looking on without being seen time is maintained in seamless 
continuity by the persistence of its gaze; it “sees us not see it even when it is there,” thereby 
maintaining a constancy of observation even when we, the objects of sight, are unaware of it. On 
the other hand, for those who are the object of sight, yet who cannot see the observer, there is a 
temporal anachrony latent in this asymmetry: any action that we take in the present will have 
been seen by the specter whether we perceive it or not, until that indeterminate point in the future 
when we will see it again. As in Cicero’s experience in the Academy, the sudden awareness of 
the presence of a specter produces in the experience of the living a profound sense of temporal 
unevenness and anachrony. The existence, therefore, in M.’s vision of the afterlife, of a 
 
111 See 1993: 10, “What is a ghost? What is the effectivity or the presence of a specter, that is, of what 
seems to remain as ineffective, virtual, insubstantial as a simulacrum?…Repetition and first time, but also 
repetition and last time, since the singularity of any first time makes of it also a last time. Each time it is 
the event itself, a first time is a last time. Altogether other. Staging for the end of history. Let us call it a 
hauntology. This logic of haunting would not be merely larger and more powerful than an ontology or a 
thinking of Being….It would harbor within itself…eschatology and teleology themselves” (emphasis 
orig.).  
112 1993: 6. 
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“universal” visor effect, wherein the souls of all the deceased circle the earth, watching 
synoptically without being seen, emphasizes the anachronous temporality of all earthly beings. 
By participating in the deferral of contemplatio during life, the philosopher adopts this anachrony 
as the temporality of his earthly existence, looking on events as constituted by the indeterminate 
future moment at which they will have been seen beyond the “visor.”  
 If, therefore, the consummation of the vita contemplativa is, in fact, a mors 
contemplativa, what can be said about any normative judgment, any telos—any consideration of 
success or failure—during life? Can the philosopher’s vita, which resembles death, ever be 
marked for success or failure? The universal visor effect that Cicero imagines separating the 
disembodied souls of the deceased and the living ensures the continuation of a total “spectral 
asymmetry” and a belated “anachrony.” If only the dead can see in any true sense of the word, 
the defining activity of the philosopher’s life is one of deferral, doubt, and ateleia—a dedication 
to and an adoption of the anachronous temporality of the dead from within life. This anachrony 
confounds the notion of a coherent, completable vita. Cicero’s treatment of the philosophical life 
and its activity of contemplatio thus provides us with an understanding of what it means to 
inhabit a condition of failure: to recognize the immanence of ateleia in the activity of 
observation and to structure a form of life around that immanence. In the philosophical 
productivity of this form of life, we should not see an imposition of “a form of success,” but a 
proliferation of the futures of failure.  
IV. The Failures of an Age 
 In Cicero’s letter to Aulus Torquatus, he envisions that his “life has already been lived” 
(vita iam acta) and he foresees nothing in the coming time but a death without sense (id sine ullo 
sensu futurum sit). Within the framework of the dialogues, the temporality of the vita that this 
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letter represents is elaborated in the philosophical narratives by which a life attains its potential 
for perfection in happiness or truth. The future orientation of this vita looks forward to the 
consummation of its finis, which, like Heidegger’s temporality of Dasein, is only authentic when 
it anticipates the coming-to-be of one’s ownmost “having been.” The future of the vita produces 
its past in a manner that circumscribes its relation to itself as the source of potentiality and 
futurity. As we have seen, however, Cicero interrogates the vita—and especially the 
philosopher’s vita—by emphasizing the profound ateleia of the philosopher’s characteristic 
activity. The endlessness of a life dedicated to observation has distinct implications for its 
temporality, reorienting its timeframe from the unfolding of the vita as an experience of 
consummation, to one constituted by its anachronous relationship to an indeterminate future 
beyond the boundary of vita / mors. Cicero’s philosophical life is lived not for the future of its 
own perfection, but for the sake of a future moment that its life may never, in fact, touch upon. In 
his skeptical treatment of the philosopher’s life, Cicero thus raises the possibility of a future for 
the aetas—for that accumulation or sedimentation of human time that is not subject to the ethical 
structuration of happiness or truth and narratives of fulfillment. The reorientation of the 
philosopher’s vita allows Cicero to more directly confront the future of the aetas and the failures 
that are produced by its heterogeneity.  
 We can understand Cicero’s approach to this heterogeneous future of the aetas by 
reconsidering the philosophical problem from which this dissertation began: how human 
experience intersects with change and transformation over time—the vis et mutatio omnium 
rerum atque temporum.113 In this section, I consider two distinct solutions to this question that 
arise in the Tusculans and in the final ethical dialogue that Cicero writes before Caesar’s death, 
 
113 See Intro., section I.  
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Cato Maior de Senectute (de Sen.). I first return to M.’s description of the philosophical 
education of the praestans vir in Tusc. 5 in order to explicate a “theoretical” relationship between 
past, present, and future as determined by the causal necessity of reason. In the ideal argument of 
the Tusculans, M. locates in contemplatio an ability to understand change and transformation 
over time from the perspective of divine logic—creating in the experience of the philosopher a 
symmetry between the eternal processes of nature and the unfolding of his own life. Second, and 
in contrast to this recognizably Stoic position, I consider the “genealogical” diachrony that is at 
work in de Sen. This later text shows a profound awareness of the breakdown in 
intergenerational time that accompanied the collapse of the Republic. In response to this 
breakdown, Cicero explores in this dialogue the constitutive indeterminacy of the future for the 
continuity between past and present. In de Sen., therefore, we find Cicero establishing the 
importance of the future for reconstituting the broken relationship between past and present. In 
doing so, Cicero’s philosophy works to liberate the aetas not only from the ethical structures of 
the vita but also from the deterministic continuity of causes that continuously “flow from eternity 
into eternity” (ab aeterno tempore fluentibus in aeternum, Tusc. 5.70).  
 As we have seen, Tusculans 5 is dedicated to M.’s argument in favor of the Stoic position 
that virtue alone is sufficient for happiness. As also discussed above, this ideal argument is best 
understood, both within the dialogue itself and across Cicero’s works, as a part of an ongoing 
process of inquiry into the ethical purpose and consummation of the vita. It is notable, therefore, 
that at the heart of M.’s narrative about the philosophical education of the praestans vir, we find 
contemplatio defined not only as the means by which the philosopher might understand the 
constitution of his own life, but, more fundamentally, how that life is related to universal 
sequences and continuities of time. Through contemplatio, M. contends, the philosophical pupil 
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can attain an understanding of origin, change, and structure in nature, which he likens to grasping 
Stoic notions of determinism and the reason of the “divine mind” (divina mens):114  
Haec tractanti animo et noctes et dies cogitanti exsistit illa a deo Delphis praecepta 
cognitio, ut ipsa se mens agnoscat coniunctamque cum divina mente se sentiat, ex quo 
insatiabili gaudio completur. Ipsa enim cogitatio de vi et natura deorum studium incendit 
illius aeternitatem imitandi, neque se in brevitate vitae collocatum putat, cum rerum 
causas alias ex aliis aptas et necessitate nexas videt, quibus ab aeterno tempore 
fluentibus in aeternum ratio tamen mensque moderatur. Haec ille intuens atque 
suspiciens vel potius omnes partes orasque circumspiciens quanta rursus animi 
tranquillitate humana et citeriora considerat! 
 
To the mind going over and considering these things night and day there comes an 
understanding of the precept from the god of Delphi, that the mind should know itself 
and feel how it is conjoined with the divine mind, from which realization it enjoys an 
insatiable joy. For consideration of the power and nature of the gods inflames a desire to 
imitate their immortality. He no longer thinks that he has been limited to the brevity of 
its lifespan, when he sees that the causes of things are fit together and bound by 
necessity, and their succession from eternity into eternity is governed by reason and 
mind. Gazing on these things and looking up or, rather, looking around at all the parts 
and regions, how with how much more tranquility does he turn back to consider the 
things that are human and close by!115 
 
By observing the order and sequence of the world constantly “night and day” (et noctes et dies), 
M. suggests, the praestans vir will arrive at an understanding of his own mind (ipsa se mens 
agnoscat) and how it is joined with the “divine mind” (coniunctamque cum divina mente). It is in 
this recognition of symmetry between particular and general that such contemplatio produces its 
characteristic “insatiable joy” (insatiabili gaudio) and allows the student to apply his 
understanding of nature to his own life and character.116 Furthermore, this symmetry, which 
 
114 This passage picks up where the argument left off above, pg. 276.  
115 5.70. The details of this passage regarding the Delphic injunction and the divine mind mark the 
difference between this and Cicero’s other presentations of the role of contemplatio for philosophy (cf. 
also de Nat. De. 2.91-132, Tusc. 1.62-70). See Douglas 1990 ad loc.  
116 Note that here, however, we find that the gaudium is insatiabile rather than a cupiditas insatiabilis. As 
“joy” rather than “desire,” gaudium avoids the problematic associations of “lack” and “absence” that 
maintains the postmortem souls in their spectral observation of the world.  
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produces an active drive to “imitate the immortality [of the gods]” (studium…illius aeternitatem 
imitandi),117 enables the vir to look beyond the “brevity of his own lifespan” (in brevitate vitae) 
to understand his own place not just within the determined sequence of cause and effect (rerum 
causas alias ex aliis aptas et necessitate nexas), but even in the succession “from eternity into 
eternity” (ab aeterno tempore…in aeternum). Thus, as in Tusc. 1.44, we find a close 
correspondence between a synoptic vision of the universe and a comprehension of the diachronic 
sequences that constitute the temporal flux within which a human lifetime arises. Yet, unlike in 
Tusc. 1, where this synopsis is accomplished only after death, thereby producing an asymmetry 
between these eternal sequences and human life, M. envisions here a sage who is able to 
overcome this spectral asymmetry and realize, through imitation within the confines of a human 
lifetime, the coherence between aetas and aeternitas.  
 At the climax of the ideal argument of the Tusculans, therefore, we find Cicero offering a 
solution to the philosophical problem that he proposes in his letter to Nigidius Figulus in the late 
fall of 46 BCE. Almost a year after he writes to Nigidius about the ineluctable “force and 
transformation of all experiences and times” (vis et mutatio omnium rerum atque temporum, ad 
Fam. IV.13[225].2-3) that has completely overturned his world—and just around the time that 
his friend dies, still in exile—we find Cicero articulating by means of an ideal philosophical 
argument that, through contemplatio, the praestans vir can attain a total understanding of “the 
change and transformation of one thing into another” (quaeque ex alio in aliud vicissitudo atque 
mutatio, Tusc. 5.69) according to the divine logic of causation. This power enables the 
philosophical student to conceive of his life as a consummate structure, not according to any 
 
117 On this drive to emulate eternity, cf. Pl. Tht. 176c and Luciani 2010: 380-88. For the idea of imitating 
god in Aristotle, see esp. Lear 2004: 72-92. Cf. Intro., section II for a discussion of Luciani’s reading of 
Cicero’s ethics which is based on this passage.  
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previous plans or desires he may have had but set and determined by the pattern of divine fate. 
And, even beyond this understanding of his own vita, such recognition also allows him to 
navigate the relationship between his particular experience and the eternal cycles of the universe 
“from eternity into eternity” (ab aeterno tempore fluentibus in aeternum). By recognizing the 
correspondence between eternity and human time, and acting upon this correspondence through 
imitation, M. argues that the tumult and disorderliness of human experience can be overcome. In 
its place, the experience of the sage will be one of cosmic order in accordance with causal 
consequentiality.  
 Yet it is important to remember that, as with Cicero’s lifelong inquiry into the 
attainability of happiness, this ideal argument is only one piece of an ongoing investigation into 
the relationship between diachrony and human experience. For Cicero, as he is writing in the late 
summer of 45, this theoretical explanation of consequentiality and the causal connections that it 
relies upon can only enhance the need for a philosophical account of the breakdown in 
diachronic sequences through which he is living. The ideal philosophical perspective of the 
Tusculans thus gives way to a renewed search for an explanation of the vis et mutatio omnium 
rerum atque temporum that more satisfactorily reflects Cicero’s experience. This evident turn in 
Cicero’s thought after the Tusculans, which looks to the aetas for a different understanding of 
futurity, may certainly be explained by his lack of Stoic wisdom. Cicero remained, after all, a 
“great holder of opinions” (ego vero ipse et magnus quidem sum opinator, Luc. 66) and so, 
perhaps, could never come to see that his life and his Republic were the best in the best of all 
possible worlds. Yet we might also understand his shift toward the future of the aetas following 
the Tusculans as an outcome, however partial, of his exhaustive skeptical treatment of the vita as 
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a way of understanding human time.118 If the vita is not a reliable source of happiness or truth, 
perhaps a new concept is needed to understand the human relation to time. Indeed, even viewed 
from the Stoic perspective of the infinite sequence of causes, there is no vita, but only aetas, 
flowing from “eternity into eternity” (ab aeternitate in aeternum), in a sequence that does not 
divide into segments; nor is the life of one man a separate whole from the whole of the 10,000 
year cycle of cosmic destruction and rebirth.119  
 Such a cosmic perspective, however, is also not conclusively forthcoming from Cicero in 
the last days of the Republic. Cicero sees the aetas not only as a way to think through the 
teleological problems of the vita, but also the diachronic and intergenerational failures of his 
historical moment. Cicero explicitly confronts this diachronic failure in de Sen., a short dialogue 
written in the months after the Tusculans and just prior to the renewed upheaval caused by 
Caesar’s assassination.120 Above all, this text is concerned with the features of the aetas as a 
distinct form of human temporality and the relevance of philosophy to “every time of life” (omne 
tempus aetatis). In terms of density, the word aetas appears much more frequently in de Sen. 
than in any of the other dialogues of 45-4 and is singled out in preference to the otherwise more 
 
118 On this shift, see, e.g., the incomplete de Universitate, discussed above Intro., section I. For the 
prominence of aetas in the post-Tusculan dialogues, see, e.g., de Nat. De. 1.6, 1.11, 1.51, 1.66, 1.81, 2.5, 
2.52, 2.64, 2.70, 3.11; on de Sen., see below; de Am. 4, 33, 69, 74, 87, 101, 104; de Div. 1.37, 2.5, 2.88, 
2.117, 2.141.  
119 On the Stoic theories of ekpurōsis and the indestructibility of the kosmos, see Long and Sedley 1987: 
i.274-79. For Cicero’s treatment of the Platonic “Great Year,” see esp. de Nat. De. 2.51; cf. Pl. Tim. 39d. 
Notably these issues of the relation between cosmic and human time are prominent in de Nat. De. and de 
Div., the major theological dialogues that Cicero began writing after Tusc. 5. The continuation of my 
project into these dialogues is a task for another time.  
120 On the dating see Cicero’s correspondence (ad Att. XIV.21[375]) from May 11 along with the list from 
Div. 2.3, which places de Sen. between de Nat. De. (autumn 45) and Div., which was itself completed 
partially before (bk. 1) and after (bk. 2) the Ides of March. De Sen., therefore, is likely the last of the 
dialogues from the period of Caesar’s dictatorship to be completed in full prior to the coup. For full 
consideration, see Powell 1988: 267-68. and Marinone 1997: 232, 235.  
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common vita.121 As a dialogue about “age” specifically rather than the ethical life generally, this 
focus is not surprising. The semantic play to which the dialogue subjects aetas, however, 
indicates that the prevalence of the word is not simply thematic, but philosophically productive. 
Cicero employs a broad range of meanings, often bringing contrastive uses to bear on one 
another in the same passage: for instance, in a series of exempla about Cyrus, Lucius Metellus, 
and Nestor, Cicero reuses the word to describe the final moment of life (extremo tempore 
aetatis), Cato’s stage of life (aetatique nostrae), and a “generation” of humanity (aetatem 
hominum).122 Taken together this semantic focus transforms the dialogue into an exploration of 
aetas as a distinct way of accessing human temporality and experience.  
 Furthermore, by putting the main speech of de Sen. into the mouth of the venerable 
Republican spokesman, Cato the Elder, Cicero casts into the past the fantasy of a “gentle and 
pleasant old age” (mollem etiam et iucundam senectutem, 2). The fantasy that this dialogue 
represents is made patently clear in the preface, which both negotiates the significance of Cato as 
a persona and the incongruity between the depiction of old age in the text with the current 
circumstances of Cicero’s life. To begin with, this dialogue marks the end of a string of works 
dedicated to Brutus and forms a diptych with de Amicitia,123 that are addressed to Atticus on 
topics specifically suited to their life-long friendship. This choice helps to emphasize the 
 
121 In de Sen. the rate of occurrence for aetas is 53/8500, whereas vita is 44/8500; cf. the Tusc. where the 
word aetas only appears 23x across all 5 books (approx. 42500 words total) but vita has roughly the same 
rate of occurrence as in de Sen. For a selection of the semantic range in de Sen., see for “a stage of life,” 
e.g., 5; for the “passage” of a lifetime, 4, 21, 33; for an inhabited “quality” of time, 6, 20, 40, 48; for the 
durative whole of a “lifetime,” 9, 62; for “age” specifically, 9, 38, 50; for the “moment” of death, 9, 30, 
50; for a “generation,” 31. 
122 De Sen. 30-31.  
123 De Am., however, was written following Caesar’s assassination. See Marinone 1997: 232-35 for 
dating. 
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importance of aetas for the work—both in the sense of the old “age” which they share, but also 
in the sense of a “generation” through which they have lived together. Additionally, unlike every 
other dialogue from this time, Cicero does not present the conversation contained therein as the 
transcription of a real encounter, but rather makes explicit the writerliness of his composition by 
discussing within the dialogue itself his selection of personae:124 “I have attributed this whole 
conversation not to Tithonus, like Aristo of Ceos—for there is too little authority in myth—but to 
the elder Marcus Cato so that the speech might have more authority.”125 Cicero’s emphasis on 
the “authority” (auctoritas) of Cato as a mouthpiece, as opposed to a mythological figure like 
Tithonus, stands out against his own contemporaneous warnings against accepting philosophical 
arguments on the auctoritas of their proponents.126 In this instance, however, Cicero looks to 
Cato for a particular form of authority, which cannot be found in his present, but exists only in 
the past.  
 The specific type of auctoritas for which Cicero looks to the figure of Cato is discussed 
explicitly within the dialogue itself.127 Cato is depicted in the text as enjoying an old age that 
 
124 In a way, this admission in the prologue is a continuation of the frequent discussions in the letters on 
the suitability of Cicero’s choice of personae; see e.g., Att. XIII.16, 19, 32 on the Academica (discussed 
above Ch. 2, section IV). It is interesting that in this case, Cicero chooses to reproduce this aspect of their 
correspondence publicly (assuming that their letters were not yet in circulation). Cf. also ad Quint. III.5.1.   
125 De Sen. 3, Omnem autem sermonem tribuimus non Tithono, ut Aristo Ceus, parum enim esset 
auctoritatis in fabula, sed M. Catoni, quo maiorem auctoritatem haberet oratio. On Cicero’s indebtedness 
and deviation from this named Greek source, see Powell 1988: 269-72.  
126 See, e.g., Tusc. 5.83 (discussed above) or de Nat. De. 1.10, “Those who want to know what I myself 
think on any particular question are being more curious than is necessary; for it is not the weight of 
authority so much as that of reason that should be looked for in an argument” (qui autem requirunt quid 
quaque de re ipsi sentiamus, curiosius id faciunt quam necesse est; non enim tam auctoritatis in 
disputando, quam rationis momenta quaerenda sunt).  
127 On Cicero’s long-standing relationship with Cato as a model whose auctoritas can in some way be 
stripped from the quality of his speech or thought, see esp. the discussion between “Marcus” and 
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combines a dedication to intellectual activity, agricultural pursuits, the pleasures of friendship 
with younger generations, and, significantly, continued relevance to the governance of the 
Roman state. As he does often in his speech, Cato offers a cultural explanation for the seemingly 
perfect old age that he inhabits by recalling the famous exemplum of Valerius Corvinus.128 Cato 
reminds his young interlocutors, 
Marcum quidem Valerium Corvinum accepimus ad centesimum annum perduxisse, cum 
esset acta iam aetate in agris eosque coleret, cuius inter primum et sextum consulatum 
sex et quadraginta anni interfuerunt. Ita quantum spatium aetatis maiores ad senectutis 
initium esse voluerunt, tantus illi cursus honorum fuit; atque huius extrema aetas beatior 
quam media, quod auctoritatis habebat plus, laboris minus. Apex est autem senectutis 
auctoritas. 
 
We are told that Marcus Valerius Corvinus lived until his hundredth year, and he 
continued, even after his prime of life was over, to work in his fields. There were forty-
six years between his first and sixth consulships. Thus as much span of life as our 
ancestors thought would reach up to the beginning of old age, so much was the time of 
his public career. But his final age was even happier than the middle, because he had 
more influence and his labor was less. The best thing in old age is indeed influence.129 
 
Corvinus functions for Cato, and for Cicero, as a consummate figure of the aetas. Not only did 
he live until his “hundredth year” (ad centesimum annum perduxisse), he spent all of those years 
actively working in his fields, even after his “prime of life was over” (acta iam aetate).130 In the 
public sphere, his career (cursus honorum) stretched over “as much span of life” (spatium 
aetatis) as Roman conventional wisdom—the “ancestors” (maiores)—assigned to the entirety of 
 
“Atticus” at Brut. 68 and 294. For a reading of Cicero’s assumption of Cato’s auctoritas as in competition 
with Cato the Younger’s own relation to his ancestor, see Craig 1986; Blom 2010: 155.  
128 On this exemplum, cf. Val. Max. 8.13.1 (a nearly verbatim quotation of Cicero’s version) and Pliny 
NH 7.157.  
129 De Sen. 60-61.  
130 Notice the shift in idiom from vita iam acta (ad Fam. VI.4, discussed above, section I) to acta iam 
aetate (on which, see Tusc. 1.94, discussed Intro., section III and Ch. 3, section III). Unlike Cicero’s vita 
in his letter to Torquatus, for Corvinus, even after his “prime” is over, there is still more aetas to live.  
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a life from birth to the onset of old age (ad senectutis initium).131 And, when arriving at the “final 
age” (extrema aetas), he found that it was “happier than the middle because he had more 
influence and his labor was less” (beatior quam media, quod auctoritatis habebat plus, laboris 
minus). His “influence” (auctoritas) was thus the apex of his old age in the metaphoric sense, 
attested only here in classical Latin, of a “crowning achievement,” a “summation” of his aetas—
an accumulation of time that is uniquely his, yet also the result of a culturally sanctioned and 
supported movement through the stages of life.132 In Cicero’s composition of Cato’s speech, 
therefore, Corvinus functions as the model of aetas to which his choice of persona aspires; the 
auctoritas of Cato’s aetas emulates the auctoritas of Corvinus’ aetas, which, in turn, is 
subtended by the assemblage of cultural practices and institutions that enabled them both to 
achieve such a perfect senectus.133  
 Cicero’s defensive comments about the suitability of his choice of Cato thus aim to lay 
claim to this type of “influence” or “authority” of the Republican past, while at the same time 
allowing him to free that auctoritas from the intellectual interests and rhetorical features of the 
historical Cato. He suggests to his audience, “If [Cato] should seem to debate more learnedly 
than he himself was accustomed to in his own books, let this be attributed to the Greek literature 
which it is well known he was consumed by in his old age” (qui si eruditius videbitur disputare 
quam consuevit ipse in suis libris, attribuito litteris Graecis, quarum constat eum perstudiosum 
 
131 Interestingly, the Roman notion that senectus begins at 46 was, at the time of Cato, due to the fact that 
this was the age of discharge from the army. By the time of Cicero’s composition, this bit of conventional 
wisdom had been calcified into an archaism; see Powell 1988: ad loc.  
132 An apex is originally “an olive-twig tied round with wool, placed in the cap of the flamines.” See 
Powell 1988: ad loc for the uniqueness of the metaphor.  
133 Cato goes on to discuss other prominent exempla of the auctoritas enjoyed in old age by Republican 
statesmen, e.g., Lucius Caecilius Metellus, Publius Crassus, Marcus Lepidus, as well as his frequent 
reference points: Paulus, Scipio Africanus, and Fabius Maximus (61).  
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fuisse in senectute, 3).134 The rich irony of this statement simultaneously brings the historical 
Cato into Cicero’s persona and emphasizes the temporal gap that separates them. While he urges 
his reader to suspend disbelief in Cato’s overly erudite speech (eruditius) because of the 
Censor’s famous zeal for Greek learning in his own old age,135 Cicero slyly employs the 
archaizing form of the “future” imperative (attribuito) precisely to make this appeal. This verb 
form is so common in Cato’s surviving writings136 that it is hard to miss this imitation of the 
antiquity of Cato’s expression and thought at the same time that Cicero is encouraging us to 
overlook it.137 Cicero confirms the uneasy meeting of past and present by asserting summarily 
just before launching into the dialogue, “Why should I say more? From now on the speech of 
 
134 See also a similar defense of the use of Republican authorities in philosophical dialogues at Luc. 5-7. 
Whereas Cicero’s concern over the suitability of his choice in that instance led him to completely revise 
his dialogue, however, in de Sen. he seems to relish in the ironic contrast that his selection of persona 
allows him. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that Cicero’s use of the comparative eruditius can also 
be interpreted to suggest that if Cato had lived longer in his dedication to Greek learning, he might have 
arrived at the level of erudition that Cicero affords him. Cicero is thus not “imposing” style and 
knowledge upon Cato, but rather “bringing him up” to a state of learning and eloquence that remains, at 
least within the fantasy world of the dialogue, part of the Censor’s own aetas.  
135 A common facet of Cicero’s characterization of Cato, which he also attributes to Cato the Younger, his 
grandson. See e.g., Brut. 63-69; cf. de Fin. 3.6-7. Cf. Plut. Cato 2. For the development of Cato as a 
persona throughout Cicero’s oeuvre, see Powell 1988: 19-22; Blom 2010: 154-58.  
136 As a representative passage, cf. de Ag. Cult. 8, stercilinum magnum stude ut habeas; stercus sedulo 
conserua: cum exportabis, purgato et comminuito: per autumnum euehito. circum oleas autumnitate 
ablaqueato et stercus addito. frondem populneam, ulmeam, querneam caedito per tempus: eam condito 
non peraridam, pabulum ouibus. item faenum cordum, sicilimenta de prato, ea arida condito. post 
imbrem autumnum, rapinam, pabulum lupinumque serito. By contrast, the form rarely appears in Cicero’s 
writing and only in specific contexts for elevated rhetorical effect (e.g., In Verr. 2.216), in quotation of 
legal language (e.g., In Verr. 2.143) or in his very early public speeches (e.g., Pro Sext. Rosc. 74, 93).  
137 The significance of this form in this context is severely downplayed by Powell 1988: ad loc., “The 
second person imperative in -to is slightly archaic, slightly formal and less peremptory than the ordinary 
imperative. It is traditionally called the ‘future imperative,’ and is often used, as here, when there is a 
dependent clause in the future tense, though it clearly has nothing to do with the future in form.” Powell 
offers one comparandum (de Or. 2.14, si cupidius factum existimas, Caesari attribues), which only helps 
to accentuate the peculiarity of the form’s appearance here. By contrast, I contend both that its connection 
to Cato’s style is foregrounded and that the futurity of the whole clause is significant.  
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Cato himself will lay out my whole opinion about old age” (sed quid opus est plura? Iam enim 
ipsius Catonis sermo explicabit nostram omnem de senectute sententiam). The future tense of 
this statement (attribuito, explicabit) embraces both the past speech of Cato himself (ipsius 
Catonis sermo) and Cicero’s present “whole opinion about old age” (omnem de senectute 
sententiam).  
 Yet this futurity belies the problem in Cicero’s adoption of Cato as a straightforward 
persona. Rather than simply being able to transmit the auctoritas of the past into the present, 
Cicero must acknowledge that he is unable, at the moment, to speak—with or without 
auctoritas—to his present. The dialogue, in fact, begins with the erasure of the present and its 
deferral into an undetermined moment in the future. After gesturing to Atticus’ “self-control” 
(moderationem animi tui) and “even temper” (aequitatem) ensured by his Epicureanism and 
gently teasing him for the “human feeling” (humanitatem) and “wisdom” (prudentiam) that he 
brought home from Athens along with his cognomen (non cognomen solum Athenis deportasse), 
the narrator worries, “nevertheless I suspect that you are sometimes disturbed quite seriously by 
these same circumstances which are troubling me” (Et tamen te suspicor eisdem rebus quibus me 
ipsum interdum gravius commoveri). Cicero, however, does not address his dialogue to these 
present circumstances: “A consolation for them is too immense a task and must be deferred until 
another time” (quarum consolatio et maior est et in aliud tempus differenda). This deferral of a 
“consolation” for the present into an undetermined future (in aliud tempus) complicates the 
underlying timeframe of the whole work. Cicero’s sententia concerning a venerable and 
successful old age that Cato’s sermo voices is conceived not as a remedy for the present moment, 
but as its deferral until the future moment at which the diachrony of intergenerational time will 
have been restored. Or, to put it differently, this indeterminate future moment provides the 
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conditions of possibility for the realization of a continuous meeting of past and present that 
Cicero’s dialogue can only imagine and render in a fictional form.  
 Thus, the temporal mechanism of this short dialogue is remarkably complex: written with 
an awareness of the failure of intergenerational time, it aims to activate the indeterminacy of the 
future in order to reconstitute the continuity between past and present. Within Cato’s speech, this 
mechanism of the dialogue is displayed in Cicero’s recurrent use of two different types of 
literary anachrony: first, as he is fond of doing throughout his dialogues,138 Cicero makes his 
characters betray the knowledge of hindsight from the time of composition as a foreshadowing 
from the dramatic time. For instance, when Laelius reassures Cato that both he and Scipio will be 
grateful to him for imparting his wisdom, he says, “Indeed, Cato, we will be most grateful to 
you—so long as I can still speak for Scipio—if, since we hope to become old men (at any rate 
we wish it), you will teach us very far in advance by what means we will most easily bear the 
burdens of age” (Atqui, Cato, gratissimum nobis, ut etiam pro Scipione pollicear, feceris, si, 
quoniam speramus, volumus quidem certe, senes fieri, multo ante a te didicerimus quibus 
facillime rationibus ingravescentem aetatem ferre possimus, 6). This seemingly innocuous 
statement of gratitude contains a prophetic reference to the “future.” The choice to put this 
statement in the mouth of Laelius, who specifically worries about speaking for Scipio (ut etiam 
pro Scipione pollicear), gestures to the discrepancy in their longevity: since Scipio will die 
before Laelius, there will be a point at which he will no longer be able to speak for his friend—
or, rather, as Cicero goes on to dramatize in de Amicitia,139 he will be left as the only one who 
 
138 E.g., his character’s “proleptic” references to Atticus’s cognomen at de Fin. 5.4, discussed above, Ch. 
1, section III.   
139 See esp. de Am. 5.  
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can speak for his friend. The convoluted syntax of the conditional protasis, si, quoniam 
speramus, volumus quidem certe, senes fieri,140 further foreshadows not only the historical 
Scipio’s untimely demise, but also Cicero’s own dramatization of Laelius’ old age, which will be 
lived without his friend.  
 In addition to this form of anachrony, which looks forward to a past future, Cato’s own 
speech is heavily laden with a rhetorical device that, on the surface, claims to establish 
genealogical continuities between the past and the dramatic present. These claims become 
anachronous when they are carried into the discontinuous and deferred present of the time of 
composition, bringing to the fore the breakdown of intergenerational time into which the 
dialogue is written. This rhetorical device is at its simplest a claim in the first-person speech of 
Cato to have lived with and known historical figures: for instance, when he claims to have 
“loved Quintus Fabius Maximus, the man who recovered Tarentum, like an age-mate, although 
he was old and I was young” (Ego Q. Maximum, eum qui Tarentum recepit, senem adulescens 
ita dilexi, ut aequalem) or when he refers to Ennius as “my friend” (noster familiaris, 10).141 
These claims of intimacy with prominent Romans of the “greatest generation” of the Republic—
the same type of generational intimacy (aequalis, familiaris) that Cicero and Atticus share—
while perhaps sanctioned by the historical Cato’s experience,142 in the world of the dialogue is 
used relentlessly to establish the continuity between the past and the dramatic present—a 
 
140 Cf. Powell 1988: ad loc., who characterizes Laelius’ lapsus as a “correction” which means that 
speramus is grammatically “forgotten.”  
141 On the historical relationship between Cato and Ennius, see Nep. Cato 1.4, who claims that Cato 
brought the poet from Sardinia to Rome. Ennius is invoked frequently in the dialogue; see 1, 14, 16, 50, 
73 for direct quotations.  
142 See Powell 1988: ad loc., “There is no reason to doubt the truth of Cicero’s idea that Cato as a young 
man attached himself to Fabius Maximus.”  
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continuity that is simultaneously ruptured by the deferral of the present moment of 
composition.143  
 These gestures of continuity can also be extended from Cato’s experience to those of 
Laelius and Scipio in increasingly complex genealogical figures. For example, after citing 
Ennius again, Cato urges Laelius and Scipio to recall their own connections of living memory to 
the poet: “You should both be able to recall him distinctly, for only 19 years after his death the 
present consuls, Titus Flaminius and Manius Acilius, were elected. He died only in the 
consulship of Caepio and Philippus (for the second time), when I, at 65, spoke in favor of the 
Voconian Law with a loud voice and strong lungs” (quem quidem probe meminisse potestis; 
anno enim undevicesimo post eius mortem hi consules, T. Flamininus et M’. Acilius, facti sunt; 
ille autem Caepione et Philippo iterum consulibus mortuus est, cum ego quinque et sexaginta 
annos natus legem Voconiam magna voce et bonis lateribus suasi, 14).144 This genealogical 
figure not only draws the memory of Ennius into the lives of the younger generation of Scipio 
and Laelius, but also establishes a correspondence between this intergenerational time and the 
chronology of the state. By making repeated reference to the consuls and to his own legislative 
activities, Cato emphasizes the interconnectedness of the time-keeping practices of the Republic 
and the diachronic continuity of its aristocracy. The seamless continuation of this temporal and 
 
143 The density of this figure—which we might call a “claim to living memory”—is indeed relentless: in 
addition to the examples discussed here, see e.g., 15, 16, 19, 21, 27-8, 29, 30, 32, 33, 34, etc.  
144 In another sense, this genealogical dating is important for the diachronic continuity for de Sen. because 
it is this particular death notice that allows modern scholars to establish precisely a dramatic date of 150 
BCE for the dialogue. See Powell 1988: 16-17 and ad loc.  
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political assemblage within the world of the dialogue stands in ironic contrast to the discontinuity 
and deferral of Cicero’s own present.145  
 These two forms of literary anachrony—the foreshadowing of a past future and the 
establishing of a discontinuous genealogical continuity—come together in a passage that Cato 
addresses to Scipio. This passage also demonstrates the importance that Cicero’s dialogue forges 
for the future as the constitutive timeframe for intergenerational diachrony. In opposition to 
“those who deny that old age can be spent in useful activity” (qui in re gerenda versari 
senectutem negant, 17), Cato compares the elder statesman to the pilot (gubernatorem) of a ship, 
whose usefulness comes not from “climbing the masts” (malos scandant) or “running along the 
gangways” (per foros cursent), tasks more suitable to younger sailors, but from his experience, 
authority, and judgment (consilio auctoritate sententia) with which he guides the ship.146 As an 
example of this utility of old age, Cato remarks on the pressure that he continues to exert on the 
Senate to destroy Carthage.147 At this moment he, pointedly, turns to Scipio:  
Quam palmam utinam di immortales, Scipio, tibi reservent, ut avi reliquias persequare, 
cuius a morte tertius hic et tricesimus annus est, sed memoriam illius viri omnes 
excipient anni consequentes. Anno ante me censorem mortuus est, novem annis post 
meum consulatum, cum consul iterum me consule creatus esset.  
 
How I hope that the immortal gods will preserve you, Scipio, so that you might follow in 
the footsteps of your grandfather! It has been thirty-three years since his death, but each 
 
145 The genealogical nature of this figure of continuity foregrounds not only the breakdown of 
intergenerational time due to Caesar’s dictatorship and his literal reconfiguration of chronology (see 
above n.8), but also points to Cicero’s own status as a novus homo, without direct ancestors to call his 
own within the Roman aristocracy. As Lydia Spielberg suggests, Cicero’s choice of Cato as his own 
direct persona may be the result of his attempt to create a lineage of orator-cum-philosophers for himself. 
On this thesis, see also Blom 2010: 35-59. On Cicero’s class status and his literary production more 
generally, see also Bishop 2019: esp. 17-26 and 259-300; for an interesting argument that ties Cicero’s 
class and literary endeavors to the size of his familia urbana, see Garland 1992.  
146 On this extended metaphor, which reappears throughout the dialogue, see Sjöblad 2009: 125-129.  
147 This passage is the earliest source for Cato’s famous hostility to Carthage; cf. [Livy] Periocha 48-49; 
Plut. Cato 26-27. On his demand Carthago delenda est, see Thurlemann 1974 and O’Gorman 2004.  
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of the following years will receive and pass on the memory of that man. He died the year 
before I was censor, nine years after I was consul, during which period in office he was 
elected consul for the second time.148   
 
This genealogical and chronological nexus demonstrates Cato’s interest in establishing the 
continuity between the figures of the past and the dramatic present. He marks the passage of time 
since the elder Scipio’s death (cuius a morte tertius hic et tricesimus annus est) and indicates the 
points of contiguity between their lives and careers (Anno ante me censorem mortuus est, novem 
annis post meum consulatum, cum consul iterum me consule creatus esset). The primary thrust of 
the comment, however, is to induce Scipio to recognize the potential continuities between his 
adoptive grandfather’s life and his own.149 Of course, Cicero’s readers know that Scipio will, in 
fact, be preserved “by the immortal gods” long enough to “follow in the footsteps of his 
grandfather” (di immortales, Scipio, tibi reservent, ut avi reliquias persequare), but from the 
internal time of the dialogue this is another example of ironical prolepsis.  
 What is slightly different about this example of the technique, which makes it relevant for 
thinking about Cicero’s conceptualization of intergenerational time as a whole, is that, unlike the 
example of Laelius’ foreshadowing of Scipio’s death, Scipio is here given agency over the 
continuity of diachrony. The accomplishments of Scipio the Elder are only “remains” or “relics” 
(reliquiae) of a former time—they have no necessary constituting force. It remains, therefore, up 
to Scipio to “follow in the footsteps” (persequare)150—to imitate, certainly, but also “to take up 
and beyond”—these remnants of a former time. We, of course, know that he did in fact do this; 
 
148 De Sen. 19. 
149 For Aemilianus Paulus’ adoption into the Scipiones, see Diod. 31.27. On Cato’s relationship to the 
younger Scipio’s biological and adoptive families, see Astin 1956; on the adoption from a cultural and 
religious perspective, see Rawson 1973.  
150 On sequi, see Ch. 2, section III.  
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yet, because of the ironical foreshadowing, Scipio the Younger’s actions are represented as 
occurring in the future. These future actions will establish the continuity between the relic of the 
past and the admonition of the present. As Cato puts it clearly in reference to the whole existence 
of a Republican tradition of memorialization, “each of the following years will receive and pass 
on the memory of that man” (sed memoriam illius viri omnes excipient anni consequentes). The 
future is the source of diachronic continuity promised by memoria. “Each of the following years” 
(omnes…anni consequentes) will be responsible for constituting and reconstituting the 
relationship between past and present.  
 If there is any hope, this passage indicates, for reestablishing the continuities that separate 
the time of the dialogue from the time of composition, Cicero must not look to the past but to the 
future. The genealogical continuity of the aetas at work in this text is thus counterposed to the 
theoretical consequentiality of Tusculans 5. The praestans vir, who, through a synoptic 
understanding of nature from within his vita, is able to conceive of diachrony as a chain of cause 
and effect flowing from past to present and into the future. In this way, the sage can comprehend 
the vicissitudo atque mutatio ex alio in aliud in human experience from the perspective of the 
divine mind and causal necessity. By contrast, in de Senectute Cicero works from the deferral 
and failure of the present in order to arrive at an understanding of diachrony that is produced, not 
by the logically determined relationship between past and present, but from the constitutive 
actions of the future. By deferring the present into an indeterminate future moment (in aliud 
tempus), Cicero’s dialogue envisions the future-past conditions under which he might be able to 
achieve the dignified old age that Cato represents—and the intergenerational continuities from 
which that aetas will have been constituted.  
V. The Future of an Age 
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 In this final section, I examine more closely the futurity that is at stake in de Senectute. 
This dialogue and its particular use of Cato as an authoritative figure presents two distinct 
conceptualizations of the future, which I will refer to as “paternity” and “fecundity.” On the one 
hand, drawing on traditional Roman forms of patrilineal inheritance, Cato, as we have already 
seen, envisions the continuity between the future and the past as one of paternity.151 The father 
creates in the son an identity of his traits, character, and goals, through which the son may realize 
the potentialities of the past from the future. Although the son may be empowered to act upon 
this identity, nevertheless, the constitutive power of the future lies in this paternal inheritance. 
On the other hand, in Cato’s discussion of agriculture and the human cultivation of the natural 
world we can locate another model of futurity that possesses commonalities with Levinas’ 
“fecundity.”152 Rather than being based in the reproduction of identity, this mode of reproduction 
 
151 On the culture of Roman paternity, see Flower 1996; Gunderson 2003: esp. 191-226; on maternal 
succession, see Crook 1986. On Levinas’ use of paternity as an initial step towards fecundity, see Levinas 
1991: 267, “Paternity remains a self-identification, but also a distinction within identification—a structure 
unforeseeable in formal logic. Hegel in the writings of his youth was able to say that the child is the 
parents, and in Weltalter Schelling was able for theological needs to deduce filiality from the identity of 
Being. Possession of the child by the father does not exhaust the meaning of the relationship that is 
accomplished in paternity, where the father discovers himself not only in the gestures of his son, but in 
his substance and his unicity. My child is a stranger (Isaiah 49), but a stranger who is not only mine, for 
he is me.” On this Levinasian understanding of paternity, which should not be taken to be the same as the 
Roman notion, see Oliver 2001.  
152 I am working with Levinas’ explication of these concepts from Time and Eternity, which undergo 
transformation in later works. For Levinas there is not an opposition between “paternity” and fecundity, 
but rather a transformative relationship; see, e.g., 1991: 268, “The relation with the child—that is, the 
relation with the other that is not a power, but fecundity—establishes relationship with the absolute 
future, or infinite time…In power the indetermination of the possible does not exclude the reiteration of 
the I, which in venturing toward this indeterminate future falls back on its feet, and, riveted to itself, 
acknowledges its transcendence to be merely illusory and its freedom to delineate but a fate. The diverse 
forms Proteus assumes do not liberate him from his identity. In fecundity the tedium of this repetition 
ceases; the I is other and young, yet the ipseity that ascribed to it its meaning and its orientation in being 
is not lost in this renouncement of self. Fecundity continues history without producing old age.”  
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partakes of the Other in order to liberate futurity from identity.153 As Levinas contends, fecundity 
“does not denote all that I can grasp—my possibilities; it denotes my future, which is not a future 
of the same—not a new avatar…And yet it is my adventure still, and consequently my future in a 
very new sense, despite the discontinuity.”154 Similarly, in Cato’s view of the farmer’s 
relationship to nature, the reproductive and generative processes of cultivation are both 
dependent on and discontinuous with the person of the cultivator. Understood philosophically, 
Cato’s farmer thus offers an alternative mode of relation to the future than the one offered by 
Roman paternity. After Brutus’ decision to “live up to his name,” we know very well which of 
these forms of futurity reestablished itself following Cicero’s composition of this dialogue. Yet it 
is important to consider the coexistence of these futures in a text written just before the events of 
March 44 altered, once again, Cicero’s perception of his present.  
 Cato’s injunction to the younger Scipio to follow in and overtake (persequare) the traces 
of his adoptive father participates in the conventional system of Republican patrimony in which 
individuals from the same family—often sharing the same names—are viewed socially as 
recurrences of a type.155 These Scaevolae, Pisones, Bruti, and Scipiones create a diachronous 
 
153 On alterity in Levinas’ philosophy of time, see Chanter 2001: esp. 58-60 on the feminine; Lin 2013: 
79-132 for intersubjective time. 
154 Cited above as epigraph.  
155 On the extraordinary power of this cultural phenomenon, see Plut. Brut. 9 who records that, prior to 
the assassination of Caesar, “Brutus was exhorted and incited to the undertaking by many arguments from 
his comrades, and by many utterances and writings from his fellow citizens. For instance, on the statue of 
his ancestor, the Brutus who overthrew the power of the kings, there was written: ‘O that we had thee 
now, Brutus!’ and ‘O that Brutus were alive!’ Besides, the praetorial tribunal of Brutus himself was daily 
found covered with such writings as these: ‘Brutus, art thou asleep?’ and ‘Thou art not really Brutus’” 
(Βροῦτον δὲ πολλοὶ μὲν λόγοι παρὰ τῶν συνήθων, πολλαῖς δὲ φήμαις καὶ γράμμασιν ἐξεκαλοῦντο καὶ 
παρώρμων ἐπὶ τὴν πρᾶξιν οἱ πολῖται. τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀνδριάντι τοῦ προπάτορος Βρούτου τοῦ καταλύσαντος 
τὴν τῶν βασιλέων ἀρχήν, ἐπέγραφον· “εἴθε νῦν ἦς, Βροῦτε,” καὶ “ὤφελε ζῆν Βροῦτος.” τὸ δ’ αὐτοῦ 
Βρούτου βῆμα στρατηγοῦντος εὑρίσκετο μεθ' ἡμέραν ἀνάπλεων γραμμάτων τοιούτων· “Βροῦτε 
καθεύδεις;” καί “Οὐκ εἶ Βροῦτος ἀληθῶς”; trans. Perrin). This belief was bound up with Roman ancestor 
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chain of repetition and variation through which the Roman aristocracy reproduced itself for 
generations. Cicero’s representation of this mode of traditional patrilineal inheritance in de 
Senectute helps to emphasize the importance of the future for establishing the continuity between 
present and past, thereby lending agency to future generations. Yet, as Cato repeatedly 
demonstrates, the ultimate importance of paternity lies in enabling and structuring the continuity 
of the chronology of the state through its familial lineages. Scipio should complete the task of 
Scipio because they are, with regard to the continuation of the state, diachronically distinct 
instantiations of the same life. Indeed, Scipio the Younger’s adopted status within the family 
from which he derives his name and purpose only accentuates this basis: the identification 
between father and son—or, rather, adoptive grandfather and grandson—is not based purely on 
biological relation, but on a similarity of character, which can be molded and shaped into the 
form required by the state.156  
 In order to explain how this type of futurity operates, Cato comments on the motivations 
of those who choose to fulfill their paternal identities. Cato contends, above all, that the 
fulfillment of an inherited identity and struggle on behalf of the paternal lineage is a way in 
 
worship, on which see the description of the funeral procession of imagines for Republican aristocratic 
families at Polyb. 6.53 with Flower 1996: 209-222. Polybius specifies that “when any illustrious member 
of the family dies, they carry these masks to the funeral, putting them on men whom they thought as like 
the originals as possible in height and other personal peculiarities. And these substitutes assume clothes 
according to the rank of the person represented…These representatives also ride themselves in chariots, 
while the fasces and axes, and all the other customary insignia of the particular offices, lead the way, 
according to the dignity of the rank in the state enjoyed by the deceased in his lifetime; and on arriving at 
the Rostra they all take their seats on ivory chairs in their order” (ἐπάν τε τῶν οἰκείων μεταλλάξῃ τις 
ἐπιφανής, ἄγουσιν εἰς τὴν ἐκφοράν, περιτιθέντες ὡς ὁμοιοτάτοις εἶναι δοκοῦσι κατά τε τὸ μέγεθος καὶ 
τὴν ἄλλην περικοπήν. οὗτοι δὲ προσαναλαμβάνουσιν ἐσθῆτας…αὐτοὶ μὲν οὖν ἐφ᾽ ἁρμάτων οὗτοι 
πορεύονται, ῥάβδοι δὲ καὶ πελέκεις καὶ τἄλλα τὰ ταῖς ἀρχαῖς εἰωθότα συμπαρακεῖσθαι προηγεῖται κατὰ 
τὴν ἀξίαν ἑκάστῳ τῆς γεγενημένης κατὰ τὸν βίον ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ προαγωγῆς, ὅταν δ᾽ ἐπὶ τοὺς ἐμβόλους 
ἔλθωσι, καθέζονται πάντες ἑξῆς ἐπὶ δίφρων ἐλεφαντίνων).  
156 See, e.g., Rawson 1973: 165, who describes how Scipio after adoption intentionally combined 
traditional aspects of both the Aemilii and Scipiones.  
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which the individual’s life can attain a relation of consequence with posterity through 
memorialization—a relation that can be summed up by the single word, gloria. Once again 
addressing Scipio, Cato explains the aim that is shared by all those participants in Rome’s 
paternal future: 
Nemo umquam mihi, Scipio, persuadebit aut patrem tuum Paulum, aut duos avos 
Paulum et Africanum, aut multos praestantes viros, quos enumerare non est necesse, 
tanta conatos quae ad posteritatis memoriam pertinerent, nisi animo cernerent 
posteritatem ad ipsos pertinere. Anne censes, ut de me ipse aliquid more senum glorier, 
me tantos labores diurnos nocturnosque domi militiaeque suscepturum fuisse, si eisdem 
finibus gloriam meam quibus vitam essem terminaturus? Nonne melius multo fuisset 
otiosam aetatem et quietam sine ullo labore et contentione traducere? 
 
No one will ever convince me, Scipio, that your father Paulus, or your two grandfathers 
Paulus and Africanus, or the many other outstanding men, whom it is not necessary to 
enumerate, would have attempted so many things which would matter to the memory of 
posterity, unless they perceived in their mind that posterity would matter to them. Or, do 
you think, if I might boast a bit in the manner of the old, that I would have undertaken so 
many struggles day and night at home and in foreign service, if I myself thought that my 
glory would share the same boundaries as my life? Would it not have been much better 
for me to have passed the time of my life in peaceful leisure without any struggle or 
effort?157 
 
Drawing Scipio’s attention to both his biological and adoptive lineages—the Pauli and the 
Scipiones—Cato summarizes the motivation of these and “the many other outstanding men” 
(multos praestantes viros) who have made up the paternal inheritance in which he now urges 
Scipio to take part. These men, he explains, never would have “attempted so many things which 
would matter to the memory of posterity, unless they perceived in their mind that posterity would 
matter to them” (tanta conatos quae ad posteritatis memoriam pertinerent, nisi animo cernerent 
posteritatem ad ipsos pertinere). In this echo of one of M.’s arguments for the immortality of the 
soul, Cato envisions participation in the paternal legacy of “posterity” (ad posteritatem 
memoriam) as a way of ensuring that that legacy will continue and extend to one’s own life 
 
157 De Sen. 82.  
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(posteritatem ad ipsos pertinere).158 The repeated verb pertinere describes both the character of 
the actions that qualify these men for the memorialization of later generations and the faithful 
maintenance of their legacy carried out by their future avatars, who will preserve this continuity 
with their predecessors.159  
 As Cato turns from Scipio’s future to the actions of his own life, the mask separating 
speaker and author seems to wear thin. Claiming to “boast in the manner of the old” (de me ipse 
aliquid more senum glorier), Cato poses a set of questions that apply equally to the historical 
moment of the old Censor and to Cicero’s current circumstances at the time of composition: “do 
you think…that I would have undertaken so many struggles day and night at home and in foreign 
service (tantos labores diurnos nocturnosque domi militiaeque), if I myself thought that my 
glory would share the same boundaries as my life (vita)? Would it not have been much better for 
me to have passed the time of my life in peaceful leisure without any struggle or effort?” In 
Cicero’s fantasy, the answer to these questions is foreclosed. There is no doubt for the character 
Cato, speaking at the dramatic date, that the consummation and perfection of the vita lies in the 
paternal future. Only by dedicating himself to the “struggles day and night at home and in 
foreign service,” will he partake of the memorialization and immortality—what he “boastingly” 
(glorier) refers to as his “glory” (gloriam meam)—promised by Rome’s paternal lineage.160 His 
certainty is so complete that he conceives of this immortality in a concrete and writerly form, 
 
158 Cf. esp. Tusc. 1.30-5 and 91 where Cicero uses similar phrasing, especially with the verb pertinere; 
and for the philosophical use of pertinere generally, see de Fin. 1.14, 2.83, 2.100; Tusc. 1.1, 24 etc. For a 
discussion of the relation between Cicero’s usage of this verb and the Epicurean symmetry arguments, see 
see Ch. 3, section III. 
159 This verb is used elsewhere in de Sen. only in Cato’s praise of the life of the farmer (24-25, discussed 
below; and 56).  
160 On Cicero and gloria, a topic to which he dedicated a now lost work in the summer of 44, see Sullivan 
1941, Habinek 2000: 267-277.  
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looking forward to his post-mortem existence in which he will see and live with not only 
Scipio’s and Laelius’ fathers, and all those others whom he has known, “but those also of whom 
I have heard and read and myself written about” (sed illos etiam, de quibus audivi et legi et ipse 
conscripsi, 83).161 Indeed, this afterlife, which exists somewhere between literary and literal 
immortality, is the future promised to a vita acta according to the mos maiorum—to have one’s 
identity enmeshed in a tradition of memorialization and resurrection in the characters and actions 
of posterity.  
 Yet, if we think about Cato’s questions posed, instead, by Cicero at the time of 
composition, the certainty of Cato’s belief in the afterlife of the gloria vitae is stripped away. In 
particular, this transposition of Cato’s words into the world of early 44 BCE reinvigorates the 
urgency of his seemingly disdainful query, “Would it not have been much better for me to have 
passed the time of my life (aetas) in peaceful leisure without any struggle or effort?” For Cato, 
there is no future for the aetas—that is, the time of life spent not according to the requirements 
of paternity, but in “leisure” and “relaxation” (otiosam aetatem et quietam sine ullo labore et 
contentione). For Cicero, however, who at this moment fears that he has been debarred from the 
future of the gloria vitae and whose present moment is failing to reproduce the continuity of 
paternal identity, the possibility of a future for the aetas opens up. The bivalence of these 
questions depending on the time at which the speaker asks them undermines Cato’s performance 
of certainty in the promises of paternity, and instead emphasizes the deferral of the present in 
which Cicero is writing.  
 The deferral through which de Senectute is written is thus essentially a crisis of paternity 
and the continuity of the gloria vitae. As Cicero’s frequent address to Brutus throughout his 
 
161 On this image of the afterlife as a gathering of ancestors and friends, see Pl. Apol. 41a; Tusc. 1.98.  
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dialogues foregrounds, the period of Caesar’s tyranny is one in which members of the ruling 
aristocracy struggled to find a way to fit into the roles that their names and family characters 
promised they would fulfill.162 The expulsion and death of the heirs of this tradition—several of 
whom are rendered in Cicero’s own dialogues: Cato the Younger, Torquatus, Piso—as a 
consequence of the civil war raises a serious question as to whether this paternity can still 
operate—whether the future of the old dynasties will continue to reconstitute the passage of the 
past into the present according to the memorialization so easily available to Cato at the dramatic 
time of the dialogue. Even in the world of the dialogue, this anxiety about identity and lineage is 
rendered succinctly by Cato’s repeated reference to the loss of his son.163 Considering the 
relationship between author and persona that Cicero forges with Cato, this recent loss of a child 
is certainly made to stand in for the death of Tullia, but can also be read from the time of 
composition as the recent death of Cato’s great-grandson or, more generally, the demise of so 
many aristocratic scions in the civil war—in short, the ruling class of the Republic itself.164  
 In light of this anxiety, it is notable that we can find in the de Senectute an alternate form 
of futurity or, what we might call more accurately with Levinas, “fecundity,” which relies not on 
the reproduction of identity but rather on the fecund proliferation of life after the model of the 
farmer. In keeping with Cicero’s depiction of Cato according to his literary interests,165 a 
 
162 See, e.g., Tusc. 1.88; see above, Ch. 3, n.91.  
163 See 68 and 84, where he is named; his marriage to the daughter of Lucius Paulus, Scipio’s biological 
father, is also hinted at in 15. This M. Cato died just before taking office as praetor in 152; cf. de Am. 9; 
Tusc. 3.70. 
164 On the identification of this death with Tullia, see Powell 1988: ad 68, “Cicero in writing this was no 
doubt thinking of his own recent loss of Tullia.” Exempla of fathers outliving their children are prominent 
in the dialogue, as they are in Tusc. via the Consolatio: see, de Sen. 12 and 35; Tusc. 3.70.  
165 Cicero has Cato quote from his own works at 62 and 75. See Powell 1988: ad 51, “It was not unnatural 
to make Cato the Elder thus speak in praise of an occupation which he clearly held in high esteem.”  
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substantial portion of de Senectute is devoted to farming, viticulture, animal husbandry, and the 
general human capacity for cultivation and care of the natural world. Of course, in Cicero’s 
hands these topics lack even the scant practical application that they may have had in Cato’s own 
treatises.166 Yet Cicero finds in Cato’s interest in the cultivation of nature a rich philosophical 
vein and metaphor for a particular kind of relationship to the future. In particular, this 
conceptualization of the future eschews the paternal model of gloria vitae that Cato elsewhere 
advocates and, instead, draws from the generative potential of the aetas—a proliferation of 
futures based not on the reproduction of identity, but on the cultivated effluence of 
heterogeneous life.  
 In his account of the pleasures that are still available to old age, Cato selects for special 
attention “the Roman farmers in the Sabine field, my neighbors and friends, who are hardly ever 
absent from their fields when there is important work to be done, such as sowing, harvesting, 
storing up the crops (possum nominare ex agro Sabino rusticos Romanos, vicinos et familiares 
meos, quibus absentibus numquam fere ulla in agro maiora opera fiunt, non serendis, non 
percipiendis, non condendis fructibus).167 In considering the unfailing attentions of these elderly 
farmers for their crops, Cato muses, 
Quamquam in aliis minus hoc mirum est—nemo est enim tam senex qui se annum non 
putet posse vivere—sed idem in eis elaborant, quae sciunt nihil ad se omnino pertinere:  
serit arbores, quae alteri saeclo prosint,  
ut ait Statius noster in Synephebis. Nec vero dubitat agricola, quamvis sit senex, 
quaerenti cui serat respondere, ‘dis immortalibus, qui me non accipere modo haec a 
maioribus voluerunt, sed etiam posteris prodere.’  
 
 
166 On Cicero’s application of agricultural terminology (“precisely correct”), see White 1970: 38; but cf. 
Finley 1981: 168-169. On the practical (or not) application of Cato’s de Agricultura, see Olson 1945, 
Reay 2005.  
167 De Sen. 24.  
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Although this is hardly surprising for those plantings [which they know will matter to 
them]168—for no one is so old that he does not think he can live another year—even still, 
they lavish the same care on those which they know will never matter directly to them at 
all:  
He plants trees to benefit another age,  
as our [Caecilius] Statius says in his “Young Comrades.” Nor will a farmer hesitate, 
even if he is old, to respond to the question, “for whom do you plant?”: “For the 
immortal gods, who have willed not only that I receive these from former generations, 
but also that they should benefit later ones.”169  
 
In the figure of the farmer, Cato identifies a philosophical relation to the future. The traditional 
wisdom of agriculture, summarized by the poetic line, “He plants trees to benefit another age” 
(serit arbores, quae alteri saeclo prosint),170 offers a strong model of futurity that is explicitly 
differentiated from paternity and the reproduction of identity.171 In contrast to Cato’s contention 
that Scipio’s ancestors—and all others who participate in the inheritance of paternity—acted in 
order to maintain their relevance to posterity and the relevance of posterity to them (ad 
posteritatis memoriam pertinerent…posteritatem ad ipsos pertinere), farmers care for plantings 
“which they know will never matter directly to them at all” (quae sciunt nihil ad se omnino 
pertinere).172 This essential feature of the farmer’s relation to the future affects their perception 
and sense of intergenerational time: unlike the Roman ancestors who act in order to embody 
posterity—to transform their own vitae according to the requirements of the state in exchange for 
 
168 On this grammatical prolepsis, see Douglas 1988: ad loc. and below n.172. 
169 de Sen. 24-5. 
170 This line is also cited at Tusc. 1.31; on the spelling and scansion of the fragment (Caec. Stat. com. 210 
Ribbeck), see Powell 1988: ad loc.  
171 Considering the comparison that my argument draws between this aspect of de Sen. and Levinas’ 
philosophy, it is important to note the comparanda from the Jewish tradition cited by Powell 1988: ad 
loc., esp., Midrash Rabbah on Leviticus 25.5, “an anecdote in which the Emperor Hadrian is surprised at 
a centenarian planting trees.”  
172 The grammatical prolepsis, in aliis…in eis elaborant quae sciunt…, accentuates the certainty of their 
knowledge that the trees they plant will have no personal benefit or bearing on them. 
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gloria—the farmer is here presented as a caretaker of the benefits of posterity, even given his 
certain knowledge (sciunt) that his actions as caretaker will not pertain to him at all (nihil ad se 
omnino pertinere).173  
 In order to emphasize this point, Cato envisions another scenario174 in which an old 
farmer is asked “for whom do you plant?” (quaerenti cui serat) to which the reply is, “For the 
immortal gods, who have willed not only that I receive these from former generations, but also 
that they should benefit later ones” (dis immortalibus, qui me non accipere modo haec a 
maioribus voluerunt, sed etiam posteris prodere). The “immortal gods” communicate the 
constitutive power of an indeterminate future onto the present of the farmer. Just as these 
nameless divinities “willed” that the farmer would receive the future benefit of the countless and 
diffuse actions of the past generations, so they maintain a continuity of benefit via the future of 
his own actions for the generations that come later. The farmer acts in the present without 
knowledge of the precise impact that his actions will have but trusts that, through the continuity 
promised by the “immortal gods,” they will have been beneficial to the future moment upon 
which they are ultimately bestowed. The nature of this benefit is emphatically not one of identity 
or paternity, but rather is imparted by these impersonal and naturalized divinities who maintain 
the futural continuity of the aetas through the heterogenous forms of life under cultivation.  
 
173 On this use of pertinere in relation to the farmer’s life, cf. 56, “My opinion, at any rate, is that no life 
can be happier [than the farmer’s] not only because of the duty performed, which benefits the entire 
human race, but because of the pleasure that I talked about before and the fulfillment and abundance of all 
the things which pertain to the sustenance of humans and the reverence of the gods” (Mea quidem 
sententia haud scio an nulla beatior possit esse, neque solum officio, quod hominum generi universo 
cultura agrorum est salutaris, sed et delectatione quam dixi, et saturitate copiaque rerum omnium, quae 
ad victum hominum, ad cultum etiam deorum pertinent…).  
174 The connection is not made clear, but it is possible this exchange is drawn from the same play 
Synephebi by Caecilius Statius; this play is also cited at de Fin. 1.4 and de Nat. De. 1.13.  
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 In the farmer, therefore, Cicero/Cato locates an alternative mode of relation with the 
future that is based not on paternal glory or the possibilities of the vita, but on the cultivation of 
the benefits of the aetas. As also indicated in Levinas’ notion of fecundity, however, even in this 
discontinuous relation to the future there remains a strand of continuity: as Levinas says, even 
without the “residue of identity,” the future is “my adventure still, and consequently my future in 
a very new sense, despite the discontinuity.” Cato’s lengthy excursus on the “art of cultivation” 
(ars agricolarum, 52)175 offers a view of the farmer’s responsibility for and continuity with the 
benefits of posterity. In this centerpiece of Cato’s speech, Cicero incorporates many obscure and 
technical words, gathered in part from Cato’s own writings on agriculture, which creates a 
literary locus that mirrors the actions of the farmer. In this pairing of agriculture and literature, I 
suggest, Cicero envisions his art as a writer as sharing a similar relation to the future as the art of 
the farmer: the cultivation and preservation of the heterogenous futures of the aetas.  
 In contrast to an identity-based paternity, a fecund relation to the future critically involves 
an interaction with the Other—not simply a reproduction of the Same. In the case of Cato’s 
farmer, this Other is represented by the earth. Cato expounds first on the “pleasures of the 
farmer” (voluptates agricolarum, 51), which he claims are not impinged at all by old age (nec 
ulla impediuntur senectute) and are “well-suited” or even “very similar to the life of a wise man” 
(ad sapientis vitam proxime videntur accedere). After defending the character of the pleasures 
garnered from a life of cultivation, Cato embarks on a sensuous depiction of agricultural 
generation, which is framed by a banking metaphor: 
Habent enim rationem cum terra, quae numquam recusat impendium176 nec umquam sine 
usura reddit quod accepit, sed alias minore, plerumque maiore cum fenore; quamquam 
 
175 This excursus is the longest sustained topic in the speech: 51-60.  
176 Impendium coni. Manutius for mss. imperium.  
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me quidem non fructus modo, sed etiam ipsius terrae vis ac natura delectat. Quae cum 
gremio mollito ac subacto sparsum semen excepit, primum id occaecatum cohibet, ex quo 
occatio quae hoc efficit nominata est; deinde tepefactum vapore et compressu suo 
diffundit et elicit herbescentem ex eo viriditatem, quae nixa fibris stirpium sensim 
adolescit culmoque erecta geniculato vaginis iam quasi pubescens includitur. 
[The pleasures of agriculture] keep their account with the earth, who never refuses a 
deposit, nor does she ever return the principal without interest accrued, whether at a low 
or a high percent. But I don’t just enjoy the fruits, but also the power and nature of the 
very earth. She takes the scattered seed in her softened and fertilized belly and at first 
keeps it hidden (from this act of hiding we get our word for “harrowing”). Then she 
cradles the seed made warm by her moisture and enlarges it and draws from it a green 
stalk, which, supported by the fibers of its roots bit by bit grows until it now, as if 
reaching maturity, stands erect in its jointed stalk and is enclosed by its sheath.177 
Through his personification of the earth as a banker who “never refuses a deposit” (numquam 
recusat impendium) and gives a fair rate of return, Cato emphasizes the productivity of the 
farmer’s interaction with nature. The necessary human activity required to ensure generation is 
evident in the passive participles mollito ac subacto…sparsum. The metaphoric connotation of 
these actions used to describe the preparation of the earth’s “belly” or “womb” (gremio) range 
from the sensual to the violent: with mollire, to “soften” or “restrain,” often being used by Cicero 
to describe the pleasing or calming (or effeminizing) effects of voices and gestures, but subigere, 
in combination with the overt feminization of gremium, striking a stronger image of agriculture 
as a kind of masculine subjugation.178 Yet this initial assertion of human action or even an 
attempt to “subdue” feminized nature is insufficient for the gestation and birth of new life. 
Indeed, Cato says that what he takes pleasure in is not simply the “profits” or “fruits” (fructus)—
 
177 De Sen. 51. 
178 On the phrase gremium terrae, see TLL 6.2.2321-23; for the full personification of Mother Earth to 
which this image refers, cf. Pl. Menex. 238a, Lucr. 1.250-51, Cic. de Nat. De. 2.83, Verg. Georg. 2.325-
26, etc. For Cicero’s use of mollire, see, e.g., de Leg. 2.38 and, esp. in reference to “calming” the [waves 
of] the sea, de Or. 3.161-67. For subigere, see Powell 1988: ad loc, “subigere is the normal agriculture 
term for making the ground suitable for cultivation…Here, however, the conjunction with gremio is 
striking, and suggests a more definite image of the earth as female.” 
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those aspects of nature in which the actions of humanity are most immediately “invested”—but 
in the “power and nature of earth herself” (ipsius terrae vis ac natura). This “power and nature” 
exists independent of humanity’s intervention and, in fact, even provides humans with some of 
its agricultural forms and functions: Cato proposes an etymological relation between nature’s 
“hiding” of the seed (semen…occaecatum) with the name and practice of “harrowing” 
(occatio).179 In the end, it is the natural process caused by moisture and heat that brings the stalk 
of grain “as if reaching maturity” (quasi pubescens) to fruition. Cato thus presents agriculture as 
a mode of reproduction that relies on the independent and native powers of the earth—a dynamic 
Other into which the farmer must enter into a mutual relation in order to partake in the growth of 
life and generation of the future.  
 Cato maintains this relationship between cultivator and nature even in the more labor 
intensive forms of agriculture, such as viticulture, arboriculture, husbandry, and apiculture.180 He 
envisions these agricultural practices, even when they are as invasive as splicing, grafting, or 
pruning, to be a way of relating to generation and the future through the careful propagation of 
heterogenous, discontinuous forms of life.181 These forms of life may carry into the future the 
 
179On this “fanciful” figura etymologica, see Powell 1988: ad loc.; cf. Varro RR. 1.31. On the use of 
technical agricultural vocabulary, see below.  
180 On these specialized techniques, see 52-54.  
181 See, e.g., 52, “The vine which by nature is crestfallen and, unless it is propped up, is carried to the 
earth, will raise itself by its hand-like tendrils and embrace whatever supports it has. And, as it is twining 
its way with its meandering and twisting course, the skill of the farmers, by trimming it with a knife, will 
check it so that its shoots do not become woody and so that it does not spread out all its parts too far” 
(Vitis quidem quae natura caduca est et, nisi fulta est, fertur ad terram, eadem, ut se erigat, claviculis 
suis quasi manibus quidquid est nacta complectitur, quam serpentem multiplici lapsu et erratico, ferro 
amputans coercet ars agricolarum, ne silvescat sarmentis et in omnes partes nimia fundatur). In this 
image it is hard to tell exactly where the vine ends and the farmer begins: the vine’s tendrils are “like 
hands” (quasi manibus), which then become the impersonal “skill of the farmers” (ars agricolarum) that 
trim back the wandering tendrils. The vine also verges on becoming other plant and animal forms of life 
 
 330 
benefit of the farmer’s skill, as the viticulturist’s care for a vine might improve the taste of its 
grapes, yet the farmer acts not out of a delight in the self-interested usefulness of his craft 
(utilitas), but in the pleasure of cultivation and nature herself (cultura et natura ipsa).182 Thus the 
farmer’s relation to the future is at every point opposed to the paternity of the mos maiorum: any 
continuity that exists for the farmer himself lies not in the preservation of his identity via the 
eternal glory of his actions, but in the anonymous benefits that his skillful care will have 
bestowed upon the heterogeneous forms of life under his cultivation. In these discontinuous and 
branching futures, the farmer partakes in fecundity for which he bears responsibility, even if the 
realization of its potentialities will in no way pertain to him.  
 As we see in his word choice and etymological interest, Cicero’s composition of Cato’s 
speech on agriculture is intensively literary. Not only does he incorporate technical and specific 
vocabulary (e.g., occatio, malleolus, viviradices, repastinationes), which transforms this speech 
into a locus of Roman agricultural writing, especially in dialogue with Cato’s own work and the 
contemporaneous treatise by Varro,183 Cicero makes explicit the connection between agriculture 
and the Greek literary tradition. Cato cheekily jokes that, although the “learned Hesiod” wrote on 
agricultural topics, the Greek poet never bothered to write about manure—unlike Cato 
himself.184 He praises Homer for extolling the peaceful and consoling virtues of farm life in the 
 
(serpentem…silvescat) in a proliferation of future life. Cf. the continuity between vines and humans at de 
Fin. 5.39; see above, Ch. 1, n.117. 
182 53, Cuius quidem non utilitas me solum, ut ante dixi, sed etiam cultura et natura ipsa delectat: 
adminiculorum ordines, capitum iugatio, religatio et propagatio vitium, sarmentorum ea, quam dixi, 
aliorum amputatio, aliorum immissio.  
183 On agricultural writing as a tradition and locus of debate over Roman identity, see Reay 2005; Spencer 
2010; Doody 2017.  
184 54, Quid de utilitate loquar stercorandi? Dixi in eo libro…De qua doctus Hesiodus ne verbum quidem 
fecit, cum de cultura agri scriberet.  
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depiction of Laertes and singles out Xenophon as a writer who treats agricultural topics with the 
respect and elaboration they deserve.185 Through this intensive literary treatment of agriculture, 
Cicero, calling again on the auctoritas of Cato as his predecessor in Roman letters, proposes a 
similarity between the farmer’s and the writer’s relations to the future. Just as the farmer acts not 
out of the expectation of gloria or the fulfillment of paternal identity, but in order to convey 
benefit to the future by means of his cultivation of heterogeneous forms of life, so the writer 
should approach his texts not as the instantiation of his identity—the reproduction of the Same—
but as a conduit of benefit through which the future will be able to determine its own continuity 
to the past. In Cato’s farmer, therefore, we can glimpse another mode in which Cicero hoped his 
writings would create his legacy—not as a recuperation of the glory that he failed to gain as a 
statesman, but as the product of a fecund and unknowable future from which the failures of his 
present could be, finally, redeemed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
185 See, e.g., his quotation of a story told by Xenophon’s Socrates about Cyrus the younger (cf. Oecon. 
4.20-25): when Cyrus, a “Persian king, outstanding in intelligence and the glory of rule” (Persarum 
regem, praestantem ingenio atque imperi gloria), was asked by a visiting Spartan, Lysander, who had 
planted the trees that he had been admiring for their height (proceritates) and “quincunx” orderliness 
(directos in quincuncem ordines), Cyrus replied, “But I planned all of this. These are my rows, my 
arrangement. Many of these very trees were planted with my own hand” (atqui ego ista sum omnia 
dimensus, mei sunt ordines, mea discriptio; multae etiam istarum arborum mea manu sunt satae, 59). 
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Conclusion 
 
 As Cicero inadvertently crossed another boundary in the time of his life, the assassination 
of Caesar caused, yet again, his thought to shift. The distance between Cicero’s state of mind 
before and after the Ides of March can be observed readily in the letters that he writes to Atticus 
following the event, which blend shock and hope with a baseline of resignation: “But let all the 
consequences fall on our heads, the Ides of March are our consolation. Our heroes achieved all 
that lay with themselves most gloriously and magnificently. What is left to do requires men and 
money, and we have none. So much from me to you” (Sed omnia licet concurrant, Idus Martiae 
consolantur. Nostri autem ἥρωες, quod per ipsos confici potuit, gloriosissime et 
magnificentissime confecerunt; reliquae res opes et copias desiderant, quas nullas habemus. 
haec ego ad te, Att. XIV.4[358]). With the “consolation” (consolantur) of the Ides and the gloria 
of the “heroes” affirmed (gloriosissime et magnificentissime), Cicero turns to face “all the 
consequences” (omnia) with a renewed faith in the political project of his life—despite his lack 
of “men and money” (opes et copias). Yet, within the philosophical writings that Cicero 
continued to produce in the final months of his life, threads of continuity remain. In the opening 
of the third book of de Officiis—the last of his philosophica written before his own brutal 
murder—Cicero returns to consider solitudo, perhaps not as a substitute for aristocratic otium, 
but still as its supplement: in his discussion of Scipio Africanus, who was “never less alone than 
when he was alone” (nec minus solum, quam cum solus esset, 3.1), solitudo comes to offer an 
alternative configuration to the opposition between public and private life that will always be 
accessible to those who are dedicated to study, literature, and philosophy.  
 As I have argued, Cicero’s philosophy written during Caesar’s dictatorship can be 
understood generally as an “ethics of time” or, better, and an “ethics of the times.” But what 
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happens when those times, once again, change? How much of the fecund relationship to the 
future that is envisioned in de Senectute remains in the paternalistic address of de Officiis? What 
function can the melancholic grief of the Tusculans serve in the triumphant (and lost) de Gloria? 
The answer to these questions will, of course, depend on how we approach these texts. This, after 
all, is the one point that subtends Cicero’s philosophical writings at every turn: it is up to us what 
to make of them. If we accept the vis et mutatio omnium rerum atque temporum as the stuff of 
philosophy, then philosophy is a tool for confronting and investigating the obscurity and deferral 
that haunts human experience at all times. Such inquiry is useful even, or especially, when its 
outcome is inconclusive, and we are compelled by “the times” to return to the starting point.  
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